THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
FRANK  J.  KLINGBERG 


Digitized  by  tlie  Internet  Arcliive 

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Some  Opinions  of 

The   Great   Illusion 

By  Norman  Angell 

$100 

Who  will  "win"  in  the  present  war?  Who  will  "lose"?  And  just 
trAo/ will  they  win  and  lose?  Will  Germany  be  "destroyed"?  Will 
England  be  "wiped  out"?  Will  any  of  the  countries  "lose  their 
colonies"?     And  if  so,  how  much  actual  loss  will  it  involve? 

"  These  questions  were  all  answered  about  four  years  ago  in  a  way 
that  made  the  answerer,  Norman  Angell,  immediately  famous. 
To-day,  by  virtue  of  those  answers,  he  is,  in  the  minds  of  thousands 
of  very  keen  thinkers,  a  towering  figure  in  international  affairs." — The 
World,  New  York,  September  13,  1914. 

"Among  the  masses  of  printed  books,  there  are  a  few  that  may  be 
counted  as  acts,  not  books.  The  Conirat  Social  was  indisputably 
one;  and  I  venture  to  suggest  to  you  that  a  book  published  in  late 
years.  The  Great  Illusion,  by  Norman  Angell,  is  another.  .  .  . 
The  thesis  of  Galileo  was  not  more  diametrically  opposed  to  current 
ideas  than  that  of  Norman  Angell.  Yet  it  had  in  the  end  a  certain 
measure  of  success.  ...  It  is  impossible  to  resist  the  conviction  that 
this  young  thinker  has  opened  a  new  chapter  for  us  in  the  history  of 
our  modern  world." — Viscount  Esher  in  a  Lecture  at  the  Sorbonne, 
Paris,  March  27,  1914. 

"M.  Norman  Angell  a  exprimd  dans  son  Hvre  si  bien  raisonnd  des 
pens6es  sur  lesquelles  on  ne  saurait  assez  r6flechir." — M.  Anatole 
France,  English  Review. 

"The  book,  being  read,  does  not  simply  satisfy  curiosity;  it  dis- 
turbs and  amazes.  It  is  not,  as  one  would  expect,  a  striking  expres- 
sion of  some  familiar  objections  to  war.  It  is  instead — it  appears 
to  be — a  new  contribution  to  thought,  a  revolutionary  work  of  the 
first  importance,  a  complete  shattering  of  conventional  ideas  about 
international  politics;  something  corresponding  to  the  epoch-making 
Origin  of  Species  in  the  realm  of  biology." — The  Evening  Post, 
Chicago  (Mr.  Floyd  Dell),  February  17,  191 1. 

"Mr.  Angell  has  a  mind  like  an  edged  blade,  but  he  uses  it  like  a 
scientist,  and  not  like  a  crusader.  He  is  not  a  propagandist,  he  is 
an  elucidator.  His  book  is  not  a  plea,  it  is  a  demonstration." — 
Everybody's  Magazine. 

"An  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  history  of  the  forces  that  have 
shaped  and  are  shaping  our  social  development  that  throws  more 
light  upon  the  meaning  and  the  probable  outcome  of  the  so-called 
'war  upon  war'  than  all  that  has  been  written  and  published  upon 
both  sides  put  together.  The  incontrovertible  service  that  Mr. 
Angell  has  rendered  us  in  The  Great  Illusion  is  to  have  introduced 
intellectual  order  into  an  emotional  chaos." — Life  (New  York). 

"The  conception  is  undoubtedly  based  on  sound  economic  premis- 
ses, and  should  be  brought  home  to  the  minds  of  our  generatioii. 
The  author's  logical  dissection  of  Chauvinism,  its  absurdi- 
ties and  contradictions,  is  merciless.  ...  It  demonstrates  the  author 
to  be  an  extraordinarily  competent  sociologist  and  economist." — 
Der  Tag  (Berlin). 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


America 

and 

The  New  World-State 

A  Plea  for  American  Leadership  in 
International  Organization 


By 

Norman   Angell 

Author  of  "The  Great  Illusion,"  "Arms  and  Industry,"  etc. 


• 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and   London 

Zbc  tinUhcvboc\{Ct  ptces 

1915 


Copyright,  1915 

BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 


Zht  Itnfclierbocher  pteea,  Hew  Ifforfc 


College 
Library 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  published  in  the  hope  that  it 
may  contribute,  in  however  small  measure, 
to  forming  on  the  part  of  the  American  people 
that  "Will"  (without  which  no  "way"  can  be 
devised)  to  take  the  leadership  in  the  civilization 
of  Christendom,  for  which  its  situation  and  the 
happy  circumstances  of  its  history  furnish  so  good 
an  opportunity. 

The  leadership  here  contemplated  is  of  a  new 
kind:  it  is  not  military,  it  is  not  imposed  upon 
unwilling  peoples,  but  it  would  be  leadership  none 
the  less;  and  if  the  American  people  can  but 
achieve  the  inspiration  and  form  this  Will,  it 
would  mark  a  chapter  in  the  history  of  human 
society  as  important  as  the  invention  of  printing, 
the  Reformation,  or  the  discoveries  of  Columbus. 

I  trust  that  this  earnest  of  what  I  am  hoping 
for  America  may  protect  me  from  any  possibility 
of  the  reader's  misunderstanding  two  chapters: 
"A  Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism,"  and 
"Anglophobia  and  other  Aberrations."  For  if 
this  mission  of  America  is  to  be  fulfilled,  American 
patriotism  must  be  purged  of  some  of  the  qualities 
which    have    marked    the    militarist,    medieval, 


156' 


IV 


Preface 


political,  patriotism  of  the  Old  Worid.  If  the 
reader  hopes  to  find  in  this  book  some  famiHar 
restatement  of  the  plea  that  the  inhabitants 
of  this  comer  of  the  Western  continent  alone  of  all 
the  men  who  have  ever  lived  upon  this  planet 
have  no  need  to  watch  their  conduct  and  their 
temper,  then  he  had  better  put  the  book  down, 
as  he  will  not  find  it.  These  two  chapters,  for 
instance,  (reprinted  the  one  from  neariy  twenty 
years  back,  and  the  other  from  some  decade  back,) 
recall  certain  of  our  political  aberrations  of  the  past. 
It  is  necessary  so  to  recall  them  if  in  the  mission  that 
I  hope  lies  before  us  we  are  to  avoid  certain  dan- 
gers which  might  irretrievably  wreck  it.  The  sane 
and  human,  to  say  nothing  of  the  wise  and  noble 
attitude,  is  the  determination  that  in  the  fulfilment 
of  the  great  task  to  which  we  may  shortly  set  our 
hands,  we  shall  avoid  those  errors  into  which  we, 
in  common  with  all  peoples,  have  fallen  in  the 
past  by  realizing  to  the  full  in  what  they  consist. 
Throughout  I  have  written  as  an  American. 
At  a  very  early  age  I  acquired  American  citizen- 
ship and  though  by  necessarily  prolonged  absences 
in  Europe  I  have  reverted  to  British  citizenship,  I 
always  claim  the  right  in  dealing  with  American 
problems,  to  speak  as  an  American,  because  in 
those  cases  I  feel  as  one.  It  is  as  an  American 
that  I  envisage  the  problems  here  dealt  with :  and 
so  I  write. 

Norman  Angell. 


CONTENTS 
PARTI 

THE  NEW  WORLD-STATE 

CHAPTER  PACB 

I.   THE  END  OF  THE  ERA  OF  ISOLATION  .     .     3 

II.    America's  future — the  alternatives    .      24 

III.      AMERICA  AS  LEADER  .  .  .  .         43    ; 

PART  II 

the  doctrines  that  MAKE  WAR 

I.  the  moral  foundations  of  prussian- 

ISM  ......         67 

II.  ANGLO-SAXON  FRUSSIANISM        .  .  .114 

III.  A  RETROSPECT  OF  AMERICAN  PATRIOTISM  .       I48 

IV.  ANGLOPHOBIA  AND  OTHER  ABERRATIONS     .       1 86 

PART  III 

CAN  ARMS  ALONE  DESTROY  PRUSSIANISM?  .  .251 

INDEX   ........      297 

V 


vi  Contents 

PART  I 

THE  NEW  WORLD-STA  TE 
CHAPTER  I 

THE   END   OF   THE   ERA   OF   ISOLATION 

PAGES 

The  old  axioms  as  to  international  relations — 
America  supposed  to  be  unaffected  by- 
European  politics — The  idea  of  nations  as 
isolated  and  rival  units — Necessity  of  exam- 
ining the  truth  of  these  assumptions — The 
fundamental  fallacies  which  underlie  them 
— The  real  nature  of  international  trade — 
The  interdependence  of  civilised  nations 
— Reaction  of  events  in  Europe  on  Amer- 
ica— Our  losses  through  the  war  in  Europe 
— How  we  pay  part  of  the  war  indemnities — 
Military  effects  of  the  war  on  America — 
Effect  of  increased  militarism  in  Europe  on 
our  social  development — Intellectual  and 
moral  interdependence — Immense  increase 
of  interdependence  in  modern  times — 
American  civilisation  reflects  develop- 
ments in  Europe — Necessity  for  America 
to  face  these  facts  in  order  to  ensure  her 
own  security.  ....  3~23 

CHAPTER  II 
America's  future — the  alternatives 
America  an  integral  part  of  Western  civilisation 
— Can  she  affect  the  course  of  events  in 
Europe?  A  suggested  line  of  action — The 
reasons  for  adopting  it — The  arguments 
against  it  considered — How  isolation  will 
lead    to    militarisation    of    America — The 


Contents  vii 

PAGES 

internationalisation  of  war — Can  security 
be  obtained  by  armaments? — War  a  matter 
of  at  least  two  parties — Absurdity  of  ignor- 
ing the  other  party  except  when  the  guns  go 
off — Fallacies  of  security  by  armaments  and 
of  the  Balance  of  Power — How  societies  are 
formed  and  the  place  of  force  therein — 
Common  interests  the  basis  of  every  com- 
munity— The  future  society  of  nations — 
America  can  lead  it  if  she  will — The  sanctions 
of  that  society  hinted  at  .  .  .  24-42 

CHAPTER  III 

AMERICA   AS   LEADER 

What  are  the  most  powerful  forces  and  sanc- 
tions in  modern  life? — The  non-military 
character  of  those  sanctions — How  the 
world  admits  their  force  without  know- 
ing it — The  opportunity  for  America  to 
organise  these  forces — How  she  can  ensure 
her  own  security — How  she  can  do  for 
Europe  what  Europe  cannot  do  for  her- 
self— America  as  the  centre  of  the  new 
world-state — Her  mission  as  initiator 
and  organiser  of  the  new  sanctions  in 
international  life — Will  America  show 
herself  capable  of  real  world  leader- 
ship?     ......  43-64 

PART  II 
THE  DOCTRINES  THAT  MAKE  WAR 
CHAPTER  I 

THE     MORAL     FOUNDATIONS     OF     PRUSSIANISM 

The   need   for   Americans    to   understand   the 


viii  Contents 

PAGES 

European  conflict — The  importance  of 
"theories" — This  wa/  by  universal  con- 
sent due  to  false  theories — The  German 
nation  transformed  by  them — What  is 
the  theory  that  has  caused  the  war? — 
How  the  ideals  of  a  people  may  be  changed 
— What  do  the  Germans  hope  to  achieve 
by  their  victory? — Why  Americans  should 
understand  these  questions — For  what 
purpose  are  States  maintained? — What  is 
the  ultimate  test  of  good  politics? — What 
does  military  and  political  power  achieve 
for  the  ultimate  realities  of  human  life? — 
"The  Great  Illusion  "—The  moral,  intel- 
lectual, and  economic  foundations  of 
Prussianism — Materialistic  roots  of  mili- 
tarism— No  refuge  save  in  the  improvement 
of  human  understanding — America's  part 
in  bringing  about  that  improvement  67-113 


CHAPTER  II 

ANGLO-SAXON  PRUSSIANISM 

The  danger  of  self-deception  in  advocacy  of 
disarmament  and  universal  peace — The 
influence  of  America  will  play  an  import- 
ant part  in  the  settlement  which  will  follow 
the  war — What  that  influence  will  be  de- 
pends upon  our  attitude  to  these  things — 
The  influence  of  militarist  writers  in  shaping 
the  Allies'  attitude,  and  our  own — A  few 
examples  of  Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism — The 


Contents  ix 

PAGES 

need  for  knowing  the  nature  of  the  Prussian 
doctrine  and  of  figRting  it — The  special 
importance  of  clear  thinking  by  Americans 

I 14-147 

CHAPTER  III 

A     RETROSPECT     OF     AMERICAN     PATRIOTISM 

The  necessity  for  national  stock-taking — 
Anglophobia  as  the  expression  of  American 
Patriotism — War  with  England  "in  the 
interests  of  human  freedom" — The  Vene- 
zuelan Crisis — Sudden  disappearance  of 
the  British  peril — The  war  with  Spain 
— "Free  and  independent"  Cuba — The 
Philippines — Adoption  of  Spanish  methods 
— The  Water  Cure — The  doctrine  of 
Military  Necessity — American  opinion  of 
the  Filipinos  before  and  after  the  war — 
Colonies  and  Imperialism — The  new  doc- 
trine as  to  annexation       .  .  .       148-185 

CHAPTER  IV 

ANGLOPHOBIA  AND  OTHER  ABERRATIONS 

American  Patriotism  in  1896 — The  necessity 
for  fighting  England — Some  expressions  of 
American  sentiment — The  wickedness  of 
the  Pacifist — What  should  we  have  gained 
by  fighting  England? — Patriotism  and 
farming — The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its 
meaning — Our  "fellow-republicans"  in 
Venezuela — Twelve  months  later — Spain 
the  real  villain  in  the  drama — The  noble 
Cuban — England     our     friend — Annexing 


Contents 


Cuba  simply  "because  we  want  it" — The 
doctrine  of  "the  strenuous  Hf e  " — The 
law  of  social  progress — American  jingoism 
imported  from  Europe — Why  we  escaped 
war  with  England — The  "finest  country 
on  God's  earth" — The  real  conditions  of 
American  life — Can  we  afford  the  luxury 
of  militarism? — Patriotism  and  the  Tariff 

186-248 

PART  III 

CAN  ARMS  ALONE  DESTROY  PRUSSIANISM? 

"A  War  against  War" — What  does  the  anni- 
hilation of  Germany  mean? — Can  sixty- 
five  millions  be  killed  off? — The  partition 
of  Germany — How  it  would  Prussianise 
Europe — How  Germany  became  Prussian- 
ised— The  reaction  of  a  Prussianised 
Europe  upon  America — The  military  in- 
destructibility of  modern  peoples — The 
mutability  of  alliances — What  should  fol- 
low the  defeat  of  Germany  ? — How  Prus- 
sianism  can  be  destroyed — The  real  basis 
of  the  society  of  nations — The  rdle  of 
America  in  organising  that  society    .        251-295 

Index 297-305 


PART  I 

THE  NEW  WORLD-STATE 


The  three  chapters  forming  Part  I  of  this  book 
originally  appeared  in  the  form  of  articles  in  the 
New  York  Times,  and  are  reprinted  by  courtesy 
of  the  proprietors  of  that  paper. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  END  OF  THE  ERA  OF  ISOLATION 

The  old  axioms  as  to  international  relations — America  supposed 
to  be  unaflFected  by  European  politics — The  idea  of  nations 
as  isolated  and  rival  units — Necessity  of  examining  the 
truth  of  these  assumptions — The  fundamental  fallacies 
which  underlie  them — The  real  nature  of  international  trade 
— The  interdependence  of  civilized  nations — Reaction  of 
events  in  Europe  on  America — Our  losses  through  the  war 
in  Europe — How  we  pay  part  of  the  war  indemnities — 
Military  effects  of  the  war  on  America — Effect  of  increased 
militari  m  in  Europe  on  our  social  development — Intellec- 
tual and  moral  interdependence — Immense  increase  of  inter- 
dependence in  modern  times — American  civilization  reflects 
developments  in  Europe — Necessity  for  America  to  face  these 
facts  in  order  to  ensure  her  own  security. 

In  the  discussion  of  America's  relation  to  the  rest 
of  the  world  we  have  always  assumed  almost 
as  an  axiom  that  America  has  nothing  to  do  with 
Europe,  is  only  in  the  faintest  degree  concerned 
with  its  poHtics  and  developments,  that  by  happy 
circumstance  of  geography  and  history  we  are 
isolated  and  self-sufficing,  able  to  look  with  calm 
detachment  upon  the  antics  of  the  distant  Euro- 
peans. When  a  European  landed  on  these  shores 
we  were  pretty  certain  that  he  left  Europe  behind 

3 


4   America  and  the  New  World-State 

him;  only  quite  recently  indeed  have  we  realized 
that  we  were  affected  by  what  he  brought  with 
him  in  the  way  of  morals  and  traditions,  and  only 
now  are  we  beginning  dimly  to  realize  that  what 
goes  on  on  the  other  side  of  the  world  can  be  any 
affair  of  ours.  The  famous  query  of  a  certain 
American  statesman:  "What  has  America  to 
do  with  abroad?"  probably  represented  at  bottom 
the  feelings  of  most  of  us. 

In  so  far  as  we  established  commercial  relations 
with  Eiirope  at  all,  we  felt  and  still  feel,  probably, 
that  they  were  relations  of  hostility,  that  we  were 
one  commercial  unit,  Europe  another,  and  that 
the  two  were  in  competition.  In  thinking  thus, 
of  course,  we  merely  accepted  the  view  of  inter- 
national politics  common  in  Europe  itself,  the 
view,  namely,  that  nations  are  necessarily  trade 
rivals — the  commercial  rivalry  of  Britain  and 
Germany  is  presumed  to  be  one  of  the  factors 
explaining  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war.  The 
idea  that  nations  do  thus  compete  together  for  the 
world's  trade  is  one  of  the  axioms  of  all  discussion 
in  the  field  of  international  politics. 

Well,  both  these  assimiptions,  in  the  form  in 
which  we  make  them,  involve  very  grave  fallacies, 
the  realization  of  which  will  shortly  become  essen- 
tial to  the  wise  direction  of  this  country's  policy. 
If  our  policy,  in  other  words,  is  to  be  shrewd  and 
enlightened,  we  must  realize  just  how  both  the 
views  of  international  relationship  that  I  have 
indicated  are  wrong. 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation       5 

I  will  take  first  the  more  special  one — that  of 
the  assumed  necessary  rivalry  of  nations  in  trade 
— ^as  its  clearer  understanding  will  help  in  what  is 
for  us  the  larger  problem  of  the  general  relation- 
ship of  this  country  to  other  civilized  Powers.  I 
will  therefore  try  and  establish  first  this  proposi- 
tion: that  nations  are  not  and  cannot  be  trade 
rivals  in  the  sense  usually  accepted;  that,  in  other 
words,  there  is  a  fundamental  misconception  in 
the  prevaiUng  picture  of  nations  as  trading  imits 
— one  might  as  well  talk  of  red-haired  people  being 
the  trade  rivals  of  black-haired  people.  And  I 
will  then  try  and  establish  a  second  proposition, 
namely,  that  we  are  intimately  concerned  with  the 
condition  of  Europe  and  are  daily  becoming  more 
so,  owing  to  processes  which  have  become  an 
integral  part  of  our  fight  against  Nature,  of  the 
feeding  and  clothing  of  the  world ;  that  we  cannot 
much  longer  ignore  the  effects  of  those  tendencies 
which  bind  us  to  our  neighbours ;  that  the  elemen- 
tary consideration  of  self-protection  will  sooner 
or  later  compel  us  to  accept  the  facts  and  recognize 
our  part  and  lot  in  the  struggles  of  Christendom; 
and  that  if  we  are  wise,  we  shall  not  take  our  part 
therein  reluctantly,  dragged  at  the  heels  of  forces 
we  cannot  resist,  but  will  do  so  consciously, 
anticipating  events.  In  other  words,  we  shall 
take  advantage  of  such  measure  of  detachment  as 
we  do  possess,  to  take  the  lead  in  a  saner  organiza- 
tion of  Western  civilization;  we  shall  become  the 
pivot  and  centre  of  a  new  world-state. 


6    America  and  the  New  World-State 

There  is  not  the  faintest  hope  of  America  taking 
this  lead  unless  a  push  or  impetus  is  given  to  her 
action  by  a  widespread  public  feeling,  based  on 
the  recognition  of  the  fallacy  of  the  two  assump- 
tions with  which  I  began  this  article.  For  if 
America  really  is  independent  of  the  rest  of  the 
world,  little  concerned  with  what  goes  on  therein, 
if  she  is  in  a  position  to  build  a  sort  of  Chinese  wall 
about  herself  and,  secure  in  her  own  strength,  to 
develop  a  civilization  and  future  of  her  own,  still 
more  if  the  weakness  and  disintegration  of  foreign 
nations,  however  unfortunate  for  them,  is  for 
America  an  opportunity  of  expanding  trade  and 
opportunities,  why  then  of  course  it  would  be  the 
height  of  folly  for  the  United  States  to  incur  all 
the  risks  and  uncertainties  of  an  adventure  into 
the  sea  of  foreign  politics. 

What  as  a  matter  of  simple  fact  is  the  real 
nature  of  trade  between  nations?  If  we  are  to 
have  any  clear  notion  at  all  as  to  just  what  truth 
there  is  in  the  notion  of  the  necessary  commercial 
rivalry  of  states,  we  must  have  some  fairly  clear 
notion  of  how  the  commercial  relationship  of  na- 
tions works.  And  that  can  best  be  illustrated  by 
a  supposititious  example.  At  the  present  time  we 
are  talking,  for  instance,  of  "capturing"  German 
or  British  or  French  trade. 

Now  when  we  talk  thus  of  "German"  trade  in 
the  international  field,  what  do  we  mean?  Here 
is  the  ironmaster  in  Essen  making  locomotives 
for  a  light  railway  in  an  Argentine  province  (the 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation      7 

capital  for  which  has  been  subscribed  in  Paris) — 
which  has  become  necessary  because  of  the  export 
of  wool  to  Bradford,  where  the  trade  has  developed 
owing  to  sales  in  the  United  States,  due  to  high 
prices  produced  by  the  destruction  of  sheep  runs, 
owing  to  the  agricultural  development  of  the  West. 
But  for  the  money  found  in  Paris  (due,  perhaps,  to 
good  crops  in  wine  and  olives,  sold  mainly  in 
London  and  New  York),  and  the  wool  needed  by 
the  Bradford  manufacturer  (who  has  foiind  a 
market  for  blankets  among  miners  in  Montana, 
who  are  smelting  copper  for  a  cable  to  China,  which 
is  needed  because  the  encouragement  given  to 
education  by  the  Chinese  Republic  has  caused 
Chinese  newspapers  to  print  cable  news  from 
Europe) — but  for  such  factors  as  these,  and  a 
whole  chain  of  equally  interdependent  ones 
throughout  the  world,  the  ironmaster  in  Essen 
would  not  have  been  able  to  sell  his  locomotives. 
How,  therefore,  can  you  describe  it  as  part  of  the 
trade  of  "Germany"  which  is  in  competition  with 
the  trade  of  ' '  Britain  "  or  "  France  "  or  "  America"  ? 
But  for  the  British,  French,  and  American  trade, 
it  could  not  have  existed  at  all.  You  may  say 
that  if  the  Essen  ironmaster  could  have  been  pre- 
vented from  selling  his  locomotives  the  order 
would  have  gone  to  an  American  one.  But,  this 
community  of  German  workmen,  called  into 
existence  by  the  Argentine  trade,  maintains  by 
its  consumption  of  coffee  a  plantation  in  Brazil, 
which    buys    its    machinery    in    Chicago.     The 


8    America  and  the  New  World-State 

destruction,  therefore,  of  the  Essen  trade,  while  it 
might  have  given  business  to  the  American  loco- 
motive maker,  would  have  taken  it  from,  say, 
an  American  agricultural  implement  maker.  The 
economic  interests  involved  sort  themselves, 
irrespective  of  the  national  groupings.  I  have 
summarized  the  whole  process  as  follows,  and  the 
need  for  getting  some  of  these  simple  things 
straight  is  my  excuse  for  quoting  myself : 

Co-operation  between  nations  has  become  essential 
for  the  very  life  of  their  peoples.  But  that  co-opera- 
tion does  not  take  place  as  between  States  at  all.  A 
trading  corporation,  "Britain,"  does  not  buy  cotton 
from  another  corporation,  "America."  A  manu- 
facturer in  Manchester  strikes  a  bargain  with  a 
merchant  in  Louisiana  in  order  to  keep  a  bargain  with 
a  dyer  in  Germany,  and  three  or  a  much  larger 
number  of  parties  enter  into  virtual,  or  perhaps  actual, 
contract,  and  form  a  mutually  dependent  economic 
community  (numbering,  it  may  be,  with  the  work 
people  in  the  group  of  industries  involved,  some  mil- 
lions of  individuals) — an  economic  entity  so  far  as 
one  can  exist  which  does  not  include  all  organized 
society.  The  special  interests  of  such  a  community 
may  become  hostile  to  those  of  another  community, 
but  it  will  almost  certainly  not  be  a  "national"  one, 
but  one  of  a  like  nature,  say  a  shipping  ring  or  groups 
of  international  bankers  or  Stock  Exchange  specula- 
tors. The  frontiers  of  such  communities  do  not 
coincide  with  the  areas  in  which  operate  the  functions 
of  the  State.  How  could  a  State,  say  Britain,  act  on 
behalf  of  an  economic  entity  such  as  that  just  indi- 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation      9 

cated?  By  pressure  against  America  or  Germany? 
But  the  community  against  which  the  British  manu- 
facturer in  this  case  wants  pressure  exercised  is  not 
"America"  or  "Germany" — both  Americans  and 
Germans  are  his  partners  in  the  matter.  He  wants 
it  exercised  against  the  shipping  ring  or  the  speculators 
or  the  bankers  who  are  in  part  British,  .  .  . 

This  estabHshes  two  things,  therefore:  the  fact  that 
the  political  and  economic  units  do  not  coincide,  and 
the  fact  which  follows  as  a  consequence:  that  action 
by  political  authorities  designed  to  control  economic 
activities  which  take  no  account  of  the  limits  of 
political  jurisdiction  is  necessarily  irrelevant  and 
ineffective. ' 

The  fallacy  of  the  idea  that  the  groups  we  call 
nations  must  be  in  conflict  because  they  struggle 
together  for  bread  and  the  means  of  sustenance 
is  demonstrated  immediately  when  we  recall  the 
simple  facts  of  historical  development.  When,  in 
the  British  Islands,  the  men  of  Wessex  were  fight- 
ing with  the  men  of  Sussex,  far  more  frequently 
and  bitterly  than  to-day  the  men  of  Germany 
fight  with  those  of  France,  or  either  with  those 
of  Russia,  the  separate  states  which  formed  the 
island  were  struggling  with  one  another  for  sus- 
tenance, just  as  the  tribes  which  inhabited  the 
North  American  continent  at  the  time  of  our  ar- 
rival there  were  struggling  with  one  another  for  the 

'  Arms  and  Industry.  A  Study  of  the  Foundations  of  Interna- 
tional Polity,  p.  xviii.     Putnams,  New  York. 


10  America  and  the  New  World-State 

game  and  hunting  grounds.  It  was  in  both  cases 
ultimately  a  "struggle  for  bread."  At  that  time, 
when  Britain  was  composed  of  several  separate 
states  that  struggled  thus  with  one  another  for 
land  and  food,  it  supported  with  great  difficulty 
anything  between  one  and  two  million  inhabitants, 
just  as  the  vast  spaces  now  occupied  by  the  United 
States  supported  about  a  hundred  thousand,  often 
subject  to  famine,  frequently  suffering  great  short- 
age of  food,  able  to  secure  just  the  barest  existence 
of  the  simplest  kind.  To-day,  although  Britain 
supports  anything  from  twenty  to  forty  times, 
and  North  America  something  like  a  thousand 
times,  as  large  a  population  in  much  greater 
comfort,  with  no  period  of  famine,  with  the  whole 
population  living  much  more  largely  and  deriving 
much  more  from  the  soil  than  did  the  men  of  the 
Heptarchy  or  the  Red  Indians,  the  "struggle  for 
bread"  does  not  now  take  the  form  of  struggle 
between  groups  of  the  population.  The  more  they 
fought,  the  less  efficiently  did  they  support  them- 
selves; the  less  they  fought  one  another,  the  more 
efficiently  did  they  all  support  themselves. 

This  simple  illustration  is  at  least  proof  of 
this,  that  the  struggle  for  material  things  did  not 
involve  any  necessary  struggle  between  the  sepa- 
rate groups  or  states;  for  those  material  things 
are  given  in  infinitely  greater  abundance  when 
the  states  cease  to  struggle.  Whatever,  therefore, 
was  the  origin  of  those  conflicts,  that  origin  was 
not  any  inevitable  conflict  in  the  exploitation  of 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation    ii 

the  earth.  If  those  conflicts  were  concerned  with 
material  things  at  all,  they  arose  from  a  mistake 
about  the  best  means  of  obtaining  them,  exploiting 
the  earth,  and  ceased  when  those  concerned 
realized  the  mistake. 

Just  as  Britain  supported  its  population  better 
when  EngHshmen  gave  up  fighting  themselves,  so 
the  world  as  a  whole  could  support  its  population 
better  if  it  gave  up  fighting. 

Moreover  we  have  passed  out  of  the  stage  when 
we  could  massacre  a  conquered  population  to  make 
room  for  us.  When  we  conquer  an  inferior  people 
like  the  Filipinos  we  don't  exterminate  them;  we 
give  them  an  added  chance  of  life.  The  weakest 
don't  go  to  the  wall. 

But  at  this  point  parenthetically  I  want  to  enter 
a  warning.  You  may  say,  if  this  notion  of  the 
rivalry  of  nations  is  false,  how  do  you  account  for 
the  fact  of  its  playing  so  large  a  part  in  the  present 
war? 

Well,  that  is  easily  explained:  men  are  not 
guided  necessarily  by  their  interest  even  in  their 
soberest  moments  but  by  what  they  believe  to 
be  their  interest.  Men  do  not  judge  from  the 
facts  but  from  what  they  believe  to  be  the  facts. 
War  is  the  "failure  of  human  understanding." 
The  religious  wars  were  due  to  the  belief  that  two 
religions  could  not  exist  side  by  side.  It  was  not 
true,  but  the  false  belief  provoked  the  wars.  Our 
notions  as  to  the  relation  of  political  power  to  a 
nation's  prosperity  are  just  as  false,   and   this 


12  America  and  the  New  World-State 

fallacy,  like  the  older  one,  plays  its  part  in  the 
causation  of  war. 

Now  let  us  for  a  moment  apply  the  very  general 
rule  thus  revealed  to  the  particular  case  of  the 
United  States  at  this  present  juncture. 

American  merchants  may  in  certain  cases,  if 
they  are  shrewd  and  able,  do  a  very  considerably 
increased  trade,  though  it  is  just  as  certain  that 
other  merchants  will  be  losing  trade,  and  I  think 
there  is  pretty  general  agreement  that  as  a  matter 
of  simple  fact  the  losses  of  the  war  so  far  have 
for  America  very  considerably  and  very  obviously 
over-balanced  the  gains.  The  loss  has  been  felt 
so  tangibly  by  the  United  States  Government, 
for  instance,  that  a  special  loan  had  to  be  voted 
in  order  to  stop  some  of  the  gaps.  Whole  States, 
whose  interests  are  bound  up  with  staples  like 
cotton,  were  for  a  considerable  time  threatened 
with  something  resembling  commercial  paralysis. 
While  we  may  admit  advances  and  gains  in  certain 
isolated  directions,  the  extra  burden  is  felt  in  all 
directions  of  commerce  and  industry.  And  that 
extra  burden  is  visible  through  finance — the  in- 
creased cost  of  money,  the  scarcity  of  capital,  the 
lower  negotiability  of  securities,  the  greater  un- 
certainty concerning  the  futvire.  It  is  by  means 
of  the  financial  reaction  that  America  as  a  whole 
has  felt  the  adverse  effects  of  this  war.  There  is 
not  a  considerable  village,  much  less  a  considerable 
city,  not  a  merchant,  nor  a  captain  of  industry 
in  the  United  States  that  has  not  so  felt  it.     It 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation    13 

is  plainly  evident  that  by  the  progressive  deamess 
of  money,  the  lower  standard  of  living  that  will 
restdt  in  Europe,  the  effect  on  immigration,  and 
other  processes  which  I  will  touch  upon  at  greater 
length  later,  any  temporary  stimulus  which  a 
trade  here  and  there  may  receive  will  be  more 
than  offset  by  the  difficulties  due  to  financial  as 
apart  from  industrial  or  commercial  reactions. 

This  war  will  come  near  to  depriving  America 
for  a  decade  or  two  of  its  normal  share  of  the 
accumulated  capital  of  the  older  peoples,  whether 
that  capital  be  used  in  paying  war-indemnities, 
or  in  paying  off  the  cost  of  the  war  or  in  repairing 
its  ravages.  In  all  cases  it  will  make  capital  much 
dearer,  and  many  enterprises  which  with  more 
abundant  capital  might  have  been  bom  and  might 
have  stimulated  American  industry  will  not  be 
bom.  For  the  best  part  of  a  generation,  perhaps, 
the  available  capital  of  Europe  will  be  used  to 
repair  the  ravages  of  war  there,  to  pay  off  the  debts 
created  by  war,  and  to  start  Hfe  normally  once 
more.     We  shall  siiffer  in  two  ways. 

In  a  recent  report  issued  by  the  Agricultural 
Department  at  Washington  is  a  paragraph  to  the 
effect  that  one  of  the  main  factors  which  have 
operated  against  the  development  of  the  American 
farm  is  the  difficulty  that  the  farmer  has  found  in 
securing  abundant  capital  and  the  high  price  that 
he  has  to  pay  for  it  when  he  can  secure  it.  It  will 
in  the  future  be  of  still  higher  price  and  still  less 
abundant  because,  of  course,  the  capital  of  the 


14  America  and  the  New  World-State 

world  is  a  common  reservoir;  if  it  is  dearer  in  one 
part,  it  is  dearer  to  some  extent  in  all  parts.  So 
that  if  for  many  years  the  American  farmhouse 
is  not  so  well  built  as  it  might  be,  the  farm  not  so 
well  worked,  rural  life  in  America  not  so  attractive 
as  it  might  be,  the  farmer's  wife  burdened  with 
a  little  more  labour  than  she  might  otherwise 
have,  and  if  she  grows  old  earlier  than  she  might 
otherwise,  it  will  be  in  part  because  we  are  paying 
our  share  of  the  war  indemnities  and  the  war 
costs.  But  this  scarcity  of  capital  operates  in 
another  way.  One  of  the  most  promising  fields 
for  American  enterprise  is,  of  course,  in  the  un- 
developed lands  to  the  south  of  us,  but  in  the 
development  of  those  lands  we  have  looked  and 
must  look  for  the  co-operation  of  European  capital. 
Millions  of  French  and  British  money  have  poured 
into  South  America,  building  docks  and  railroads 
and  opening  up  the  country,  and  that  development 
of  South  America  has  been  to  our  advantage, 
because  quite  frequently  these  enterprises  were 
under  the  actual  management  of  Americans,  using 
to  the  common  advantage  the  savings  of  the  thrifty 
Frenchman  and  the  capital  of  the  wealthy  English- 
man. For,  of  course,  as  between  the  older  and 
the  newer  worlds  there  has  gone  on  this  very  bene- 
ficient  division  of  labour;  the  Old  World,  having 
developed  its  soil,  built  its  cities,  made  its  roads, 
has  more  capital  available  for  outside  employment 
than  has  the  population  of  newer  countries  that 
have  so  much  of  this  work  before  them.     And 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation    15 

now  this  possibility  of  fruitful  co-operation  is,  for 
the  time  being  and  it  may  be  for  many  years, 
suspended.  I  say  nothing  of  the  loss  of  markets  in 
the  older  countries  which  will  be  occasioned  by 
sheer  loss  of  population  and  the  lower  standard 
of  living.  That  is  one  of  the  more  obvious  but 
not  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  ways  in 
which  the  war  affects  us  commercially. 

Speaking  purely  in  terms  of  commercial  advan- 
tage— ^and  these,  I  know,  do  not  tell  the  whole 
story;  I  am  not  for  a  moment  pretending  they 
do — the  losses  that  we  shall  suffer  through  this 
war  are  probably  very  much  more  considerable 
than  those  we  should  suffer  by  the  loss  of  the 
Philippines  in  the  event,  say,  of  their  being  seized 
by  some  hostile  Power;  and  we  suffer  these  losses 
although  not  a  single  foreign  soldier  lands  upon  our 
soil.  It  is  literally  and  precisely  true  to  say  that 
there  is  not  one  person  from  Hudson's  Bay  to 
Cape  Horn  that  will  not  be  affected  in  some  degree 
by  what  is  now  going  on  in  Europe.  And  it  is 
at  least  conceivable  that  our  children  and  child- 
ren's children  will  feel  its  effects  more  deeply  still. 

Nor  is  America  escaping  the  military,  any  more 
than  she  has  escaped  the  commercial  and  financial 
effects  of  this  war.  She  may  never  be  drawn  into 
active  military  co-operation  with  other  nations, 
but  she  is  affected  none  the  less.  Indeed  the 
military  effects  of  this  war  are  already  revealing 
themselves  in  a  demand  for  a  naval  programme, 
immensely  larger  than  any  American  could  have 


1 6  America  and  the  New  World-State 

anticipated  a  year  ago,  by  plans  for  an  enormously 
enlarged  army.  All  this  is  the  most  natural 
result. 

Just  consider,  for  instance,  the  ultimate  effect 
of  a  quite  possible  outcome  of  the  present  conflict 
— Germany  victorious  and  the  Prussian  effort 
next  directed  at,  say,  the  conquest  of  India. 
Imagine  India  Prussianized  by  Germany,  so  that 
with  the  marvellous  efficiency  in  military  organiza- 
tion, which  she  has  shown,  she  is  able  to  draw  on  an 
Asiatic  population  of  something  approaching  four 
hundred  millions.  Whether  the  situation  then 
created  would  really  constitute  a  menace  for  us 
or  not,  this  much  would  be  certain :  that  the  more 
timid  and  timorous  amongst  us  would  believe  it 
to  be  a  menace,  and  it  would  furnish  an  irresistible 
plea  for  a  very  greatly  enlarged  naval  and  military 
establishment.  We  too  in  that  case  would  pro- 
bably be  led  to  organize  our  nation  on  the  lines 
on  which  the  European  military  nations  have  or- 
ganized theirs,  with  compulsory  military  service 
and  so  forth.  Indeed,  even  if  Germany  is  not 
victorious,  the  future  contains  possibilities  of  a  like 
result;  imagine,  what  is  quite  possible,  that  Russia 
becomes  the  dominant  factor  in  Europe  after  this 
war  and  places  herself  at  the  head  of  a  great  Slav 
confederacy  of  two  hundred  millions,  with  her 
power  extending  incidentally  to  the  Pacific  coast 
of  Asia  and,  it  may  be  the  day  after  to-morrow, 
over  one  or  two  hundred  millions  of  Asiatics.  We 
should  thus  have  a  militarized  power  of  two  or 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation    17 

three  or  four  hundred  million  souls,  autocratically 
governed,  endowed  with  Western  technical  know- 
ledge in  the  manipulation  of  the  instruments  of 
war,  occupying  the  Pacific  coast  line  directly 
facing  our  Pacific  coast  line.  It  is  quite  conceiv- 
able, therefore,  that  as  the  outcome  of  either  of  the 
two  possible  results  of  this  war  we  may  find  our- 
selves embarked  upon  a  great  era  of  militarization. 
Our  impregnability  does  not  protect  us  from 
militarism.  It  is  quite  true  that  this  country, 
like  Russia,  cannot  be  permanently  invaded;  it  is 
quite  true  that  hostile  navies  need  not  necessarily 
be  resisted  by  navies  of  our  own  so  far  as  the 
protection  of  our  coasts  is  concerned.  But  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  certainty  in  these 
matters.  While  personally  I  believe  that  no 
country  in  the  world  will  ever  challenge  the  United 
States,  that  the  chances  are  a  hundred  to  one 
against  it,  it  is  on  just  that  one  chance  that  the 
militarist  bases  his  plea  for  armaments  and  secures 
them.  But,  unfortunately,  we  are  already  com- 
mitted to  a  good  deal  more  than  just  mere  defence 
of  American  territory;  problems  arising  out  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  have  already  committed  us  to  a  mea- 
sure of  intervention  in  the  political  affairs  of  the 
outside  world.  In  brief,  if  the  other  nations  of 
the  world  have  great  armies  and  navies, — and 
to-morrow  those  other  nations  will  include  a  re- 
organized China  as  they  already  include  a  Western- 
ized Japan, — ^if  there  is  all  that  weight  of  military 


1 8  America  and  the  New  World-State 

material  which  might  be  used  against  us,  then  in 
the  absence  of  those  other  guarantees  which  I 
shall  suggest,  we  shall  be  drawn  into  piling  up  a 
corresponding  weight  of  material  as  against  that 
of  the  outside  world. 

And,  of  course,  just  as  we  cannot  escape  the 
economic  and  the  military  reaction  of  European 
development,  neither  can  we  escape  the  moral. 
If  European  thought  and  morality  did,  by  some 
fatality,  really  develop  in  the  direction  of  a  Niet- 
zschean  idealization  of  military  force,  we  might  well 
get  in  the  coming  years  a  practical  submergence 
of  that  morality  which  we  believe  to  be  distinc- 
tively American,  and  get  throughout  the  older 
hemisphere  a  type  of  society  based  upon  authority, 
reproducing,  it  may  be,  some  features  of  past 
civilizations,  Mongol,  Asiatic,  or  Byzantine.  If 
that  were  to  happen,  if  Europe  were  really  to 
become  a  mere  glorified  form  of,  say,  certain 
Asiatic  conceptions  that  we  all  thought  had  had 
their  day,  why  then  of  course  America  could  not 
escape  a  like  transformation  of  outlook,  ideals,  and 
morals. 

For  there  is  no  such  thing  as  one  nation  standing 
out  and  maintaining  indefinitely  a  social  spirit, 
an  attitude  towards  life  and  society  absolutely 
distinct  and  different  from  that  of  the  surrounding 
world.  The  character  of  a  society  is  determined 
by  the  character  of  its  ideas,  and  neither  tariffs 
nor  coastal  defences  are  really  efficient  in  pre- 
venting the  invasion  of  ideas,  good  or  bad.     The 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation     19 

difference  between  the  kind  of  society  which  exists 
in  Illinois  to-day  and  that  which  existed  there 
five  hundred  years  ago  is  not  a  difference  of 
physical  vigour  or  of  the  raw  materials  of  nature; 
the  Indian  was  as  good  a  man  physically  as  the 
modem  Chicagoan  and  possessed  the  same  soil. 
What  makes  the  differences  between  the  two  is 
accumulated  knowledge,  the  mind.  And  there 
never  was  yet  on  this  planet  a  change  of  idea  which 
did  not  sooner  or  later  affect  the  whole  planet. 

The  "nations"  that  inhabited  this  continent,  a 
couple  of  thousand  years  ago  were  apparently 
qmte  vmconcemed  with  what  went  on  in  Europe 
or  Asia,  say,  in  the  domain  of  mathematical  and 
astronomical  knowledge.  But  the  ultimate  effect 
of  that  knowledge  on  navigation  and  discovery 
was  destined  to  affect  them — and  us — profoundly. 
But  the  reaction  of  European  thought  upon  this 
continent,  which  originally  required  twenty  or 
for  that  matter  two  hundred  or  two  thousand  years 
to  show  itself,  now  shows  itself,  in  the  industrial, 
and  commercial  field,  for  instance,  through  our 
banking  and  stock  exchanges,  in  as  many  hours, 
or  for  that  matter,  minutes. 

It  is  difficult,  of  course,  for  us  to  realize  the 
extent  to  which  each  nation  owes  its  civilization  to 
others,  how  we  have  all  lived  by  taking  in  each 
other's  washing.  As  Americans,  for  instance,  we 
have  to  make  a  definite  effort  properly  to  realize 
that  our  institutions,  the  sanctity  of  oiir  homes, 
and  all  the  other  things  upon  which  we  pride 


20  America  and  the  New  World-State 

ourselves,  are  the  result  of  anything  but  the  un- 
aided efforts  of  a  generation  or  two  of  Americans, 
perhaps  owing  a  Httle  to  certain  of  the  traditions 
that  we  may  have  taken  from  Britain.  One  has 
to  stop  and  uproot  impressions  that  are  ahnost 
instinctive,  to  remember  that  our  forefathers 
reached  these  shores  by  virtue  of  knowledge  which 
they  owed  to  the  astronomical  researches  of 
Egyptians  and  Chaldeans,  who  inspired  the 
astronomers  of  Greece,  who  inspired  those  of  the 
Renaissance  in  Italy,  Spain,  and  Germany,  keeping 
alive  and  developing  not  merely  the  art  of  measur- 
ing space  and  time,  but  also  that  conception  of 
order  in  external  nature  without  which  the  growth 
of  organized  knowledge,  which  we  call  science, 
enabling  men  to  carry  on  their  exploitation  of  the 
world,  would  have  been  impossible;  that  our  very 
alphabet  comes  from  Rome,  who  owed  it  to  others; 
that  the  mathematical  foundation  of  our  modem 
mechanical  science — without  which  neither  New- 
ton, nor  Watt,  nor  Stevenson,  nor  Ericsson,  nor 
Faraday,  nor  Edison  could  have  been — is  the  work 
of  Arabs,  strengthened  by  Greeks,  protected  and 
enlarged  by  Italians;  that  our  conception  of  po- 
litical organization,  which  has  so  largely  shaped 
our  political  science,  comes  mainly  from  the  Scan- 
dinavian colonists  of  a  French  province;  that 
British  intellect,  to  which  perhaps  we  owe  the  major 
part  of  our  political  impulses,  has  been  nurtiu-ed 
mainly  by  Greek  philosophy;  that  our  Anglo- 
Saxon  law  is  principally  Roman,  and  our  religion 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation     21 

almost  entirely  Asiatic  in  its  origins;  that  for 
those  things  which  we  deem  to  be  the  most  impor- 
tant in  our  Hves,  our  spiritual  and  religious  aspira- 
tions, we  go  to  a  Jewish  book  interpreted  by  a 
Church,  Roman  in  origin,  reformed  mainly  by  the 
efforts  of  Swiss  and  German  theologians. 

And  this  interaction  of  the  respective  elements  of 
the  various  nations,  the  influence  of  foreigners  in 
other  words  and  of  foreign  ideas,  is  going  to  be 
far  more  powerful  in  the  future  than  it  has  been 
in  the  past.  Morally  as  well  as  materially  we  are 
a  part  of  Europe.  The  influence  which  one  group 
exercises  on  another  need  not  operate  through 
political  means  at  all;  indeed  the  strongest  in- 
fluences are  non-political.  American  life  and 
civilization  may  be  transformed  by  European  de- 
velopments though  the  governments  of  Europe 
may  leave  us  severely  alone.  Luther  and  Calvin 
had  certainly  a  greater  effect  in  England  than  Louis 
XIV  or  Napoleon.  Gutenberg  created  in  Europe 
a  revolution  more  powerful  than  all  the  mihtary 
revolutions  of  the  last  ten  centuries.  Greece  and 
Palestine  did  not  transform  the  world  by  their 
political  power.  Yet  these  simple  and  outstanding 
truths  are  persistently  ignored  by  our  political 
and  historical  philosophers  and  theorists.  By 
the  most  part  our  history  is  written  with  a  more 
sublime  disregard  of  the  simple  facts  of  the  world 
than  is  shown  perhaps  in  any  other  department 
of  himian  thought  and  inquiry.  You  may  to-day 
read  histories  of  Europe  written  by  men  of  world- 


22  America  and  the  New  World-State 

wide  and  pre-eminent  reputation,  professing  to 
tell  the  story  of  the  development  of  human  society, 
in  which  whole  volumes  will  be  devoted  to  the 
effect  of  a  particular  campaign  or  military  alliance 
on  influencing  the  destinies  of  a  people  like  the 
French  or  the  German.  But  in  those  histories 
you  will  find  no  word  as  to  the  effect  of  such 
trifles  as  the  invention  of  the  steam-engine,  the 
coming  of  the  railroad,  the  introduction  of  the 
telegraph,  and  cheap  newspapers  and  literature,  on 
the  destiny  of  those  people;  volumes  as  to  the 
influence  which  Britain  may  have  had  upon  the 
history  of  France  or  Germany  by  the  campaigns 
of  Marlborough,  but  absolutely  not  one  word  as 
to  the  influence  which  Britain  had  upon  the 
destinies  of  those  people  by  the  work  of  Watt 
and  Stevenson.  A  great  historian  philosopher, 
laying  it  down  that  the  "influence"  of  England 
was  repelled  or  offset  by  this  or  that  military 
alliance,  seriously  stated  that  "England"  was 
losing  her  influence  on  the  Continent  at  a  time 
when  her  influence  was  transforming  the  whole 
lives  of  continental  people  to  a  greater  degree 
than  they  had  been  transformed  since  the  days 
of  the  Romans. 

I  have  gone  into  this  at  some  length  to  show 
mainly  two  things:  first,  that  neither  morally  nor 
materially,  neither  in  our  trade  nor  in  our  finance, 
nor  in  our  industry,  nor  in  all  those  intangible 
things  that  give  value  to  life,  can  there  be  such  a 
thing  as  isolation  from  the  rest  of  Christendom. 


The  End  of  the  Era  of  Isolation     23 

If  European  civilization  takes  a  "wrong  turning" 
— ^and  it  has  done  that  more  than  once  in  the  past 
— we  can  by  no  means  escape  the  effects  of  that 
catastrophe.  We  are  deeply  concerned,  if  only 
because  we  may  have  to  defend  ourselves  against 
it  and  in  so  doing  necessarily  transform  in  some 
degree  our  society  and  so  ourselves.  And  I  wanted 
to  show,  secondly,  that  not  only  as  a  simple  matter 
of  fact  as  things  stand,  are  we  in  a  very  real  sense 
dependent  upon  Europe,  that  we  want  European 
capital  and  European  trade,  and  that  if  we  are 
to  do  the  best  for  American  prosperity  we  must 
increase  that  dependence,  but  that  if  we  are 
effectively  to  protect  those  things  that  go  deeper 
even  than  trade  and  prosperity,  we  must  co-operate 
with  Europe  intellectually  and  morally.  It  is 
not  for  us  a  question  of  choice.  For  good  or  evil, 
we  are  part  of  the  world,  affected  by  what  the 
rest  of  the  world  becomes  and  affected  by  what  it 
does.  And  I  shall  show  in  the  next  chapter  that 
only  by  frankly  facing  the  fact  (which  we  cannot 
deny)  that  we  are  a  part  of  the  civilized  world 
and  must  play  our  part  in  it,  shall  we  achieve  real 
security  for  our  material  and  moral  possessions 
and  do  the  best  that  we  know  for  the  general 
betterment  of  American  life. 


CHAPTER  II 
America's  future  — the  alternatives 

America  an  integral  part  of  Western  civilization — Can  she  affect 
the  course  of  events  in  Europe? — A  suggested  line  of  action — 
The  reasons  for  adopting  it — The  arguments  against  it 
considered — How  isolation  will  lead  to  militarization  of 
America — The  internationalization  of  war — Can  security  be 
obtained  by  armaments? — War  a  matter  of  at  least  two 
parties — Absurdity  of  ignoring  the  other  party  except  when 
the  guns  go  off — Fallacies  of  security  by  armaments  and  of 
the  Balance  of  Power — How  societies  are  formed  and  the 
place  of  force  therein — Common  interests  the  basis  of  every 
community — The  future  society  of  nations — America  can 
lead  it  if  she  will — The  sanctions  of  that  society  hinted  at. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  attempted  to  show 
how  deeply  must  America  feel,  sooner  or  later, 
and  for  good  or  evil,  the  moral  and  material  results 
of  the  upheavals  in  Europe  and  the  new  tendencies 
that  will  be  generated  by  them.  The  shells  may 
not  hit  us,  yet  there  is  hardly  a  farmhouse  in  our 
country  that  will  not,  however  unconsciously, 
be  affected  by  these  far-off  events.  We  may  not 
witness  the  trains  of  weary  refugees  trailing  over 
the  roads,  but  (if  we  could  but  see  the  picture) 
there  will  be  an  endless  procession  of  our  own 
farmers'  wives  with  a  hardened  and  shortened  life 

24 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives    25 

and  their  children  with  less  ample  opportunities. 
We  have  seen  also  that  our  ideals  of  the  future 
will  in  some  measure  be  twisted  by  the  moral  and 
material  bankruptcy  of  Europe.  Those  who  con- 
sider at  all  carefully  the  facts  already  hinted  at 
will  realize  that  the  "isolation"  of  America  is  an 
illusion  of  the  map,  and  is  becoming  more  so  every 
day;  that  she  is  an  integral  part  of  Occidental 
civilization  whether  she  wishes  it  or  not,  and  that  if 
civilization  in  Europe  takes  the  wrong  turn  we 
Americans  will  suffer  less  directly  but  not  less 
vitally  than  France  or  Britain  or  Germany. 

All  this,  of  course,  is  no  argument  for  departing 
from  our  traditional  isolation.  Our  entrance  into 
the  welter  might  not  change  things  or  it  might 
change  them  for  the  worse,  or  the  disadvantages 
might  be  such  as  to  outweigh  the  advantages.  The 
sensible  question  for  America  is  this:  "Can  we 
affect  the  general  course  of  events  in  Europe — in 
the  world,  that  is — to  our  advantage  by  entering 
in;  and  will  the  advantage  of  so  doing  be  of  such 
extent  as  to  offset  the  risks  and  costs?" 

Before  answering  that  question  I  want  to  indi- 
cate, by  very  definite  proposals  or  propositions,  a 
course  of  action  and  a  basis  for  estimating  the 
effect.  I  will  put  the  proposal  with  reference  to 
America's  future  attitude  to  Europe  in  the  form  of 
a  definite  proposition  thus: 

That  America  shall  use  her  influence  to  secure 
the  abandonment  by  the  Powers  of  Christen- 


26  America  and  the  New  World-State 

dom  of  rival  group  alliances  and  the  creation  in- 
stead of  an  alliance  of  all  the  civilized  Powers 
having  as  its  aim  some  common  action — not 
necessarily  military — which  will  constitute  a 
collective  guarantee  of  each  against  aggression. 

Thus  when  Germany,  asked  by  the  Allies  at  the 
prospective  peace  to  remove  the  menace  of  her 
militarism  by  reducing  her  armaments,  replies, 
' '  What  of  my  protection  against  Russia  ? ' '  Christen- 
dom should,  with  America's  help,  be  in  a  position  to 
reply:  "We  will  all  protect  you  against  Russia, 
just  as  we  would  all  protect  Russia  against  you." 

The  considerations  which  support  such  a  policy 
on  America's  part  are  mainly  these:  (i)  That 
if  America  does  not  lend  the  assistance  of  her 
detachment  from  European  quarrels  to  such  an 
arrangement,  Europe  of  herself  may  not  prove 
capable  of  it.  (2)  That  if  Europe  does  not  come 
to  some  such  arrangement  the  resulting  unrest, 
militarism,  moral  and  material  degeneration,  for 
the  reasons  above  indicated  and  for  others  to  be 
indicated  presently,  will  most  unfavourably  affect 
the  development  of  America,  and  expose  her  to 
dangers  internal  and  external  much  greater  than 
those  which  she  would  incur  by  intervention. 
(3)  That  if  America's  influence  is  in  the  manner 
indicated  made  the  deciding  factor  in  the  establish- 
ment of  a  new  form  of  world  society,  she  would 
virtually  take  the  leadership  of  Western  civiliza- 
tion and  her  capital  become  the  centre  of  the 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives     27 

political  organization  of  the  new  world-state. 
While  "world  domination"  by  military  means 
has  always  proven  a  dangerous  diet  for  all  nations 
that  have  eaten  of  it  heretofore,  the  American 
form  of  that  ambition  would  have  this  great  differ- 
ence from  earlier  forms :  that  it  would  be  welcomed 
instead  of  being  resisted  by  the  dominated. 
America  would  have  given  a  new  meaning  to  the 
term  and  found  a  means  of  satisfying  national 
pride,  certainly  more  beneficial  than  that  which 
comes  of  military  glory.  I  envisage  the  whole 
problem,  however,  first  and  last  in  this  discussion 
on  the  basis  of  America's  interest ;  and  the  test  which 
I  would  apply  to  the  alternatives  now  presenting 
themselves  is  simply  this:  What  one  balance  is 
most  advantageous,  in  the  broadest  and  largest 
sense  of  the  term,  in  its  moral  as  well  as  its 
material  sense,  to  American  interest? 

Now  I  know  full  well  that  there  is  much  to  be 
said  against  the  step  which  I  think  America 
should  initiate.  I  suppose  the  weight  of  the  reasons 
against  it  would  be  in  some  such  order  as  the  fol- 
lowing: (i)  That  it  is  a  violation  of  the  ancient 
tradition  of  American  statecraft  and  of  the  rule 
laid  down  by  Washington  concerning  the  avoidance 
of  entangling  alliances.  (2)  That  it  may  have  the 
effect  which  he  feared  of  dragging  this  country 
into  war  on  matters  in  which  it  has  no  concern. 
(3)  That  it  will  militarize  the  country  and  so  (4) 
lead  to  the  neglect  of  those  domestic  problems 
upon  which  the  progress  of  our  nation  depends. 


28  America  and  the  New  World-State 

I  will  take  the  minor  points  first  and  will  deal 
with  the  major  consideration  presently. 

First  I  would  remind  the  reader  that  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  being  unaffected  by  the  miUtary 
policies  of  Eiirope;  and  there  never  has  been.  At 
this  present  moment  a  campaign  for  greatly  in- 
creased armaments  is  being  waged  on  the  strength 
of  what  is  taking  place  in  the  Old  World,  and  our 
armaments  are  directly  and  categorically  dictated 
by  what  foreign  nations  do  in  the  matter.  So 
that  it  is  not  a  question  in  practice  of  being  in- 
dependent of  the  policies  of  other  nations;  we  are 
not  independent  of  their  policies.  We  may  refuse 
to  co-operate  with  them,  to  have  anything  to  do 
with  them.  Even  then  our  military  policy  will 
be  guided  by  theirs,  and  it  is  at  least  conceivable 
that  in  certain  circumstances  we  should  become 
thoroughly  militarized  by  the  need  for  preparing 
against  what  our  people  would  regard  as  the 
menace  of  European  military  ambitions.  This 
tendency,  if  it  became  sufficiently  acute,  would 
cause  neglect  of  domestic  problems  hardly  less 
mischievous  than  that  occasioned  by  war.  In  the 
preceding  chapter  I  touched  upon  a  quite  possible 
turn  of  the  alliance  groupings  in  Europe :  the  grow- 
ing influence  of  Russia,  the  extension  of  that 
influence  to  the  Asiatic  populations  on  her  borders 
(Japan  and  Russia  are  already  in  alliance)  so  that 
within  the  qmte  measurable  future  we  may  be 
confronted  by  a  military  community  drawing  on  a 
population  of  five  htmdred  million  souls,  auto- 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives    29 

cratically  governed  and  endowed  with  all  the 
machinery  of  destruction  which  modem  science 
has  given  to  the  world.  A  Russo-Chino- Japanese 
alliance  might,  on  behalf  of  the  interest  or  dignity 
of  one  of  the  members  of  such  a  group,  challenge 
this  cotmtry  in  some  form  or  another,  and  a 
western  Europe  with  whom  we  had  refused  to  co- 
operate for  a  common  protection  might,  as  a 
consequence,  remain  an  indifferent  spectator  of  the 
conflict.  Such  a  situation  would  certainly  not 
relieve  us  from  the  burdens  of  militarism  merely 
because  we  declined  to  enter  into  any  arrangement 
with  the  European  Powers.  As  a  matter  of  fact  of 
course  this  present  war  destroyed  the  nationaHst 
basis  of  militarism  itself.  The  militarist  may 
continue  to  talk  about  international  agreement 
between  nations  being  impossible  as  a  means  of 
ensuring  a  nation's  safety,  and  a  nation  having  no 
security  but  the  strength  of  its  own  arms,  but  when 
it  actually  comes  to  the  point  even  he  is  obliged 
to  trust  to  agreement  with  other  nations  and  to 
admit  that  even  in  war  a  nation  can  no  longer 
depend  merely  upon  the  strength  of  its  arms;  it 
has  to  depend  upon  co-operation,  which  means 
an  agreement  of  some  kind  with  other  nations,  as 
well. 

Just  as  the  nations  have  by  forces  stronger  than 
their  own  volition  been  brought  into  industrial 
and  commercial  co-operation,  so,  strangely  enough, 
have  they  been  brought  by  those  same  forces  into 
miHtary   co-operation.     While    the   warrior   and 


30  America  and  the  New  World-State 

militarist  have  been  talking  the  old  jargon  of 
nationaHsm  and  holding  international  co-operation 
up  to  derision  as  a  dream,  they  have  themselves 
been  brought  to  depend  upon  foreigners.  War 
itself  has  become  internationalist. 

There  is  something  of  sardonic  himiour  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  the  greatest  war  of  history,  which  is  illus- 
trating the  fact  that  even  the  most  powerful  of  the 
European  nations  must  co-operate  with  foreigners 
for  its  security.  For  no  one  of  the  nine  or  ten 
combatants  of  the  present  war  could  have  main- 
tained its  position  or  defended  itself  alone.  There 
is  not  one  nation  involved  that  would  not  believe 
itself  in  danger  of  destruction  but  for  the  help  of 
foreigners;  there  is  not  one  whose  national  safety 
does  not  depend  upon  some  compact  or  arrange- 
ment with  foreign  nations.  France  would  have 
been  helpless  but  for  the  help  of  Britain  and  of 
Russia.  Russia  herself  could  not  have  imposed 
her  will  upon  Germany  if  Germany  could  have 
thrown  all  her  forces  on  the  eastern  frontier. 
Austria  could  certainly  not  have  withstood  the 
Russian  flood  single-handed.  Quite  obviously 
the  lesser  nations,  Servia,  Belgium,  and  the  rest 
would  be  helpless  victims  but  for  the  support  of 
their  neighbours. 

And  it  should  be  noted  that  this  international 
co-operation  is  not  by  any  means  always  with 
similar  and  racially  allied  nations.  Republican 
France  finds  itself,  and  has  been  for  a  generation, 
the  ally  of  autocratic  Russia.    Australia,  who  much 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives     31 

more  than  any  other  country  has  been  obsessed 
by  the  Yellow  Peril  and  the  danger  from  Japan, 
finds  herself  to-day  fighting  side  by  side  with  the 
Japanese.  And  as  to  the  ineradicable  hostility 
of  races  preventing  international  co-operation, 
there  are  fighting  together  on  the  soil  of  France, 
as  I  write,  Flemish,  Walloons,  and  negroes  from 
Sengal,  Turcos  from  Northern  Africa,  Gurkhas 
from  India,  co-operating  with  the  advance  on 
the  other  frontier  of  Cossacks,  and  Russians  of  all 
descriptions.  This  military  and  political  co- 
operation has  brought  together  Mohammedan 
and  Christian,  Catholic,  Protestant,  and  Orthodox, 
negro,  white,  and  yellow,  African,  Indian,  and 
European,  monarchist,  republican,  socialist,  re- 
actionary— there  seems  hardly  a  racial,  religious, 
or  political  difference  that  has  stood  in  the  way  of 
rapid  and  effective  co-operation  in  the  common 
need. 

Thus  the  soldier  himself,  while  defending  the 
old  nationalist  and  exclusive  conceptions,  is  helping 
to  shrink  the  spaces  of  the  world,  and  break  down 
old  isolations  and  show  how  interests  at  the  utter- 
most ends  of  the  earth  react  one  upon  the  other. 

But  even  apart  from  this  influence,  as  already 
noted,  America  cannot  escape  the  military  any 
more  than  she  has  escaped  the  commercial  and 
financial  effects  of  this  war.  She  may  never  be 
drawn  into  active  military  co-operation  with  other 
nations,  but  she  is  affected  none  the  less;  by  a 
demand  for  a  naval  programme  immensely  larger 


32  America  and  the  New  World-State 

than  any  American  could  have  anticipated  a  year 
since,  by  plans  for  an  enormously  enlarged  army. 
That,  it  will  be  argued,  is  the  one  thing  needed: 
to  be  stronger  than  our  prospective  enemy.  And 
of  course  any  enemy — whether  he  be  one  nation 
or  a  group — who  really  does  contemplate  aggres- 
sion would  on  his  side  take  care  to  be  stronger  than 
us.  War  and  peace  are  matters  of  two  parties, 
and  any  principle  which  you  may  lay  down  for 
one  is  applicable  to  the  other.  When  we  say: 
"Si  vis  pacem,  para  bellum'*  we  must  apply  it  to 
all  parties.  One  eminent  upholder  of  this  principle, 
has  told  us  that  the  only  way  to  be  sure  of  peace 
is  to  be  so  much  stronger  than  your  enemy  that 
he  will  not  dare  to  attack  you.  Apply  that  to  the 
two  parties  and  you  get  this  result:  here  are  two 
nations  or  two  groups  of  nations  likely  to  quarrel. 
How  shall  they  keep  the  peace?  And  we  say 
quite  seriously  that  they  will  keep  the  peace  if 
each  is  stronger  than  the  other.  This  principle 
therefore,  which  looks  at  first  blush  like  an  axiom, 
is  as  a  matter  of  fact  an  attempt  to  achieve  a 
physical  impossibility  and  always  ends,  as  it  has 
ended  in  Europe  on  this  occasion,  in  explosion. 
You  cannot  indefinitely  pile  up  explosive  material 
without  an  accident  of  some  sort  occurring;  it  is 
bound  to  occur.  But  you  will  note  this:  that  the 
militarist — while  avowing  by  his  conduct  that 
nations  can  no  longer  in  a  military  sense  be  inde- 
pendent, that  they  are  obliged  to  co-operate  with 
others  and  consequently  depend  upon  some  sort 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives    33 

of  arrangement,  agreement,  compact,  alliance 
with  others — ^has  adopted  a  form  of  compact 
which  merely  perpetuates  the  old  impossible 
situation  on  a  larger  scale!  He  has  devised  the 
"Balance  of  Power." 

For  several  generations  Britain,  which  has  oc- 
cupied with  reference  to  the  Continent  of  Europe 
somewhat  the  position  which  we  are  now  coming 
to  occupy  with  regard  to  Europe  as  a  whole,  has 
acted  on  this  principle :  that  so  long  as  the  Powers 
of  the  Continent  were  fairly  equally  divided  she 
felt  she  could,  with  a  fair  chance  of  safety,  face 
either  one  or  the  other.  But  if  one  group  became 
so  much  stronger  than  the  other  that  it  was  in 
danger  of  dominating  the  whole  continent  then 
Britain  might  find  herself  faced  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing power  with  which  she  would  be  unable  to  deal. 
To  prevent  this  she  joined  the  weaker  group. 
Thus  Britain  intervened  in  continental  politics 
against  Napoleon  as  she  has  intervened  to-day 
against  the  Kaiser.  But  this  policy  is  merely  a 
perpetuation  on  a  larger  scale  of  the  principle  of 
"each  being  stronger  than  the  other."  Military 
power,  in  any  case,  is  a  thing  very  difficult  to 
estimate;  an  apparently  weaker  group  or  nation 
has  often  proved,  in  fact,  to  be  the  stronger,  so 
that  there  is  a  desire  on  the  part  of  both  sides  to 
give  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  to  themselves.  Thus 
the  natural  and  latent  effort  to  be  strongest  is 
obviously  fatal  to  any  "balance."  Neither  side, 
in  fact,  desires  a  balance ;  each  desires  to  have  the 


34  America  and  the  New  World-State 

balance  tilted  in  its  favour.  This  sets  up  a  per- 
petual tendency  towards  rearrangement;  and  re- 
groupings and  reshufflings  in  these  international 
alliances  sometimes  take  place  with  extraordinary 
and  startling  rapidity,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Balkan 
States.  It  is  already  illustrated  in  the  present 
war;  Italy  has  broken  away  from  a  definite  and 
formal  alliance  which  everyone  supposed  would 
range  her  on  the  German  side.  There  is  at  least 
a  possibility  that  she  may  finally  come  down  upon 
the  Anglo-Franco-Russian  side.  You  have  Japan, 
which  little  more  than  a  decade  ago  was  fighting 
bitterly  against  Russia,  to-day  ranged  upon  the 
side  of  Russia.  The  position  of  Russia  is  still 
more  startling.  In  the  struggles  of  the  eighteenth 
and  early  nineteenth  centuries  Britain  was  almost 
always  on  the  side  of  Russia ;  then  for  two  genera- 
tions she  was  taught  that  any  increase  of  the 
power  of  Russia  was  a  particularly  dangerous 
menace.  That  once  more  was  a  decade  ago 
suddenly  changed,  and  Britain  is  now  fighting  to 
increase  both  relatively  and  absolutely  the  power 
of  a  century  which  her  last  war  on  the  Continent 
was  fought  to  check.  The  war  before  that  which 
Great  Britain  fought  upon  the  Continent  was 
fought  in  alliance  with  Germans  against  the  power 
of  France.  As  to  the  Austrians,  whom  Britain  is 
now  fighting,  they  were  for  many  years  her  faithful 
allies.  So  it  is  practically  true  to  say  of  nearly  all 
the  combatants  respectively  that  they  have  no 
enemy  to-day  that  was  not,  historically  speaking, 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives     35 

quite  recently  an  ally,  and  not  an  ally  to-day  that 
was  not  in  the  recent  past  an  enemy. 

These  combinations,  therefore,  are  not,  never 
have  been,  and  never  can  be,  permanent.  If 
history,  even  quite  recent  history,  has  any 
meaning  at  all,  the  next  ten  or  fifteen  or  twenty 
years  will  be  bound  to  see  among  these  ten  com- 
batants, now  in  the  field,  rearrangements  and 
permutations  out  of  which  the  crushed  and  sup- 
pressed Germany  that  is  to  follow  the  war — 
a  Germany  which  will  embrace,  nevertheless,  a 
hundred  million  of  the  same  race,  highly  efficient, 
highly  educated,  trained  for  co-ordination  and 
common  action — will  be  bound  sooner  or  later  to 
find  her  chance. 

If  America  should  by  any  catastrophe  join 
Britain  or  any  other  nation  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  a  "Balance  of  Power"  in  the  world, 
then  indeed  would  her  last  state  be  worse  than  her 
first.  The  essential  vice  of  the  Balance  of  Power 
is  that  it  is  based  upon  a  fundamentally  false 
assumption  as  to  the  real  relationship  of  nations 
and  as  to  the  function  and  nature  of  force  in  human 
affairs.  The  limits  of  the  present  article  preclude 
any  analysis  of  most  of  the  monstrous  fallacies, 
but  a  hint  can  be  given  of  one  or  two. 

First,  of  coiu-se,  if  you  could  get  such  a  thing 
as  a  real  Balance  of  Power — two  parties  con- 
fronting one  another  with  about  equal  forces — ^you 
would  probably  get  a  situation  most  favourable 
to  war.     Neither  being  manifestly  inferior  to  the 


36  America  and  the  New  World-State 

other,  neither  would  be  disposed  to  yield;  each 
being  manifestly  as  good  as  the  other  woiild  feel  in 
"honour"  bound  to  make  no  concession.  If  a 
Power  quite  obviously  superior  to  its  rival  makes 
concessions  the  world  may  give  it  credit  for 
magnaminity  in  yielding,  but  otherwise  it  would 
always  be  in  the  position  of  being  compelled  to 
vindicate  its  courage.  Our  notions  of  honour  and 
valour  being  what  they  are,  no  situation  could 
be  created  more  likely  to  bring  about  deadlocks 
and  precipitate  fights.  All  the  elements  are  there 
for  bringing  about  that  position  in  which  the 
only  course  left  is  "to  fight  it  out." 

The  assumption  underlying  the  whole  theory  of 
the  Balance  of  Power  is  that  predominant  military 
power  in  a  nation  will  necessarily — or  at  least 
probably — be  exercised  against  its  weaker  neigh- 
bours to  their  disadvantage.  Thus  Britain  has 
acted  on  the  assumption  that  if  one  Power  domi- 
nated the  Continent,  British  independence,  more 
truly  perhaps  British  predominance  in  the  world, 
would  be  threatened. 

Now  how  has  a  society  of  individuals — the 
community  within  the  frontiers  of  a  nation — met 
this  difficulty  which  now  confronts  the  society 
of  nations,  the  difficulty  that  is  of  the  danger  of 
the  power  of  an  individual  or  a  group?  They 
have  met  it  by  determining  that  no  individual  or 
group  shall  exercise  physical  power  or  predomi- 
nance over  others ;  that  the  community  alone  shall 
be  predominant.     How  has  that  predominance 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives    37 

been  secured?  By  determining  that  any  one 
member  attacked  shall  be  supported  by  the  whole 
weight  of  the  community  (exercised,  say,  through 
the  policeman).  If  A  flies  at  B's  throat  in  the 
street  with  evident  intention  of  throttling  him  to 
death,  the  community,  if  it  is  efficient,  immediately 
comes  to  the  support  of  B .  And  you  will  note  this : 
that  it  does  not  allow  force  to  be  used  for  the  settle- 
ment of  differences  by  anybody.  The  community 
does  not  use  force  as  such  at  all ;  it  merely  cancels 
the  force  of  units  and  determines  that  nobody  shall 
use  it.  It  eliminates  force.  And  it  thus  cancels 
the  power  of  the  units  to  use  it  against  other  units 
(other  than  as  a  part  of  the  commimity)  by  stand- 
ing ready  at  all  times  to  reduce  the  power  of  any 
one  unit  to  futility.  If  A  says  that  B  began  it, 
the  community  does  not  say,  "  Oh,  in  that  case  you 
may  continue  to  use  your  force;  finish  him  off." 
It  says,  on  the  contrary,  "Then  we'll  see  that  B 
does  not  use  his  force;  we'll  restrain  him,  we  won't 
have  either  of  you  using  force.  We'll  cancel  it 
and  suppress  it  wherever  it  rears  its  head."  For 
there  is  this  paradox  at  the  basis  of  all  civilized 
intercourse;  force  between  men  has  but  one  use, 
to  see  that  force  settles  no  difference  between 
them. 

And  this  has  taken  place  because  men — ^individ- 
ually— ^have  decided  that  the  advantage  of  the 
security  of  each  from  aggression  outweighs  the  ad- 
vantage which  each  has  in  the  possible  exercise  of 
aggression.     When  nations  have  come  to  the  same 


38  America  and  the  New  World-State 

decision — ^and  not  a  moment  before — they  will 
protect  themselves  from  aggression  in  precisely 
the  same  way;  by  agreeing  between  them  that 
they  will  cancel  by  their  collective  power  the 
force  of  any  one  member  exercised  against  another. 
I  emphasize  the  fact  that  you  must  get  this  recogni- 
tion of  common  interest  in  a  given  action  before 
you  can  get  the  common  action.  We  have  man- 
aged it  in  the  relations  between  individuals  because 
the  numbers  being  so  much  greater  than  in  the 
case  of  nations  individual  dissent  goes  for  less. 
The  poHceman,  the  judge,  the  gaoler  have  behind 
them  a  larger  number  relatively  to  individual 
exceptions  than  is  the  case  with  nations.  For  the 
existence  of  such  an  arrangement  by  no  means 
impUes  that  men  shall  be  perfect,  that  each  shall 
willingly  obey  all  the  laws  which  he  enforces.  It 
merely  implies  that  his  interest  in  the  law  as  a 
whole  is  greater  than  his  interest  in  its  general 
violation.  No  man  for  a  single  day  of  his  life 
observes  all  the  Ten  Commandments,  yet  you  can 
always  secure  a  majority  for  the  support  of  the 
Ten  Commandments  for  the  simple  reason  that, 
while  there  are  a  great  many  who  would  like  to 
rob,  all  are  in  favour  of  being  protected  against  the 
robber.  While  there  are  a  great  many  who  would 
like  on  occasion  to  kill,  all  are  in  favour  of  being 
protected  against  being  killed.  The  prohibition 
of  this  act  secures  universal  support  embracing 
"all  of  the  people  all  of  the  time";  the  positive 
impulse   to   it   is  isolated  and   occasional — with 


America's  Future — The  Alternatiues     39 

some  individuals  perhaps  all  the  time — but  with  all 
individuals  only  some  of  the  time,  if  ever. 

When  you  come  to  the  nations,  there  is  less 
disproportion  between  the  strength  of  the  unit 
and  the  society.  Hence  nations  have  been  slower 
than  individuals  in  realizing  their  common  interest. 
Each  has  placed  greater  reliance  on  its  own  strength 
for  its  protection.  Yet  the  principle  remains  the 
same.  There  may  be  nations  which  desire  for 
their  own  interest  to  go  to  war,  but  they  all  want 
to  protect  themselves  against  being  beaten.  You 
have  there  an  absolutely  common  interest.  The 
other  interest,  the  desire  to  beat,  is  not  so  universal; 
in  fact,  if  any  value  can  be  given  whatever  to 
the  statement  of  the  respective  statesmen,  such 
an  interest  is  non-existent.  There  is  not  a  single 
statesman  in  Christendom  to-day  who  would 
admit  for  a  moment  that  it  is  his  desire  to  wage 
war  on  a  neighbouring  nation  for  the  purpose  of 
conquering  it.  All  this  warfare  is,  each  party 
to  it  declares,  merely  a  means  of  protecting  it- 
self against  the  aggression  of  neighbours.  What- 
ever insincerity  there  may  be  in  these  declarations, 
we  can  at  least  admit  this  much,  that  the  desire 
to  be  safe  is  more  widespread  than  the  desire  to 
conquer,  for  the  desire  to  be  safe  is  universal. 
We  ought  to  be  able,  therefore,  to  achieve,  on  the 
part  of  the  majority,  action  to  that  end.  And  on 
this  same  principle  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
nations  as  a  whole  would  give  their  support  to 
any  plan  which  would  help  to  secure  them  from 


40  America  and  the  New  World-State 

being  attacked.  It  is  time  for  the  society  of 
nations  to  take  this  first  step  towards  the  creation 
of  a  real  community;  to  agree,  that  is,  that  the 
influence  of  the  whole  shall  be  thrown  against  the 
one  recalcitrant  member. 

The  immensely  increased  contact  between 
nations,  which  has  set  up  a  greater  independence 
(in  the  way  hinted  at  in  my  last  article),  has  given 
weight  to  the  interest  in  security  and  taken  from 
the  interest  in  aggression.  The  tendency  to  aggres- 
sion is  often  a  blind  impulse  due  to  the  momenttim 
of  old  ideas  which  have  not  yet  had  time  to  be 
discredited  and  disintegrated  by  criticism.  And 
of  organization  for  the  really  common  interest — 
that  of  security  against  aggression — there  has  in 
fact  been  none.  If  there  is  one  thing  certain  it  is 
that  in  Europe,  in  July,  1914,  the  people  did  not 
want  war;  they  tolerated  it,  passively  dragged 
by  the  momenttmi  of  old  forces  which  they  could 
not  even  formulate.  The  really  general  desire 
has  never  been  organi2:ed;  any  means  of  giving 
effect  to  a  common  will — such  as  is  given  it  in 
society  within  the  frontiers — ^has  never  so  far  been 
devised. 

I  believe  that  it  is  the  mission  of  America  in  her 
own  interest  to  devise  it;  that  the  circumstances 
of  her  isolation,  historical  and  geographical,  enable 
her  to  do  for  the  older  peoples — ^and  herself — a. 
service  which  by  reason  of  their  circumstances, 
geographical  and  historical,  they  cannot  do  for 
themselves. 


America's  Future — The  Alternatives    41 

The  power  that  she  exercises  to  this  end  need  not 
be  mihtary.  I  do  not  think  that  it  should  be 
miUtary.  This  war  has  shown  that  the  issues  of 
mihtary  conflict  are  so  uncertain,  depending  upon 
all  sorts  of  physical  accidents,  that  no  man  can 
possibly  say  which  will  win.  The  present  war  is 
showing  daily  that  the  advantage  does  not  always 
go  with  numbers,  and  the  outcome  of  war  is  always 
to  some  extent  a  hazard  and  a  gamble,  but  there 
are  certain  forces  that  can  be  set  in  operation  by 
nations  situated  as  is  the  United  States,  that  are 
not  in  any  way  a  gamble  and  a  hazard,  the  effect 
of  which  will  be  quite  certain.  I  refer  to  the  pres- 
s\ire  of  such  a  thing  as  organized  non-intercourse, 
the  sending  of  a  country  to  moral,  social,  economic 
Coventry.  We  are,  I  know,  here  treading  some- 
what unknown  ground,  but  we  have  ample  evi- 
dence to  show  that  there  do  exist  forces  capable  of 
organization,  stronger  and  more  certain  in  their 
operation  than  military  forces.  That  the  world 
is  instinctively  feeHng  this  is  demonstrated  by  the 
present  attitude  of  all  the  combatants  in  Europe 
to  the  United  States.  The  United  States  relatively 
to  Powers  like  Russia,  Britain,  and  Germany,  is  not 
a  great  military  Power,  yet  they  are  all  pathetically 
anxious  to  secure  the  goodwill  of  the  United  States. 

Why? 

It  can  hardly  be  to  save  the  shock  to  their 
moral  feelings  which  would  come  from  the  mere 
disapproval  of  people  on  the  other  side  of  the 
world.     If  any  percentage  of  what  we  have  read 


42  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  German  methods  is  true,  if  German  ethics  bear 
the  faintest  resemblance  to  what  they  are  so  often 
represented  to  be,  Germany  must  have  no  feeling 
in  the  political  sphere  to  be  hurt  by  the  moral 
disapproval  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
If  German  statesmen  are  so  desperately  anxious, 
as  they  evidently  are,  to  secure  the  approval  and 
goodwill  of  the  United  States  it  is  because  they 
realize,  however  indistinctly,  that  there  lie  in  the 
hands  of  the  United  States  powers  which  could  be 
loosed,  more  portentous  than  those  held  by  the 
masters  of  many  legions. 

Just  what  these  powers  are  and  how  they  might 
be  used  to  give  America  greater  security  than  she 
could  achieve  by  arms  to  place  her  at  the  virtual 
head  of  a  great  world-state  and  to  do  for  mankind 
as  a  whole  a  service  greater  than  any  yet  recorded 
in  written  history  must  be  left  to  another  chapter. 


CHAPTER  III 

AMERICA  AS  LEADER 

What  are  the  most  powerful  forces  and  sanctions  in  modem  life? — 
The  non-military  character  of  those  sanctions — How  the 
world  admits  their  force  without  knowing  it — The  opportu- 
nity for  America  to  organize  these  forces — How  she  can 
ensure  her  own  security — How  she  can  do  for  Europe  what 
Europe  cannot  do  for  herself — America  as  the  centre  of 
the  new  World-State — Her  mission  as  initiator  and  organizer 
of  the  new  sanctions  in  international  life — Will  America  show 
herself  capable  of  real  world  leadership? 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  indicated  that  America 
might  undertake  at  this  juncture  of  interna- 
tional affairs  an  intervention  in  the  poHtics  of 
the  Old  World  which  is  of  a  kind  not  yet  heretofore 
attempted  by  any  nation,  an  intervention,  that 
is  to  say,  that  should  not  be  military,  but  in  the 
first  instance  mediatory  and  moral,  having  in 
view,  if  needs  be,  the  employment  of  certain 
organized  social  and  economic  forces  which  I  will 
detail  presently. 

The  suggestion  that  America  should  take  any 
such  lead  is  resisted,  first,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a 
violation  of  her  traditional  policy,  and,  secondly, 
that  "economic  and  social  forces"  are  bound  to 

43 


44  America  and  the  New  World-State 

be  ineffective  unless  backed  by  military,  so  that 
the  plea  would  involve  her  in  a  militarist  policy. 
With  reference  to  these  two  points,  I  pointed  out 
in  the  preceding  chapter  that  America's  isolation 
from  a  movement  for  world  agreement  would 
infallibly  land  her  in  a  very  pronounced  militarist 
policy,  the  increase  of  her  armaments,  the  militari- 
zation of  her  civilization  and  all  that  that  implies. 

There  are  open  to  America  at  this  present 
moment  two  courses:  one  which  will  lead  her  to 
militarism  and  the  indefinite  increase  of  arma- 
ments— that  is  the  course  of  isolation  from  the 
world's  life,  from  the  new  efforts  that  will  be  made 
towards  world  organization;  the  other,  to  antici- 
pate events  and  take  the  initiative  in  the  leader- 
ship of  world  organization,  which  would  have  the 
effect  of  rendering  Western  civilization,  including 
herself,  less  military,  less  dependent  upon  arms, 
and  put  the  development  of  that  civilization  on  a 
civilist  rather  than  a  militarist  basis. 

I  believe  that  it  is  the  failure  to  realize  that  this 
intervention  can  be  non-military  in  character 
which  explains  the  reluctance  of  very  many 
Americans  to  depart  from  their  traditional  policy 
of  non-intervention.  With  reference  to  that 
point  it  is  surely  germane  to  remember  that  the 
America  of  1 9 14  is  not  the  America  of  1776; 
circumstances  which  made  Washington's  advice 
sound  and  statesmanlike  have  been  transformed. 
The  situation  to-day  is  not  that  of  a  tiny  Power 
not  yet  solidified,  remote  from  the  main  currents 


America  as  Leader  45 

of  the  world's  life,  outmatched  in  resources  by 
any  one  of  the  greater  Powers  of  Europe.  America 
is  no  longer  so  remote  as  to  have  httle  practical 
concern  with  Europe.  Its  contacts  with  Europe 
are  instantaneous,  daily,  intimate,  innumerable — 
so  much  so  indeed  that  our  own  civilization  will  be 
intimately  affected  and  modified  by  certain  changes 
which  threaten  in  the  older  world.  I  will  put  the 
case  thus:  suppose  that  there  are  certain  develop- 
ments in  Europe  which  would  profoundly  threaten 
our  own  civilization  and  otu"  own  security,  and 
suppose  further  that  we  could,  without  great  cost 
to  ourselves,  so  guide  or  direct  those  changes  and 
developments  as  to  render  them  no  longer  a  menace 
to  this  country.  If  such  a  case  could  be  estab- 
lished, would  not  adherence  to  a  formula  estab- 
lished imder  eighteenth-century  conditions  have 
the  same  relation  to  sound  politics  that  the  incanta- 
tions and  taboos  of  superstitious  barbarians  have 
to  sound  religion?  And  I  think  such  a  case  can 
be  established. 

I  wonder  whether  it  has  occurred  to  many 
Americans  to  ask  why  all  the  belligerents  in  this 
present  war  are  showing  such  remarkable  deference 
to  American  public  opinion.  Some  Americans 
may,  of  course,  believe  that  it  is  sheer  personal 
fascination  of  individual  Americans  or  simple 
tenderness  of  moral  feeling  that  makes  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  Germany,  Austria,  take 
definitely  so  much  trouble  at  a  time  when  they 
have  sufficient  already,  to  demonstrate  that  they 


46  America  and  the  New  World-State 

have  taken  the  right  course,  that  they  are  obeying 
all  the  laws  of  war,  that  they  are  not  responsible 
for  the  war  in  any  way,  and  so  forth.  Is  it  simply 
that  our  condemnation  would  hurt  their  feelings? 
This  hardly  agrees  with  certain  other  ideas  which 
we  hold  as  to  the  belligerents.  There  is  something 
beyond  this  order  of  motive  at  the  bottom  of  the 
immense  respect  which  all  the  combatants  alike 
are  paying  to  American  opinion.  It  happened  to 
the  writer  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  to  meet 
a  considerable  number  of  Belgian  refugees  from 
Brussels,  all  of  them  full  of  stories  (which  I  must 
admit  were  second  or  third  or  three  hundredth- 
hand)  of  German  barbarity  and  ferocity.  Yet  all 
were  obliged  to  admit  that  German  behaviour  in 
Brussels  had  on  the  whole  been  very  good.  But 
that,  they  explained,  was  "merely  because  the 
American  Consul  put  his  foot  down."  Yet  one 
is  not  aware  that  President  Wilson  had  authorized 
the  American  Consul  so  much  as  to  hint  at  the 
possible  military  intervention  of  America  in  this 
war.  Nevertheless  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
these  "Huns,"  so  little  susceptible  in  our  view 
for  the  most  part  to  moral  considerations,  were 
greatly  influenced  by  the  opinion  of  America; 
and  we  know  also  that  the  other  belligerents  have 
shown  the  same  respect  for  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States. 

I  think  we  have  here  what  so  frequently  happens 
in  the  development  of  the  attitude  of  men  towards 
large  general  questions:   the  intuitive  recognition 


America  as  Leader  47 

of  a  truth  which  those  who  recognize  it  are  quite 
unable  to  put  into  words.  It  is  a  self-protective 
instinct,  a  movement  that  is  made  without  its 
being  necessary  to  think  it  out.  (In  the  way  that 
the  untaught  person  is  able  instantly  to  detect  the 
false  note  in  a  tune  without  knowing  that  such 
things  as  notes,  or  crotchets  and  quavers  exist.) 

It  is  qmte  true  that  the  Germans  feared  the  bad 
opinion  of  the  world  because  the  bad  opinion  of  the 
world  may  be  translated  into  an  element  of  resist- 
ance to  the  very  ends  which  it  is  the  object  of  the 
war  to  achieve  for  Germany. 

Those  ends  include  the  extension  of  German 
influence,  material  and  moral,  of  German  com- 
merce and  culture.  But  a  world  very  hostile  to 
Germany  might  quite  conceivably  check  both. 
We  say  rightly  enough,  probably,  that  pride  of 
place  and  power  had  its  part — many  declare  the 
predominant  part — in  the  motives  that  led  Ger- 
many into  this  war.  But  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  a  universal  revulsion  of  feeHng  against  a 
Power  like  Germany  might  neutraHze  the  influence 
she  would  gain  in  the  world  by  a  mere  extension 
of  her  territorial  conquests.  Russia,  for  instance, 
has  nearly  five  times  the  population  and  very- 
many  times  the  area  of  France ;  but  one  may  doubt 
whether  even  a  Russian  would  assert  that  Russian 
influence  is  five  or  ten  times  greater  than  that  of 
France ;  still  less  that  the  world  yielded  him  in  any 
sense  a  proportionately  greater  deference  than 
it  yields  the  Frenchman.     The  extent  to  which 


48  America  and  the  New  World-State 

the  greatest  Power  can  impose  itself  by  bayonets 
is  very  limited  in  area  and  depth.  All  the  might 
of  the  Prussian  Army  cannot  compel  the  children 
of  Poland  or  of  Lorraine  to  say  their  prayers  in 
German;  it  cannot  compel  the  housewives  of 
Switzerland  or  Paraguay  or  of  any  other  little 
state  that  has  not  a  battleship  to  its  name,  to 
buy  German  saucepans  if  so  be  they  do  not  desire 
to.  There  are  so  many  other  things  necessary  to 
render  political  or  military  force  effective;  and 
there  are  so  many  that  can  offset  it  altogether. 
We  see  these  forces  at  work  around  us  every  day 
accomplishing  miracles,  doing  things  which  a  thou- 
sand years  of  fighting  were  never  able  to  do — and 
then  say  serenely  that  they  are  mere  "theories." 
Why  do  Catholic  Powers  no  longer  execute  here- 
tics? They  have  a  perfect  right — even  in  Inter- 
national Law — to  do  so.  What  is  it  that  protects 
the  heretic  in  Catholic  countries?  The  police? 
But  the  main  business  of  the  police  and  the  army 
used  to  be  to  hunt  him  down.  What  is  controlling 
the  police  and  the  army? 

By  some  sort  of  process  there  has  been  an 
increasing  intuitive  recognition  of  a  certain  code 
which  we  realize  to  be  necessary  for  a  decent 
society.  It  has  come  to  be  a  sanction  much 
stronger  than  the  sanction  of  law,  much  more 
effective  than  the  sanction  of  military  force. 
During  the  German  advance  on  Paris,  I  happened 
to  be  present  at  a  French  family  conference. 
Stories  of  the  incredible  cruelties  and  ferocity  of 


America  as  Leader  49 

the  Germans  were  circulating  in  the  northern 
Department  where  I  happened  to  be  staying. 
Everyone  was  in  a  condition  of  panic,  and  two 
Frenchmen,  fathers  of  families,  were  seeing  red 
at  the  story  of  all  these  barbarities.  But  they  had 
to  decide — and  the  thing  was  discussed  at  a  Httle 
family  conference — where  they  should  send  their 
wives  and  children.  And  one  of  these  French- 
men, the  one  who  had  been  most  ferocious  in  his 
condemnation  of  the  German  barbarian,  said  quite 
naively  and  with  no  sense  of  irony  or  paradox: 
"Of  course,  if  we  could  find  an  absolutely  open 
town  which  would  not  be  defended  at  all,  the 
women  folk  and  children  would  be  all  right." 
His  instinct,  of  course,  was  perfectly  just.  The 
German  "savage"  had  had  three-quarters  of  a 
million  people  in  his  absolute  power  in  Brussels, 
and,  so  far  as  we  know,  not  a  child  or  a  woman  has 
been  injured.  Indeed  in  normal  times  our  secu- 
rity against  foreigners  is  not  based  upon  physical 
force  at  all.  I  suppose  during  the  last  century 
some  hundreds  of  thousands  of  British  and  Ameri- 
can tourists  have  travelled  through  the  historic 
cities  of  Germany,  their  children  have  gone  to  the 
German  educational  institutions,  their  invahds 
have  been  tended  by  German  doctors  and  cut  up 
by  German  surgeons  in  German  sanatoria  and 
health  resorts,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  it  never 
occttrred  to  any  one  of  these  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands that  their  little  children,  when  in  the  educa- 
tional institutions  of  these  "Huns,"  were  in  any 
4 


50  America  and  the  New  World-State 

way  in  danger.  It  was  not  the  guns  of  the  Ameri- 
can Navy  or  the  British  Navy  that  were  protect- 
ing them;  the  physical  force  of  America  or  of 
Great  Britain  could  not  certainly  be  the  factor 
operative  in,  say,  Switzerland  or  Austria,  yet 
every  summer  tens  of  thousands  of  them  trust 
their  lives  and  those  of  their  women  and  children 
in  the  remote  mountains  of  Switzerland  on  no 
better  security  than  the  expectation  that  a  foreign 
community,  over  whom  we  have  no  possibility 
of  exercising  force,  will  observe  a  convention  which 
has  no  sanction  other  than  the  recognition  that  it 
is  to  their  advantage  to  observe  it.  And  we  thus 
have  the  spectacle  of  millions  of  Anglo-Saxons 
absolutely  convinced  that  the  sanctity  of  their 
homes  and  the  safety  of  their  property  are  secure 
from  the  ravages  of  the  foreigner  only  because  they 
possess  a  naval  and  military  force  that  overawes 
him,  yet  serenely  leaving  the  protection  of  that 
miUtary  force,  and  placing  life  and  property  alike 
within  the  absolute  power  of  that  very  foreigner 
against  whose  predatory  tendencies  we  spend 
millions  in  protecting  ourselves. 

No  use  of  military  power,  however  complete 
and  overwhelming,  would  pretend  to  afford  a 
protection  anything  like  as  complete  as  that 
afforded  by  these  moral  forces.  Sixty  years  ago 
Britain  had  as  against  Greece  a  preponderance  of 
power  that  made  her  the  absolute  dictator  of  the 
latter's  policy,  yet  all  the  British  battleships  and 
all    the    threats   of    "consequences"    could    not 


America  as  Leader  51 

prevent  British  travellers  being  murdered  by 
Greek  brigands,  though  in  Switzerland  only  moral 
forces — the  recognition  by  an  astute  people  of  the 
advantage  of  treating  foreigners  well — had  already 
made  the  lives  and  property  of  Britons  as  safe 
in  that  country  as  in  their  own. 

In  the  same  way,  no  scheme  of  arming  Protest- 
ants as  against  Catholics,  or  Catholics  as  against 
Protestants  (the  method  which  gave  us  the  wars 
of  religion  and  the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew), 
could  assure  that  general  security  of  spiritual  and 
intellectual  possessions  which  we  now  in  large 
measure  enjoy.  So  indeed  with  the  more  material 
things,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  some  of  the 
older  nations  have  sunk  thousands  of  millions 
in  foreign  investments,  the  real  security  of  which 
is  not  in  any  physical  force  which  their  govern- 
ment could  possibly  exercise,  but  the  free  recogni- 
tion of  foreigners  that  it  is  to  their  advantage  to 
adhere  to  financial  obHgations.  Englishmen  do 
not  even  pretend  that  the  security  of  their  invest- 
ments in  a  country  like  the  United  States  or  the 
Argentine  is  dependent  upon  the  coercion  which 
the  British  Government  is  able  to  exercise  over 
these  communities. 

The  reader  will  not,  I  think,  misunderstand  me. 
I  am  not  pleading  that  human  nature  has  under- 
gone or  will  undergo  any  radical  transformation. 
Rather  am  I  asserting  that  it  will  not  undergo 
any;  that  the  intention  of  the  man  of  the  tenth 
century  in  Europe  was  as  good  as  that  of  the  man 


52  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  the  twentieth ;  that  the  man  of  the  tenth  century 
was  as  capable  of  self-sacrifice,  was,  it  may  be,  less 
self-seeking.  But  what  I  am  trying  to  hint  is 
that  the  shrinking  of  the  world  by  our  developed 
intercommunication  has  made  us  all  more  inter- 
dependent. The  German  Government  moves  its 
troops  against  Belgium;  a  moratorium  is  imme- 
diately proclaimed  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  a  dozen 
American  Stock  Exchanges  are  promptly  closed, 
and  some  himdreds  of  thousands  of  our  people 
are  affected  in  their  daily  lives.  This  world-wide 
effect  is  not  a  matter  of  some  years  or  a  generation 
or  two.  It  is  a  matter  of  an  hour;  we  are  inti- 
mately concerned  with  the  actions  of  men  on  the 
other  side  of  the  world  that  we  have  never  seen 
and  never  shall  see;  and  they  are  intimately 
concerned  with  us.  We  know,  without  having 
thought  it  out,  that  we  are  bound  together  by  a 
compact;  the  very  fact  that  we  are  dependent 
upon  one  another  creates  as  a  matter  of  fact  a 
partnership.  We  are  expecting  the  other  man  to 
perform  his  part;  he  has  been  doing  so  uninter- 
ruptedly for  years,  and  we  send  him  our  goods  or 
we  take  his  bill  of  exchange,  or  our  families  are 
afloat  in  his  ships,  expecting  that  he  will  pay  for  his 
goods,  honour  the  bill  of  exchange,  navigate  safely 
his  ship — he  has  undertaken  to  do  these  things 
in  the  world-wide  partnership  of  our  common 
labour  and  then  he  fails.  He  does  not  do  these 
things,  and  we  have  a  very  lively  sense  of  the 
immorality  of  the  doctrine  which  permits  him  to 


America  as  Leader  53 

escape  doing  them.  And  so  there  are  certain  of 
these  things  that  are  not  done,  certain  lengths  to 
which  even  in  war  time  we  cannot  go.  What  will 
stop  the  war  is  not  so  much  the  fighting,  any  more 
than  Protestant  massacres  prevented  Catholic 
massacres.  Men  do  not  fear  the  enemy  soldiers ; 
they  do  fear  the  turning  of  certain  social  and 
moral  forces  against  them.  The  German  Govern- 
ment does  not  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  send  ten 
thousand  of  its  own  people  to  certain  death  imder 
enemy  guns  even  though  the  military  advantage 
of  so  doing  may  be  relatively  trifling.  But  it 
dare  not  order  the  massacre  of  ten  thousand 
foreign  residents  in  Berlin.  There  is  some  force 
which  makes  it  sometimes  more  scrupulous  of  the 
lives  of  its  enemy  than  of  the  lives  of  its  own  people. 

Yet  why  should  it  care?  Because  of  the  physical 
force  of  the  armies  ranged  against  it?  But  it  has 
to  meet  that  force  in  any  case.  It  fears  that  the 
world  will  be  stirred.  In  other  words  it  knows 
that  the  world  at  large  has  a  very  lively  realization 
that  in  its  own  interest  certain  things  must  not 
be  done,  that  the  world  could  not  live  together 
as  we  now  know  it,  if  it  permitted  those  things  to 
be  done.     It  would  not  so  permit  them. 

At  the  bottom  of  this  moral  hesitation  is  an 
unconscious  realization  of  the  extent  of  each 
nation's  dependence  upon  the  world-partnership. 
It  is  not  a  fear  of  physical  chastisement;  any 
nation  will  go  to  war  against  desperate  odds  if  a 
foreign  nation  talks  of  chastising  it.     It  is  not 


54  America  and  the  New  Worid-State 

that  consideration  which  operates,  as  a  thousand 
examples  in  history  prove  to  us.  But  there  are 
forces  outside  miHtary  power  more  visible  and 
ponderable  than  these. 

There  exists,  of  course,  already  a  world-state 
which  has  no  formal  recognition  in  our  paper  con- 
stitutions at  all,  and  no  sanction  in  physical  force. 
If  you  are  able  to  send  a  letter  to  the  most  obscure 
village  of  China,  a  telegram  to  any  part  of  the 
planet,  to  travel  over  most  of  the  world  in  safety, 
to  carry  on  trade  therewith,  it  is  because  for  a 
generation  the  Post-Ofhce  Departments  of  the 
world  have  been  at  work  arranging  traffic  and 
communication  details,  methods  of  keeping  their 
accoimts;  because  the  shipowner  has  been  devis- 
ing international  signal  codes,  the  banker  arrang- 
ing conditions  of  international  credit ;  because  in 
fact  not  merely  a  dozen  but  some  hundreds  of 
international  agreements,  most  of  them  made  not 
between  governments  at  all,  but  between  groups 
and  parties  directly  concerned,  have  been  de- 
vised. There  is  no  overlord  enforcing  them,  yet 
much  of  our  daily  life  depends  upon  their  normal 
working.  The  bankers  or  the  shipowners  or  the 
makers  of  electric  machinery  have  met  in  Paris 
or  in  Brussels  and  decided  that  such  shall  be  the 
accepted  code,  such  the  universal  measurement 
for  the  lamp  or  instrument,  such  the  conditions 
for  the  bill  of  exchange,  and  from  the  moment  that 
there  is  an  agreement  you  do  not  need  any  sanc- 
tion.    If  the  instrument  does  not  conform  to  the 


America  as  Leader  55 

measurement  it  is  unsalable  and  that  is  sanction 
enough. 

We  have  seen  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  the 
dependence  of  the  nations  goes  back  a  good  deal 
further  than  we  are  apt  to  think ;  that  long  before 
the  period  of  fully  developed  intercommunication, 
all  nations  owed  their  civilization  to  foreigners. 
It  was  to  their  traffic  with  Gaul  and  the  visits  of 
the  Phoenician  traders  that  the  early  inhabitants 
of  the  British  Isles  learned  their  first  steps  in  arts 
and  crafts  and  the  development  of  a  civilized 
society,  and  even  in  what  we  know  as  the  Dark 
Ages  we  find  Charlemagne  borrowing  scholars  from 
York  to  assist  him  in  civilizing  the  continent. 
The  civilization  which  our  forefathers  brought 
with  them  to  America  was  the  result  of  centuries 
of  exchange  in  ideas  between  Britain  and  the 
Continent,  and  though  in  the  course  of  time  it  had 
become  something  characteristically  Anglo-Saxon, 
its  origins  were  Greek  and  Arabic  and  Roman 
and  Jewish.  But  the  interdependence  of  nations 
to-day  is  of  an  infinitely  more  vital  and  insistent 
kind,  and,  despite  superficial  set-backs,  becomes 
more  vital  every  day.  As  late  as  the  first  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  for  instance,  Britain 
was  still  practically  self-sufficing;  her  very  large 
foreign  trade  was  a  trade  in  luxuries.  She  could 
still  produce  her  own  food,  her  population  could 
still  live  on  her  own  soil.  But  if  to-day  by  some 
sort  of  magic  Britain  could  kill  off  all  foreigners, 
the  means  of  livelihood  for  quite  an  appreciable 


56  America  and  the  New  World-State 

portion  of  her  poptilation  would  have  disappeared. 
Millions  woiild  be  threatened  by  actual  starvation. 
For  Britain's  overseas  trade,  on  which  so  large  a 
proportion  of  the  population  actually  lives,  is 
mainly  with  the  outside  world  and  not  with  her 
own  Empire.  We  have  seen  what  isolation  merely 
from  two  countries  has  meant  for  Great  Britain. 
Britain  is  still  maintaining  her  contacts  with  the 
world  as  a  whole,  but  the  cessation  of  relationship 
with  two  countries  has  precipitated  the  gravest 
financial  crisis  known  in  all  her  history,  has  kept 
her  Stock  Exchanges  closed  for  months,  has  sent 
her  consols  to  a  lower  point  than  any  known  since 
the  worst  period  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  and  has 
compelled  the  Government  ruthlessly  to  pledge 
its  credit  for  the  support  of  banking  institutions 
and  all  the  various  trades  that  have  been  most 
seriously  hit.  Nor  is  Germany's  isolation  al- 
together complete.  She  manages  through  neutral 
countries  and  otherwise  to  maintain  a  considerable 
current  of  relationship  with  the  outside  world, 
but  how  deeply  and  disastrously  the  partial 
severance  of  contact  has  affected  Germany  we 
shall  not  at  present,  probably  at  no  time,  in  full 
measure  know. 

All  this  gives  a  mere  hint  of  what  the  organized 
isolation  by  the  entire  world  would  mean  to  any 
one  nation.  Imagine  the  position  of  a  civilized 
country  whose  ports  no  ship  from  another  country 
would  enter,  whose  bills  no  banker  would  dis- 
count, a  country  unable  to  receive  a  telegram  or  a 


America  as  Leader  57 

letter  from  the  outside  world  or  send  one  thereto, 
whose  citizens  could  neither  travel  in  other  coun- 
tries or  maintain  communication  therewith.  It 
would  have  an  effect  in  the  modem  world  some- 
what equivalent  to  that  of  the  dreadful  edicts  of 
excommunication  and  interdict  which  the  Papal 
Power  was  able  to  issue  in  the  mediaeval  world. 

I  am  aware,  of  course,  that  such  a  measure  would 
fall  very  hardly  upon  certain  individuals  in  the 
countries  inflicting  this  punishment,  but  it  is 
quite  within  the  power  of  the  Governments  of 
those  countries  to  do  what  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  done  in  the  case  of  persons  like  acceptors 
of  German  bills  who  found  themselves  threatened 
with  bankruptcy  and  who  threatened  in  conse- 
quence to  create  great  disturbance  aroimd  them 
because  of  the  impossibility  of  securing  payment 
from  the  German  endorsers.  The  British  Govern- 
ment came  to  the  rescue  of  those  acceptors  and 
used  the  whole  national  credit  to  sustain  them. 
It  is  expensive  if  you  will,  but  infinitely  less  ex- 
pensive than  a  war,  and  finally  most  of  the  cost 
of  it  wiU  probably  be  recovered. 

Now  if  that  were  done,  how  could  a  coimtry  so 
dealt  with  retaliate?  She  could  not  attack  all  the 
world  at  once.  Upon  those  neighbours  more 
immediately  interested  could  be  thrown  the  bur- 
den of  taking  such  defensive  military  measures 
as  the  circumstances  might  dictate.  You  might 
have  a  group  of  Powers  probably  taking  such 
defensive  measures  and  all  the  Powers  of  Christen- 


58  America  and  the  New  World-State 

dom  co-operating  economically  by  this  suggested 
non-intercourse.  It  is  possible  even  that  the 
Powers  as  a  whole  might  contribute  to  a  general 
fimd  indemnifying  individuals  in  those  States 
particularly  hit  by  the  fact  of  non-intercourse; 
I  am  thinking  for  instance  of  shipping  interests 
in  a  port  like  Amsterdam  if  the  decree  of  non- 
intercourse  were  proclaimed  against  a  Power  like 
Germany. 

We  have  little  conception  of  the  terror  which 
such  a  policy  might  constitute  to  a  nation.  It  has 
never  been  tried,  of  course,  because  even  in  war 
complete  non-intercourse  is  not  achieved.  At 
the  present  time  Germany  is  buying  and  selling 
and  trading  with  the  outside  world,  cables  from 
Berlin  are  being  sent  almost  as  freely  to  New 
York  as  cables  from  London  and  German  mer- 
chants are  making  contracts,  maintaining  con- 
nections of  very  considerable  complexity.  But  if 
this  machinery  of  non-intercourse  were  organized 
as  it  might  be,  there  would  be  virtually  no  neu- 
trals, and  its  effect  in  our  world  to-day  woiild  be 
positively  terrifying. 

It  is  true  that  the  American  administration  did 
try  something  resembling  a  policy  of  non-inter- 
course in  dealing  with  Mexico.  But  the  thing  was 
a  fiction.  While  the  Department  of  State  talked 
of  non-intercourse  the  Department  of  the  Treasury 
was  busy  clearing  ships  for  Mexico,  facilitating 
the  dispatch  of  mails,  etc.  And  of  course  Mexico's 
communication    with    Europe    remained    unim- 


America  as  Leader  59 

paired;  at  the  exact  moment  when  the  President 
of  the  United  States  was  threatening  Huerta  with 
all  sorts  of  dire  penalties,  Huerta's  Government 
was  arranging  in  London  for  the  issue  of  large 
loans,  and  the  advertisements  of  these  Mexican 
loans  were  appearing  in  the  London  Times.  So 
that  the  one  thing  that  might  have  moved  Huerta's 
Government,  the  United  States  Government  was 
unable  to  enforce.  In  order  to  enforce  it,  it  needed 
the  co-operation  of  other  countries.  I  have  spoken 
of  the  economic  World-State — of  all  those  complex 
international  arrangements  concerning  post-offices, 
shipping,  banking,  codes,  sanctions  of  law,  criminal 
research,  and  the  rest,  on  which  so  much  of  our 
civilized  life  depends.  This  World-State  is  tm- 
organized,  incoherent.  It  has  neither  a  centre 
nor  a  capital,  nor  a  meeting  place.  The  ship- 
owners gathered  in  Paris,  the  world's  bankers  in 
Madrid  or  Berne,  and  what  is,  in  effect,  some  vital 
piece  of  world  regulation  is  devised  in  the  smoking- 
room  of  some  Brussels  hotel.  The  World-State 
has  not  so  much  as  an  office  or  an  address.  The 
United  States  should  give  it  one.  Out  of  its  vast 
resources  it  should  endow  civilization  with  a 
Central  Bureau  of  Organization — a  Clearing  House 
of  its  international  activities  as  it  were,  with  the 
funds  needed  for  its  staff  and  upkeep. 

If  undertaken  with  largeness  of  spirit  it  woiild 
become  the  Capitol  of  the  world.  And  the  Old 
World  looks  to  America  to  do  this  service,  because 
it  is  the  one  which  it  cannot  do  for  itself.     Its  old 


6o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

historic  jealousies  and  squabbles,  from  which 
America  is  so  happily  detached,  prevent  any  one 
Power  taking  up  and  putting  through  this  work  of 
organization,  but  America  could  do  it,  and  do  it  so 
effectively  that  from  it  might  well  flow  this  organi- 
zation of  that  common  action  of  all  the  nations 
against  any  recalcitrant  member  of  which  I  have 
spoken  as  a  means  of  enforcing  non-militarily  a 
common  decision. 

It  is  this  World-State  which  it  should  be  the 
business  of  America  during  the  next  decade  or 
two  to  co-ordinate,  to  organize.  Its  organization 
will  not  come  into  being  as  the  result  of  a  week- 
end talk  between  ambassadors.  There  will  be 
difficulties,  material  as  well  as  moral,  jealousies 
to  overcome,  suspicions  to  surmount.  But  this 
war  places  America  in  a  more  favourable  posi- 
tion than  any  one  European  Power.  The  older 
Powers  woiild  be  less  suspicious  of  her  than  of  any 
one  among  their  number.  America  has  infinitely 
greater  material  resources,  she  has  a  greater  gift 
for  improvised  organization,  she  is  less  hidebound 
by  old  traditions,  more  disposed  to  make  an 
attempt  along  new  lines.  That  is  the  most  terrify- 
ing thing  about  the  proposal  which  I  make ;  it  has 
never  been  tried.  But  the  very  difficulties  con- 
stitute for  America  also  an  immense  opportunity. 
We  have  had  nations  give  their  lives  and  the  blood 
of  their  children  for  a  position  of  supremacy  and 
superiority.  But  we  are  in  a  position  of  supe- 
riority and  supremacy  which  for  the  most  part 


America  as  Leader  6i 

would  be  welcomed  by  the  world  as  a  whole  and 
which  would  not  demand  of  America  the  blood  of 
one  of  her  children.  It  would  demand  some  en- 
thusiasm, some  moral  courage,  some  sustained 
effort,  faith,  patience,  and  persistence.  It  would 
establish  new  standards  in,  and  let  us  hope  a  new 
kind  of,  international  rivalry. 

One  word  as  to  a  starting  point  and  a  possible 
line  of  progress.  The  first  move  toward  the  end- 
ing of  this  present  war  may  come  from  America. 
The  President  of  the  United  States  will  probably 
act  as  mediator.  The  terms  of  peace  will  pro- 
bably be  settled  in  Washington.  Part  of  the 
terms  of  peace  to  be  exacted  by  the  Allies  will 
probably  be,  as  I  have  already  hinted,  some  sort 
of  assurance  against  future  danger  from  German 
militarist  aggression.  The  German,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  does  not  believe  that  he  has  been  the 
aggressor — it  is  not  a  question  at  all  of  whether 
he  is  right  or  wrong,  it  is  a  question  of  what  he 
believes.  And  he  believes  quite  honestly  and 
sincerely  that  he  is  merely  defending  himself. 
So  what  he  will  be  mainly  concerned  about  in  the 
future  is  his  security  from  the  victorious  Allies. 
Around  this  point  much  of  the  discussion  at  the 
conclusion  of  this  present  war  will  range.  If  it  is 
to  be  a  real  peace  and  not  a  truce,  an  attempt  will 
have  to  be  made  to  give  to  each  party  security 
from  the  other,  and  the  question  will  then  arise 
whether  America  will  come  into  the  combination 
or  not.     I  have  already  indicated  that  I  think 


62  America  and  the  New  World-State 

she  shotild  not  come  in,  certainly  I  do  not  think 
she  will  come  in,  with  the  offer  of  military  aid.  But 
if  she  stays  out  of  it  altogether,  she  will  have  with- 
drawn from  this  world  congress,  that  must  sit  at 
the  end  of  the  war,  a  mediating  influence  which 
may  go  far  to  render  it  nugatory.  And  when, 
after,  it  may  be  somewhat  weary  preliminaries, 
an  international  council  of  conciliation  is  estab- 
lished to  frame  the  general  basis  of  the  new  alli- 
ance between  the  civilized  powers  for  mutual 
protection  along  the  lines  indicated,  America,  if 
she  is  to  play  her  part  in  securing  the  peace  of  the 
world,  must  be  ready  to  throw  at  least  her  moral 
and  economic  weight  into  the  common  stock,  the 
common  moral  and  economic  forces  which  will 
act  against  the  common  enemy,  whoever  he  may 
happen  to  be.  That  does  not  involve  taking  sides, 
as  I  showed  in  my  last  chapter.  The  policeman 
does  not  decide  which  of  two  quarrellers  is  right; 
he  merely  decides  that  the  stronger  shall  not  use  his 
power  against  the  weaker.  He  goes  to  the  aid  of 
the  weaker  and  then  later  the  community  deals 
with  the  one  who  is  the  real  aggressor.  One  may 
admit,  if  you  will,  that  at  present  there  is  no 
international  law  and  that  it  may  not  be  possible 
to  create  one.  But  we  can  at  least  exact  that 
there  shall  be  an  inquiry,  a  stay;  and  more  often 
than  not  that  alone  would  suffice  to  solve  the 
difficulty  without  the  application  of  definite  law. 
It  is  just  up  to  that  point  that  the  United  States 
shoiild  at  this  stage  be  ready  to  commit  herself 


America  as  Leader  63 

in  the  general  council  of  conciliation,  namely  to 
say  this : 

We  shall  throw  our  weight  against  any  Power  that 
refuses  to  give  civilization  an  opportunity  at  least  of 
examining  and  finding  out  what  the  facts  of  the 
dispute  are.  After  due  examination  we  may  reserve 
the  right  to  withdraw  from  any  further  interference 
between  such  Power  and  its  antagonist.  But  at 
least  we  pledge  ourselves  to  secure  that,  by  throwing 
the  weight  of  such  non-miHtary  influence  as  we  may 
have  on  the  side  of  the  weaker. 

That  is  the  point  at  which  a  new  society  of  na- 
tions would  begin,  as  it  is  the  point  at  which  a 
society  of  individuals  has  begun.  And  it  is  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  effect  to  her  undertaking  in  that 
one  regard  that  America  should  become  the  centre 
of  a  definite  organization  of  that  World-State  which 
has  already  cut  athwart  all  frontiers  and  traversed 
all  seas. 

It  is  not  easy  without  apparent  hyperbole  to 
write  of  the  service  which  America  would  thus 
render  to  mankind.  She  would  have  discovered 
a  new  sanction  for  human  justice,  would  have  made 
human  society  a  reality.  She  would  have  done 
something  immeasinrably  greater,  immeasiirably 
more  beneficent  than  any  of  the  conquests  recorded 
in  the  long  story  of  man's  mostly  futile  struggles. 
The  democracy  of  America  would  have  done 
something  which  the  despots  and  the  conquerors 
of  all  time  from  Alexander  and  Ca?sar  to  Napoleon 


64  America  and  the  New  World-State 

and  the  Kaiser  have  found  to  be  impossible. 
Dangerous  as  I  believe  national  vanity  to  be, 
America  would,  I  think,  find  in  the  pride  of  this 
achievement — this  American  leadership  of  the 
human  race — a  glory  that  would  not  be  vain,  a 
worid-victory  which  the  worid  would  welcome. 


PART  II 
THE  DOCTRINES  THAT  MAKE  WAR 


65 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    MORAL    FOUNDATIONS     OF     PRUSSIANISM 

The  importance  of  "  theories  " — This  war  by  universal  consent  due 
to  false  theories — The  German  nation  transformed  by  them 
— What  is  the  theory  that  has  caused  the  war? — How  the 
ideals  of  a  people  may  be  changed — What  do  the  Germans 
hope  to  achieve  by  their  victory? — Why  Americans  should 
understand  these  questions — For  what  purpose  are  States 
maintained? — What  is  the  ultimate  test  of  good  politics? — 
What  does  military  and  political  power  achieve  for  the  ulti- 
mate realities  of  human  life? — "The  Great  Illusion" — The 
moral,  intellectual,  and  economic  foundations  of  Prussianism 
— Materialistic  roots  of  militarism — No  refuge  save  in  the 
improvement  of  human  understanding — America's  part  in 
bringing  about  that  improvement. 

If  America  is  to  fulfil  the  role  which  has  been 
indicated  in  the  first  part  of  this  book,  if  she  is 
to  become  the  leader  in  the  new  World-State,  it 
is  essential  that  the  American  people  should 
understand  the  circumstances  by  which  this  op- 
portunity has  been  created  and  should  know 
something  of  the  alternative  lines  which  the  devel- 
opment of  the  world  may  take.  They  must  know 
something  of  the  peculiar  character  of  the  present 
struggle  in  Europe  and  of  the  results  which  are 
likely  to  spring  from  it.     For  only  by  a  knowledge 

67 


68  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  these  things  can  they  determine  the  manner  in 
which  their  own  influence  must  be  exerted  in  order 
to  obtain  security  for  themselves  and  contribute 
to  the  full  measure  of  their  opportimities  to  the 
progress  of  the  world.  Now  the  one  outstanding 
feature  of  the  European  War  is  that  according  to 
the  testimony  of  the  combatants  themselves  it  is 
mainly  a  war  of  ideas. 

All  fine-spun  theories,  all  sentimental  aspirations 
and  vague  generalities,  the  whole  collection  of  shib- 
boleths treasured  by  the  idealists  and  the  dreamers,  are 
shattered  by  the  first  whiff  of  grapeshot  [wrote  a 
popular  journalist  some  years  ago].  The  idealogues 
and  doctrinaires  [he  went  on]  do  not  seem  capable  of 
realizing  the  difference  between  the  world  of  theory 
and  the  world  of  fact — the  material  world  in  which  we 
live:  that  all  the  argument  in  the  world  won't  pene- 
trate an  inch  of  armour-plate,  and  that  a  syllogism 
is  no  answer  to  a  Dreadnought. 

It  is  the  "practical "  view  always,  one  would  have 
thought,  that  is  beloved  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peo- 
ples: the  importance  of  "facts" — Dreadnoughts, 
beef-steaks,  machine-guns,  and  a  balance  at  the 
bank — as  opposed  to  the  "theories,"  ideals,  desires, 
aspirations,  of  the  idealogues  and  the  doctrinaires. 
These  things  cannot  change  human  nature  or  the 
"hard"  facts  of  the  world;  they  can  be  no  concern 
of  men  of  affairs  or  those  responsible  for  practical 
policy — above  all,  should  such  logomachies  of  the 
study  be  no  concern  of  statesmen  and  men  of 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  69 

action,  since  it  is  their  business  to  deal  with 
"  things  as  they  are." 

Such  is  the  attitude,  as  of  course  you  are  aware, 
if  you  have  followed  the  discussion  of  the  issues 
of  war  and  peace  or  of  the  more  fundamental  pro- 
blems of  international  relationship,  that  has  in- 
variably been  adopted  by  all  those  in  the  United 
States  or  in  Great  Britain  who  desire  to  retain  their 
reputation  for  practicality  and  common  sense. 

Yet  to-day  the  British  people  have  not  only 
become  convinced,  but  are  saying  loudly  and 
insistently,  that,  so  far  from  theories,  doctrines, 
professors  and  philosophers,  being  of  no  account, 
the  war  in  which  they  are  engaged,  the  greatest  in 
so  many  respects  that  has  marked  their  history,  or 
any  history,  has  but  one  basic  and  fundamental 
cause:  theories,  aspirations,  dreams,  desires — the 
false  theories  of  professors,  the  false  ideals  of 
idealogues.  And  there  is  a  general  disposition  in 
America  to  accept  this  view  of  the  matter. 

The  people  of  Great  Britain  are  practically 
agreed  that  this  war  is  the  result  of  a  false  national 
doctrine,  which  is  in  its  turn  the  work  of  half  a 
dozen  professors  and  a  few  writers  and  theorists — 
Nietzsche,  Treitschke,  and  their  school.  And  a 
large  proportion,  perhaps  the  great  bulk  of  Amer- 
ican public  opinion,  is  inclined  to  agree.  Not  only 
have  the  false  ideas  and  ideals  of  these  theorists 
produced  the  greatest  war  of  history,  but  they 
have,  according  to  this  view,  accomplished  a 
miracle  still  more  startling:  they  have  radically 


70  America  and  the  New  World-State 

transformed  the  nature  and  character  of  a  nation 
of  some  seventy  million  souls.  For  very  rightly 
the  evil  influence  of  the  Germans  is  attributed  to 
an  idea  and  a  tradition,  and  not  to  the  inherent 
wickedness  of  the  race.  The  Germans  are,  of  all 
the  peoples  of  Europe,  the  most  nearly  allied  to 
the  English-speaking  peoples  in  race  and  blood; 
in  all  the  simple  and  homely  things  our  very 
language  is  the  same.  Every  time  that  we  speak 
of  house  and  love,  father  and  mother,  son  and 
daughter,  God  and  man,  work  and  bread,  we  attest 
to  common  origins  in  the  deepest  and  realest 
things  that  affect  us.  Our  religious  history  is 
allied;  the  political  ties  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  in  the  past  have  been  many.  The 
British  Royal  Family  is  largely  of  German  origin. 
As  for  ourselves,  we  have  living  amongst  us  millions 
of  German  descent  who  have  contributed  largely 
to  the  building  up  of  our  prosperity  and  civiliza- 
tion. Some  of  the  most  cherished  names  in  our 
history  are  those  of  our  German  citizens.  Now,  if 
they  say  that  German  wickedness  is  inherent  in  the 
race,  and  not  in  doctrine,  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples 
condemn  themselves.  If  we  are  to  see  straight 
in  this  matter  at  all,  we  must,  in  judging  Germans, 
remember  what  they  were  and  what  they  have 
become.     That  is  not  easy. 

The  public  memory  is  notoriously  a  short-lived 
one.  If  twenty  years  ago  the  average  Briton  had 
been  asked  what  people  in  Europe  were  most  like 
himself,  in  moral  outlook,  in  their  attitude  to  the 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  71 

things  which  really  matter — family  life,  social 
morality,  the  relations  of  the  sexes,  and  the  respec- 
tive importance  which  we  ascribe  to  the  various 
moral  qualities — he  would  have  said  that  that 
nation  was  Germany.  The  notion  that  they  were 
more  naturally  allied  in  character  to  the  French 
would  have  appeared  twenty  years  ago,  to  ninety- 
nine  Britons  out  of  a  hundred,  almost  offensive. 
Until  yesterday,  for  nearly  three  himdred  years, 
among  educated  men  in  Europe  and  America, 
German  idealism  had  been  recognized  as  the  out- 
standing moral  force  in  Eiurope.  From  the  days 
of  the  Reformation  until  military  ambitions  and 
necessities  changed  it  all,  her  great  work  has  been 
in  things  of  the  mind.  Voltaire  embodied  this 
common  judgment  of  educated  men  in  Europe 
two  hundred  years  ago,  when  he  said  that  "France 
ruled  the  land,  England  the  sea,  and  German}^  the 
clouds."  And  even  now,  in  the  passion  and  heat 
of  war,  there  are  Britons  who  cannot  be  accused 
of  pro-Germanism  who  recognize  this  in  the  fullest 
degree.     One  of  them  has  said  quite  recently: 

The  world's  debt  to  Germany  for  thought  and 
knowledge  is  inestimable.  .  .  .  Germany  was  a 
land  of  dreams.  Her  peoples  from  the  earliest  times 
had  been  children  of  romance,  and  they  became,  not 
only  pioneers  of  thought,  but  the  unequalled  masters 
of  certain  forms  of  imaginative  art.  Of  that  the  mere 
names  of  their  composers  and  poets — Grimm  and 
Humperdinck,    Schubert    and    Schumann,    Schiller, 


72  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Heine,  Weber,  Brahms — are  sufficient  testimony. 
Bach,  Mozart,  Beethoven,  Wagner — no  other  people 
has  had  such  genius  in  the  world  of  blended  thought 
and  emotion  out  of  which  music  springs ;  and  no  other 
people  has  shown  so  constantly  the  power  of  laborious 
craftsmanship  which  musical  creation  demands. 
Goethe,  who  represented  in  his  single  work  all  three 
of  the  great  movements  of  German  mind — in  science, 
in  thought,  and  in  romance — was  typical  of  German 
capacity,  and  in  his  attitude  to  the  world  a  typical 
German  of  his  time.  .  .  .  The  ideal  of  that  Ger- 
many was  art  and  culture,  not  patriotism.  Its  vital 
forces  were  turned  to  the  production,  not  of  political 
efficiency  or  military  leadership,  but  of  Kant's  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  Beethoven's  Ninth  Symphony,  and 
Goethe's  Faust.  This  was  the  Germany  on  which 
the  figure  of  the  genial  professor,  familiar  to  caricature, 
was  founded.  To  it  the  world  owes,  and  has  always 
paid,  a  steady  tribute  of  affection  and  gratitude.* 

Here,  then,  are  a  people  so  closely  allied  to  the 
British  and  to  ourselves  in  race  that  their  children 
in  the  hotels  of  France  and  Italy  are  mistaken 
for  British  children;  a  people  with  whom  Great 
Britain  has  for  a  thousand  years  maintained  prac- 
tically unbroken  peace,  from  whom  the  British 
have  drawn  their  rulers,  and  with  whom  their 
Royal  Family  remains  to-day  closely  associated, 
who  have  often  been  their  allies  in  the  past,  and 
to  whom  we  and  they  have  given  unstinted  admira- 
tion and  respect — to-day  become,  thanks  to  the 

*  The  Round  Table,  September,  1914. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  73 

metamorphosis  of  a  false  doctrine  and  idea,  un- 
speakable savages  and  barbarians  quite  unworthy 
to  be  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  family  of  civili- 
zation, stirpassing  Huns  in  barbarity,  Turks  in 
wickedness.  This  miracle  of  transformation,  the 
work  of  a  few  professors,  has  been  accomplished 
within  a  period  of  half  a  century  or  less. 

And  the  very  practical  Anglo-Saxon  people  who 
give  this  verdict  were  until  yesterday  declaring 
that  ideas,  theories,  and  doctrines,  are  of  no 
accoimt  or  import  in  the  world;  that,  indeed, 
they  are  not  "facts"  at  all,  and  that  that  term 
must  be  reserved  only  for  such  things  as  battle- 
ships and  howitzers. 

I  hope  the  reader  will  not  suppose  that  I  am 
overstating  a  case  in  order  to  support  a  contention 
w^hich  happens  to  be  the  burden  of  everything  that 
I  have  written  upon  this  subject — ^namely,  that 
war  and  peace,  like  all  good  and  bad  things  in 
human  relationship,  like  all  problems  of  the  good 
or  bad  use  which  we  make  of  the  raw  materials  of 
nature,  depend  upon  the  justice  or  the  fallacy  of 
the  ideas  of  men;  that  the  final  solution  of  this 
problem  will  come  through  the  reform  and  clarifi- 
cation of  ideas,  and  by  no  other  way  whatsoever. 

The  fact  that  a  false  theory,  the  fermentation  of 
wrong  ideas,  has  wrought  this  incredible  miracle, 
the  production  of  the  vastest  war  in  human  history, 
and  the  transformation  of  a  nation  from  a  very 
good  to  a  very  bad  force  in  human  society,  is 
one  upon  which  practically  all  Britons  and  the 


74  America  and  the  New  World-State 

majority  of  Americans  now  writing  on  this  subject 
are  agreed. 

So  well-known  a  British  writer  and  thinker  as 
Mr.  H.  G.  Wells,  for  instance,  puts  the  matter  as 
follows : 

All  the  realities  of  this  war  are  things  of  the  mind. 
This  is  a  conflict  of  cultures,  and  nothing  else  in  the 
world.  All  the  world-wide  pain  and  weariness,  fear 
and  anxieties,  the  bloodshed  and  destruction,  the 
innumerable  torn  bodies  of  men  and  horses,  the  stench 
of  putrefaction,  the  misery  of  hundreds  of  millions 
of  human  beings,  the  waste  of  mankind,  are  but  the 
material  consequences  of  a  false  philosophy  and  foolish 
thinking.  We  fight  not  to  destroy  a  nation,  but  a 
nest  of  evil  ideas. 

We  fight  because  a  whole  nation  has  become  ob- 
sessed by  pride,  by  the  cant  of  cynicism  and  the  vanity 
of  violence,  by  the  evil  suggestion  of  such  third-rate 
writers  as  Gobineau  and  Stewart  Chamberlain,  that 
they  were  a  people  of  peculiar  excellence  destined  to 
dominate  the  earth .... 

On  the  back  of  it  all,  spurring  it  on,  are  the  idea- 
mongers,  the  base-spirited  writing  men,  pretentious 
little  professors  in  frock  coats,  scribbling  colonels. 
They  are  the  idea.  They  pointed  the  way,  and  whis- 
pered "  Go ! "  They  ride  the  world  now  to  catastrophe. 
It  is  as  if  God  in  a  moment  of  wild  humour  had  lent 
His  whirlwinds  for  an  outing  to  half  a  dozen  fleas. 

And  the  real  task  before  mankind  is  quite  beyond 
the  business  of  the  fighting  line,  the  simple,  awful 
business  of  discrediting  and  discouraging  these  stupid- 
ities,, by  battleship,  artillery,  rifle,  and  the  blood  and 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  75 

courage  of  seven  million  men.  The  real  task  of  man- 
kind is  to  get  better  sense  into  the  heads  of  these 
Germans,  and  therewith  and  thereby  into  the  heads 
of  humanity  generally,  and  to  end  not  simply  a  war, 
but  the  idea  of  war.  What  printing  and  writing  and 
talking  have  done,  printing  and  writing  and  talking 
can  undo.  Let  no  man  be  fooled  by  bulk  and  matter. 
Rifles  do  but  kill  men,  and  fresh  men  are  born  to  follow 
them.  Our  business  is  to  kill  ideas.  The  ultimate 
purpose  of  this  war  is  propaganda — the  destruction 
of  certain  beliefs,  and  the  creation  of  others.  It  is 
to  this  propaganda  that  reasonable  men  must  address 
themselves.  * 

Substantially  the  same  view  is  expressed  again 
and  again  in  the  leading  articles  of  the  great 
British  dailies.  I  take  typical  passages  from  the 
leaders  of  the  London  Times,  as  follows : 

Peace  cannot  come  till  the  theories  of  the  Prussian 
Junkers  and  of  the  German  military  party,  the  theories 
of  which  men  like  von  Treitschke  and  Bemhardi  are 
the  frank  exponents,  the  theories  which  are  summed 
up  in  the  principle  that  "  Might  is  the  highest  right, " 
have  been  universally  renounced."^ 

The  spokesmen  of  the  nation  realize  to  the  full  that 
this,  in  Mr.  Asquith's  words,  is  a  "spiritual  conflict." 
We  have  not  entered  on  this  war  for  material  gain  or 
for  military  glory.  We  have  gone  into  it,  and  we  will 
fight  it  out,  to  defeat  the  monstrous  code  of  interna- 
tional immorality  which  a  certain  school  of  German 

'  London  Nation,  August  29,  1914. 
'  August  10,  19 14. 


76  America  and  the  New  World-State 

professors  and  German  soldiers  have  long  been  teach- 
ing, and  which  the  German  Government  have  adopted 
to  the  horror  of  mankind.  ^ 

The  Allies  will  go  to  Berlin  to  settle  accounts,  and 
not  to  lay  waste  the  Fatherland.  They  have  to  say 
to  the  German  people:  "This  worship  of  war  must 
cease,  and  the  sword  you  have  forged  must  be  broken." 
.  .  ,  Not  until  the  capital  is  reached  will  the  sword 
be  struck  from  Germany's  hands,  and  not  until  they 
see  the  conquerors  in  their  midst  will  the  Germans  turn 
from  Treitschke  and  Nietzsche  to  Luther  and  Goethe 
once  more.* 

An  eminent  British  journalist  puts  the  case  thus: 

As  this  great  tragedy  proceeds,  it  becomes  increas- 
ingly clear  that  the  issue  that  is  being  fought  at  this 
moment  in  the  trenches  of  the  Aisne  is  not  this  or 
that  national  gain  or  loss,  but  the  spiritual  governance 
of  the  world.  Someone — I  think  it  was  Sir  Robertson 
Nicoll — has  expressed  it  in  the  phrase  "Corsica  or 
Calvary. "  I  think  that  is  more  true  than  pictvu^esque 
phrases  ordinarily  are,  for  the  cause  for  which  the 
Allies  fight  is  more  vast  than  any  material  motive 
that  inspires  them.  They  are  the  instruments  of 
something  greater  than  themselves. 

If  the  phrase  is  unjust,  it  is  unjust  to  Corsica,  for 
behind  the  militarism  of  Napoleon  there  was  a  certain 
hiunan  and  even  democratic  fervour;  but  behind  the 
gospel  of  the  Kaiser  there  is  nothing  but  the  death  of 
the  free  human  spirit .  .  .  .  If  he  were  to  triumph, 
the  world  would  have  plunged  back  into  barbarism. 

'  September  5,  1914.  *  September  15,  1914. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  ^^ 

.  .  .  We  are  fighting  not  against  a  nation  so  much 
as  against  an  evil  spirit  who  has  taken  possession  of 
that  nation,  and  we  must  destroy  that  spirit  if  Europe 
is  to  be  habitable  to  us.  .  .  .  But  at  the  moment 
we  have  one  thing  to  do — to  hang  together  until  we 
have  beaten  the  common  enemy  of  humanity.  When 
that  is  done,  we  shall  remember  the  cause  for  which  we 
stand.  We  shall  break  the  Prussian  idol  for  ever.  .  .  . 
We  stand  for  the  spirit  of  light  against  the  spirit  of 
darkness.^ 

Mr.  Thomas  Hardy,  the  doyen  of  British  letters, 
also  gives  testimony  to  the  immense  influence  of  a 
little  group  of  professors: 

What  a  disastrous  blight  upon  the  glory  and  no- 
bility of  that  great  nation  has  been  wrought  by  the 
writings  of  Nietzsche,  with  his  followers!  I  should 
think  there  is  no  instance  since  history  began  of  a 
country  being  so  demoralized  by  a  single  writer. 

Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle  writes  in  substantially 
identical  terms,  and  concludes: 

Where,  now,  is  that  "deep,  patient  Germany"  of 
which  Carlyle  wrote?  Was  ever  a  nation's  soul  so 
perverted,  so  fallen  from  grace! 

Among  ourselves  this  opinion  has  been  endorsed 
notably  by  Dr.  Eliot,  ex-President  of  Harvard 
University,  who  says  in  a  letter  to  the  New  York 
Times  on  "America  and  the  Issues  of  the  European 
War": 

*  "A.  G.  G."  in  London  Daily  News,  September  26,  1914. 


78  America  and  the  New  World-State 

It  wotdd  be  a  serious  mistake  to  suppose  that 
Americans  feel  any  hostility  or  jealousy  towards 
Germany,  or  fail  to  recognize  the  immense  obligations 
under  which  she  has  placed  all  the  rest  of  the  world, 
although  they  now  feel  that  the  German  nation  has  been 
going  wrong  in  theoretical  and  practical  politics  for  more 
than  a  hundred  years,  and  to-day  is  reaping  the  conse- 
quences of  her  own  wrong  thinking  and  wrong  doing.  ^ 
[The  italics  are  mine.] 

The  New  York  Times,  summarizing  American 
opinion  of  the  war,  wrote  as  follows: 

Why  do  the  American  people  condemn  Germany? 
Because  they  condemn  and  abhor  militarism.  .  .  . 
The  supremacy  of  German  militarism  would  turn  back 
the  hands  of  the  clock.  The  civilized  world  would 
thereafter  be  less  civilized.* 

Now,  a  doctrine  that  can  accomplish  the  double 
miracle — so  to  transform  a  great  and  civilizing 
nation  as  to  make  it  a  danger  to  mankind,  and  to 
render  it  necessary  for  civilized  Europe  to  put 
some  fifteen  millions  of  its  soldiers  into  the  field 
in  order  to  fight  it — is  obviously  worth  a  little 
study.  We  are  very  particularly  concerned  to 
know,  now  that  we  ourselves  are  suffering  from  the 
effects  of  the  war  which  is  being  waged  to  destroy 
it,  what  will  be  necessary  for  its  destruction,  what 
will  be  the  chances  of  its  revival,  what  measures  are 

'  October  3,  1914.  *  September  7,  1914. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  79 

likely  to  be  successful  in  keeping  it  under — all  these 
are  practical  problems  which  will  concern  us,  as 
well  as  the  nations  of  Europe,  to-morrow,  and  we 
cannot  pretend  even  to  deal  with  this  spiritual 
enemy  of  mankind  unless  we  know  something  of 
the  facts — for  doctrines  and  ideas,  false  and  true, 
are  as  much  facts  as  shrapnel  or  dynamite,  and 
far  more  difficult  to  deal  with. 

What,  therefore,  is  the  nature  of  the  Prussian 
doctrine  that  has  wrought  all  this  havoc?  Why, 
in  fact,  did  Germany  go  to  war?  The  need  of 
an  increasing  population  for  territorial  expansion? 
That  motive — which  I  shall  deal  with  presently — 
may  have  played  its  part;  I  think  it  has.  The 
German,  like  most  of  the  other  men  of  Europe, 
may  have  a  general  impression  that  conquest  will 
somehow  enrich  him;  that  he  will  be  better  off  as 
the  subject  of  a  great  empire  than  as  the  subject  of 
a  small  one — ^which  is  much  like  saying  that  the 
people  of  New  York  are  richer  and  better  off  than 
the  people  of  Boston  or  Pittsburg;  or  that  a 
Russian  is  of  course  richer  than  a  Hollander  or 
Swiss.  But  as  it  is  one  of  the  beliefs  imiversally 
accepted  in  Europe,  he  may  share  it. 

But  everyone  is  agreed  that  the  material  motive 
alone  does  not  explain  German  aggression.  Ger- 
many, it  is  said,  desires  to  make  herself  the  master 
of  Europe,  and  so  of  the  world,  and  to  impose 
her  culture  thereon,  not  necessarily,  presumably, 
because  Germans  will  be  benefited  thereby,  but  as 
a  matter  of  national  pride.     It  is  an  Ideal,  sedu- 


8o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

lously  cultivated  by  the  new  teachers  who  have  won 
Germans  from  their  old  intellectual  allegiance.  ^ 

The  British,  and  to  some  extent  the  American 
public,  are,  indeed,  by  this  time  fairly  familiar 
with  the  cruder  manifestations  of  this  new  Ideal 
owing  to  the  immense  circulation  of  such  books  as 
Bemhardi's  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Accord- 
ing to  the  school  which  Bemhardi  represents, 
triumph  by  arms  is  a  thing  desirable  in  itself;  as, 
indeed,  is  war,  which  is  "  God's  test  of  the  nations." 
(The  whole  philosophy,  by  the  way,  as  expounded 
by  Germans,  as  distinct  from  the  Polish  exponents 
like  Nietzsche  and  Treitschke,  is  permeated  by 
intense  piety.)  War,  says  Bemhardi,  is  the 
greatest  factor  in  the  furtherance  of  culture  and 
power;  it  is  not  so  much  a  painful  necessity  as  a 
splendid  duty.  It  has  already  been  for  Germany 
a  means  to  national  imion,  and  must  now  be  a 
means  of  securing  for  the  German  spirit  and  Ger- 
man ideas  that  fitting  recognition  "which  has 
hitherto  been  withheld  from  them."  For,  con- 
continues   Bemhardi,   a   nation    must  dominate 


*  The  change  of  sentiment  and  ideal  to  which  the  writers  I 
have  cited  one  and  all  testify  is  the  more  remarkable  because  the 
older  Germany  (the  Germany  that  influenced  Europe  intellectu- 
ally and  morally)  had  the  nationalist  spirit  very  feebly  developed. 
Kant,  for  instance,  with  his  Dissertations  on  World  Peace,  was 
an  internationalist  and  a  cosmopolitan  before  the  French  had 
given  names  to  those  things;  Goethe  was  so  little  nationalist  or 
patriotic  that  he  tells  us  that  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  care 
particularly  even  about  Napoleon's  ovemmning  of  the  German 
States. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  8i 

others,  or  be  dominated  by  others;  there  is  no 
other  alternative.  There  is  in  all  virile  and  worthy- 
nations  the  "Will  to  Power,"  of  which  Nietzsche 
has  sung,  and  which  Treitschke,  Stewart  Chamber- 
lain, and  other  like  non-German  writers,  and  their 
followers,  have  applied  to  definite  politics.  Such 
a  "Will  to  Power, "  such  desire  to  dominate  others, 
involves  in  the  nation  animated  by  it  the  belief, 
not  merely  that  its  own  civilization  is  the  best  for 
itself,  but  that  it  is  the  best  for  all  others;  and 
that  if  war  be  needed  to  impose  it,  why,  that 
justifies  war,  which  is  a  great  selective  process, 
the  weeder-out  of  the  feeble,  a  school  of  discipline, 
a  moral  tonic.  These  philosophers  declare  that 
the  motives  prompting  war  are  inherent  in  human 
nature,  and  that  the  amiable  sentimentalists  who 
would  substitute  for  it  peace  and  arbitration  lack 
the  virile  human  outlook,  and  are  attempting  to 
set  at  nought  a  great  natural  law.  War  is  the 
struggle  for  life  among  nations  corresponding  to 
the  struggle  which  goes  on  in  all  other  spheres  of 
sentient  nature. 

The  philosophy  need  hardly  be  defined;  indeed, 
it  existed  long  before  Nietzsche,  and  has  been 
voiced  by  militarist  exponents  in  every  country 
that  ever  gained  a  military  victory. 

Behind  it  there  lie  very  definite  biological  and 
economic  fallacies:  the  idea  that  nations  are  con- 
demned to  struggle  as  rival  units  against  one 
another  for  a  fixed  and  limited  quantity  of  sus- 

0 


82  America  and  the  New  World-State 

tenance  and  opportunity;  that  a  people's  relative 
advantage  in  such  a  fight  depends  upon  the 
military  or  political  power  which  it  can  exercise 
over  others;  that  to  be  prosperous  and  to  feed  its 
population  a  nation  must  be  great  and  expanding; 
that  it  acquires  wealth  by  conquest  of  territory; 
and  all  the  subsidiary  illusions  which  are  bound 
up  with  those  fallacies. 

But  the  "Will  to  Power"  philosophy  goes  a 
little  deeper  than  the  false  arguments  which 
buttress  it.  It  is  a  crude  expression  of  the  idea 
that  it  is  "inherent  in  human  nature"  for  men 
to  wish  to  see  their  nation  more  powerful  than 
others,  the  ideals  it  represents  triumphant  over 
other  ideals,  its  influence  imposed  on  the  world; 
that  such  a  clash  of  nationalities  is  inevitable, 
because,  in  spiritual  things,  there  must  take  place 
the  same  conflict  as  goes  on  in  the  struggle  for 
physical  life. 

Well,  there  is  the  same  confusion  here  as  once 
made  religious  faith  in  Europe,  not  a  matter  of 
truth  and  feeling  for  the  eternal  verities,  but  a 
matter  of  opposing  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  the 
cleverness  of  one  general  at  deceiving  and  out- 
witting another  in  a  trade  where  "all  is  fair." 
In  the  wars  of  religion  the  spiritual  conflict  was 
replaced  by  a  very  material  one,  a  conflict  dragged 
down  from  the  higher  plane  whereon  it  might 
have  purified  men  to  a  plane  whereon  it  certainly 
debased  them.  For  hundreds  of  years  men  were 
sure  that  they  had  to  fight  out  their  religious 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  83 

differences  by  war,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to 
protect  and  promote  their  religious  ideas  by  that 
means.  The  Protestants  of  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  were  as  certain  that  Catholic 
power  had  to  be  destroyed  by  arms  as  Englishmen 
of  the  twentieth  century  that  Prussianism  must  be 
destroyed  by  the  same  means.  And,  indeed,  so 
long  as  Catholic  and  Protestant  alike  based  their 
position  upon  military  force,  so  long  as  both  be- 
lieved that  their  only  security  was  in  dominating 
the  other  by  that  force,  collision  was,  of  course, 
inevitable.  This  conflict,  the  determination  of 
each  group  to  impose  its  military  domination  on 
the  other,  was  also  certainly  "inherent  in  human 
nature."  Yet  the  day  came  when  one  group 
ceased  to  attach  any  very  great  value  to  the 
military  domination  of  the  other,  because  it  came 
to  be  realized  that  the  religious  and  moral  value 
of  such  domination  was  nil,  and  that  the  military 
conflict  was  irrelevant  to  religious  or  moral 
realities;  that  the  religious  possessions  of  all  were 
rendered  more  secure  by  ceasing  to  fight  for  them. 
It  is  difficult  for  us  here  in  America  to  realize  that 
our  forefathers  ever  thought  it  a  proper  objective 
of  state  action  to  suppress  the  Quakers  by  force. 
If  men  are  sufficiently  wise,  a  like  transformation 
will  take  place  in  the  domain  of  the  ideals  of  na- 
tionality. You  had  men  in  the  religious  struggles 
not  concerned  with  religious  dogma  at  all,  but 
only  with  the  military  glory  of  their  particular 
religious  group,  with  the  simple  desire  to  have 


84  America  and  the  New  World-State 

their  side  win  as  against  the  other  side.  And 
you  have  a  corresponding  motive  in  war  as  between 
nations:  millions  animated  by  a  determination  to 
achieve  victory,  and  to  give  their  lives  for  it,  for 
the  simple  end  of  victory.  In  the  Nietzschean 
and  other  "Will  to  Power"  philosophies  you  will 
find  plenty  of  this  glorification  of  victory  for  itself, 
irrespective  of  any  moral  or  material  aim  what- 
soever. It  may  be  true,  in  fact,  urge  these  de- 
fenders of  war,  that  we  could  not  impose  our 
national  ideals  by  war,  that  we  could  not  destroy 
our  enemy's  ideals  by  destroying  his  armies,  that 
his  language  and  literature  and  intellectual  and 
moral  influence  in  the  world  will  still  go  on,  and 
our  military  glory  would  be  irrelevant  to  that 
conflict;  but  we  should  have  beaten  him  and 
vindicated  our  nation's  military  superiority. 

And  that  we  are  told  is  the  final  poser,  that 
you  cannot  get  over  this  human  desire  to  beat  the 
other  man. 

It  is  one  of  the  curiosities  of  the  general  attitude 
towards  the  less  tangible  but  none  the  less  real 
things,  like  ideals  and  aspirations,  that  they  are 
regarded  as  unchangeable  and  immutable;  not 
in  any  way  the  result  of  contact  of  mind  with 
mind,  born  of  literature  and  the  intellectual 
activities  of  men,  but  as  something  which  argu- 
ment and  discussion  can  in  no  way  affect.  Now, 
I  submit  that,  far  from  argument  and  discussion 
not  affecting  ideals  like  those  which  I  have  indi- 
cated, they  are  the  direct  outcome  of  such  intel- 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  85 

lectual  activity,  as  I  think  the  whole  spectacle  of 
the  moral  and  intellectual  transformation  of 
Germany,  and  the  still  profounder  change  in 
Europe  as  a  whole  which  has  come  over  the  rela- 
tionship of  rival  religious  groups,  conclusively 
show.  The  desire  of  the  Huguenots  to  impose  their 
military  and  political  power  upon  Catholics,  and 
Catholics  upon  Huguenots,  was  marked  by  a 
hatred  so  intense  that  incidents  like  the  massacre 
of  St.  Bartholomew,  where  tens  of  thousands  of 
men,  women,  and  children  were  murdered  in  cold 
blood,  were  the  natural  outcome.  A  Catholic 
would  not  sit  at  table  with  a  Huguenot  "because 
of  the  special  odour  that  attached  to  heretics." 
Yet  as  the  result  of  an  intellectual  fermentation 
that  went  on  through  a  period  of  theological  dis- 
cussion, not  merely  did  Catholics  and  Huguenots 
cease  massacring  one  another;  something  much 
more  remarkable  occurred:  they  ceased  wanting 
to  do  so,  and  the  odour  of  the  heretic  disappeared. 
It  is  quite  true  that  the  question,  "What  does 
the  power  to  dominate  other  men,  to  conquer 
them,  achieve?"  will  be  answered  by  millions  in 
Europe,  to  the  effect  that  it  achieves  nothing  but 
itself;  that  is  all  it  is  intended  to  achieve.  And 
among  ourselves  there  has  come  into  existence 
a  school  of  writers  and  politicians  who  take  the 
same  view.  But  the  fact  of  wanting  such  a  thing 
for  itself  depends  upon  our  relative  estimate  of 
moral  values — whether,  for  instance,  we  regard 
sheer  physical  domination  of  another  as  a  worthy 


86  America  and  the  New  World-State 

thing — as  a  fit  aim  for  the  nation  that  we  desire 
to  have  respected — and  that  depends  upon  pre- 
cisely this  intellectual  fermentation,  the  discussion 
and  comparison  of  values  to  which  I  have  referred. 
That  brings  us  to  this:  that  you  cannot  deal 
with  this  problem  of  Prussianism,  the  moral 
attributes  it  connotes,  and  of  the  military  conflicts 
which  it  provokes,  without  asking  the  question, 
"For  what  purpose  does  the  State  exist?  What 
sort  of  life  do  we  desire  that  it  shall  assure  to  its 
people  ?  "  "A  life  of  war  and  struggle  and  victory, '  * 
says  the  Nietzschean  (and  some  Christians).  "If 
it  contains  that,  little  else  matters."  Well,  that 
might  conceivably  be  the  aim  which  a  society 
should  set  before  itself  as  the  objective  of  its 
collective  action — the  common  and  final  test  of 
policy  and  conduct — but  for  this  fact,  that  it 
cannot  be  common  or  universal.  Men  will  always 
be  able  to  form  themselves  into  groups.  Victory, 
domination,  mastery,  cannot  be  for  all.  It  is  an 
ideal  which  presupposes  victims,  and  no  one  will 
freely  choose  to  be  the  victim.  It  is  only  for  half 
the  world — the  top  half — and  as  in  war  the  decision 
as  to  which  comes  out  on  top  is  often  a  matter  of 
accident — decided  sometimes  by  such  things  as 
the  sudden  illness  of  a  general,  a  fog  or  rain-storm, 
giving  the  advantage  of  a  decisive  battle  to  the 
side  that  would  not  otherwise  have  had  it — no 
one  who  desires  to  be  the  master  of  his  fate  and 
to  direct  his  conduct  will  place  himself  knowingly 
in  a  position  where  he  becomes  the  helpless  puppet 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  87 

of  physical  accident  and  chance.  Since  Niet- 
zscheanism  involves  surrender  to  blind  physical 
forces,  it  defeats  itself.  Its  inevitable  end  is  the 
slavery  of  all — of  the  mind  of  all — to  dead  matter. 

What,  then,  must  be  the  ultimate  test  of  the 
true  aim  of  the  State?  There  are  rival  conceptions 
of  "good,"  of  what  men  should  strive  for.  Even 
religion  does  not  furnish  a  common  ultimate  test — 
no  common  denominator — for  the  modem  State 
has  no  common  religious  faith. 

And  yet  both  politics  and  religion  have  slowly 
been  evolving  a  common  test,  and  it  is  important 
to  this  discussion  to  note  the  direction  of  that 
development. 

Early  religious  ideals  have  little  to  do  with 
moral  or  social  ends;  their  emotion  is  little  con- 
cerned with  the  sanctification  of  human  relations. 
The  early  Christian  thought  it  meritorious  to  live 
a  sterile  life  at  the  top  of  a  pillar,  eaten  by  vermin, 
just  as  the  Hindoo  saint  to-day  thinks  it  meri- 
torious to  live  an  equally  sterile  life  upon  a  bed  of 
spikes.  But  as  the  early  Christian  ideal  progressed, 
sacrifices  having  no  end  connected  with  the  better- 
ment of  mankind  lost  their  appeal.  Our  admira- 
tion now  goes  but  faintly  to  the  recluse,  while  the 
saint  who  would  allow  the  nails  of  his  fingers  to 
grow  through  the  palms  of  his  clasped  hands  would 
excite,  not  our  admiration,  but  our  revolt. 

Something  similar  is  taking  place  in  politics. 
The  first  ideals  are  concerned  simply  with  personal 
allegiance  to  some  dynastic  chief,  a  feudal  lord, 


88  America  and  the  New  World-State 

or  a  monarch;  the  well-being  of  a  community 
hardly  enters  into  the  matter  at  all.  Later,  the 
chief  must  embody  in  his  person  that  well-being, 
or  he  does  not  obtain  the  allegiance  of  a  community 
of  any  enlightenment;  later,  the  well-being  of  the 
community  becomes  the  end  in  itself,  without 
being  embodied  ill  the  person  of  an  hereditary 
chief,  so  that  the  people  realize  that  their  efforts, 
instead  of  being  directed  to  the  protection  of  the 
personal  interest  of  some  chief,  are,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  directed  to  the  protection  of  their  own  inter- 
ests, and  their  altruism  has  become  self-interest, 
since  self-sacrifice  of  a  community  for  the  sake  of 
the  community  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  More 
and  more  is  a  given  religious  code  subject  to  this 
test:  does  it  make  for  the  improvement  of  society? 
If  not,  it  stands  condemned.  Political  ideals  will 
inevitably  follow  a  like  development,  and  will  be 
more  and  more  subjected  to  a  like  test. 

Now  I  well  know  the  derision  to  which  that  test 
can  be  subjected:  that  it  is  a  wide  and  question- 
begging  term,  since  "well-being,  improvement  of 
society,"  can  be  variously  interpreted;  that  so 
far  as  it  is  definite  at  all,  it  is  material  and  sordid, 
and  belongs  to  the  order  of  "pig  philosophy." ' 

'  I  happened  once  in  Paris  to  be  present  at  an  informal  dis- 
cussion between  some  French  priests  touching  the  question  of 
divorce,  and  the  most  suggestive  thing  about  the  whole,  I  thought, 
was  their  tendency  to  justify  this  or  that  line  taken  by  the  Church 
by  one  test — that  it  made,  or  it  did  not  make,  for  the  disintegra- 
tion of  society.  And  wherever  the  dogmatic  sanction  was  intro- 
duced,  I  believe  it  was  introduced  as  an  afterthought.     On 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  89 

And  to  that  I  would  reply :  the  widest  instincts 
of  Christendom  condemn  that  derision  as  ill- 
founded;  the  commonest  sense  of  Christendom  in 
our  age  gives  a  quite  definite  meaning  to  this  term, 
knows  full  well  what  it  implies — quite  well  enough 
for  the  practical  purposes  of  politics — and  has  de- 
cided that  the  end  it  represents  is  neither  sordid 
nor  materialistic;  the  narrowing  of  the  gulf  which 
is  supposed  to  separate  ideal  and  material  aims 
does  not  necessarily  degrade  religious  emotion, 
and  does  sanctify  the  common  labour  and  endeav- 
ours, the  everyday  things  of  life.  It  is  suggestive 
that  the  Founder  of  Christianity  in  the  invocation 
which  has  become  the  universal  prayer  of  Christen- 
dom has  embodied  in  it  a  plea  for  daily  bread. 
That  plea  is  not  a  sordid  one  because,  without  food, 
there  can  be  no  human  life,  and  consequently  no 
human  emotion  and  morality  or  society.  The 
ultimate  realities  of  life,  whether  they  be  moral  or 
material,  are  in  part  "economic"  realities. 

For  the  economic  interests  of  a  people  mean,  not 
merely  food  and  clothing  and  habitable  houses,  the 
means  of  decency  and  cleanliness  and  good  health,  but 

another  occasion  a  man  of  religious  instincts  resented  what  he 
regarded  as  a  slighting  reference  of  mine  to  St.  Simon  Stylites, 
He  thought  to  reprove  me  by  pointing  out  that  these  lives  of  aus- 
terity were  a  protest  against  a  condition  of  society  which  amounted 
to  social  putrefaction.  In  other  words,  he  justified  them  by 
attempting  to  show  that  they  had  a  social  end — that  they  made 
for  the  betterment  of  mankind  in  the  widest  terms.  This  line 
of  argument  pursued  by  such  a  person  indicates  that  the  Western 
man  is  simply  incapable  of  any  other  conception. 


90  America  and  the  New  World-State 

books,  education,  and  some  leisure,  freedom  from  care 
and  the  cramping  terror  of  destitution,  from  the  effects 
of  the  deadly  miasma  of  the  slum.  The  material  thing 
is  but  the  expression  of  still  profounder  realities  which 
cannot  be  separated  therefrom,  because  with  leisure 
and  a  wider  outlook  come  a  finer  affection — the  laugh- 
ter of  children,  the  grace  of  women,  some  assurance 
that  maternity  shall  be  a  joy  instead  of  a  burden — 
the  keener  feeling  for  life.  Bread  is  not  merely  the 
pulverized  seed  of  a  plant,  it  is  the  bloom  on  a  child's 
cheek,  it  is  life ;  for  it  is  human  food — that  is  to  say, 
a  part  of  what  human  life  represents.  And  to  save 
for  mothers  their  children,  and  for  men  their  wives; 
to  prolong  human  life,  to  enlarge  and  dignify  it,  are 
aims  not  to  be  dismissed  as  an  appeal  to  the  pocket. 
And  yet  too  often  they  are  so  dismissed. 

The  idealist  of  war  may  see  in  economics,  in 
"the  science  of  the  daily  bread,"  nothing  but  a 
sordid  struggle  for  "profit."  But  that  will  cer- 
tainly not  indicate  imaginativeness,  nor  is  it  an 
attitude  that  will  make  for  the  elevation  of  the 
common  lives  of  men.  To  make  of  the  activities 
to  which  the  immense  mass  of  mankind  for  the 
most  of  their  lives  are  condemned  something  mean 
and  sordid  is  to  degrade  the  quality  of  ordinary 
life  and  of  ordinary  men.  One  cannot  inspire 
those  things  by  making  ideals  something  apart 
from  them,  from  the  workaday  world,  something 
that  one  puts  on  for  special  occasions,  like  a  Sunday 
coat,  and  leaves  behind  for  six  days  of  the  week. 
It   can  only  be  accomplished   by   the  contrary 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  91 

process  of  giving  to  the  week-day  task  something 
of  inspiration  and  sanctity. 

The  great  mass  of  the  western  world  to-day 
know  full  well  that  by  "well-being"  they  imply 
a  condition  in  which  life  is  not  only  rendered 
possible,  but  expansive  and  inspiring,  the  things 
to  which  men,  as  a  simple  matter  of  fact,  do  devote 
their  lives  and  work.  The  enlargement  and 
security  of  those  ultimate  realities  I  have  taken 
as  the  test  by  which  our  politics  shall  be  judged. 

In  the  sub-title  of  The  Great  Illusion,  I  indicated 
that  that  book  was  intended  as  "a  study  of  the 
relation  of  military  power  to  national  advantage, " 
and  I  have  defined  "advantage"  as  "national 
weU-being  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,"  as 
including  such  things  as  the  fact  of  belonging  by 
contact  and  association  to  people  of  one's  own 
racial  group,  speech,  and  outlook;  all  that  makes 
for  happiness  and  dignity:  health,  sufficiency, 
cleanHness,  leisure,  laughter,  contact  of  mind  with 
mind,  satisfaction  of  physical,  intellectual,  and 
emotional  hunger  and  thirst,  affection,  the  play  of 
childhood,  grace,  courtesy,  beauty,  love — those 
things  which,  by  the  common  consent  of  Christen- 
dom and  the  western  world,  give  value  to  human 
life. 

Does  victory,  the  political  power  of  one  State 
over  other  States,  promote  these  things?  So  long 
as  much  doubt  remains  in  our  minds  on  that  ques- 
tion, war  will  go  on.  We  must  realize  at  least 
that  that  is  the  ultimate  test. 


92  America  and  the  New  World-State 

And  this  test,  moreover,  unlike  the  ideal  of  the 
Nietzschean,  who  extols  war  and  force  as  beautiful 
and  desirable  in  themselves,  more  beautiful  and 
desirable  than  affection  and  laughter,  and  all  the 
other  components  of  happiness  which  I  have 
indicated,  is  capable  of  universal  application:  all 
can  accept  all  its  implications,  whereas  no  one  will 
willingly  choose  defeat  and  slavery;  and  yet 
Nietzscheanism  necessarily  involves  defeat  and 
slavery  for  some.  It  involves  victims  on  one  side 
and  those  who  profit  by  the  victims  on  the  other; 
but  the  ends  which  I  have  indicated  are  best 
achieved  by  the  partnership  of  men,  and  in  a 
sound  partnership  there  are  no  victims. 

We  have  at  last,  then,  our  least  common  de- 
nominator, a  basic  moral  sanction  common  to  all 
western  society,  now  that,  whether  we  like  it  or 
not,  such  common  sanction  can  no  longer  be  foiuid 
in  religious  dogma  or  in  any  universally  accepted 
authoritative  code.  Here  is  the  final  test,  the  only 
one  capable  of  universal  application. 

Now,  this  war  is  a  struggle  for  political  power 
and  domination.  All  Englishmen  and  many 
Americans  believe  it  is  the  outcome  of  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Germany  to  dominate  Europe. 
Germans  believe  it  is  an  attempt  of  the  Slav  to  do 
so.  In  any  case,  political  power  is  the  objective. 
Now  the  question  which  The  Great  Illusion  asked 
is  this :  "What  can  such  political  power,  even  when 
achieved  by  the  victor,  do  for  the  betterment  of 
his  people?"    And  it  answered  that  question  by 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  93 

saying  that  it  does  and  can  do  nothing  whatsoever 
for  those  things  upon  which  we  are  agreed  as  the 
ultimate  reaUties  of  Hfe,  the  ends  for  which  the 
State  in  the  western  world  is  supposed  to  be 
created.  As  appHed  to  this  present  war  the  ques- 
tion asked  is  this:  " If  you,  Frank  or  Teuton,  Slav 
or  Briton,  could  secure  this  mastery  of  Europe, 
how  would  it  profit  your  people  or  add  any  mortal 
thing,  moral  or  material,  of  value  to  your  lives?" 
Again,  the  answer  which  that  book  gives  is  that  it 
would  profit  them  not  at  all  morally  or  materially ; 
that  military  and  political  power  is  economically, 
socially,  spiritually,  futile. 

Let  us  examine  the  thing  a  little  more  closely 
and  in  detail. 

To  take  first  the  moral  and  ideal  as  distinct  from 
the  narrowly  economic  problem,  accepting  for  the 
moment  the  conventional  distinction. 

Suppose  that  Germany  had  been  able  to  carry 
out  her  intention  and  to  bring  Europe  under  her 
sway,  conquer  India,  and  force  Britain  to  give  up 
her  Colonies,  would  any  German  have  been  the 
better  morally,  using  that  word  in  the  largest 
sense?  Would  those  German  workmen  and  peas- 
ants and  teachers  gain  anything  whatsoever  in 
the  moral  realities  of  life?  Would  they  have  been 
more  truthful,  better  fathers  and  husbands,  jollier, 
more  sincere?  Would  the  relationship  they  main- 
tain together  be  finer?  Would  life  have  been 
emotionally  keener?  Would  the  children  have 
shown  greater  affection?    Would  the  love  of  the 


94  America  and  the  New  World-State 

women  have  been  deeper? — because  the  German 
State  happened  to  have  conquered  imwilling 
provinces?  Is  it  the  people  of  the  great  miHtary 
States — Russia  for  instance — that  display  the 
moral  qualities  to  a  greater  degree  than  the  people 
of  the  little  States,  of  Switzerland,  Denmark, 
Sweden,  Belgium,  Holland?  Are  these  "little 
people"  poorer  in  the  spiritual  realities  of  existence 
than  the  people  of  the  great  States,  the  Austrians, 
Germans,  and  the  rest?  Is  life  in  a  Russian  village 
happier  and  spiritually  fuller  than  life  in  a  Dutch 
or  Scandinavian  or  Swiss  village?  What  is  the 
moral  gain  that  comes  of  the  power  to  dominate 
others  by  the  sword? 

There  is  no  moral  gain.  It  is  an  illusion. 
This  political  domination  over  other  men  is  in 
terms  of  the  deepest  realities  of  human  feeling  an 
empty  and  futile  thing,  which  adds  neither  to  the 
dignity  nor  happiness  of  those  who  exercise  it, 
and  has  in  it  an  infinity  of  moral  danger  from  which 
no  people  in  history  has  yet  escaped,  or  can  in  the 
nature  of  things  escape.  It  carries  with  it  a  fatal 
contradiction  and  stultification:  it  implies  that  a 
people  who  desire  to  be  just  to  all  men,  to  do  as 
they  would  be  done  by,  are  asking  others  to  accept 
a  situation  which  they  themselves  would  rather 
die  than  accept.  We  all  believe  it  our  duty  to 
give  our  lives  rather  than  be  subject  to  the  rule  of 
foreigners,  of  aliens,  yet  this  philosophy  of  con- 
quest and  imperialism  demands  that  others  shall 
accept  the  rule  of  aliens.     That  which  we  believe 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  95 

would  be  a  moral  degradation  for  ourselves  we  try 
to  enforce  upon  other  millions  of  our  fellows ;  it  is 
an  arrangement  which  makes,  as  someone  has  said, 
of  the  top  dog  a  bully,  and  of  the  bottom  dog  a 
cur.  It  would  divide  the  world  into  master  and 
slave,  and  the  world  should  be  neither  master  nor 
slave ;  it  is  the  negation  of  human  dignity,  and  its 
moral  foundations  are  unsound.  It  does  not  stand 
the  first  test  which  should  be  given  to  any  principle 
of  human  relationship — namely,  that  it  can  be 
made  of  general  application.  We  cannot  all  be 
conquerors;  we  can  all  be  partners.  This  philo- 
sophy is  poisoned  at  its  roots,  and  there  never 
yet  was  a  people  who  permanently  resisted  the 
effect  of  such  poison.  We  could  not  resist  it  our- 
selves if  ever  we  allowed  ourselves  to  be  led  away 
by  its  high-sounding  phrases. 

We  say,  therefore,  that,  on  its  moral  side,  this 
Prussianism,  this  desire  for  domination,  is  an 
empty,  futile,  and  evil  thing,  and  when  accom- 
plished can  achieve  nothing  of  worth.  We  have 
not  said  that  the  desire  does  not  exist.  It  does 
exist,  just  as  did  the  desire  among  religious  men  a 
century  or  two  ago  to  dominate  by  military  means 
the  men  of  other  creeds;  and  it  was  that  desire 
which  brought  about  the  wars  of  religion.  But  we 
have  urged  that  this  desire  is  in  itself  a  human 
idea,  due  to  the  light  in  which  we  see  certain  things, 
and  can  be  changed  like  all  ideas  by  seeing  those 
things  in  a  different  light,  more  clearly.  And  just 
as  that  fierce  thirst  for  mastery  in  terms  of  force, 


96  America  and  the  New  World-State 

for  the  military  control  of  men  of  other  faith, 
which  kept  Europe  ablaze  for  a  century  or  two,  dis- 
appeared in  large  part  with  the  correction  of  the 
intellectual  and  moral  defect  that  caused  it,  as 
the  result  of  certain  definite  intellectual  and  moral 
efforts  of  certain  definite  individual  men,  so  in 
like  manner  can  the  senseless  craving  for  political 
domination  disappear. 

So  much  for  the  ideal  impulses  that  inspire 
Prussianism,  but  what  of  the  economic  and 
material  side?  If,  as  the  Prussians  say,  war  is  also 
a  struggle  for  bread,  why,  cessation  of  that  struggle 
is  for  an  expanding  nation  equivalent  to  slow 
starvation;  and  war  will  go  on  unless,  of  course, 
we  can  ask  a  nation  to  commit  suicide.  I  cannot 
conceive  of  any  morality  which  should  demand 
that. 

The  economic  case  for  military  domination  in 
the  circumstances  of  a  State  like  Germany  have 
been  well  put  by  an  English  writer  as  follows : 

Germany  must  expand.  Every  year  an  extra  mil- 
lion babies  are  crying  out  for  more  room,  and,  as  the 
expansion  of  Germany  by  peaceful  means  seems  im- 
possible, Germany  can  only  provide  for  those  babies 
at  the  cost  of  potential  foes,  and  France  is  one  of 
them. 

A  vanquished  France  might  give  Germany  all  she 
wants.  The  immense  colonial  possessions  of  France 
present  a  tantalizing  and  provoking  temptation  to 
German  cupidity,  which,  it  cannot  be  too  often  re- 
peated, is  not  mere  envious  greed,  but  stern  necessity. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  97 

The  same  struggle  for  life  and  space  which  more  than 
a  thousand  years  ago  drove  one  Teutonic  wave  after 
another  across  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps  is  now  once 
more  a  great  compelling  force.  Colonies  fit  to  receive 
the  German  surplus  population  are  the  greatest  need 
of  Germany.  This  aspect  of  the  case  may  be  all  very 
sad  and  very  wicked,  but  it  is  true.  .  .  .  Herein 
lies  the  temptation  and  the  danger.  Herein,  too,  lies 
the  ceaseless  and  ruinous  struggle  of  armaments,  and 
herein  for  France  lies  the  dire  necessity  of  linking  her 
foreign  policy  with  that  of  powerful  allies.  ^ 

The  author  by  the  way  adds:  "So  it  is  impos- 
sible to  accept  the  theory  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell. " 
And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  if  this  author's  statement 
of  the  case  is  correct,  my  theory  is  absolutely  and 
completely  wrong.  I  will  hazard,  however,  the 
guess  that  the  writer  of  the  article  in  question  has 
not  the  faintest  notion  of  how  that  theory  is  sup- 
ported; his  form  of  statement  implies  that  he  has 
burked  the  series  of  facts  to  which  he  refers; 
whereas,  of  course,  it  has,  on  its  economic  side, 
been  stated  in  terms  of  them.  This  view  concern- 
ing the  necessity  of  Germany's  expansion  as  a 
sheer  matter  of  finding  bread  for  her  increasing 
population  is  the  generally  accepted  view  of  the 
necessities  of  national  expansion:  she  needs  the 
wheat  and  food  of  Canada,  or  of  some  other  British 
colony,  wherewith  to  feed  her  children. 

The  illusion,  the  confusion  of  facts  underlying 
this  conception,  can  be  indicated  in  a  line  or  two. 

*  National  Review,  September,  1913. 
7 


98  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Is  it  not  quite  obvious  that  Germany  can  in  nor- 
mal times  have  the  food  of  Canada  now  by  pay- 
ing for  it,  and  that  even  if  she  conquered  Canada, 
she  would  still  have  to  pay  for  it?  That  the  fact 
of  political  conquest  would  make  no  difference  to 
the  problem  of  subsistence  one  way  or  another? 
I  can  briefly  indicate  a  process,  which  I  have 
sketched  in  very  considerable  detail  in  The  Great 
Illusion,  by  reproducing  the  following  passage: 

In  the  days  of  the  sailing  ship,  and  the  lumbering 
wagon  dragging  slowly  over  all  but  impassable  roads, 
for  one  country  to  derive  any  considerable  profit  from 
another,  it  had  practically  to  administer  it  politically. 
But  the  compound  steam-engine,  the  railway,  the 
telegraph,  have  profoundly  modified  the  elements  of 
the  whole  problem.  In  the  modern  world  political 
dominion  is  playing  a  more  and  more  effaced  role  as  a 
factor  in  commerce;  the  non-political  factors  have  in 
practice  made  it  all  but  inoperative.  It  is  the  case 
with  every  modern  nation  actually,  that  the  outside 
territories  which  it  exploits  most  successfully  are 
precisely  those  of  which  it  does  not  "own"  a  foot. 
Even  with  the  most  characteristically  colonial  of  all — 
Great  Britain — the  greater  part  of  her  overseas  trade 
is  done  with  countries  which  she  makes  no  attempt  to 
"own, "  control,  coerce,  or  dominate,  and  incidentally 
she  has  ceased  to  do  any  of  those  things  with  her 
colonies. 

Millions  of  Germans  in  Prussia  and  Westphalia 
derive  profit  or  make  their  living  out  of  countries  to 
which  their  political  dominion  in  no  way  extends. 
The   modern   German   exploits    South   America   by 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  99 

remaining  at  home.  "^Hiere,  forsaking  this  principle, 
he  attempts  to  work  through  pohtical  power,  he 
approaches  futility.  German  colonies  are  colonies 
pour  rire.  The  Government  has  to  bribe  Germans  to 
go  to  them:  her  trade  with  them  is  microscopic; 
and  if  the  twenty  millions  who  have  been  added  to 
Germany's  population  since  the  war  had  to  depend  on 
their  country's  political  conquest,  they  would  have  had 
to  starve.  What  feeds  them  are  countries  which 
Germany  has  never  "owned,"  and  never  hopes  to 
"own":  Brazil,  Argentina,  the  United  States,  India, 
Australia,  Canada,  Russia,  France,  and  Britain. 
(Germany,  which  never  spent  a  mark  on  its  political 
conquest,  to-day  draws  more  tribute  from  South 
America  than  does  Spain,  which  has  poured  out 
mountains  of  treasure  and  oceans  of  blood  in  its 
conquest.)     These  are  Germany's  real  colonies.^ 

In  the  book  from  which  this  extract  is  taken  I 
have  dealt  in  detail  with  questions  which  par- 
tially affect  this  generalization — the  question  of 
hostile  tariffs,  of  preferential  treatment  in  Colonies 
for  the  Motherland,  and  so  forth.  For  the  full 
treatment  of  those  I  must  refer  the  reader  thereto. 
But  I  would  like  to  give  a  hint  of  the  nature  of  the 
fallacy  involved  in  the  idea  of  the  necessary 
economic  conflict  of  states  by  reminding  the 
reader  of  certain  processes  that  have  operated 
in  human  society: 

When  the  men  of  Wessex  were  fighting  with  the  men 

'  The  Great  Illusion,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York.  Fourth 
Edition,  pp.  141-142. 


loo  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  Sussex,  far  more  frequently  and  bitterly  than  to-day 
the  men  of  Germany  fight  with  those  of  France,  or, 
either,  with  those  of  Russia,  the  separate  States  which 
formed  this  island  were  struggling  with  one  another  for 
sustenance,  just  as  the  tribes  which  inhabited  the 
North  American  Continent  at  the  time  of  our  arrival 
there  were  struggling  with  one  another  for  the  game 
and  hunting  grounds.  It  was  in  both  cases  ultimately 
a  "struggle  for  bread."  At  that  time,  when  this 
island  was  composed  of  several  separate  States,  that 
struggled  thus  with  one  another  for  land  and  food, 
it  supported  with  great  difficulty  anything  between 
one  and  two  million  inhabitants,  just  as  the  vast  spaces 
now  occupied  by  the  United  States  supported  about  a 
hundred  thousand,  often  subject  to  famine,  frequently 
suffering  great  shortage  of  food,  furnishing  just  the 
barest  existence  of  the  simplest  kind.  To-day,  al- 
though this  island  supports  anything  from  twenty  to 
forty  times,  and  North  America  something  like  a 
thousand  times,  as  large  a  population  in  much  greater 
comfort,  with  no  period  of  famine,  with  the  whole 
population  living  much  more  largely  and  deriving 
much  more  from  the  soil  than  did  the  men  of  the 
Heptarchy,  or  the  Red  Indians,  the  "struggle  for 
bread  "  does  not  now  take  the  form  of  struggle  between 
groups  of  the  population.  ^ 

This  simple  illustration  is  at  least  proof  of  this, 
that  the  struggle  for  material  things  does  not 
involve  any  necessary  struggle  between  the 
separate   groups    or    States;  for   those   material 

"^  Arms  and  Industry,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York,  pp.  156- 
157. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism   loi 

things  are  given  in  infinitely  greater  abundance 
when  the  States  cease  to  struggle.  Whatever, 
therefore,  was  the  origin  of  those  conflicts,  that 
origin  was  not  any  inevitable  conflict  in  the 
exploitation  of  the  earth.  If  those  conflicts  were 
concerned  with  material  things  at  all,  they  arose 
from  a  mistake  about  the  best  means  of  obtaining 
them,  of  exploiting  the  earth,  and  ceased  when 
those  concerned  realized  the  mistake. 

For  the  moral  and  material  futility  of  war  will 
never  of  itself  stop  war — it  obviously  has  not 
stopped  it.  Only  the  recognition  of  that  futility 
will  stop  it.  Men's  conduct  is  determined  not 
necessarily  by  a  right  conclusion  from  the  fact, 
but  what  it  believes  to  be  the  right  conclusion. 
"Not  the  facts,  but  men's  opinions  about  the 
facts,  is  what  matters, "  as  someone  has  remarked. 
If  the  propositions  I  have  quoted  are  true,  war 
will  go  on ;  also,  it  will  go  on  if  men  bel  eve  them 
to  be  true.  As  long  as  men  are  dominated  by 
the  old  beliefs,  those  beliefs  will  have  virtually 
the  same  effect  in  politics  as  though  they  were 
intrinsically  sound. 

That  is  the  fundamental  problem  of  all:  Can 
men  be  brought  to  see  their  best  interest  and  be 
guided  by  wisdom  and  reason?  That  is  the  ulti- 
mate question.  Very  rarely  does  either  party  to 
our  discussion  realize  what  that  question  involves; 
nor  how  essential  it  is  that  for  any  useful  discussion 
we  should  realize  its  implications  and  relation  to 
the  whole  problem. 


102  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Before  dealing  analytically  with  the  moral  and 
practical  implications  of  this  doctrine  I  want  to 
recall  once  more  two  orders  of  historical  fact  that 
bear  on  it.  One  is  that  complete  change  oi  feeling 
that  has  followed  upon  a  change  of  opinion.  I 
have  already  touched  upon  the  fact  that  it  was 
impossible  for  the  Catholics  in  the  fifteenth  century 
to  sit  at  table  with  a  heretic,  "because  of  the  odour 
which  he  carried."  The  odour  at  all  events  has 
disappeared  in  consequence  of  certain  theological 
works  appealing  purely  to  reason.  And  the  sec- 
ond one  is  the  change  of  opinion  in  such  a  matter 
as  witchcraft.  Montaigne  declared  men  would 
never  lose  this  belief.  "  If, "  he  argued,  "  educated 
judges,  trained  in  the  laws  of  evidence,  can  send  old 
women  to  their  deaths  for  changing  themselves  in- 
to snakes,  how  can  we  expect  that  the  average 
imeducated  person  will  rise  above  these  errors?" 
We  know  that  grave  and  pious  magistrates  in 
Massachusetts  were  condemning  old  women  for 
witchcraft  less  than  three  hundred  years  ago.  Yet 
to-day  a  child  would  not  be  taken  in  by  them,  and 
is  able  without  special  learning  to  judge  rightly 
where  the  "expert"  of  the  past  judged  wrongly. 

That  shows  this:  that  the  essential  truths  of  life 
are  self-evident,  if  they  are  not  overlaid  by  false 
theories.  In  the  witchcraft  days  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  common  phenomena  of  life  was  in  the 
judge's  mind  overlaid  by  false  theories  of  devils 
and  goblins.  Destroy  such  theories,  and  the 
truth  is  self-evident  to  a  child. 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  103 

Our  conception  of  foreign  politics — of  inter- 
national relations — is  in  the  witchcraft  stage;  it  is 
overlaid  with  untrue  analogies,  false  pictures  of 
States  as  units  and  persons,  that  create  artificial 
national  animosities,  abstractions  that  have  no 
relation  to  fact.  Destroy  these  things,  and  the 
real  facts  of  human  and  international  relationship 
will  emerge  as  easily  as  does  the  truth  about  the 
witch  story  to  a  schoolboy.  It  is  not  a  matter 
of  expert  knowledge  upon  abstruse  points  in  eco- 
nomics and  international  trade;  it  is  a  matter  of 
seeing  the  simple  visible  facts  of  life  {e.  g.,  as  that 
the  people  of  a  "great"  and  conquering  State  are 
no  better  off  morally  or  materially  than  those  of 
the  little  Powers)  straight  instead  of  crooked. 

This,  then,  is  the  fundamental  question:  "Can 
the  wisdom  of  men  as  a  whole  be  so  far  strength- 
ened as  not  merely  to  enable  them  to  realize 
abstractedly  the  fallacy  of  war  and  devise  means 
of  avoiding  it,  but  to  use  those  means  and  be 
guided  by  this  wisdom,  and  not  by  their  passions 
and  impatience?" 

That  man's  fighting  instincts  are  ineradicable, 
that  he  does  not  act  by  "reason,"  and  cannot  be 
guided  by  "logic,"  that  wars  are  the  result  of 
forces  beyond  the  control  of  the  makers  of  theories, 
is  a  position  which  the  average  believer  in  orthodox 
political  doctrine  regards  as  so  impregnable  that 
the  great  majority  hardly  esteem  it  worth  while 
to  defend  any  other.  So  far,  indeed,  his  instinct 
is  correct.     Not  merely  is  the  question  I  have 


104  America  and  the  New  World-State 

indicated  "the  first  and  last,"  concerned  with  the 
whole  philosophical  foundations  of  our  faith  and 
attitude  to  life  and  politics,  not  merely  is  it  the 
question  which  must  be  answered  if  we  are  to  make 
any  progress  in  this  discussion  at  all,  not  merely  do 
many  points  of  detail  arise  out  of  misconceptions 
concerning  the  problem  it  presents,  but  it  repre- 
sents practically,  as  well  as  philosophically,  the 
most  important  phase  of  the  whole  problem. 
Now,  suppose  it  were  true  that  man  does  not  act 
from  reason,  from  an  intelhgent  realization  of  his 
interest,  but  from  temper,  passion,  his  fighting 
instinct,  blindly.  What  would  be  the  conclusion 
to  be  drawn  from  it?  The  conclusion,  say  the 
militarists,  is  that  you  should  give  him  as  many 
destructive  arms  as  possible,  so  that  his  capacity 
for  damage  while  in  his  condition  of  blind  rage 
should  be  as  great  as  possible. 

Is  that  the  right  conclusion?  Or  is  not  rather 
the  right  conclusion  that,  if  man  is  really  that  kind 
of  animal,  it  is  the  duty  of  all  of  us  to  keep  de- 
structive weapons  out  of  the  hands  of  such  an 
irresponsible  creature,  and  to  use  such  lucid 
intervals  as  he  may  have  to  persuade  him  to 
drop  them? 

There  are  some  militarist  writers  who  seem  to 
imagine  that  they  can  evade  the  consequences  of 
their  own  conclusion  by  pleading,  not  that  all 
parties  should  be  highly  armed,  but  only  that  we 
should  be  so  armed  ourselves.  But,  obviously, 
since  every  nation  is  free  to  adopt  the  same 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  105 

philosophy,  the  result  is  the  same  as  if  no  quali- 
fication of  the  conclusion  had  been  made. 

So  much  for  the  bearing  of  the  fundamental 
question  upon  the  problems  of  armaments.  An- 
other conclusion,  drawn  by  militarist  philosophers 
from  their  answer  to  this  question,  gives  still  more 
startling  results  when  subjected  to  a  similar  test. 
They  say  in  effect:  "Human  reason,"  "logic," 
has  not  the  shghtest  effect  upon  war.  Man  acts 
from  forces  which  he  cannot  control.  He  is  the 
plaything  of  fate.  This  is  the  note  of  nearly  all 
militarist  literature.  Professor  Cramb  (who  is 
the  best  and  most  sympathetic  interpreter  of 
Bemhardi  and  Treitschke  in  English)  says: 

The  forces  which  determine  the  actions  of  empires 
and  great  nations  ...  lie  beyond  the  wishes  or  in- 
tentions of  the  individuals  composing  those  nations. 
They  may  be  even  contrary  to  those  wishes  and  inten- 
tions. ...  It  may  be  questioned  whether  in  the 
twentieth  century  any  plebiscite  would  be  in  favour  of 
war.  ...  In  the  history  of  nations  there  is  fate, 
an  inexorable  nexus  of  things  .  .  .  more  akin  to 
Nature  and  the  elements  than  to  the  motives  of 
himian  action. 

The  works  of  an  American  author.  Homer  Lea, 
soimd  this  note  from  beginning  to  end: 

National  entities,  in  their  birth,  activities,  and 
death,  are  controlled  by  the  same  laws  that  govern  all 
life — plant,  animal,  or  national — the  law  of  struggle, 
the  law  of  survival.     These  laws  are  universal  as 


io6  America  and  the  New  World-State 

regards  life  and  time,  unalterable  in  causation  and 
consummation.  .  .  .  Plans  to  thwart  them,  to 
shortcut  them,  to  circumvent,  to  cozen,  to  deny,  to 
scorn  and  violate  them,  is  folly  such  as  man's  conceit 
alone  makes  possible. 

Again,  suppose  that  this  were  absolutely  and 
completely  true,  what  is  the  conclusion  to  be 
drawn? 

Well,  it  is  evident  that  if  it  were  absolutely  and 
completely  true,  all  learning,  all  accumulated 
knowledge,  all  books  and  churches,  codes.  Ten 
Commandments,  laws,  would  have  no  effect  on 
human  affairs,  and  that  in  so  far  as  their  practical 
work  is  concerned,  they  might  just  as  well  be 
swept  away. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  among  great  masses  of  men 
— in  a  great  part  of  the  Eastern  world — that  pure 
fatalism  is  predominant.  "Kismet,  it  is  the  will 
of  Allah."  It  is  an  attitude  of  mind  associated 
either  as  a  cause  or  an  effect — for  the  moment  it 
does  not  matter  much  which — with  the  crudest 
forms  of  Oriental  stagnation ;  it  marks  those  who, 
at  least  as  far  as  this  world  is  concerned,  have  no 
hope.  It  is,  indeed,  a  statement  of  the  proposi- 
tion that  it  does  not  matter  how  man  uses  his  mind 
or  moral  effort,  since  impulses  and  forces  that  are 
stronger  than  his  own  volition  will  determine  his 
conduct,  despite  any  moral  or  intellectual  effort 
of  his  own. 

Now,  this  has  only  to  be  pointed  out  to  be 
evident.     It  is  certain,  therefore,  that  the  pro- 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  107 

position  in  the  crude  form  in  which  I  have  couched 
it — although  that  form  is  exactly  that  in  which  it 
is  most  generally  made — cannot  be  absolutely  and 
completely  true. 

It  then  becomes  plain  that  the  militarist  has  not 
asked  himself  in  any  clear  and  fresh  and  real  way 
what  his  own  proposition  means,  what  even  the 
immediate  and  necessary  consequences  must  be. 
Otherwise  he  would  not  have  enunciated  it.  To 
say  that  man  is  always  in  danger  of  losing  his  head, 
and  of  acting  in  opposition  to  his  own  best  inter- 
ests, is  not  an  argument  for  furnishing  him  with  the 
instruments  of  destruction.  To  say  that  reason- 
ing and  the  effort  to  know  the  truth  do  not  affect 
human  conduct  is  to  condemn  all  those  activities 
which  distinguish  man  from  the  beast. 

Presumably,  the  militarist  who  had  taken  into 
account  the  consequences  of  his  proposition  as  to 
the  futility  of  human  reason  and  the  helplessness 
of  man  would  put  a  qualified  case,  somewhat  in 
these  terms : 

War  is  the  last  resort  in  a  collision  of  two  rights. 
That  is  to  say,  two  parties  believe  that  each  has  right 
on  his  own  side,  and  will  not  yield  to  the  other.  When 
this  is  the  case,  and  when  the  questions  involved  are 
fundamental  enough,  there  is  no  outcome  but  force, 
and  we  can  accept  that  fact  because  victory  will  in  the 
long  run  go  to  the  party  which  has  the  greater  earnest- 
ness, the  greater  spiritual  passion,  the  greater  cohesion, 
and  so  forth.  Man's  instinct  and  intuition  are  in  all 
crises  a  surer  and  better  guide  than  ratiocination, 


io8  America  and  the  New  World-State 

argumentation.  The  profounder  truths,  which  we 
know  to  be  true,  but  which  we  are  quite  incapable  of 
defending  rationally,  are  those  things  which  we  per- 
ceive intuitively.  As  a  matter  of  simple  fact,  again 
and  again  in  history,  you  have  two  parties,  both  of 
whom  are  pushed  by  all  their  instincts  and  intuition 
to  settle  their  differences  by  resort  to  the  sword.  And 
the  outcome  has  been  as  true  and  as  just  as  any  that 
could  have  been  devised  by  a  court  of  lawyers  or 
arbitrators,  judging  by  dry  law  and  the  argumentation 
of  legal  advocates.  ^ 

Now,  however  this  statement  of  the  case  for 
war  may  disguise  it,  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  plea  for 
the  superiority  of  physical  force  or  of  chance  to  the 
force  of  the  mind.  It  is  either  the  statement  in 
less  crude  terms  of  Napoleon's  dictum,  "That 
Providence  is  on  the  side  of  the  biggest  battalions," 
or  it  is  the  philosophy  which  stood  behind  the  trial 
by  ordeal,  a  claim  for  matter  as  against  reason, 
for  muscle  as  against  brains,  for  the  dead  weight 
of  material  things  as  against  the  spiritual,  the 

'  Thus,  a  British  author,  Mr.  Harold  Wyatt,  in  an  article  which 
has  had  the  honour  of  being  twice  printed  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  and  After, writes:  "  In  the  crash  of  conflict,  in  the  horrors 
of  battlefields  piled  with  the  dead,  the  dying,  and  the  wounded, 
a  vast  ethical  intention  has  still  prevailed.  Not  necessarily  in 
any  given  case,  but  absolutely  certainly  in  the  majority  of  cases, 
the  triumph  of  the  victor  has  been  the  triumph  of  the  nobler 
soul  of  man.  ...  In  that  great  majority  of  instances  which 
determines  general  result,  the  issue  of  war  has  made  for  the  ethical 
advantage  of  mankind.  It  must  have  been  so;  it  could  not  be 
otherwise,  because  ethical  quality  has  tended  always  to  produce 
military  efl&ciency. " 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  109 

intellectual  recognition  of  right  and  wrong.  It 
is  the  abdication  of  the  mind,  of  conscience. 
One  may  find  among  the  reasons  urged  by  old 
defenders  of  "trial  by  ordeal"  pleas  far  more 
eloquent  from  this  point  of  view,  and  about  as 
compelling  as  any  of  those  made  in  our  day  on 
behalf  of  warfare.  The  old  lawyer  urged  with 
great  sincerity  that  God  would  not  permit  the  arm 
of  the  innocent  man  to  be  scalded  when  boiling 
oil  or  boiling  water  was  poured  over  it  or  when  it 
was  plunged  into  a  cauldron.  Still  less  would 
God  permit,  when  accused  and  accuser  met  upon 
the  field,  that  the  innocent  should  be  slain  and  the 
guilty  should  escape.  But  to-day,  if  you  deny  the 
justice  of  this  argument  in  the  case  of  the  individ- 
ual, why  should  we  suppose  that  it  would  be  any 
truer  in  the  case  of  nations?  We  have  recognized 
that  a  mere  conflict  of  physical  strength  in  the  case 
of  individuals  does  not  establish  the  rights  or 
wrongs  of  the  case.  It  establishes  nothing  except 
which  of  the  two  is  the  stronger,  or,  in  the  case  of 
the  ordeal  by  boiHng  oil,  which  has  the  thicker 
skin.  And  just  as  in  the  establishment  of  equity 
and  right  in  the  individual  field  we  cannot  escape 
the  need  for  understanding,  so  we  cannot  escape 
the  need  for  understanding  in  the  establishment  of 
right  and  equity  as  between  groups  of  men. 

The  appeal  to  force  is  at  bottom  an  effort  to 
escape  the  responsibility  and  labour  of  intellectual 
judgment,  as  was  the  "ordeal."  If  the  judges 
had  any  strong  feeling  of  the  clear  justice  of  the 


no  America  and  the  New  World-State 

case,  any  strong  feeling  that  one  of  the  parties 
had  been  outrageously  ill-treated,  their  consciences 
would  have  revolted  at  the  idea  of  submitting  the 
issue  to  the  "ordeal  of  battle."  But  when  the 
ideas  of  law  and  equity  and  obligation  are  obscure 
and  ill-defined,  so  that  just  decision  is  difficult, 
the  judges  naturally  desire  to  escape  the  labour 
and  responsibility  of  intellectual  judgment,  and 
to  submit  the  matter  to  the  outcome  of  mere 
physical  conflict.  And  the  outcome  of  physical 
conflict,  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword,  is  in  the 
end  only  an  accident  so  far  as  the  moral  issues  are 
concerned,  dependent  on  the  amount  of  force  or 
the  sharpness  of  the  sword,  not  on  any  principle 
of  justice  or  wisdom.  Indeed,  it  is  only  where  the 
issues  are  not  clear  that  anyone  thinks  of  appealing 
to  force.  Perhaps  the  whole  case  against  the 
appeal  to  force  rather  than  the  appeal  to  reason, 
on  behalf  of  justice,  can  be  summarized  by  saying 
that  justice  will  not  be  secured  by  intellectual 
laziness,  and  that  the  labour  of  the  mind,  quite 
as  much  as  the  labour  of  the  body  and  the  risk  of 
the  body,  is  necessary  to  secure  the  triumph  of 
right. 

It  is  necessary  again  and  again  to  urge  that  we 
no  more  assume  that  men  will  act  rationally  than 
we  assume  the  impossibility  of  war.  Even  so 
clear-sighted  and  well-informed  a  British  critic 
as  Mr.  Brailsford  can  be  guilty  of  the  confusion 
involved  in  the  following  remark:  "Mr.  Norman 
Angell  is  convinced  that  mankind  is  guided  by 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  iii 

reason."  Mr.  Norman  Angell  is  convinced  of 
nothing  of  the  kind.  About  nineteen- twentieths 
of  the  time  mankind  seems  to  be  guided  by  the 
negation  of  reason.  I  am  convinced  that  when 
mankind  acts  wisely  it  is  guided  by  reason.  The 
trouble  is  that  most  of  the  time  it  does  not  act 
wisely.  What  I  am  convinced  of  is  that  its  only 
hope  lies  in  wisdom,  and  that  that  is  the  thing  we 
must  mature  and  cultivate. 

So  deep  set  is  this  materialist  determinism  in  the 
mind  of  the  militarist  that  he  insists  upon  ascrib- 
ing the  same  attitude  to  the  pacifist.  Ninety- 
nine  out  of  a  hundred  of  our  critics  will  tell  you 
that  pacifists  are  people  who  believe  that  "war 
is  impossible, "  and  every  war  is  taken  as  a  trium- 
phant demonstration  of  the  folly  of  their  creed. 
There  is  not  even  a  glimmering  in  the  minds  of  such 
critics  of  the  pacifists'  real  position :  That  whether 
war  continues  or  not  depends  absolutely  upon 
whether  men  decide  to  go  on  waging  it  or  not. 

"It  is  the  last  resort."  Well,  in  a  badly  man- 
aged community,  where  even  agriculture  is  not 
developed,  one  may  get  periods  of  famine  when 
cannibalism  is  the  last  resort — it  happened  during 
some  of  the  Irish  famines,  and  it  is  said  to  happen 
during  some  of  the  Russian  famines  now.  Con- 
ceivably one  might  argue  from  that,  that  can- 
nibalism is  justifiable.  Well,  so  it  may  be  in 
certain  circumstances,  but  the  fact  that  it  is  re- 
sorted to  is  not  an  argument  for  so  neglecting  the 
tilling  of  the  soil  that  it  is  likely  to  be  resorted  to. 


112  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Rather  is  it  an  argument  for  saying :  "  If  we  do  not 
cultivate  our  fields,  we  shall  suffer  from  hunger, 
and  be  compelled  to  eat  our  children;  let  us, 
therefore,  cultivate  our  fields  with  industry." 
In  the  same  way  we  should  argue  with  reference 
to  the  use  of  force: 

If  we  neglect  the  understanding  of  human  relation- 
ships, and  the  cultivation  of  political  wisdom,  we  shall 
in  periods  of  tension  get  to  flying  at  one  another's 
throats,  because  we  shall  not  be  able  to  understand 
the  differences  which  divide  us.  And  that  will  lead 
to  murder.  Therefore  let  us  so  understand  htunan 
relationships  that  we  shall  not  be  Hkely  to  degenerate 
to  that  kind  of  thing,  and  let  us,  perhaps,  establish 
some  sort  of  machinery  for  the  settlement  of  difficulties 
so  that  those  kinds  of  abominations  shall  be  avoided. 

But  that  is  not  the  way  men  have  argued. 
They  have  argued  that  what  they  want  in  this 
matter  is  not  a  better  understanding  of  national 
relations,  but  better  arms;  not  machinery  for  the 
settlement  of  difficulties  with  other  nations,  but 
machinery  for  their  destruction.  We  have  had 
no  faith  in  a  society  of  nations,  we  have  given 
no  real  effort  to  establish  it;  we  have  derided  and 
held  up  to  scorn  and  contempt  those  who  have 
urged  it.  If  a  hundredth  part  of  the  time  and 
wealth,  the  sacrifice,  heroism,  discipline,  expert 
knowledge,  which  have  been  given  to  preparing 
the  destruction  of  the  nations  had  been  given  to 
their  consolidation,  if  we  had  been  willing  for  the 


Moral  Foundations  of  Prussianism  1 13 

sake  of  ordered  co-operation  with  other  nations 
to  expose  our  own  to  a  tenth  of  the  risk  and  sacrifice 
that  we  readily  expose  it  to  in  war,  war  itself  would 
have  disappeared  from  the  western  world  long 
since. 

If  the  organized  society  of  nations  of  which  we 
have  spoken  is  to  be  made  possible  and  if  America 
is  to  take  her  natural  position  as  the  initiator  and 
leader  in  this  World-State,  the  American  people 
must  be  inspired  by  a  real  and  reasoned  faith  in 
the  possibility  of  international  co-operation.  They 
are  in  a  peculiarly  advantageous  position  for  doing 
so,  for  while,  as  we  have  seen,  they  have  a  very 
real  dependence,  moral,  intellectual,  and  economic 
upon  the  nations  of  the  older  world,  they  are 
happily  detached,  by  virtue  of  their  position  and 
history,  from  the  old  traditions  and  quarrels  by 
which,  for  the  peoples  of  Europe,  the  real  facts  of 
international  relationship  are  obscured.  While 
it  has  become  impossible  for  them  altogether  to 
stand  aside  from  the  political  developments  of 
Europe,  they  are  happily  placed  to  become  the 
leaders  in  the  political  reformation  of  the  world  by 
which  alone  the  creation  of  a  better  human  society 
can  be  effected. 

8 


CHAPTER  II 

ANGLO-SAXON    PRUSSIANISM 

The  danger  of  self-deception  in  advocacy  of  disarmament  and 
universal  peace — The  influence  of  America  will  play  an 
important  part  in  the  settlement  which  will  follow  the  war — 
What  that  influence  will  be,  depends  upon  our  attitude  to 
these  things — The  influence  of  militarist  writers  in  shaping 
the  Allies'  attitude — and  our  own — A  few  examples  of 
Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism — The  need  for  knowing  the  nature 
of  the  Prussian  doctrine  and  of  fighting  it — The  special 
importance  of  clear  thinking  by  Americans. 

"Britain  is  fighting  for  disarmament  and  uni- 
versal peace, "  says  a  writer  in  the  London  Times.  ^ 
I  think  most  Britons  are  now  persuaded  of  that, 
and  of  the  belief  that  when  Germany  is  de- 
stroyed war  and  armaments  will  oppress  Europe 
no  more.  It  is  because  this  belief  is  so  largely 
shared  in  America  that  American  public  opinion, 
as  a  whole,  is  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  in  the  present 
war. 

It  would  be  broadly  true  to  say  that  for  most 
of  us  just  now  armaments,  militarism  and  war, 
international  bad  faith  and  rapacity,  fear  and 
resentment,  all  the  errors  of  passion  that  lead  to 

» Mr.  Stephen  Graham  on  "  Russia's  Holy  War,"  October 
13,  1914. 

114 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        115 

conflict,  are  merely,  or  at  least  mainly,  German 
things;  they  have  not  marked  in  the  past  in  any 
period  that  need  concern  us,  and  presumably  could 
not  in  the  future,  mark  our  conduct  or  that  of  the 
Allies,  of  countries  like  Great  Britain,  or  Russia, 
or  France,  or  Servia,  or  Japan,  or  Montenegro; 
that  all  the  immense  difficulties  which  have  stood 
heretofore  in  the  way  of  international  co-operation 
will,  at  least  in  large  part,  disappear  as  soon  as 
the  German  State  has  been  destroyed. 

This  last  point  will  be  dealt  with  in  Part  III  of 
this  book.  It  is  with  the  former  one — that  these 
ideas  are  purely  German  ideas,  and  not  likely  in 
any  circumstances  to  affect  the  conduct  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  peoples — that  I  now  want  to  deal. 
I  think  that  we  have  quite  genuinely  talked  our- 
selves into  this  view,  and  I  want  to  suggest  that  it 
constitutes  a  very  dangerous  self-deception,  which, 
if  nursed,  will  come  near  to  rendering  impossible 
those  changes  for  the  better  which  it  is  the  object 
of  this  war  to  accomplish  and  which  we  in  America 
hope  to  see  it  accomplish;  that  this  doctrine  of 
Prussianism  has  very  wide  acceptance  not  only 
in  Britain,  as  in  most  other  countries  of  Europe, 
but  also  among  ourselves.  Though  I  believe  as 
strongly  as  anyone  that  it  could  never  be  the 
ground  for  an  aggressive  war  on  our  part,  I  suggest 
that  that  belief — if  not  corrected — will,  neverthe- 
less, affect  the  kind  of  influence  which  America 
will  exercise  in  the  world  of  to-morrow. 

I  want  to  emphasize  the  point  that  it  is  unlikely 


ii6  America  and  the  New  World-State 

that  the  American,  or  indeed  the  British,  nation 
would  ever  be  brought  to  beHeve  in  the  justice  of 
an  aggressive  war  waged  for  domination  d  la 
Bemhardi;  but  as  I  think  I  have  shown  towards 
the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter,  those  ideas 
involve  a  good  deal  more  than  the  advocacy  of 
ruthless  war  for  the  mere  sake  of  conquest.  It 
involves  the  belief  that  universal  peace  is  an  idle 
dream;  that  even  if  it  were  realizable,  it  would  be 
fruitful  of  slothfulness  and  decadence;  that  it  is, 
in  fact,  hopeless  to  form  a  society  of  nations;  that 
the  true  work  of  the  patriot  is  to  add  to  the  political 
and  military  power  of  his  State;  that  extension 
of  territory  and  domination  over  others  is  a 
justifiable  subject  of  pride  and  glory  for  a  nation. 
After  this  war  there  is  likely  to  be  a  widespread — 
— and  not  unnatural — feeling  that  Germany  has 
sacrificed  ariy  right  to  consideration;  that  the 
Allies  will  be  placed  in  a  position  whereby  their 
aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of  Germany  would 
be  justified,  and  we  may  be  brought  to  feel  that 
circumstances  excuse  in  the  Allies  that  policy 
which  we  have  condemned  in  the  Prussians. 
If  we  hold  this  idea  it  is  likely  to  have  a  very  dis- 
astrous effect  upon  the  influence  of  America  on  the 
settlement  and  on  the  future  evolution  of  civilized 
society. 

Three  things,  most  of  us  hope,  will  be  the  out- 
come of  this  war:  First,  that  the  Allies  will  be 
victorious;  second,  that  Great  Britain  will  be  the 
most  powerful  of  the  Allies,  exercising  a  dominating 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        117 

influence  on  the  settlement;  and  third,  that  the 
influence  and  opinion  of  America  are  going  to 
play  a  very  great  part  in  the  framing  of  that 
settlement.  How  are  we  going  to  use  that 
influence?  Are  we  going  so  to  use  it  that  the 
struggle  between  European  units  will  go  on  as 
before  with  a  mere  reshuffling  of  roles,  or  shall  we 
use  it  so  as  to  put  an  end  to  that  feature  of  Euro- 
pean life  from  which  we  ourselves  suffer  so  dis- 
astrously? It  is  this  latter  policy  which  for  the 
moment  has  the  approval  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
people  in  this  country  and  in  Great  Britain.  But 
to  carry  it  out  will  not  be  the  work  of  a  single  con- 
ference, or  a  few  weeks  of  negotiation  following  the 
peace.  It  will  be  a  matter  of  pursuing  for  many 
years  with  faith  and  persistence,  during  changes  of 
party,  through  much  criticism  and  many  set-backs, 
a  policy  having  that  end  in  view.  If  it  is  to  suc- 
ceed, it  will  be  because  there  is  an  abiding  faith 
in  its  possibility  of  success  on  the  part  of  the 
American  and  British  peoples.  That  faith  at 
present  has  a  very  slender  intellectual  foundation. 
If  the  British  end  the  war  in  the  kind  of  temper 
(for  which  there  will  be  much  excuse)  indicated  in 
the  expression  used  by  one  paper,  "that  we  must 
exterminate  the  vermin,"  then  there  will  be  no 
new  Europe.  It  will  be  the  old  Europe  with  parts 
of  it  painted  a  different  colour  on  the  map.  And 
it  will  be  part  of  the  opportunity  which  is  now 
open  to  the  American  people  to  use  their  influence 
against  the  adoption  of  such  a  tone. 


ii8  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Let  me  make  this  point  clear.  We  are  all  hoping 
that  the  outcome  of  this  war  may  be  a  general 
stock-taking,  by  which  we  shall  get  rid  of  the  old 
rivalries,  that  we  shall  establish  a  real  council  of 
the  nations,  that  we  shall  replace  a  struggle  for 
domination  by  work  in  partnership  to  common 
ends,  that  we  shall  be  able  to  agree  to  something 
in  the  shape  of  the  reduction  of  armaments,  be- 
cause we  shall  see  that  it  is  to  no  one's  advantage 
to  use  those  armaments  aggressively,  to  conquer, 
to  subdue  tmwilling  peoples,  to  impose  unfavour- 
able commercial  conditions  on  others,  and  so  forth. 

But  the  British  people  go  into  this  conference 
having  certain  obligations  to  allies  less  liberalized 
than  themselves — Russia,  Servia,  Japan,  Mon- 
tenegro— and  if  they  believe  that  the  annexation 
of  conquered  provinces  is  an  advantage,  that  it  is  a 
just  reward  of  victory,  and  that  military  expansion 
of  virile  peoples  is  a  natural  and  inevitable  process, 
will  they  really  be  able  to  stand  out  against  certain 
claims  which  will  be  made  by  those  allies?  Will 
they  not  be  charged  justly  with  the  accusation 
that  they  are  prepared  to  favour  their  enemies 
rather  than  their  friends?  The  only  thing  which 
could  justify  their  insistence  upon  abstention  from 
annexation,  respect  of  nationality,  and  so  forth, 
would  be  their  belief  that  the  essential  condition 
of  civilization,  of  a  real  society  of  nations,  is  the 
abandonment  by  all  of  the  policy  of  conquest, 
and  a  determined  effort  by  all  to  eliminate  war 
and  conflict.     But  if  they  do  not  believe  in  that 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        119 

possibility,  if  they  believe  that  the  society  of 
nations,  the  council  of  the  world,  are  a  mere 
Utopian  dream  setting  at  nought  inherent  tenden- 
cies, "biological  laws,"  and  Heaven  knows  what, 
how  can  we  hope  that  they  will  use  their  influence, 
and  exercise  that  doggedness  and  patience,  which 
alone,  in  peace  as  in  war,  can  achieve  great  ends? 
If  we  ourselves  do  not  believe  in  these  possibili- 
ties, if  we  are  still  dominated  by  the  old  illusions, 
how  shall  we  be  in  a  position  to  urge  upon  the 
Allies  a  just  and  permanent  settlement,  or  how 
shall  we  be  able  to  use  our  influence  in  favour  of 
the  organization  of  a  World-State  based  on  inter- 
national co-operation? 

It  should  be  remembered  that  in  the  domain 
of  political  ideas  we  have  been  the  leader  of 
the  world,  and  that  the  world  will  look  to  us  for 
leadership  in  these  things;  but  if  underneath  the 
mere  conventional  assent  to  the  belief  in  the  newer 
order  there  is  a  strong  and  instinctive  belief  that 
the  old  order  represents  the  realities  in  a  hard 
world,  how  can  we  hope  for  a  moment  that  the 
net  and  final  result  of  the  very  difficult  efforts  in 
which  our  influence  must  play  so  large  a  part  will 
be  anything  but  failure?  How  can  we  hope  that 
our  representatives  will  be  able  to  initiate  and  to 
urge  upon  the  nations  of  Europe  ideas  in  which 
the  mass  of  our  public  do  not  as  a  matter  of  fact 
believe? 

No  one  will  doubt  this:  that  a  disarmed  world 
living  in  perpetual  peace  will  involve  adherence 


120  America  and  the  New  World-State 

on  the  part  of  many  nations  to  a  policy  very  differ- 
ent from  that  which  they  have  pursued  in  the 
past;  no  one  will  deny  that  it  will  involve  very 
deep-seated  and  radical  changes  of  attitude  and 
view,  the  abandonment  of  ideals  and  beliefs  which 
have  exercised  a  fatal  fascination  not  merely  over 
the  Germans,  but  over  very  many  peoples.  A 
change  so  radical  and  profound  will  not  come 
about  without  difficulty,  or  all  at  once.  If  the 
new  policy,  until  this  war  a  very  unpopular  one, 
is  to  win,  as  against  a  very  old  and,  until  this  war, 
very  popular  one,  we,  as  the  people  most  detached 
from  the  entanglements  of  the  old  ideas  and  the 
bitterness  of  the  present  struggle,  will  have  to 
maintain  in  the  councils  of  the  nations  a  long  and 
earnest  fight;  maintain  it  through,  it  may  be, 
many  changes  of  administration  and  of  parties. 
And  imless  our  faith  is  abiding,  and  our  persist- 
ence for  peace  as  great  as  the  persistence  of  the 
Allies  in  war,  the  old  enemy,  so  powerfully  en- 
trenched intellectually  and  in  the  passions  of  men, 
will  not  be  defeated.  In  any  fight  no  fault  is 
greater  than  this:  contempt  of  one's  enemy;  and 
it  is  because  I  want  to  give  to  the  American  reader 
some  true  notion  of  the  strength  of  that  evil  doc- 
trine which  he  believes  the  Allies  to  be  fighting 
that  this  chapter  has  been  written. 

All  that  we  are  now  saying  as  to  the  miraculous 
force  which  this  idea  of  conquest  has  exercised 
over  the  mind  of  the  German,  all  that  we  are  now 
pointing  out  as  to  the  transformation  which  has 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        121 

been  wrought  in  the  German  people  by  half  a 
dozen  writers,  is  striking  evidence  of  the  subtle 
power  of  the  evil  doctrine  that  must  be  destroyed. 
One  point  to  note  particularly  is  this:  that  the 
tempter  did  not  come  only  in  evil  guise  to  the  old 
Germans  that  the  world  respected,  to  the  people 
who  spun  for  us  cradle  songs  and  fairy  stories, 
the  songs  of  Christmas  and  the  old  moonlit  towns, 
to  the  country  of  "philosophers  who  could  forget 
the  world  in  thought  like  children  at  play,"  who 
studied,  indeed,  so  lovingly  the  imtaught  mind  of 
the  child.  This  people  were  not  won  from  all  that 
by  a  doctrine  that  came  to  them  in  the  guise  of 
brutality  and  wickedness.  It  came  to  them  at 
first,  at  least,  and  in  some  respects,  in  a  noble 
form — the  glory  of  their  Fatherland,  the  safety 
of  their  homes,  the  vindication  of  their  great  ideals, 
the  spread  of  enlightenment.  Is  there  no  danger 
that  the  evil  may  come  in  a  like  guise  during  the 
long  contest  that  will  follow  this  war  to  the  Allies 
or  even  to  ourselves?  Is  there  no  danger  there, 
unless  we  and  they  learn  to  penetrate  these  dis- 
guises and  to  know  the  various  attractive  forms 
under  which  our  enemy  can  appear? 

I  want  to  suggest  that  this  is  a  very  real  danger, 
that  the  national  conversion  of  the  British  and 
of  ourselves  to  the  creed  of  universal  peace  is  too 
sudden  to  have  gone  very  deep,  and  that  the 
reversion  may  be  as  rapid  as  the  conversion.  And 
to  do  certain  of  the  opponents  of  that  idea  justice, 
they  have  warned  us  against  the  easy  self-decep- 


122  America  and  the  New  World-State 

tion  to  which  I  am  referring.  Thus,  Lord  Roberts, 
the  most  popular  of  British  soldiers,  earnestly 
warned  his  fellow-coimtrymen  "not  to  be  led 
away  by  those  who  say  that  the  end  of  this  great 
struggle  is  to  be  the  end  of  war,  and  that  it  is 
bound  to  lead  to  a  great  reduction  of  armaments; 
nor  should  we  pay  any  attention  to  the  foolish 
prattle  of  those  who  talk  of  this  war  as  the  doom  of 
conscription."  And  among  ourselves  a  big  cam- 
paign in  favour  of  greatly  increased  armaments 
and  a  more  militarized  policy  is  being  based  on 
the  presumed  "lessons"  of  the  present  war. 
Thus,  Representative  A.  P.  Gardner  has  moved  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  for  an  inquiry 
"into  the  unpreparedness  of  the  United  States  for 
war"  and  tells  us  that  "the  time  has  not  yet  come 
when  the  United  States  can  afford  to  allow  the 
martial  spirit  of  her  sons  to  be  destroyed"  and 
that  "we  must  begin  at  once  to  reorganize  our 
military  strength." 

Now  we  have  already  noted  that  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  German  spirit  and  the  direction  given 
to  German  policy  have  been  the  work  of  a  few  men. 
In  very  many  circumstances  a  few  active  individ- 
uals can  carry  their  point  against  a  very  large 
number  that  are  inert  and  inarticulate.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  the  German  nation  as  a  whole 
has  been  actively  indoctrinated  with  Nietzschean- 
ism,  but  its  inertia  has  been  overcome.  Bemhardi 
complains  bitterly  that  he  speaks  only  for  a  few. 
The  American  and  British  public  in  centering  its 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        123 

attention  upon  Bemhardi's  book  seem  to  have 
overlooked  the  fact  that  as  Bemhardi  announces  in 
his  introduction,  he  wrote  the  work  because  for  the 
most  part  his  countrymen  did  not  share  the  ideas 
therein  expressed.  He  accuses  them  of  being 
unwarlike,  immiHtary,  dangerously  permeated 
with  the  doctrines  of  peace  and  pacifism,  just  as 
our  own  militarists  on  our  side  say  exactly  the 
same  thing  of  their  coimtry. 

The  value  of  war  for  the  political  and  moral  develop- 
ment of  mankind  has  been  criticized  by  large  sections 
of  the  modem  civilized  world  in  a  way  which  threatens 
to  weaken  the  defensive  powers  of  States  by  under- 
mining the  warlike  spirit  of  the  people.  Such  ideas 
are  widely  disseminated  in  Germany,  and  whole  strata 
of  our  nation  seem  to  have  lost  that  ideal  enthusiasm 
which  constituted  the  greatness  of  its  history .... 
They  have  to-day  become  a  peace-loving — an  almost 
"too"  peace-loving  nation.  A  rude  shock  is  needed 
to  awaken  their  warlike  instincts,  and  compel  them 
to  show  their  military  strength ....  An  additional 
cause  of  the  love  of  peace,  besides  those  which  are 
rooted  in  the  very  soul  of  the  German  people,  is  the 
wish  not  to  be  disturbed  in  commercial  life.  .  .  . 
Under  the  many-sided  influence  of  such  views  and 
aspirations  we  seem  entirely  to  have  forgotten  the 
teaching  which  once  the  old  German  Empire  received.  * 

It  is  as  well,  therefore,  not  lightly  to  dismiss 
as  unimportant  and  isolated  opinion  the  Anglo- 

'  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  pp.  i,  2,  3. 


124  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Saxon  expressions  of  the  Prussian  doctrine  here 
dealt  with.  Those  readers  of  Bemhardi,  by  the 
way,  who  condemn  his  book  as  an  expression  of 
Nietzscheanism,  which  could  only  find  support  and 
sanction  in  Germany,  and  could  in  no  circum- 
stances voice  opinion  inspired  by  the  ideas  of 
Anglo-Saxon  civilization,  seem  to  have  overlooked 
the  fact  that  some  time  before  the  war  this  book 
foimd  warm  commendation  from  no  less  a  person 
than  Earl  Roberts.  The  fact  that  Bemhardi's 
thesis  should  thus  find  warm  applause  from  a  great 
and  valiant  British  soldier  who  certainly,  be  it 
noted,  represents  not  a  base  and  jingo  spirit,  but 
the  spirit  of  very  good  and  honourable  Britons 
who  have  thought  seriously  on  these  matters, 
shows  how  little  true  it  is  to  describe  Bemhardi's 
as  a  purely  Prussian  doctrine. 
Here  is  what  Lord  Roberts  says: 

How  was  this  Empire  of  Britain  founded?  War 
founded  this  Empire — war  and  conquest !  When  we, 
therefore,  masters  by  war  of  one  third  of  the  habitable 
globe,  when  we  propose  to  Germany  to  disarm,  to 
curtail  her  navy  or  diminish  her  army,  Germany 
naturally  refuses;  and  pointing,  not  without  justice, 
to  the  road  by  which  England,  sword  in  hand,  has 
climbed  to  her  unmatched  eminence,  declares  openly, 
or  in  the  veiled  language  of  diplomacy,  that  by  the 
same  path,  if  by  no  other,  Germany  is  determined  also 
to  ascend!  Who  amongst  us,  knowing  the  past  of  this 
nation,  and  the  past  of  all  nations  and  cities  that  have 
ever  added  the  lustre  of  their  name  to  human  annals. 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        125 

can  accuse  Germany  or  regard  the  utterance  of  one  of 
her  greatest  a  year  and  half  ago  (or  of  General  Bem- 
hardi  three  months  ago)  with  any  feelings  except  those 
of  respect?* 

And  in  order  that  there  should  be  no  doubt  as  to 
the  meaning  of  this  passage,  Lord  Roberts  adds 
the  following  footnote: 

In  March,  191 1,  when  every  pulpit  and  every  news- 
paper, under  the  influence  of  President  Taf  t's  message, 
promised  us  within  a  brief  period  universal  peace  and 
disarmament,  the  German  Chancellor,  Herr  Beth- 
mann-HoUweg,  had  the  courage  and  the  common  sense 
to  stand  apart;  and,  speaking  for  his  Emperor  and 
his  nation,  to  lay  it  down  as  a  maxim  that,  at  the 
present  stage  of  the  world's  history,  the  armed  forces 
of  any  nation  or  empire  must  have  a  distinct  relation 
to  the  material  resources  of  that  nation  or  empire. 
This  position  seems  to  me  as  statesmanlike  as  it  is 
unanswerable;  but  in  applying  the  principle  to  our 
own  country,  I  should  be  inclined  to  modify  it  by 
saying  that  the  armed  forces  of  any  nation  or  empire 
ought  to  represent,  not  only  its  material  resources, 
but  the  spirit  which  animates  that  nation  or  empire 
— in  a  word,  that  its  armed  forces  should  be  the 
measure  of  the  nation's  devotion  to  whatever  ends  it 
pursues. 

As  one  disagreeing  fundamentally  with  these 
views,  I  should  like  to  emphasize  the  respect  that 
I  feel  for  Lord  Roberts's  candour  and  frankness. 

*  Message  to  the  Nation  (Murray),  pp.  8,  9. 


126  America  and  the  New  World-State 

It  is  infinitely  preferable  that  those  who  do  not 
beHeve  in  the  peace-ideal  should  say  so,  rather 
than  that  they  should  pay  conventional  homage 
to  it  and  disguise  their  real  feeling  towards  it. 

In  what  follows  I  want  to  show  how  much  Prus- 
sianism,  which  we  now  persuade  ourselves  is  the 
work  of  Nietzsche  and  Treitschke,  and  has  so  large 
a  responsibility  for  this  war,  is  in  reality  just  part 
of  the  general  political  conception  of  the  western 
world,  and  how  much  Anglo-Saxon  thought  has 
contributed  to  it. 

Take,  for  instance,  its  more  material  and  eco- 
nomic foundations.  Few  in  the  Anglo-Saxon 
world  have  had  greater  authority  in  the  domain 
of  international  politics  than  the  late  Admiral 
Mahan.  And  he  referred  to  the  naval  ambitions 
of  Germany,  which  are  at  least  one  of  the  origins 
of  the  conflict,  in  these  terms: 

Governments  are  corporations,  and  corporations 
have  no  souls;  Governments,  moreover,  are  trustees, 
and  as  such  must  put  first  the  lawful  interests  of  their 
wards — their  own  people.  .  .  .  More  and  more 
Germany  needs  the  assured  importation  of  raw  mate- 
rials, and,  where  possible,  control  of  regions  productive 
of  such  materials.  More  and  more  she  requires 
assured  markets  and  security  as  to  the  importation 
of  food,  since  less  and  less  comparatively  is  produced 
within  her  own  borders  by  her  rapidly  increasing 
population.  This  all  means  security  at  sea.  .  .  . 
Yet  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  in  European  seas 
means  a  perpetually  latent  control  of  German  com- 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        127 

merce.  .  .  .  The  world  has  long  been  accustomed 
to  the  idea  of  a  predominant  naval  power,  coupling 
it  with  the  name  of  Great  Britain,  and  it  has  been 
noted  that  such  power,  when  achieved,  is  commonly 
often  associated  with  commercial  and  industrial 
predominance,  the  struggle  for  which  is  now  in  pro- 
gress between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  Such 
predominance  forces  a  nation  to  seek  markets,  and, 
where  possible,  to  control  them  to  its  own  advantage 
by  preponderant  force,  the  ultimate  expression  of 
which  is  possession.  .  .  .  From  this  flow  two 
results:  the  attempt  to  possess,  and  the  organization 
of  force  by  which  to  maintain  possession  already 
achieved ....  This  statement  is  simply  a  specific 
formulation  of  the  general  necessity  stated;  it  is  an 
inevitable  link  in  the  chain  of  logical  sequences — 
industry  markets,  control,  navy  bases .    .    .    .  ^ 

Indeed,  it  has  been  more  than  hinted  that 
Admiral  Mahan's  work  played  no  small  part  in 
prompting  the  German  naval  policy.  Professor 
Spenser  Wilkinson,  a  British  writer  of  high  repute 
on  questions  of  naval  and  military  policy,  remarks: 

No  wonder  that  when,  in  1888,  the  American  ob- 
server, Captain  Mahan,  published  his  volume  The 
Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  other  nations 
besides  the  British  read  from  that  book  the  lesson 
that  victory  at  sea  carries  with  it  a  prosperity,  an 
influence,  and  a  greatness  obtainable  by  no  other 
means.' 

'  The  Interest  of  America  in  International  Conditions, 
'  Britain  at  Bay,  p.  41. 


128  America  and  the  New  World-State 

This  plea  of  the  inevitability  of  national  conflict, 
owing  to  the  pressure  of  increasing  needs  and  popu- 
lation in  a  world  of  limited  space  and  opportunity, 
is  expressed  with  even  greater  frankness  by  certain 
British  writers  than  by  the  great  American  author- 
ity on  naval  power.  One  characteristic  presenta- 
tion ?f  the  case  is  quoted  in  the  first  chapter  of 
Part  II.  ^  Another  British  writer  puts  it  as  follows : 

The  teaching  of  all  history  is  that  commerce  grows 
under  the  shadow  of  armed  strength.  Did  we  not 
fight  with  Dutch  and  French  to  capture  the  Indian 
trade?  Did  we  not  beat  Dutch  and  French  because 
we  happened  to  be  the  strongest?  Could  we  have 
beaten  either  Dutch  or  French  but  for  the  fact  that 
we  had  gained  command  of  the  sea? 

Disarmament  will  not  abolish  war;  you  cannot 
abolish  war  from  a  competitive  system  of  civilization ; 
competition  is  the  root-basis  of  such  a  system  of 
civilization,  and  competition  is  war.  When  a  business 
firm  crushes  a  trade  rival  from  the  markets  by  cut 
prices,  there  is  exactly  the  same  process  at  work  as 
when  a  business  nation  crushes  a  trade  rival  by 
physical  force;  the  means  vary,  but  the  end  in  view, 
and  the  ethical  principles  in  question,  are  identical. 
In  both  cases  the  weaker  goes  to  the  wall;  in  both 
cases  it  is  woe  to  the  vanquished. ' 

Among  ourselves  the  same  view  is  expressed 
hardly  less  brutally  in  Mr.  Homer  Lea's  book, 
The  Day  of  the  Saxon,  which  had  a  year  or  two 

»  See  pp.  96-97. 

»  The  Struggle  for  Bread,  by  A.  Rifleman,  pp.  142, 143,  209. 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        129 

since  a  very  considerable  vogue.     Mr.  Lea  says 
(pp.  10,  II): 

The  brutality  of  all  national  development  is  appar- 
ent, and  we  make  no  excuse  for  it.  To  conceal  it 
would  be  a  denial  of  fact;  to  glamour  it  over,  an 
apology  to  truth.  There  is  little  in  life  that  is  not 
brutal  except  our  ideal.  As  we  increase  the  aggregate 
of  individuals  and  their  collective  activities,  we 
increase  proportionately  their  brutality. 

Nations  cannot  be  created,  nor  can  they  become 
great,  by  any  purely  ethical  or  spiritual  expansion. 
The  establishment,  in  great  or  small  entities,  of  tribes 
and  states  is  the  resultant  only  of  their  physical  power; 
and  whenever  there  is  a  reversal,  or  an  attempted 
reversal  to  this,  the  result  is  either  internal  dissolution 
or  sudden  destruction,  their  dismembered  territories 
going  to  make  up  the  dominions  of  their  conquerors. 

In  just  such  a  manner  has  the  British  Empire  been 
made  up  from  the  fragments  of  four  great  maritime 
Powers,  the  satrapies  of  petty  potentates,  and  the 
wilderness  of  nameless  savages. 

In  The  Valour  of  Ignorance,  again,  he  tells  us: 

In  theory  international  arbitration  denies  the 
inexorability  of  natural  laws,  and  would  substitute 
for  them  the  veriest  Cagliostroic  formulas,  or  would, 
with  the  vanity  of  Canute,  sit  down  on  the  ocean-side 
of  life  and  command  the  ebb  and  flow  of  its  tides  to 
cease. 

The  idea  of  international  arbitration  as  a  substitute 
for  natural  laws  that  govern  the  existence  of  political 
entities  arises  not  only  from  a  denial  of  their  fiats  and 


130  America  and  the  New  World-State 

an  ignorance  of  their  application,  but  from  a  total 
misconception  of  war,  its  causes,  and  its  meaning. 

This  thesis  is  emphasized  by  General  John  J.  P. 
Storey,  who  writes  an  introduction  to  Mr.  Lea's 
book: 

A  few  idealists  may  have  visions  that  with  advanc- 
ing civilization  war  and  its  dread  horrors  will  cease. 
Civilization  has  not  changed  human  nature.  The 
nature  of  man  makes  war  inevitable.  Armed  strife 
will  not  disappear  from  the  earth  until  human  nature 
changes. 

Leaving  for  the  moment  economic  Prussianism, 
we  find  the  more  mystic  and  idealistic  side  dupli- 
cated in  an  ample  English  and  American  litera- 
ture. The  author,  who  is  perhaps  the  very  best 
English  interpreter  of  Treitschke,  Professor  Cramb, 
allows  his  admiration  for  the  Prussian  ideal  abso- 
lutely to  blaze  out : 

Let  me  say  with  regard  to  Germany  that  of  all 
England's  enemies  she  is  by  far  the  greatest;  and  by 
"greatness"  I  mean  not  merely  magnitude,  not  her 
millions  of  soldiers,  not  her  millions  of  inhabitants,  I 
mean  grandeur  of  soul.  She  is  the  greatest  and  most 
heroic  enemy — if  she  is  our  enemy — that  England,  in 
the  thousand  years  of  her  history,  has  ever  confronted. 
In  the  sixteenth  century  we  made  war  upon  Spain  and 
the  empire  of  Spain.  But  Germany,  in  the  twentieth 
century,  is  a  greater  power,  greater  in  conception,  in 
thought,  in  all  that  makes  for  human  dignity,  than 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        131 

was  the  Spain  of  Charles  V.  and  Philip  II.  In  the 
seventeenth  century  we  fought  against  Holland ;  but 
the  Germany  of  Bismarck  and  the  Kaiser  is  greater 
than  the  Holland  of  De  Witt.  In  the  eighteenth 
century  we  fought  against  France;  and  again  the 
Germany  of  to-day  is  a  higher,  more  august  power  than 
France  under  Louis  XIV. 

.  .  .  These  two  empires,  both  the  descendants  of 
the  war-god  Odin,  and  yet,  because  of  that,  doomed  to 
this  great  conflict.  ^ 

While  he  out-Bemhardi's  Bemhardi  in  his 
moral  justification  of  war  as  an  end  in  itself : 

In  the  laws  governing  the  States  and  individuals 
the  highest  functions  transcend  utility  and  transcend 
even  reason  itself.  In  the  present  stage  of  the  world's 
history  to  end  war  is  not  only  beyond  man's  power,  but 
contrary  to  man's  will,  since  in  war  there  is  some  secret 
possession  or  lingering  human  glory  to  which  man 
clings  with  an  unchangeable  persistence;  some  source 
of  inspiration  which  he  is  afraid  to  lose,  uplifting  life 
beyond  life  itself;  some  sense  of  a  redeeming  task 
which,  like  his  efforts  to  unriddle  the  universe,  for 
ever  baffled  yet  for  ever  renewed,  gives  a  meaning  to 
this  else  meaningless  scheme  of  things.* 

Indeed,  when  British  and  American  writers  and 
journalists  hold  up  their  hands  in  horror — which 
they  have  been  doing  since  this  war  broke  out — 
at  Prussian  and  Nietzschean  defence  of  war  as  an 

^  Germany  and  England,  pp.  46,  69. 
'Ibid.,  pp.  71,72. 


132  America  and  the  New  World-State 

ennobling,  elevating,  and  disciplining  factor  in 
human  life,  one  wonders  whether  such  writers 
have  any  memory  at  all  for  the  attitude  of  certain 
great  figures  of  English  literature  reviewed  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  on  the  subject — Carlyle, 
Ruskin,  Kingsley,  Kipling,  Swinburne,  to  mention 
just  a  few  that  come  prominently  to  mind.  Is 
there  any  German  defence  of  war  which  transcends 
this  passage  from  Ruskin : 

All  the  pure  and  noble  arts  of  peace  are  founded  on 
war ....  There  is  no  great  art  possible  to  a  nation 
but  that  which  is  based  on  battle,  .  .  .  All  great 
nations  learned  their  truth  of  word  and  strength  of 
thought  in  war ;  they  were  nourished  in  war  and  wasted 
by  peace;  taught  by  war  and  deceived  by  peace; 
trained  by  war  and  betrayed  by  peace.  ^ 

Ex-President  Roosevelt,  too,  holds  this  ideal 
out  to  us  as  the  highest  national  ambition : 

We  must  play  a  great  part  in  the  world,  and  espe- 
cially .  ,  .  perform  those  deeds  of  blood,  of  valour, 
which  above  everything  else  bring  national  renown.  * 

I  shall  show  in  the  two  following  chapters  in 
what  manner  this  spirit  has  influenced  the  temper 
and  attitude  of  this  country  at  more  than  one 
crisis  in  its  career;  and  while  I  am  convinced  that 
we  are  at  this  moment  absolutely  sincere  in  our 
outspoken  disapproval  of  the  Prussian  theory, 

'  From  an  address  on  "War"  in  The  Crown  of  Wild  Olive,  etc. 
'  The  Strenuous  Life. 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        133 

we  shall  never  be  able  to  play  our  part  effectively 
in  exorcising  it  from  the  world's  life  unless  we 
recognize  frankly  that  although  it  may  have  found 
its  fullest  development  in  German  politics,  it  is  by 
no  means  an  exclusively  German  product,  but  is 
founded  on  misconceptions  only  too  widely  held 
among  all  nations,  including  our  own. 

As  to  the  pietistic  Prussianism,  which  we  are  apt 
to  regard  now  as  blasphemous,  it  has  at  all  times 
found  its  counterpart  among  British  and  American 
theologians.  Its  ethic  was  very  definitely  voiced 
by  a  recent  article  in  the  London  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury,"^  entitled  "God's  Test  by  War"  (by  Mr. 
Wyatt),  which  the  editor  found  so  apposite  to 
present  circumstances  that  he  reprinted  it.  Its 
avowals  are  significant  from  many  points  of  view. 

The  truth  is  that  armaments  are  the  reflection  of 
the  national  soul.  The  immense  naval  and  military 
strength  of  Germany  is  the  reflex  of  moral  and  social 
conditions  better  than  our  own.  The  excess  of  her 
birth-rate  over  ours  (and  still  more  over  that  of  France) 
is  in  itself  the  proof  of  that  superiority.  For  the 
growth  of  her  population  involves  not  the  production 
of  degenerates,  but  of  a  sound  and  vigorous  race.  Pa- 
triotism, public  spirit,  frugality,  and  industry  are  the 
essential  moral  factors  which  render  possible  the  vast 
armed  force  which  Germany  wields.  And  in  all  these 
factors  it  must  be  admitted,  with  whatever  shame  and 
sorrow,  that  she  surpasses  England.  Therefore,  if  in 
the    gigantic    process   of    international    competition 

'  September,  1914. 


134  America  and  the  New  World-State 

England  fall  before  Germany — which  fate  may  God 
avert — then  that  fall  will  follow  from  no  other  destiny 
than  the  destiny  inwoven  with  the  universal  law  which 
in  this  article  I  have  attempted  to  set  forth — the  law 
that  the  higher  morality  tends  to  produce  the  greater 
military  strength. 

If  in  all  these  considerations  any  force  be  admitted 
to  inhere,  then  clearly  the  duty  of  patriotism  and  of 
preparation  for  war  is  reinforced  ten  thousandfold. 
If  what  has  been  here  advanced  is  sound,  then  from 
every  pulpit  in  the  land  the  voice  of  exhortation 
should  be  heard,  urging  every  man  and  every  woman 
to  serve  God  in  and  through  service  to  their  country. 

The  discovery  that  Christianity  is  incompatible  with 
the  military  spirit  is  made  only  among  decaying 
peoples.  While  a  nation  is  still  vigorous,  while  its 
population  is  expanding,  while  the  blood  in  its  veins 
is  strong,  then  on  this  head  no  scruples  are  felt.  But 
when  its  energies  begin  to  wither,  when  self-indulgence 
takes  the  place  of  self-sacrifice,  when  its  sons  and  its 
daughters  become  degenerate,  then  it  is  that  a 
spurious  and  bastard  humanitarianism  masquerading 
as  religion  declares  war  to  be  an  anachronism  and 
a  barbaric  sin .... 

What  is  manifest  now  is  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  world, 
with  all  its  appurtenant  Provinces  and  States,  is  in  the 
most  direct  danger  of  overthrow,  final  and  complete, 
and  of  the  noble  qualities  upon  which  all  military 
virtue  is  built.  Throughout  that  world,  in  churches 
and  in  chapels,  on  the  platform,  as  in  the  pulpit,  in 
the  press,  and  on  the  stage,  which  is  our  chief  temple 
now,  the  voice  of  every  God-fearing  man  should  be 
raised,  through  the  spoken  or  through  the  written 
word,  to  kindle  anew  the  spark  that  is  dying,  to  preach 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        135 

the  necessity  of  self-sacrifice  for  the  country's  cause, 
and  to  revive  that  dying  military  spirit  which  God 
gave  to  our  race  that  it  might  accomplish  His  will 
upon  earth. 

It  is  only  Prussia,  we  are  now  sure,  that  could 
frame  the  ideal  of  carrying  its  civilization  and 
culture  by  force  throughout  the  world.  Yet  it  was 
a  very  great  Englishman,  who  was  also  a  profound 
admirer  of  the  United  States,  who  visioned  just 
such  a  r61e  for  the  Anglo-Saxons.  We  read  of 
Cecil  Rhodes  that  the  dream  of  his  life  "was  no- 
thing less  than  the  governance  of  the  world  by 
the  British  race."  A  will  exists  written  in  Mr. 
Rhodes's  own  handwriting  in  which  he  states  his 
reasons  for  accepting  the  aggrandizement  and 
service  of  the  British  Empire  as  his  highest  ideal 
of  practical  achievement.  The  document  begins 
with  the  characteristic  sentence:  "I  contend  that 
the  British  race  is  the  finest  which  history  has  yet 
produced."     His  biographer  tells  us: 

The  argument  [continued  through  some  twenty 
foolscap  pages]  is  a  clear  if  somewhat  crude  simimary 
of  the  articles  of  faith  on  which  the  edifice  of  mo- 
dern British  Imperialism  is  based.  It  puts  forward 
broadly,  as  an  aim  which  must  appeal  to  every  ele- 
vated mind,  the  conception  of  working  for  the  govern- 
ance of  the  entire  world  by  its  finest  race;  and  it 
ends  with  a  single  bequest  of  everything  of  which 
he  might  die  possessed  for  the  futherance  of  this  great 
purpose.     Five-and-twenty  years  later  his  final  will 


136  America  and  the  New  World-State 

carried  out,  with  some  difference  of  detail,  the  same 
intention.* 

Among  other  Englishmen  who  have  not  hesi- 
tated to  give  expression  to  the  thought  reflected 
in  Rhodes's  will  is  Earl  Grey,  who  says: 

Probably  everyone  would  agree  that  an  Englishman 
would  be  right  in  considering  his  way  of  looking  at  the 
worid  and  at  life  better  than  that  of  the  Maori  or 
Hottentot,  and  no  one  wotdd  object,  in  the  abstract,  to 
England  doing  her  best  to  impose  her  better  and  higher 
view  on  those  savages.  But  the  same  idea  will  carry 
you  much  farther.  In  so  far  as  an  Englishman  differs 
in  essentials  from  a  Swede  or  Belgian,  he  believes  that 
he  represents  a  more  perfectly  developed  standard  of 
general  excellence.  Yes,  and  even  those  nations 
nearest  to  us  in  mind  and  sentiment — German  and 
Scandinavian — we  regard  on  the  whole  as  not  so  excel- 
lent as  ourselves,  comparing  their  typical  character- 
istics with  ours.  Were  this  not  so,  our  energies  would 
be  directed  to  becoming  what  they  are.  Without 
doing  this,  however,  we  may  well  endeavour  to  pick 
out  their  best  qualities  and  add  them  to  otirs,  believing 
that  our  compound  will  be  superior  to  the  common 
stock. ' 

It  is,  however,  Lord  Grey's  view  as  to  the  point 
at  which  the  champions  of  this  ideal  may  find 
a  moral  justification  for  war  that  is  particularly 
interesting  in  view  of  current  condemnation  of 

'  F.  L.  S.,  in  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  new  volumes,  vol.  xxxii. 
(tenth  edition). 
»  Memoir  of  Herbert  Harvey,  by  Earl  Grey.    London,  1899. 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        137 

German  world-ambitions.     Lord  Grey  concludes 
the  reflections  just  quoted  as  follows: 

It  is  the  mark  of  an  independent  nation  that  it 
should  feel  thus.  How  far  such  a  feeling  is,  in  any 
particular  case,  justified,  history  alone  decides.  But  it 
is  essential  that  each  claimant  for  the  first  place  should 
put  forward  his  whole  energy  to  prove  his  right.  This 
is  the  moral  justification  for  international  strife  and 
for  war,  and  a  great  change  must  come  over  the  world 
and  over  men's  minds  before  there  can  be  any  ques- 
tion of  everlasting  universal  peace,  or  the  settlement 
of  international  differences  by  arbitration.* 

Nor  were  these  writers  alone  in  such  conceptions. 
When  Bemhardi  uses  the  expression  "World 
Power  or  Downfall, "  we  see  in  it  the  indication  of 
a  particularly  mischievous  and  dangerous  political 
megalomania.  Yet  British  writers  of  repute  use 
almost  this  expression,  and  voice  certainly  this 
idea  with  reference  to  Britain  without  any  par- 
ticular misgiving.  Among  other  well-known  pub- 
licists, Professor  Spenser  Wilkinson  has  urged  the 
need  for  Britain's  assuming  the  "leadership  of  the 
human  race."  In  the  preface  to  his  book,  The 
Great  Alternative,  he  writes: 

The  Great  Alternative  is  such  a  choice  given  to 
England — a  choice  between  the  first  place  among  the 
nations  of  the  world  and  the  last;  between  the  leader- 
ship of  the  hiiman  race  and  the  loss  of  Empire  and  of 
all  but  the  shadow  of  independence.     The  idea  set 

*  Memoir  of  Herbert  Harvey,  by  Earl  Grey.    London,  1899. 


138  America  and  the  New  World-State 

forth  in  this  book  is  that  England  has  the  choice 
between  these  two  extremes,  with  no  middle  course 
open  to  her .... 

It  may  fairly  be  argued  that  what  distinguishes 
German  and  Anglo-Saxon  political  ambition  is  that 
the  former  is  pursued  without  regard  to  the  rights 
of  others,  and  the  latter  is  not.  As  a  statement 
of  simple  fact  that  can  doubtless  be  accepted. 
But  this  distinguishing  mark  is  not,  I  fear,  due  to 
the  influence  of  the  nationalist  and  militarist 
writers.  To  the  degree  to  which  they  influence 
opinion  and  policy  their  tendency  is  to  obliterate 
that  difference.  Even  the  article  of  the  Bemhardi 
creed  which  (in  him)  so  shocks  us — the  declaration 
that  "What  is  right  is  decided  by  the  arbitrament 
of  war;  war  gives  a  biologically  just  decision,  since 
its  decisions  rest  on  the  very  nature  of  things" — 
differs  in  no  essential  from  the  deeply  religious 
view  of  (for  instance)  Mr.  Wyatt,  whom  I  have 
quoted.  Mr.  Wyatt  accepts  to  the  full  even  the 
logical  conclusion  of  Bemhardi's  doctrine:  "If 
in  the  gigantic  process  of  international  competition 
England  fall  before  Germany — which  fate  may 
God  avert — then  that  fall  will  follow  from  .  .  . 
the  law  that  the  higher  morality  tends  to  produce 
the  greater  military  strength."  Admiral  Mahan 
comes  very  near  to  the  same  proposition  that 
military  might  makes  right: 

National  power  is  surely  a  legitimate  factor  in 
international  settlements;  for  it  is  the  outcome  of 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        139 

national  efficiency,  and  efficiency  is  entitled  to  assert 
its  fair  position  and  chance  of  exercise  in  world 
matters.    .    .    . 

The  existence  of  might  is  no  mere  casual  attribute, 
but  the  indication  of  qualities  which  should,  as  they 
assuredly  will,  make  their  way  to  the  front  and  to  the 
top  in  the  relations  of  States.* 

Among  British  writers  Colonel  Maude  expresses 
an  allied  view  when  he  says  that  "War  is  the 
divinely  appointed  means  by  which  the  environ- 
ment may  be  readjusted  until  ethically  'fittest' 
and  'best'  become  syoonymous. " * 

In  the  vindication  of  this  policy  at  least  some 
of  our  own  popular  military  writers  wave  aside 
certain  scruples  as  readily  as  could  any  Prussian. 
In  the  book  on  The  Day  of  the  Saxon ,  which  he  has 
dedicated  to  Lord  Roberts,  Homer  Lea  writes 
concerning  certain  international  moralities  as 
follows: 

The  necessity  of  a  declaration  of  war  is  only  a 
modem  illusion.  During  the  last  two  centuries  we 
have  less  than  ten  cases  where  declarations  have  been 
issued  prior  to  the  regular  commencement  of  hostil- 
ities, though  in  one  form  or  another  war  already 
existed.  During  this  same  period  of  time  we  have 
one  hundred  and  eleven  cases  where  war  was  begun 
without  any  notification. 

No  nation  has  followed  more  persistently  than  the 

'  Armaments  and  Arbitration. 

'  War  and  the  World's  Life  (Smith,  Elder),  London,  p.  i8. 


140  America  and  the  New  World-State 

English  this  principle  of  making  war  without  prior 
declaration.  They  have  done  so,  as  have  others, 
because  the  initiation  of  a  conflict  constitutes  the  most 
essential  principle  of  warfare.  .  .  .  During  the 
former  century  there  are  recorded  forty-seven  wars 
begun  without  any  prior  declaration,  while  in  the 
nineteenth  century  eighty  wars  were  begun  without 
any  prior  declaration. 

The  occupation  of  the  Persian  and  Afghanistan 
frontiers  prior  to  war  with  Russia,  or  the  European 
frontiers  in  a  conflict  with  Germany,  arouses  in  the 
British  nation  the  appearance  of  great  opposition  to 
the  violation  of  neutral  territory.  This  is  false,  for 
the  Empire  is  not  moved  by  the  sanctity  of  neutrality. 

Neutrahty  of  States  under  the  conditions  just 
mentioned  has  never  heretofore  nor  will  in  future 
have  any  place  in  international  association  in  time 
of  war.  Such  neutrality  is  a  modem  delusion.  It  is 
an  excrescence. 

In  the  year  1801  the  island  of  Madeira  was  taken 
possession  of  by  the  British,  without  any  previous 
communication  to  the  Court  of  Lisbon,  in  order  that 
it  shoiild  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  French,  observ- 
ing in  this  action  the  true  principle  governing  such 
activities  in  war. 

In  1807  the  British  fleet,  without  any  notification, 
with  no  intimation  given  of  hostile  intentions,  no 
complaint  of  misconduct  on  the  part  of  Denmark, 
entered  the  Baltic,  seized  the  Danish  fleet,  and  block- 
aded the  island  of  Zealand,  on  which  is  situated  the 
city  of  Copenhagen.  At  this  time  both  nations  had 
their  Ambassadors  residing  in  their  respective  capitals, 
and  were  in  perfect  harmony.  The  purpose  of  this 
attack  was  to  anticipate  the  occupation  of  Denmark 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        141 

and  the  use  of  her  fleets  by  France.  So  correct  is  the 
principle  of  this  initiation  that  it  stands  out  with 
remarkable  brilliancy  in  the  darkness  of  innumerable 
military  errors  made  by  the  Saxon  race. 

If  England  were,  therefore,  justified  in  seizing 
Denmark  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
for  no  other  reason  than  to  prevent  the  employment  of 
the  Danish  fleet  by  the  French,  how  much  more  is  she 
justified  during  peace  in  the  twentieth  century  in  the 
occupation  of  its  southern  frontiers  for  the  protection 
of  both  nations  against  German  aggression.^ 

Nor  do  certain  British  military  writers,  to  do 
them  justice,  shirk  this  point  (and  again  I  will 
emphasize  the  point  that  they  do  a  real  service  to 
the  sincere  and  honest  discussion  of  these  subjects 
by  their  frankness).  Lord  Roberts  has  written  a 
laudatory  preface  to  Major  Stewart  Murray's 
book,  The  Future  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons. 
In  this  book  (pp.  40,  41)  Major  Stewart  Murray, 
speaking  of  the  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet  in  1807, 
says: 

Nothing  has  ever  been  done  by  any  other  nation 
more  utterly  in  defiance  of  the  conventionalities  of 
so-called  international  law.  We  considered  it  ad- 
visable and  necessary  and  expedient,  and  we  had 
the  power  to  do  it;  therefore  we  did  it. 

Are  we  ashamed  of  it?  No,  certainly  not;  we  are 
proud  of  it.  In  like  manner,  if  any  nation  can  surprise 
Britain,  far  from  being  ashamed  of  it,  they  will  be 
equally  proud  of  it.     And  what  sickening  hypocrisy 

*  The  Day  of  the  Saxon,  by  Homer  Lea. 


142  America  and  the  New  World-State 

it  must  seem  to  other  nations  to  hear  us,  of  all  people, 
prate  of  the  sanctity  of  international  law  and  call 
aloud  on  its  sacred  rules  as  a  sure  protection  to  our 
commerce  and  food  supply,  or  as  a  sure  protection 
against  surprise.  Whatever  course  of  sudden  and 
unexpected  violence,  whatever  sudden  naval  surprise, 
whatever  surprise  attack  on  our  commerce,  etc., 
any  nation  may  adopt  against  us,  can  be  amply 
justified  by  the  precedents  we  ourselves  have  set.  .  .  . 
For  people  in  this  country  to  talk  of  the  sanctity  of 
international  law  is  nothing  but  hypocrisy  or  ignor- 
ance. 

And  Major  Murray  has  made  it  clear  that  fero- 
city in  war  is  not  Prussianism  but — war.  He  wel- 
comes Clausewitz  as  "the  Shakespeare  of  military 
writers,  the  greatest  and  deepest  of  military 
thinkers,  whose  book  forms  to-day  the  foimdation 
of  all  military  thought  in  Europe,  and  should  form 
the  foundation  of  all  military  thought  in  Britain, " 
and  warmly  applauds  the  appeals  against  "sicken- 
ing humanitarianism. "  Major  Murray  fully  en- 
dorses the  principle  of  making  war  as  "frightful" 
as  possible: 

The  worst  of  all  errors  in  war  is  a  mistaken  spirit 
of  benevolence.  .  .  .  For  "he  who  uses  his  force 
unsparingly,  without  reference  to  the  quantity  of 
bloodshed,  must  obtain  a  superiority  if  his  adversary 
does  not  act  likewise."  ....  Now  this  is  an 
elementary  fact  which  it  is  most  desirable  that  those  of 
our  politicians  and  Exeter  Hall  preachers  and  numer- 
ous old  women  of  both  sexes  who  raise  hideous  out- 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        143 

cries  about  "methods  of  barbarism, "  etc.,  every  time 
we  have  a  war,  should  endeavour  to  learn.  By  their 
very  outcries  for  moderation  and  weakness  they  clearly 
show  that  they  know  nothing  about  war.  They 
impede  the  proper  energetic  use  of  the  national  forces ; 
they  encourage  the  enemy  to  trade  on  our  probable 
weakness  and  folly ;  they  prevent  the  proper  measures 
being  taken  to  bring  the  war  to  a  conclusion;  they 
lengthen  the  war,  thereby  causing  an  infinitely 
greater  loss  of  life  and  an  infinitely  greater  sum  of 
misery;  and  they  delay  the  conclusion  of  peace.  By 
their  noisy,  foolish,  thoughtless  din  in  the  name  of 
humanity  they  murder  humanity.  In  this  country 
their  name  is  legion;  they  fill  the  pulpits  and  the 
platforms  and  Parliament  with  their  outcries  and  the 
press  with  their  articles  and  letters,  and  do  their  ut- 
most to  mislead  the  people  into  a  display  of  false 
humanity  and  deplorable  weakness  in  the  conduct  of 
war.  They  are  the  greatest  possible  enemies  to  our 
peace.  ^ 

Nor  does  Major  Murray  stand  alone.  Dr. 
Miller  Maguire,  an  English  military  critic  and 
authority  of  standing,  writes: 

The  proper  strategy  consists  in  the  first  place  in 
inflicting  as  terrible  blows  as  possible  upon  the  enemy's 
army,  and  then  in  causing  the  inhabitants  so  much 
suffering  that  they  must  long  for  peace  and  force  their 
Government  to  demand  it.  The  people  must  be  left 
with  nothing  but  their  eyes  to  weep  with  over  the  war. 
It  will  require  the  daily  and  hourly  exertions  of  those 

^  Future  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  p.  27. 


144  America  and  the  New  World-State 

who  have  been  burnt  out  to  procure  a  scanty  sub- 
sistence to  sustain  life.  When  the  soldier  learns  that 
his  family — his  wife  and  little  children — are  sure  to 
suffer,  he  will  become  uneasy  in  his  place,  and  will 
weigh  the  duty  he  owes  his  family;  and  what  the 
promptings  of  nature  will  be  it  is  not  difficult  to 
determine.  * 

Dr.  Maguire  borrows  this  reasoning  from  the 
Federal  Generals  of  our  own  Civil  War,  and  adds 
that  "the  Federal  Generals  knew  their  business. 
Their  duty  was  to  bring  about  peace  by  so  ruining 
the  property  of  the  Confederate  civilians  as  to 
make  all  classes  disgusted  with  the  war.  This 
policy  was  deliberately  and  very  properly  applied." 

It  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  a  trivial  tu  quoque 
that  I  have  disinterred  these  opinions  of  American 
and  British  writers,  but  in  order  that,  rereading 
them,  we  may  honestly  ask  ourselves  whether  our 
real  feeling  just  now  is  against  the  doctrine  or 
against  those  who  put  it  into  effect — against 
Prussianism  or  against  Prussians.  For  if  it  is 
against  the  people  and  not  against  the  idea,  then 
our  feelings  will  not  render  us  less,  but  more  likely 
to  become  ourselves  victims  of  the  doctrine  and  to 
fall  once  more  beneath  its  evil  influence. 

We  deem  the  crime  of  Germany  fully  proved 
because  Bemhardi  writes  of  "World-Power  or 
Downfall,"  but  when  a  British  professor  writes 
that   England   has  no   alternative  between   the 

^London  Times,  July  2,  1900. 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        145 

leadership  of  the  human  race  and  loss  of  her 
empire,  the  British  public  accept  it  as  a  quite 
natural  and  laudable  political  conception;  and 
we  are  horrified  at  German  adulation  of  war  as 
a  noble  thing  in  itself;  but  our  own  poets  and 
clergymen  urge  just  that  thing,  and  we  are  not 
horrified  at  all.  We  point  to  German  hostility 
to  peace  as  a  proof  of  her  ineradicable  barbarism, 
while  our  own  popular  journalists  have  for  years 
poured  ferocious  contempt  upon  "the  amiable 
sentimentalists  at  The  Hague  with  their  impossible 
dreams  of  arbitration  and  disarmament." 

Do  we  really  believe  that  this  doctrine  is  an  evil 
and  anti-social  thing,  or  merely  that  it  is  evil  and 
anti-social  when  embraced  by  others?  In  that 
case — if  we  ourselves  at  the  bottom  of  our  hearts 
believe  it  and  excuse  allegiance  to  it  in  ourselves — 
then  it  is  inevitably  destined  to  dominate  the 
policy  and  conduct  of  the  nations  after  the  war 
is  over. 

This  truth  has  evidently  appealed  with  par- 
ticular force  to  a  writer  whose  opinion  in  the  special 
circumstances  of  Europe  at  this  juncture  should 
have  weight  with  us.  A  very  distinguished  Bel- 
gian author,  Dr.  Sarolea,  whose  work.  The  Anglo- 
German  Problem  has  won  the  highest  encomiums 
from,  among  others,  the  King  of  the  Belgians, 
writes  on  this  aspect  of  the  problem  as  follows- 

What  is  even  more  serious  and  ominous,  so  far  as 
the  prospects  of  peace  are  concerned,  the  German,  who 


146  America  and  the  New  World-State 

knows  that  he  is  right  from  his  own  point  of  view, 
knows  that  he  is  also  right  from  the  EngHsh  point  of 
view ;  he  knows  that  the  premises  on  which  he  is  reason- 
ing are  still  accepted  by  a  large  section  of  the  English 
people.  Millions  of  English  people  are  actuated  in 
their  policy  by  those  very  Imperialistic  principles  on 
which  the  Germans  take  their  stand.  After  all, 
German  statesmen  are  only  applying  the  political 
lessons  which  England  has  taught  them,  which  Mr. 
Rudyard  Kipling  has  sung,  and  Air.  Chamberlain 
has  proclaimed  in  speeches  innumerable.  Both  the 
English  Imperialist  and  the  German  Imperialist 
believe  that  the  greatness  of  a  country  does  not  de- 
pend mainly  on  the  virtues  of  the  people,  or  on  the 
resources  of  the  home  country,  but  largely  on  the 
capacity  of  the  home  country  to  acquire  and  to  retain 
large  tracts  of  territory  all  over  the  world.  Both  the 
English  Imperialist  and  the  German  Imperialist  have 
learned  the  doctrine  of  Admiral  Mahan,  that  the  great- 
ness and  prosperity  of  a  country  depend  mainly  on 
sea-power.  Both  believe  that  efficiency  and  success 
in  war  is  one  of  the  main  conditions  of  national 
prosperity. 

Now,  as  long  as  the  two  nations  do  not  rise  to  a 
saner  political  ideal,  as  long  as  both  English  and  Ger- 
man people  are  agreed  in  accepting  the  current 
political  philosophy,  as  long  as  both  nations  shall 
consider  military  power  not  merely  as  a  necessary  and 
temporary  evil  to  submit  to,  but  as  a  permanent  and 
noble  ideal  to  strive  after,  the  German  argument 
remains  unanswerable.  War  is  indeed  predestined, 
and  no  diplomatists  sitting  round  a  great  table  in  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  or  the  Ballplatz  or  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
will  be  able  to  ward  off  the  inevitable.     It  is  only, 


Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism        147 

therefore,  in  so  far  as  both  nations  will  move  away 
from  the  old  political  philosophy,  that  an  understand- 
ing between  Germany  and  England  will  become 
possible.  ...  It  is  the  ideas  and  the  ideals 
that  must  be  fundamentally  changed:  "Instauratio 
facienda  ab  imis  fundamentis. "  And  those  ideals 
once  changed,  all  motives  for  a  war  between  England 
and  Germany  would  vanish  as  by  magic.  But  alas ! 
ideas  and  ideals  do  not  change  by  magic  or  prestige — 
they  can  only  change  by  the  slow  operation  of  intel- 
lectual conversion.     Argtiments  alone  can  do  it. 

It  could  not  be  more  lucidly  expressed,  and  this 
Belgian  author  is  good  enough  to  add  that  it  is 
particularly  such  arguments  as  those  with  which 
this  book  deals  that  must  operate  in  any  intellec- 
tual conversion.^ 

And  if  we,  in  America,  who  are  detached  to  a 
great  extent  from  the  sufferings  and  passions  of  the 
war,  continue  to  be  swayed  by  the  old  ideas,  our 
influence  will  not  represent  a  progressive  factor 
in  the  creation  of  a  better  organized  World-Society. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can  clear  our  minds  of 
these  fallacies  and  if  we  have  clearly  before  us  the 
danger  of  allowing  the  Prussian  idea  to  dominate 
the  evolution  of  the  future,  either  in  Europe  or 
among  ourselves,  we  may  hope  to  play  a  pre- 
dominant part  in  the  creation  of  that  World-State 
which  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  our  own  civilization. 

^  The  Anglo-German  Problem,  pp.  362-3. 


CHAPTER  III 

A   RETROSPECT  OF  AMERICAN   PATRIOTISM 

The  necessity  for  national  stock-taking — Anglophobia  as  the 
expression  of  American  patriotism — War  with  England  "in 
the  interests  of  human  freedom" — The  Venezuelan  Crisis — 
Sudden  disappearance  of  the  British  peril — The  war  with 
Spain — "Free  and  independent"  Cuba — The  Philippines — 
Adoption  of  Spanish  methods — The  water  cure — The  doc- 
trine of  Military  Necessity — American  opinion  of  the  Fili- 
pinos before  and  after  the  war — Colonies  and  Imperialism — 
The  new  doctrine  as  to  annexation 

One  of  the  great  problems  of  international  re- 
lationship— it  is  in  one  sense  the  very  greatest 
of  all — is  that  no  nation  ever  deems  that  its  pa- 
triotism can  by  any  possibility  need  watching  or 
that  there  can  ever  be  the  slightest  danger  of  it 
developing  into  that  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
others,  into  the  "my  country  right  or  wrong" 
attitude,  which  has  made  German  patriotism,  for 
instance,  a  menace  to  civilization. 

I  have  touched  on  this  danger  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  but  in  order  that  we  may  have  it  clearly 
before  us,  I  think  that  in  this  connection,  a  stock- 
taking of  the  not  very  remote  past  of  American 
patriotism  may  be  wholesome.    For  this  purpose 

148 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  149 

I  have  thought  it  useful  to  reprint  three  papers 
that  date  back  in  part  nearly  twenty  years.  The 
chapter  which  follows  was  taken  from  a  book 
published  in  England  in  1902  but  which  has  not 
yet  appeared  in  the  United  States.  The  two  later 
papers  forming  Chapter  IV  are  from  a  little  West- 
em  publication  of  an  earlier  date,  now  defunct. 
Writing  a  year  a  two  after  the  Venezuelan  mes- 
sage of  President  Cleveland  and  speaking  of  the  na- 
tional temper  both  before  and  after  that  incident, 
I  said: 

This  Anglophobia  was  not  a  mere  historical 
sentiment,  a  memory  of  wrongs  inflicted  upon  a 
more  or  less  distant  ancestry,  but  an  active  and 
powerful  political  motive  influencing,  not  merely 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  country,  but  what  was 
more  important,  almost  the  whole  range  of  domes- 
tic politics.  To  no  passion  could  the  politician  be 
so  sure  of  appealing  with  such  success  as  to  hatred 
of  England.  To  call  a  thing  "British,"  whether 
it  were  Free  Trade,  or  an  independent  judiciary, 
or  a  reformed  civil  service,  was  to  condemn  it  as 
un-American,  something  no  true  patriot  could 
countenance.  No  theme  was  so  popular  as  that 
which  represented  England  as  a  malicious  Power 
eternally  plotting  the  downfall  of  the  American 
Republic,  and  which  would  one  day  have  to  be 
crushed,  "in  the  interests  of  himian  freedom." 
Such  sentiments  were  expressed,  not  merely  by 
obscure    tub-thumpers,    but    by    senators    and 


150  America  and  the  New  World-State 

editors  of  great  newspapers.  One  of  the  most 
notable  Anglophobes  in  the  Senate,  Henry  Cabot 
Lodge,  is  the  author  of  historical  works  of  no 
mean  merit,*  the  graduate  of  a  great  university, 
the  confidante  of  cabinet  ministers,  the  particular 
friend  of  a  former  President.  Another  United 
States  Senator  starts  out  upon  a  lecturing  tour  to 
advocate  a  war  with  England,  "with  or  without 
cause,"  as  he  himself  expressed  it;  that  a  great 
American  newspaper  could  recommend  that  notice 
be  served  upon  England  "to  quit  this  free  soil 
forever."  An  eminent  American  publicist,  Mr. 
David  A.  Wells,  has  put  it  on  record  that  this  out- 
and-out  Anglophobia  was  "accepted  and  endorsed 
by  nearly  every  member  of  our  national  or  state 
legislatures,  and  by  nearly  every  newspaper  or 


*  The  conversion  of  these  strenuous  Anglophobes  to  equally 
strenuous  Anglophiles  is  dealt  with  farther  on.  Regarding  Sena- 
tor Lodge,  the  Evening  Post  points  out  that  through  nine-tenths 
of  the  Story  of  the  Revolution  (the  part  written  in  the  pre-Anglo- 
phile  period),  the  Senator  bangs  and  bethumps  the  English  in 
the  familiar  old  ward-caucus  style.  At  the  very  end,  the  able 
historian  suddenly  turns  square  about  and  gushes  over  England 
as  extravagantly  as  he  had  before  abused  her.  "  It  simply  meant 
he  had  caught  the  trick  of  utterance  common  when  he  was  finish- 
ing his  gigantic  labours,  just  as  he  similarly  caught  it  at  the  begin- 
ning of  them.  When  he  began  to  write,  it  was  the  fashion  to  curse 
England,  and  he  cursed  her  soundly.  When  he  ended,  everyone 
was  falling  on  England's  neck,  and  he  fell  blubbering  with  the  rest. 
The  conversion  was  suspiciously  sudden.  The  repentant  sinner 
was  only  a  rice  Christian,  penitent  for  value  received,  and  as  soon 
as  the  heathen  crops  are  good  once  more,  an  unblushing  and  roar- 
ing heathen  he  will  be  again." 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  151 

magazine    in    the    country."     Enumerating    the 
causes  of  this  prejudice,  he  says: 

It  is  all  but  universally  assumed  that  the  govern- 
mental and  commercial  policy  of  England  is  character- 
ized by  no  other  principle  save  to  monopolize,  through 
arbitrary,  selfish,  and  unjust  measures,  everything  on 
the  earth's  surface  that  can  glorify  herself  and  promote 
the  interests  of  her  own  insular  population,  to  the 
detriment  of  all  other  nations  and  peoples;  and  that 
it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  the  people  and  Government 
of  the  United  States,  in  behalf  of  popular  liberty, 
civilization,  and  of  Christianity,  to  put  an  end  to  the 
further  continuance  of  such  a  policy,  even  if  a  resort 
to  war  be  necessary  to  effect  it. 

One  might  justly  base  a  general  condemnation  of 
the  "patriotic  instinct"  as  a  guide  in  politics  upon 
this  single  fact,  that  sixty  millions  of  the  shrewdest 
and  most  hard-headed  people  in  the  world  should, 
during  several  generations,  represent  as  intolerably 
oppressive  the  most  liberal  commercial  policy  in 
the  history  of  the  world;  that  they  should  set 
before  themselves  as  one  of  the  first  objects  of 
their  national  ambition  the  impoverishment  of  a 
people  whose  wealth  was  an  essential  element  in 
their  own  prosperity.  Yet  such  assumption  and 
the  policy  which,  as  Americans  themselves  in 
our  day  recognize,  defied  both  fact  and  common- 
sense,  were  endorsed  by  the  American  nation 
with  a  completer  unanimity  than  the  English  na- 
tion showed  in  the  war  upon  the  South  African 


152  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Republics.  The  pro-Boer  party  in  England  was 
considerable,  including  the  official  leaders  of  the 
Opposition;  the  pro-British  party  ten  years  since 
had  no  existence  in  American  politics.  A  Demo- 
cratic President  sent  the  Venezuelan  Ultimatum, 
the  Republican  Opposition  "fell  over  itself"  in 
voting  the  appropriation  for  military  preparation. 
The  Republicans  exploited  Anglophobia  as  against 
the  Free-Trade  Democrats;  the  Democrats  ex- 
ploited it  as  against  the  Gold-Bug  Republicans. 
Both  parties  deemed  themselves  to  be  passing  the 
severest  condemnation  upon  the  policy  of  their  op- 
ponents when  they  could  represent  it  as  "British. " 
But  if  American  patriotism  be  condemned  by 
the  attitude  of  generations  in  the  matter  of  Eng- 
land's commercial  and  territorial  policy,  it  may  be 
said  to  have  reached  the  burlesque  when  it  insisted 
that  the  enlargement  by  a  few  square  miles  of  a 
small  British  colony  in  South  America  endangered 
the  institutions  and  independence  of  America. 
This  hard-headed  people,  who  for  a  hundred 
and  thirty  years  had  had  England  as  a  neighbour 
along  three  thousand  miles  of  their  frontier,  seri- 
ously contended  that  if  England  enlarged  by  so 
much  as  an  arrow-shot  her  frontier  in  South 
America,  a  country  separated  from  them  by  half  a 
continent,  their  national  existence  was  threatened. 
So  seriously  indeed  did  they  presumably  believe 
this  that  they  stood  ready  to  provoke  a  war  which 
must  in  any  case  have  been  one  of  the  most 
stupendous  conflicts  in  history,  to  prevent  such 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  153 

enlargement.  And  American  patriotism  was  so 
sensitive  on  the  point  that  the  mildest  objection 
to  such  a  view  was  stigmatized  as  "treason,"  as 
"siding  with  the  enemies  of  one's  coimtry."^ 
And  yet,  so  little  real  basis  in  fact  had  this  insane 
hostility  that  it  was  at  a  certain  juncture  suddenly 
abandoned,  and  transferred  to  another  country. 
In  a  few  weeks  the  "British  peril,"  which  had 
haunted  the  imagination  of  American  patriots  for 
generations,  completely  disappeared,  and  the 
Spaniard,  against  whom  not  one  American  in  a 

^  A  curious  proof  of  the  extent  of  American  Anglophobia  at  the 
time  of  which  I  am  writing  is  furnished  by  Herbert  Spencer  in 
Facts  and  Comments.  No  charge  against  England  was  commoner 
with  American  Anglophobes  than  that  she  favoured  the  Southern 
cause  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.  Desiring  to  show  on  what 
little  evidence  this  charge  rested,  Spencer  overhauled  the  EngHsh 
newspapers  of  the  day,  and  was  able  to  show  that  they  all — Tory, 
Whig,  and  Radical — condemned  the  action  of  the  South  both 
before  and  after  the  declaration  of  war.  Blackwood' s  Magazine 
furnished  the  single  exception.  This  was  embodied  in  a  letter  to 
the  Tribune,  but  friends  of  Spencer  in  America  were  so  persuaded 
that  it  would  do  no  good  and  would  only  intensify  bitterness, 
that  the  letter  was  not  printed.  Spencer  adds:  "Some  years 
afterwards,  however,  when  the  ill-feeling  had  diminished,  the 
London  correspondent,  to  whom  I  mentioned  the  matter,  asked  me 
to  let  him  have  the  letter  for  publication.  I  did  so,  and  it  event- 
tially  appeared.  There  was  an  accompanying  leading  article 
referring  in  a  slighting  way  to  the  evidence  that  it  contained,  and, 
as  I  gathered,  though  some  effect  was  produced,  it  was  but  small. " 
We  see  from  this,  that  not  merely  was  the  feeling  against  England 
intense,  but  it  was  so  intense  as  to  resent  any  evidence  that  went 
to  prove  England  in  any  way  friendly.  Even  so  influential  a 
paper  as  the  Tribune  dared  not  jeopardize  its  patriotic  orthodoxy 
by  printing  evidence  which  might  contribute  to  Anglo-American 
good-feeling. 


154  America  and  the  New  World-State 

million  had  any  real  grievance  whatever,  became 
the  monster  which  it  was  necessary  to  annihilate. 
But  this  sudden  change  of  front  was  shortly  to  be 
altogether  outdone,  and  the  American  patriot  to 
perform  a  feat  of  mental  gymnastics  which  has 
probably  never  been  equalled  by  any  other  people 
in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  situation  which 
gave  rise  to  this  exhibition  may  be  resumed  thus: 
America  had  intervened  in  Cuba  to  stop  the 
severities  of  war  waged  against  a  people  struggling 
for  independence  and  the  right  to  govern  itself. 
The  joint  resolution  in  Congress  declared  that  the 
*' people  of  Cuba  are,  and  by  right  ought,  to  be 
free  and  independent."  Mr.  McKinley,  in  his 
message  to  Congress  later,  declared  that  such 
autonomous  government  as  Spain  had  set  up  in 
the  capital  and  elsewhere,  "appeared  not  to  gain 
the  favour  of  the  inhabitants,  nor  to  be  able  to 
extend  its  influence  to  the  large  extent  of  territory 
held  by  the  insurgents. "  Hence,  "  in  the  name  of 
humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization  .  .  .  the 
war  in  Cuba  must  stop.  **  Spain  replied  that  such 
grievances  as  Cubans  could  show  would  be  honestly 
considered  the  moment  the  rebels  would  lay  down 
their  arms,  which  they  must  do  before  she  could 
treat  with  them.  The  national  honour  of  Spain 
demanded  as  much.  America  regarded  these  rea- 
sons as  puerile  and  fantastic:  she  declared  war. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  American  people 
were  honest  in  the  matter.  They  were  fully  con- 
vinced that  they  were  going  to  war  to  vindicate 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  155 

the  American  principle  of  political  independence, 
to  relieve  suffering  and  starving  insurgents.  Sena- 
tor Wolcott  declared  in  Congress  that 

in  the  eyes  of  every  man  in  Europe,  we  must  be  free 
from  ulterior  motives,  if  we  are  to  preserve  their  re- 
spect and  our  own ....  We  cannot  take  territory, 
because  our  constitution  is  founded  upon  the  consent 
of  the  governed.  It  is  the  principle  upon  which  we,  as 
a  nation,  exist,  and  which  gives  us,  above  all  others, 
the  right  to  intervene  in  Cuba.  The  war  must  be 
fought,  because,  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  we  stand  as 
the  sentinel  of  liberty  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
and,  because,  if  we  fail  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  the 
suffering  and  the  down-trodden,  we  will  be  untrue  to 
the  principles  upon  which  this  government  is  founded, 
as  upon  a  rock. 

Archbishop  Ireland  declared  that  the  "people 
of  America  offered  their  lives  through  no  sordid 
ambition  of  pecuniary  gain,  of  conquest  of  terri- 
tory, of  national  aggrandizement.  An  all-ruling 
providence.    .    .    ." 

Never  had  such  a  flood  of  patriotism  swept  over 
the  country.  Those  who  doubted  the  wisdom  of 
America's  action  were  attacked  with  a  virulence 
which  it  is  difficult  at  this  date  to  conceive.  The 
opponents  of  the  Cuban  policy  were  declared  to 
have  "no  conception  of  the  spirit  that  Americanism 
represented,  of  the  principles  upon  which  Amer- 
ican government  was  based.    .    .    .  " 

This  was  in  June,  1898.     In  June,  1899,  America 


156  America  and  the  New  World-State 

was  in  the  midst  of  a  war  for  destroying  the  inde- 
pendent government  of  a  people  lying  ten  thousand 
miles  from  her  shores,  alien  alike  in  race,  in  lan- 
guage, in  law,  religion,  traditions;  a  people  which 
had  never  at  any  time  acknowledged  any  allegiance 
of  any  sort  to  America,  a  people  of  whose  very 
existence  most  Americans  were  ignorant  before  the 
war  of  subjugation  and  conquest  was  started  upon. 
None  of  the  excuses,  even,  which  England  could 
advance  in  the  case  of  her  war  against  the  Boers, 
were  available.  America  had  no  injustice  to 
redress,  no  paramount  interest  to  defend.  Her 
national  security  was  not  threatened.  The  most 
apprehensive  patriot  could  not  pretend  that  the 
existence  of  an  Hispano-Eurasian  Republic  off  the 
coast  of  China  threatened  American  independence, 
or  that  she  had  any  mission  for  the  prevention  of 
anarchy  there,  when  anarchy  had  reigned  more  or 
less  normally  in  a  score  of  republics  on  the  Amer- 
ican continent — some  of  them  at  the  very  doors  of 
the  United  States — for  upwards  of  a  century.  Nor 
was  it  pretended  that  America  had  great  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  islands.  Her  commer- 
cial interests  there  were  trivial,  immeasurably 
inferior  to  England's  or  Spain's,  and  nothing 
like  so  great  as  American  interests  in  such  coun- 
tries as  Chili,  Costa  Rica,  or  Bolivia.  Nor 
could  it  be  claimed  that  America  had  pressing  need 
of  territory  for  an  expanding  population.  She  had 
already  more  territory  than  she  could  populate  in 
generations,  while  the  physical  conditions  of  the 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  157 

Philippines  are  such  that  Americans  cannot  in 
health  and  comfort  live  there.  America's  only 
possible  excuse  for  the  war  was  that  she  had  bought 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Philippines  from  Spain — a 
sovereignty,  which,  by  her  policy,  and  by  a  thou- 
sand patriotic  utterances  of  six  months  before,  she 
had  vociferously  declared  Spain  did  not  possess. 
After  co-operating  with  the  insurgents  for  the 
expulsion  of  Spanish  authority,  after  declaring 
that  Spain  had  sacrificed  further  right  to  the 
exercise  of  that  authority,  America  buys  it  like  so 
much  mining  stock,  and  demands  that  the  Fili- 
pinos submit  to  it.  The  wishes  of  the  inhabitants 
were  never  consulted  in  the  matter  (although  for 
over  a  century  Americans  had  been  declaring  that 
government  could  only  derive  its  just  power  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed),  while  so  far  as  the 
legal  title  is  concerned,  it  was  acquired  in  1898 
from  a  source  which  in  1897  Americans  were 
declaring  invalid. 

Mr.  McKinley  himself,  in  his  message  to  Con- 
gress in  December,  1897,  declared,  with  regard  to 
the  Philippines:  "I  speak  not  of  forcible  annexa- 
tion, because  that  is  not  to  be  thought  of,  and 
under  our  code  of  morality  would  be  a  criminal 
aggression."  Exactly  a  year  later  the  President,  on 
his  own  initiative,  a  month  before  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  was  ratified  by  the  Senate,  issued  a  proclama- 
tion to  the  Islanders,  announcing  that  they  must  un- 
conditionally submit  to  American  authority,  which 
would  be  established  "at  any  cost  whatever." 


158  America  and  the  New  World-State 

This,  as  the  outcome  of  a  war,  undertaken  to 
deliver  a  people  from  a  foreign  yoke,  to  vindi- 
cate the  sacred  right  of  self-government.  It  is  un- 
imaginable that  any  people  in  the  world,  savage 
or  civilized,  would,  when  suddenly  called  upon,  so 
surrender  their  country  imconditionally  into  the 
hands  of  a  foreign  nation,  a  nation  of  which  most 
had  never  heard,  a  nation  which  had  not  previously 
the  remotest  interest  or  concern  in  the  country 
they  thus  suddenly  imdertook  to  rule,  a  nation  in 
every  imaginable  respect  alien,  if  not  hostile. 
The  Americans  would  themselves  have  been  the 
first  to  resist  a  sovereignty  imposed  in  such  an 
imheard-of  fashion.  Spain,  whom  America  had 
turned  out,  was  in  some  senses,  at  least,  better 
qualified  for  the  government  of  the  islands.  She, 
at  least,  had  been  established  there  during  three 
centuries,  had  given  the  islands  such  civilization 
as  they  possessed,  the  language  which  was  the 
medium  of  civilized  intercourse,  their  laws  and 
religion.  The  Americans  were  alien  in  all  these 
respects.  Not  a  self-respecting  American  but 
would  have  done  as  did  the  Filipinos,  yet  for  doing 
so  much  the  Filipinos  have  for  four  years  been 
harassed  with  a  severity  that  Spain  never  exceeded. 
It  is  not  a  mere  effort  of  rhetoric  but  an  absolute 
truth  to  say  that  there  is  not  an  act  of  tyranny,  not 
a  crime,  not  a  cruelty  which  was  alleged  against 
Spain  in  her  waging  of  the  Cuban  War  as  the 
justification  of  American  intervention  which  Amer- 
ica herself  has  not  been  guilty  of  in  the  Philippines, 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  159 

and  which  the  American  patriots  have  not,  when 
committed  by  their  own  government,  palliated, 
or  excused,  or  directly  defended.  ^  The  reconcen- 
trados  system,  the  ruthless  massacre  of  whole 
populations,  including  the  women  and  children, 
the  denial  of  quarter  to  prisoners,  torture,  the 

*  See  Reports  quoted  below. 

The  Evening  Post  of  4th  March  says:  "Governor  Taft's 
testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Philippines  is  an 
admission  that  some  of  the  ugliest  stories  told  of  the  conduct  of 
the  war  are  true.  There  has  been,  he  stated,  some  '  unnecessary 
killing'  (polite  official  phrase  for  murder),  some  cases  of  whipping 
and  the  use  of  the  water  cure  (that  is  torture).  We  are  thus  .  .  . 
caught  doing  the  very  things  which  led  us  to  go  to  war  in  solemn 
protest  and  in  the  name  of  an  outraged  humanity.  When  it  was 
the  Spaniards  who  were  guilty  of  'unnecessary  killing'  (in 
Governor  Taft's  elegant  words)  and  of  torture  and  of  reconcentra- 
tion  in  Cuba  and  in  the  Philippines,  we  did  not  fall  back  on  the 
cold  philosophic  comfort  that  war  is  '  inherently  a  cruel  thing ' ; 
that  it  is  necessary  to  be  '  severe, '  and  that  the  more  truculently 
we  make  war,  the  sooner  will  the  enemy  ask  for  peace.  No,  these 
salves  we  prudently  reserved  for  our  own  conscience.  The 
Spaniards  we  denounced  to  high  heaven  as  monsters  without 
excuse.  Our  war  against  them  was  a  holy  war,  and  it  was  as 
champions  of  religion  and  the  tenderest  humanity  that  we  un- 
furled our  banners,  only  to  find  that  we  were  soon  to  allow,  or  at 
least  to  apologize  for,  in  ourselves  the  things  we  had  fiercely  con- 
demned in  others. " 

The  Chicago  Inter  ocean,  representing  the  apologist  attitude, 
says,  editorially,  on  21st  July,  1902,  that  General  Smith  has  been 
reprimanded  for  "violent  language.  His  record  remains  un- 
stained." General  Smith  was  reprimanded  by  the  President — 
not  a  severe  punishment — for  ordering  his  subordinate  to  "take 
no  prisoners,  to  kill  everything  over  ten,  to  make  Samar  a  howling 
wilderness."  This  to  the  Inter  ocean  is  mere  "violent  language." 
Yet  the  Interocean  was  especially  notable  for  its  perfervid 
condemnation  of  Weyler  in  Cuba. 


i6o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

entrapping  of  native  leaders  by  the  meanest 
trickery — a  trickery  which  in  the  words  of  Senator 
Hoar  was  "in  violation,  not  only  of  the  laws  of  war, 
but  of  that  law  of  hospitality  which  governs  alike 
everywhere  the  civilized  Christian  or  pagan 
wherever  the  light  of  chivalry  has  penetrated" — 
the  laying  waste  of  a  score  of  peaceful  villages  for 
the  killing  of  a  single  soldier,  all  this  has  been  calm- 
ly watched  without  a  protest  from  those  patriots 
who  appealed  to  high  heaven  when  similar  crimes 
were  committed  in  the  Philippines  and  in  Cuba  by 
Spain.  More,  the  distinctly  patriotic  organs  of 
opinion  have  treated  as  sentimentalists,  and  even 
traitors,  those  Americans  who  have  protested. 

It  is  impossible  to  reproduce  here  the  enormous 
mass  of  evidence — of  which  the  great  majority  of 
Americans  are  ignorant — which  justifies  these 
strictures.  But  I  will  recall  a  few  facts  of  an 
official  nature,  and  the  reader  may  judge  whether 
the  foregoing  is  overdrawn. 

General  Jacob  Smith,  at  the  court-martial 
which  became  necessary  owing  to  the  acquittal  of 
a  subordinate  on  charges  of  murder  based  upon  the 
execution  of  military  orders,  admitted  having 
issued  the  following: 

I  wish  you  to  kill  and  burn.  The  more  you  kill, 
the  more  you  will  please  me.  The  island  of  Samar 
must  be  made  a  howling  wilderness. 

Asked  by  the  subordinate  above-mentioned 
what  age  limit  should  be  placed  to  the  killing, 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism   i6i 

General   Smith   replied,    "Kill   everything    over 
ten." 

This  seems  pretty  definite.  General  Smith,  far 
from  denying  the  issue  of  such  orders,  stoutly 
defended  their  necessity  and  their  "humanity."^ 
That  they  were  thoroughly  carried  out,  and  that 
their  spirit  animated  large  sections  of  the  American 
army  in  the  Philippines,  there  can  be  no  manner  of 
doubt.  Major  Gardner — extracts  from  whose 
report  I  give  later  in  another  connection — officially 
notified  his  government  as  civil  governor  of  the 
Province  of  Tayabas,  that  "a  third  of  the  popula- 
tion had  disappeared  as  the  result  of  the  military 
operations."  He  complains  that  the  wholesale 
and  indiscriminate  "killing"  was  depopulating  the 
country.  Captain  Elliott  at  about  this  time 
published  over  his  own  signature  a  letter  from 
which  the  following  is  an  extract: 

Caloocan  was  supposed  to  contain  17,000  in- 
habitants. The  Twentieth  Kansas  swept  through  it, 
and  Caloocan  contains  not  one  living  native.  Of  the 
buildings  the  battered  walls  of  the  great  church  and 
the  dismal  prison  alone  remain.  The  village  of  May- 
paja,  where  our  first  fight  occurred  on  the  night  of  the 

'  "Colonel  Woodruff,  Counsel  for  General  Smith,  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  trial,  at  once  stated  that  he  desired  to  simplify  matters, 
and  with  that  object  was  willing  to  admit  that  he  wanted  every- 
body to  be  killed  who  was  capable  of  bearing  arms,  and  that  he 
did  specify  ten  years  as  the  age  limit  for  such  killing,  since  Samar 
boys  of  that  age  were  as  dangerous  as  those  of  maturer  years." 
— Manila  Dispatches  to  American  Papers  of  25th  April,  1902. 


i62  America  and  the  New  World-State 

14th,  had  5000  people  in  it  on  that  day.     Now  not  one 
stone  stands  upon  another. 

The  report  reads  like  an  account  of  the  cam- 
paigns of  Timur  or  Ghengis  Khan.^  Yet  when 
revelations  of  this  character  were  being  made 
Senator  Chauncey  Depew,  in  a  Fourth  of  July 
oration  which  I  had  the  pleasure  of  hearing  him 
deliver  in  Paris,  assured  his  hearers  that  "millions 
in  the  far-off  Philippines  were  that  night  on  their 
knees  thanking  God  that  the  free  flag  of  the  Stars 
and  Stripes,  the  glorious  emblem  of  freedom  and 
humanity,  at  last  floated  over  them." 

The  Smith  incident  of  itself  would  not  perhaps 

'  Perhaps  the  best  historical  parallel  may  be  found  in  the 
history  of  British  campaigns  in  Ireland.  Froude  quotes  Maltby's 
report  to  government  as  follows:  "I  burnt  all  their  corn  and 
houses,  and  committed  to  the  sword  all  that  could  be  found.  In 
like  manner,  I  assaulted  a  castle  when  the  garrison  surrendered. 
I  put  them  to  the  misericordia  of  my  soldiers.  They  were  all 
slain.  Thence  I  went  on,  sparing  none  which  came  in  my  way, 
which  cruelty  did  so  amaze  their  followers  that  they  could  not 
tell  where  to  bestow  themselves."  Of  the  commander  of  the 
English  forces  at  Munster  we  read,  "He  .  .  .  diverted  his 
forces  into  East  Clanwilliam  and  Muskery-Quirke,  and,  harassing 
the  country,  killed  all  mankind  that  were  found  therein,  for  a 
terror  to  those  as  should  give  relief  to  the  runagate  traitors. 
Thence  we  came  to  Aberleagh  (the  beautiful  glen  of  Aberlow) 
where  we  did  the  like,  not  leaving  behind  us  man  or  beast,  come 
or  cattle. "  Lord-Deputy  Chichester,  commander  of  the  English 
forces  in  Ulster,  writes:  "  I  burned  all  along  Lough  Neagh,  within 
four  miles  of  Dungannon  .  .  .  sparing  none  of  what  quality,  age, 
or  sex  soever,  besides  many  burned  to  death.  We  killed  man, 
woman,  and  child,  horse,  beast,  or  whatever  we  could  find." 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  163 

have  great  importance  were  it  not  that  there  is 
overwhelming  evidence  that  the  spirit  of  the  "kill 
and  bum"  order  animated  most,  if  not  all,  the 
later  American  operations  in  the  Philippines.  Not 
the  least  suggestive  fact  in  connection  with  the 
whole  evidence  is  the  determined  effort  that  has 
been  made  officially  to  hush  matters  up.  Acts  of 
the  most  serious  nature  have,  despite  the  Senate 
Enquiry  Commission,  only  come  to  light  months, 
and  years,  after  their  committal.  At  the  very 
time  that  the  Secretary  of  War  made  his  statement 
to  the  effect  that  the  "war  in  the  Philippines  had 
been  conducted  with  scrupulous  regard  for  the 
rules  of  civilized  warfare, "  he  was  in  possession  of 
a  report  (which  he  conveniently  suppressed)  from 
one  of  his  own  officers  complaining  that  the  laws  of 
civilized  warfare  were  habitually  violated  by  the 
American  troops,  and  that  unless  such  a  policy 
were  stopped  the  seed  of  perpetual  revolution  and 
resistance  in  the  islands  would  be  sown.  This 
report,  which  was  produced  at  the  Senate  inves- 
tigation, and  was  drawn  up  by  Major  Gardner, 
the  Civil  Governor  of  the  Philippine  Province  of 
Tayabas,  states: 

Of  late,  by  reason  of  the  conduct  of  the  troops,  such 
as  the  extensive  burning  of  the  barrios  in  trying  to  lay 
waste  the  country,  so  that  the  insurgents  cannot  oc- 
cupy it ;  the  torturing  of  natives  by  so-called  water  cure 
and  other  methods,  in  order  to  obtain  information ;  the 
harsh  treatment  of  natives  generally,  and  the  failure 


1 64  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  inexperienced  lately-appointed  lieutenants  to  dis- 
tinguish between  those  who  are  friendly,  and  to  treat 
every  native  as  if  he  were,  whether  or  no,  an  insurrec- 
tor  at  heart,  the  friendly  sentiment  above  referred  to 
is  being  fast  destroyed,  and  a  deep  hatred  towards 
us  engendered.  If  these  things  need  be  done,  they  had 
best  be  done  by  native  troops,  so  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States  will  not  be  credited  therewith.  Almost 
without  exception,  soldiers,  and  also  many  officers, 
refer  to  natives  in  their  presence  as  "niggers. "... 
The  cotirse  now  being  pursued  in  this  province,  and 
in  the  provinces  of  Batangas,  Laguna,  and  Samar,  is, 
in  my  opinion,  sowing  the  seeds  for  a  perpetual  revolu- 
tion against  us  wherever  a  good  opportunity  occurs. 
.  .  .  We  are  daily  making  permanent  enemies. 
In  the  course  above  referred  to,  the  troops  made  no 
distinction  often  between  the  property  of  those  natives 
who  are  insurgents,  or  insurgent  sympathizers,  and  the 
property  of  those  who  heretofore  have  risked  their 
lives  by  being  loyal  to  the  United  States,  and  giving 
us  information  against  their  countrymen  in  arms. 
Often  every  house  in  a  barrio  is  burned.  In  my  opin- 
ion, the  situation  does  not  justify  the  means  employed, 
and  especially  when  taking  into  consideration  the 
suffering  that  must  be  undergone  by  the  innocent, 
and  its  effect  upon  the  relations  with  these  people 
hereafter 

Yet  with  this  report  in  his  possession,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  in  reply  to  newspaper  criticism 
of  the  conduct  of  the  troops  and  the  Philippine 
policy  generally,  spoke  with  indignation  of  "base 
slanders  having  not  the  least  justification,"  and 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism   165 

of    "self-restraint   and   humanity   never    before 
surpassed  in  any  war."  ^ 

I  have  before  me  as  I  write,  copies  of  the  letters 
of  nearly  two  hundred  American  soldiers;  they  are 
all  signed,  and  in  most  cases  the  writer's  regiment 
is  given.  They  all  have  stories  to  tell  of  scenes 
like  that  described  by  Captain  Elliott,  or  of 
tortures  so  revolting  that  it  is  scarcely  possible  to 
believe  that  they  could  have  occurred.  And  yet 
when  one  soldier  after  another  describes  in  prac- 
tically the  same  words,  with  a  little  more  or  less 
detail,  the  same  acts  of  barbarous  atrocity,  what 
conclusion  can  be  drawn?  Are  they  all  inventing 
horrors  of  which  only  a  morbid  imagination  could 
conceive?  Massacre,  torture,  wholesale  destruc- 
tion and  devastation,  rape  and  savage  licence  are 
all  reflected.  One  writer  describes  the  shooting 
of  a  whole  village  which  offered  no  resistance: 
old  men,  sick  people,  children — all  fell. 


» It  is  curious  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  should,  in  defence  of 
English  conduct  in  South  Africa,  have  appealed  to  the  American 
conduct  of  the  Philippine  campaign.  Compare  the  American 
secretary's  language,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  its  use, 
with  the  declaration  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  (Birmingham,  30th 
August,  1902),  that "  there  never  has  been  a  war  recounted  to  us  in 
history,  or  within  the  experience  of  the  oldest  living  man  amongst 
us,  in  which  a  more  sincere  endeavour  was  made  to  reduce  the 
evils  of  war  to  a  minimum  .  .  .  never  has  there  been  in  the 
course  of  a  campaign  less  cruelty  or  less  wanton  mischief,"  in 
the  face  of  an  English  Field-Marshal's  (NeviUe  Chamberlain) 
emphatic  declaration:  "I  can  recall  no  campaign  in  which  there 
has  been  such  wholesale  devastation  of  the  enemy's  country  as 
in  this." 


1 66  America  and  the  New  World-State 

In  addition  to  the  soldiers'  letters,  there  are 
those  of  newspaper  correspondents.  Joseph  Ohl, 
a  trustworthy  correspondent  of  the  Atlanta  Con- 
stitution, an  old  paper  of  very  good  standing, 
writes  as  follows: 

The  officer  commanding  the  battalion  over  on 
Bohol  has  been  giving  instructions  to  kill  off  every- 
body suspected  of  connection  with  the  insurgents.  He 
has  been  told  that  these  orders  give  him  the  widest 
latitude,  that  he  is  not  to  be  very  particular  whether 
the  suspected  is  bearing  arms  or  has  been;  if  he  is  a 
suspect,  he  is  to  be  treated  as  an  outlaw  and  shot  down. 
General  Hughes  is  of  opinion  that  this  is  the  only  way 
to  deal  with  the  rebellion  in  the  present  stage.  Never 
will  it  be  thoroughly  stamped  out  until  those  respons- 
ible for  the  resistance  have  been  killed  off. 

As  the  military  officers  over  and  over  again  have 
attempted  to  justify  their  measures,  by  the  fact 
that  "every  Filipino  is  at  heart  a  rebel,"  the 
islands  are  likely  to  be  pacified  when  they  are 
depopulated.  What  a  striking  confirmation  of  the 
facts  cited  in  this  letter  is  given  by  the  report  of 
Major  Gardner  may  be  judged  from  a  comparison 
therewith. 

The  following  letter  is  signed  by  A.  A.  Barnes, 
Battery  G,  3rd  United  States  Artillery,  first  pub- 
lished in  the  Standard  of  Greensburg  (Ind.),  an 
"Imperialist"  paper: 

Last  night  one  of  our  boys  was  found  shot  and  his 
stomach  cut  open.     Immediately  orders  were  received 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  167 

from  General  Wheaton  to  bum  the  town,  and  kill 
every  native  in  sight;  which  was  done  to  a  finish. 
About  a  thousand  men,  women,  and  children"  were 
reported  to  be  killed.  I  am  probably  growing  hard 
hearted,  for  I  am  in  my  glory  when  I  can  sight  my 
gun  on  some  dark  skin,  and  pull  the  trigger.  .  .  . 
Tell  all  my  enquiring  friends  that  I  am  doing  all  I 
can  for  Old  Glory. 

Another  soldier's  letter,  published  in  the  Port- 
land Oregonian,  of  4th  May,  1900,  reports  that 
while  Wheaton's  column  was  near  Malapat,  near 
Bato — 

Reports,  which  afterwards  proved  to  be  somewhat 
exaggerated,  came  in,  that  two  companies  of  the 
Twenty-second  Infantry  had  been  literally  cut  to 
pieces,  having  fallen  into  an  ambush.  After  a  hasty 
consultation,  it  was  decided  to  proceed  at  once  to  kill 
or  drive  into  the  lake  every  native  possible  to  be  found 
in  the  half -moon-shaped  district,  lying  between  the 
mouth  of  the  Mateo  River  and  the  farther  end  of  the 
lake,  a  distance  of  twelve  miles. 

To  kill  every  human  being  within  a  hundred  odd 
square  miles  of  territory,  because  of  the  rumoured 
cutting  up  of  a  military  company,  seems  hardly  the 
way  to  impress  natives  with  Anglo  Saxon  civiliza- 
tion. At  the  very  time  that  these  letters  were 
appearing,  the  papers  were  noisily  urging  "greater 
severity,"  and  condemning  the  "weak-kneed 
policy  of  toying  with  rebellion. "     On  the  very  day 


1 68  America  and  the  New  World-State 

that  the  last  quoted  letter  appeared,  the  War 
Department  issued  the  following  to  the  press: 

The  War  Department  has  urged  upon  General  Otis 
the  necessity  of  putting  aside  the  insurgent  temporiz- 
ing over  peace,  and  of  assuming  the  most  aggressive 
tactics.  The  wisdom  of  this  course  is  fully  realized 
by  General  Otis,  who  has  seen  that  the  natives  needed 
further  chastisement  in  order  to  bring  them  to  a  sense 
of  their  position. 

The  Philadelphia  Record  prints  the  following 
statement  from  Michael  Snee,  Company  M, 
Ninth  Infantry,  under  the  command  of  John  B. 
Schoeffel,  of  Rochester,  New  York,  in  its  issue  of 
2 1st  April,  1902. 

Our  orders  (in  Samar)  were  clear  and  strict.  Every- 
body found  in  the  hills,  man,  woman,  and  child,  was 
to  be  killed.  Shoot  all  hogs  and  dogs  was  the  order, 
and  we  were  not  instructed  to  spare  children.  .  .  . 
I  saw  as  many  as  twenty  Filipinos  given  the  water  cure. 
The  native,  of  course,  resisted,  and  the  soldier  rubbed 
the  bottle  across  the  mouth,  lacerating  the  flesh  and 
breaking  the  teeth,  and  leaving  the  man's  face  covered 
with  blood.  After  the  cure  was  over,  the  prisoner 
was  shot,  and  his  body  left  for  the  dogs.  .  .  .  One 
night  last  November  we  found  seven  old  natives  in  a 
shack.  There  was  no  fight  as  we  took  them  unawares. 
The  native  interpreter  plied  them  with  questions,  but 
they  refused  to  tell  anything ;  so  we  tied  them  in  a  row 
and  shot  the  lot,  and  left  them  for  the  dogs ....  I 
was  very  sick. 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  169 

A  great  number  of  these  letters  refer  to  the 
application  of  the  "water  cure."  What  that 
means  is  well  described  by  the  letter  of  a  resident 
of  Manila,  for  whose  high  character  and  unim- 
peachable veracity  the  New  York  Evening  Post 
vouches.  The  letter  appears  in  that  paper  of 
8th  April,  1902,  and  the  following  is  a  quotation: 

The  native  is  thrown  upon  the  ground,  and,  while 
his  legs  and  arms  are  pinioned,  his  head  is  raised 
partially  so  as  to  make  pouring  in  the  water  an 
easier  matter;  an  attempt  to  keep  the  mouth  closed 
is  of  no  avail,  a  bamboo  stick  or  a  pinching  of  the 
nose  will  produce  the  desired  effect.  And  now  the 
water  is  poured  in,  and  swallow  the  poor  wretch  must, 
or  strangle.  A  gallon  of  water  is  much,  but  it  is 
followed  by  a  second  and  third.  By  this  time  the 
victim  is  certain  his  body  is  about  to  burst.  But  he 
is  mistaken,  for  a  fourth  and  even  a  fifth  gallon  are 
poured  in.  By  this  time  the  body  becomes  an  object 
frightftil  to  contemplate,  and  the  pain  and  agony  are 
terrible.  While  in  this  condition  speech  is  impossible 
and  so  the  water  must  be  squeezed  out  of  him.  This 
is  sometimes  allowed  to  occur  naturally,  but  is  some- 
times hastened  by  the  pressure,  and  "sometimes  we 
jump  on  them  to  get  it  out  quick,"  said  a  young 
soldier,  a  mere  boy,  hardly  ten  years  out  of  his  moth- 
er's lap.  I  did  not  wonder  when  an  officer,  in  answer 
to  my  question  how  often  he  had  seen  it,  said,  "Not 
often;  it  is  too  revolting."  Does  it  seem  possible 
that  cruelty  could  go  farther?  And  what  must  we 
think  of  the  fortitude  of  the  native,  when  we  learn 
that  many  times  the  cure  is  given  twice  ere  the  native 


170  America  and  the  New  World-State 

yields.     I  heard  of  one  who  took  it  three  times  and 
died. 

The  object,  of  course,  is  the  extraction  of  in- 
formation— generally  information  that  is  likely  to 
implicate  some  fellow-countryman  in  "rebellion" 
and  send  him  to  his  death. 

I  have  seen  it  stated  over  and  over  again — no  less 
an  authority  than  Mr.  Stephen  Bonsai,  indeed, 
recently  made  a  similar  statement — that  cases  of 
"water  cure"  have  been  "extremely  rare" — two 
or  three  at  most — and  then  imder  "grievous  pro- 
vocation." I  can  only  suppose  that  those  who 
make  these  statements  have  never  read  the  evi- 
dence given  before  the  Senate  Commission. 
Witness  after  witness — soldiers  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers — testified  before  that  Commission 
that  they  had  seen  or  assisted  at  the  adminis- 
tration of  "water  cure"  upon  scores  of  occasions. 
More  than  that,  several  officers,  subsequent  to  the 
Senate  inquiry,  were  put  upon  trial  for  administer- 
ing it  in  a  wholesale  fashion,  and  condemned. 
Major  Glenn,  Lieutenants  Cook  and  Gaujot,  were 
among  the  number ;  forty  specific  charges  for  such 
torture  were  brought  against  the  first  officer,  and 
he  was  convicted,  being  sentenced  to  a  fine  of 
fifty  dollars — something  over  a  dollar  apiece. 
That  some  of  the  worst  cases  have  never  been 
brought  officially  to  light  we  may  fairly  assume 
from  a  fact  revealed  by  the  last  report  (19th 
November,  1902)  of  the  Judge  Advocate-General 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  171 

to  the  Secretary  of  War.  In  that  report  is  re- 
corded the  admission  by  Captain  ComeHus 
Brownell,  that  he  administered  the  "cure"  to 
Father  Augustine,  a  Filipino  priest  at  Banate,  and 
that  after  the  torture  had  been  administered  a 
third  time  the  priest  died.  Captain  Brownell  had 
previously  reported  the  man's  death,  but  had  made 
no  reference  to  the  cause  (which  came  out  by 
accident  long  afterwards).  Indeed  the  attitude  of 
the  military  on  this  matter  inevitably  suggests 
that  they  regard  the  wholesale  torture  of  which 
Major  Gardner  complains  either  as  a  venial  offence 
or  as  a  necessary  element  in  the  campaign.  Major- 
General  Brooke,  speaking  at  the  annual  dinner  of 
the  St.  George's  Society  at  New  York,  in  reply  to 
the  toast  of  the  army  and  navy,  said : 

Now  for  the  water  cure.  It  is  called  brutal.  Of 
course  it  is  brutal.  That  is  what  it  is  meant  to  be. 
Brutality  is  war,  and  it  is  nothing  else.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  do  things  in  war  that  are  not  done  in  peace. 
...  I  cannot  understand,  being  a  military  man, 
why  the  American  people  will  not  stand  for  a  military 
government  in  the  Philippines. 

Indeed  the  acquittal  of  Major  Waller  and  Lieu- 
tenant Day  for  the  promiscuous  killing  of  unarmed 
natives — an  acquittal  against  which  General  Chaf- 
fee himself  had  to  protest' — shows  how  lightly  the 
methods  of  General  Smith's  "kill  and  bum"  order 
were  regarded. 

'  See  Manila  Dispatches,  25th  May,  1902. 


172  America  and  the  New  World-State 

What  is  of  more  importance,  even,  than  the 
attitude  of  the  military  towards  these  abomina- 
tions is  the  attitude  of  the  public.  The  late  Bishop 
Potter  said  once,  concerning  the  Philippine  situa- 
tion :  "The  question  is  not  so  much  what  we  are  go- 
ing to  do  with  the  Philippines,  as  what  the  Philip- 
pines are  going  to  do  with  us."  Has  the  moral 
sense  of  the  American  public  been  seared  by  its 
connection  with  this  conquest  of  the  Philippines? 

Certain  it  is  that  evidence  of  a  much  less  striking 
character  than  that  just  cited  sufficed  to  set  the 
country  aflame  when  it  was  alleged  against  Spain. 
None  of  the  excuses  anent  "military  necessity'* 
were  accepted  by  the  American  people  in  1898: 

As  a  nation  we  solemnly  denied  the  validity  of  such 
a  defence  of  cruelty  in  warfare,  and  appealed  to  the 
arbitrament  of  the  sword  in  protest  against  it.  We 
went  to  war  with  Spain  for  conducting  war  cruelly. 
We  did  not  sneer  at  sentiment  in  1897  and  1898  when 
stories  of  Spanish  inhimianity  and  torture  roused  our 
indignation.  .  .  .  Talk  not  to  us  of  military 
necessity.  Urge  no  precedents.  We  woiild  listen 
to  none  of  them,  but  went  to  war  calling  men  and 
angels  to  witness  that  our  motives  were  of  the  purest, 
and  that  we  resorted  to  arms  only  because  our  out- 
raged natures  could  not  longer  endure  the  sight  of 
miserable  beings  starved,  tortured,  and  massacred  by 
a  ruthless  soldier.^ 

What  has  been  the  American  attitude  with 
regard  to  the  sort  of  thing  revealed  by  Major 

'  Evening  Post. 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  173 

Gardner,    a    respected    officer    of    the    highest 
reputation? 

On  the  morrow  of  the  Waller  trial,  in  which  the 
fullest  light  was  thrown  upon  the  sort  of  campaign 
waged  in  Samar,  and  upon  General  Smith's 
methods,  and  with  Major  Gardner's  report  in  his 
possession,  the  Secretary  of  War  stated  in  reply- 
to  the  Senate  resolution  that  he  "fully  approved  of 
the  policy  of  Generals  Bell  and  Smith,"  and  in- 
sisted that  "their  methods  are  the  most  humane 
and  effective  that  could  be  followed."*  Even 
after  Smith's  punishment  by  the  President  not  a 
few  papers  of  the  patriotic  order  stoutly  defended 
him.  The  service  paper,  the  Army  and  Navy 
Journal,  did  so,  bitterly  upbraiding  the  President 
for  having  punished  the  General,  and  the  court- 
martial  for  convicting  him. 

Such  an  act  is  not  only  unjust,  but  unwise  and 
unfortunate.  .  .  ,  It  will  be  construed  by  the  Anti- 
Imperialists  as  a  plea  of  guilty  to  all  their  wicked 
charges  against  the  army.  .  .  .  The  detractors  of 
the  army  have  been  howling  for  a  sacrifice  and  it  has 
been  offered  up  to  them. 

One  does  not  know  what  "detraction"  of  the 
army  could  well  be  more  severe  than  that  contained 
in  the  implication  that  the  court-martial  which 
condemned  Smith  were  prompted  in  their  verdict 
ty  fear  of  the  mob  and  not  the  obligations  of  their 
oath,  and  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 

'  Reuter's  Dispatch,  Washington,  8th  May,  1902. 


174  America  and  the  New  World-State 

army  was  "howled"  into  sacrificing  an  innocent 
man. 

The  utmost  that  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal 
will  admit  General  Smith  to  have  been  guilty  of  is 
"strong  language."  And  it  must  be  admitted 
that  many  American  papers — above  all  (it  must 
always  be  insisted)  those  that  have  always  em- 
phasized their  patriotism — took  a  like  view  of  the 
General's  orders.  The  Chicago  Interocean,  which 
is  a  paper  typical  of  this  class  and  has  been  notable 
for  its  violent  condemnation  of  England's  bar- 
barity in  the  South  African  War  and  the  unwar- 
ranted nature  of  England's  aggression,  ^  comments 
editorially    1 8th  July,  1902)  as  follows: — 

General  Jacob  H.  Smith  has  been  retired  from 
active  service  in  the  army  because  of  his  reckless 
language.  Under  the  influence  of  excitement  he  is 
given  to  the  use  of  violent  language.  Under  the 
ordinary  ruling  General  Smith  would  have  retired  in 
a  year  or  two.  There  is  nothing  in  the  sentence  of  the 
court-martial  nor  in  the  censure  of  the  President 

'  The  Interocean' s  comparison  is  as  follows:  "  In  the  Philippines 
the  United  States,  as  Englishmen  admit,  is  defending  its  own, 
and  fighting  to  establish  order  and  maintain  peace.  In  South 
Africa  England  is  avowedly  striving  to  subdue  the  Boers  and 
overthrow  two  republics,  in  the  interest  of  the  British  Empire 
....  In  the  Philippines  the  Americans  are  protecting  the 
peaceable  Filipinos  against  brigands  and  savages.  In  South  Africa 
the  British  are  making  relentless  war  on  patriots  fighting  for  their 
homes.  The  cases  are  very  different,  but  the  United  States  has  as 
good  reason  to  be  proud  of  the  American  record  in  the  Philippines 
as  England  has  to  be  ashamed  of  the  British  record  in  South 
Africa. "    Thus  does  patriotism  illuminate  our  vision. 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  175 

reflecting  on  General  Smith's  courage  or  efficiency  as  a 
soldier.  There  is  no  charge  of  cruelty  against  him. 
He  is  punished  for  using  language  that  shocked 
American  sentiment,  and  yet  is  punished  in  a  way  not 
to  discredit  his  forty  years'  service  in  the  army. 

And  that  is  all.  Not  for  a  moment  would  the 
Interocean  admit  that  American  troops  have  ever 
acted  with  ought  but  the  most  conspicuous  human- 
ity— "  a  humanity  never  equalled  in  any  other 
campaign  whatsoever"  is  its  own  phrase,  a  human- 
ity which  it  deems  sets  a  shining  example  to  the 
barbarous  British  in  South  Africa. 

In  justice  to  General  Smith  it  should  be  said  that 
he  himself  has  never  made  any  such  defence.  At 
the  trial  his  counsel  stoutly  maintained  that  he 
fully  meant  what  he  said  and  pleaded  justification. 
The  necessity  for  each  order  was  dealt  with  in 
detail,  and  objections  to  them  stigmatized  as 
"sops  to  the  sentimentalists."' 

It  is,  indeed,  chiefly  by  the  nature  of  the  defence 
made  for  the  army  in  this  matter  that  we  may 
judge  how  far  we  have  fallen  away  from  the  high 
standards  of  1898.  Dr.  Henry  C.  Rowland, 
formerly  an  army  surgeon  in  the  Philippines, 
writes  what  is  evidently  intended  as  a  rebuttal  of 
all  this  evidence,  in  McClure^s  Magazine  for  July 
I902.  Yet  he  insists  that  the  soldiers  must  not 
be  judged  for  their  conduct  as  they  would  be  if 
they  committed  similar  acts  in  their  native  towns. 

•  See  Manila  Dispatches,  American  Papers,  8th  May,  1902. 


176  America  and  the  New  World-State 

The  ordinary  citizen  who  exclaims  "What  brutes!" 
cannot  possibly  imagine  the  psychic  reversion  by 
which  in  a  few  weeks'  time  a  civilized  individual  can 
hark  back  to  a  primitive  state  of  savagery. 

This  surely  is  an  explanation  of  the  bad  conduct, 
not  a  denial.  The  writer  insists  that  the  American 
soldier  does  not  obey  blindly.  In  view  of  the  sort 
of  orders  we  have  just  been  discussing  and  the 
common  plea  that  they  are  not  to  be  taken  au 
pied  de  la  lettre  and  that  the  men  are  incapable 
of  carrying  them  out,  the  following  admission  is 
most  important.     Says  Dr.  Rowland: 

A  knowledge  of  the  conditions  forces  us  to  admit 
that  in  the  case  of  the  wholesale  executions  of  which 
we  read,  the  orders  to  kill  are  carried  out  by  the  men, 
not  in  blind  obedience,  but  because  such  orders  seem 
to  them  good.  The  factors  in  the  production  of  such 
a  state  of  mind  cannot  be  distinguished  at  a  range  of 
12,000  miles. 

And  this  is  written  by  an  American  army  sur- 
geon in  an  American  magazine  as  a  defence  of  the 
American  soldier  who  is  in  the  Philippines,  as  the 
result  of  a  war  imdertaken,  in  the  words  of  Senator 
Cullom, 

to  avenge  the  black  crimes  of  that  sinister  tyrant  who 
would  destroy,  if  possible,  the  patriots  fighting  for  their 
freedom  to  the  last  man;  to  avenge,  in  the  interest 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  177 

of  hvimanity,  atrocities  which  have  become  intolerable 
to  the  American  people. ' 

This  astounding  contradiction  is  nearly  equalled 
in  the  attitude  of  American  public  men  in  1898  and 
in  1899  with  regard  to  the  character  of  the  Cuban 
and  the  Filipino.  In  his  dispatches  succeeding  the 
victory  of  Manila,  Admiral  Dewey  used  the  follow- 
ing language  in  a  report  to  Secretary  Long : 

In  my  opinion  these  people  are  far  superior  in  their 
intelligence,  and  more  capable  of  self-government, 
than  the  natives  of  Cuba,  and  I  am  familiar  with  both 
races.  .  .  .  Aguinaldo  is  a  leader  of  disinterestedness 
and  capacity  of  whom  any  country  might  be  proud. 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee, 
on  27th  Jime,  1902,  this  same  Admiral  Dewey 
stated : 

Aguinaldo  is  a  common  robber.  I  believe  that  he 
was  at  Manila  for  gain,  loot,  and  money,  and  that 
independence  never  entered  his  head. 

Senator  Patterson  pertinently  asked  why,  if 
Aguinaldo  were  a  common  robber.  Admiral  Dewey 
had  given  him  arms,  and  assisted  him  in  organizing 
the  insurgent  army.  To  which  Admiral  Dewey 
replied,  "All's  fair  in  war.  Besides,  the  Americans 
had  no  troops  in  the  islands."  This  revision  of 
opinion,  so  convenient  for  the  purposes  of  aggres- 

*  Speech  in  Senate,  i6th  April,  1898. 
xa 


1 78  America  and  the  New  World-State 

sion,  is  typical  of  what  has  taken  place  in  very- 
many  public  men,  and  is  not  special  to  America. 
The  most  notable  instance  of  all  is,  of  course, 
that  of  ex- President  Roosevelt  himself.  So  familiar 
are  we  with  his  fantastic  doctrine  of  the  "strenu- 
ous life"  as  a  justification  for  military  adventure 
and  territorial  conquest,  and  so  accustomed  to 
his  infinite  scorn  for  the  "weaklings"  who  hesi- 
tate to  apply  to  other  nations  a  policy  which  they 
deem  tyrannical  when  applied  by  other  nations  to 
themselves,  that  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  all  this 
"  strenuousness  "  dates  from  the  Hispano-American 
War.  Before  that  date,  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  as 
much  opposed  to  Imperialism  and  territorial 
expansion  as  the  veriest  "  anti- American. "  Writ- 
ing in  the  Bachelor  of  Arts  for  March,  1896,  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  the  Imperialist  conqueror  of  the 
Philippines,  laid  down  the  following  principles: 

The  establishment  of  a  colony  prevents  any  healthy 
popular  growth. 

At  the  present,  the  only  hope  of  a  colony  that 
wishes  to  attain  full  mental  and  moral  growth  is  to 
become  an  independent  state. 

Under  the  best  of  circumstances,  a  colony  is  in  a 
false  position.  But  if  the  colony  is  a  region  where 
the  colonizing  race  has  to  do  its  work  by  means  of 
other  inferior  races,  the  condition  is  much  worse. 

There  is  no  chance  for  any  tropical  colony  owned 
by  a  Northern  race. 

This  was  written  in  support  of  the  Venezuelans 
as  against  England,  at  the  time  of  Cleveland's 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  179 

Venezuelan  message.  He  urged  that  "no  people 
could  have  a  mission  to  instruct  other  peoples  in 
the  art  of  government."  "Mean  and  bloody,'* 
he  wrote,  "though  the  history  of  the  South  Amer- 
ican Republics  had  been,,  it  is  distinctly  in  the 
interests  of  civilization"  that  they  should  be  left 
to  develop  "along  their  own  lines. "  Incidentally 
in  this  article,  Mr.  Roosevelt  declared  that  "we 
do  not  wish  to  bring  ourselves  to  a  position  where 
we  shall  have  to  emulate  the  European  system  of 
enormous  armies. " 

To-day  the  Americans  who  voice  this  self-same 
philosophy  are  for  Mr.  Roosevelt  everything  that 
is  contemptible:  "weakling,"  "craven,"  and  even 
hypocritical.  He  has  poured  out  the  vials  of  his 
wrath  upon  them  in  presidential  messages,  and 
adjures  the  nation  to  choose  the  path  of  action,  of 
warlike  vigour,  of  ever-growing  expansion  and 
"glorious  destiny."  This  is  how,  after  the  His- 
pano-American  War,  he  treats  the  men  who  voice 
what  was  once  his  own  philosophy  and  use  almost 
his  own  words.  Writing  in  the  Century  Magazine^ 
he  says: 

I  have  even  scantier  patience  with  those  who  make 
a  pretence  of  humanitarianism  to  hide  and  cover  their 
timidity,  and  who  cant  about  liberty  and  the  "consent 
of  the  governed,"  in  order  to  excuse  themselves  for 
their  unwillingness  to  play  the  part  of  men. 

Yet  Mr.  Roosevelt  is  a  man  who  holds  all  his 
opinions  with  passionate  conviction  and  with  the 


i8o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

certainty  that  neither  time  nor  place  can  affect 
their  vaHdity. 

Were  the  horrors  which  have  just  been  recounted 
and  the  recital  of  which  assuredly  make  one's 
blood  run  cold  committed  in  a  passion  of  self- 
protection,  as  the  blows  delivered  blindly  in  a 
desperate  struggle  for  national  existence,  for 
homes  and  fatherland  overrun  by  a  ruthless  in- 
vader, it  would  be  possible  perhaps  to  palliate 
them.  But  none  of  these  reasons  hold.  The 
Americans  have  gone  into  the  Philippines  of  their 
own  choice;  to  pretend  that  their  national  exist- 
ence would  be  threatened  by  bad  government 
in  islands  ten  thousand  miles  away,  when  bad 
government  has  reigned  imchecked  for  generations 
in  the  Spanish- American  Republics  at  their  door, 
is  ridiculous.  We  are  presented  with  the  spectacle 
of  a  great  and  civilized  people  led  by  a  false 
conception  of  patriotism  to  watch  calmly — such 
protest  as  has  been  made  has  been  feeble  and 
spasmodic — the  perpetration  of  abominable  crimes, 
the  infliction  of  prolonged  horror  of  slaughter  and 
desolation,  for  the  empty  pleasure,  so  far  as  the 
great  mass  of  the  public  is  concerned,  of  triumph- 
ing over  a  small  and  backward  people,  of  pro- 
claiming themselves  "rulers  and  conquerors" 
of  poor  savages — so  it  is  alleged — who,  however 
backward  in  all  else,  at  least  know  how  to  die  and 
suffer  for  an  aspiration  which  Americans  but 
yesterday  declared  to  be  the  loftiest  that  could 
fill  the  hearts  and  minds  of  men. 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  i8i 

That  the  motives  of  those  responsible  in  the 
American  Administration  were  of  a  quite  different 
character  I  am  entirely  disposed  to  think.  The 
American  Government  was  placed  in  a  particularly- 
difficult  position :  perhaps  it  would  not  have  been 
for  the  best  that  the  Islands  should  have  fallen  into 
the  hands,  say,  of  the  Japanese — though  that  is 
an  arguable  point.  But  it  was  not  these  difficulties 
which  perplexed  the  general  public  at  the  time. 
The  regrettable  thing  and  the  dangerous  thing  was 
that  the  public  as  a  whole  did  not  care  two  straws 
about  the  dangers  of  the  future,  or  the  difficulties 
which  presented  themselves  to  the  American 
Government,  but  gloried  in  the  prospect  of  expan- 
sion, right  or  wrong,  safe  or  dangerous,  simply 
because  the  national  vanity  of  the  cheaper  kind 
was  tickled;  and  in  the  execution  of  such  a  policy 
gloated  in  all  the  dirty  work  of  conquest — regarded 
it  not  as  a  horrible  and  painful  thing  but  as  some- 
thing that  added  to  the  laurels  of  American  fame. 

The  thing  would  be  imbelievable,  had  we  not 
the  demonstration  before  our  eyes.  If  the  object 
be  not  vainglory,  what  is  it?  Will  those  who  in 
one  breath  proclaim  that  their  country  has  room 
for  half  the  population  of  the  civilized  world, 
in  the  next  contend  that  there  is  need  of  these 
fever-stricken  swamps  in  which  white  men  cannot 
breed?  Will  they  urge  that  their  object  is  the 
regeneration  of  the  Filipinos  in  the  same  breath 
that  they  voice  their  passionate  contempt  for 
those    "treacherous    rebel    cut-throats?"     Even 


1 82  America  and  the  New  World-State 

if  some  notion  of  exotic  philanthropy  were  the 
object,  are  not  these  patriots  eternally  declaring 
that  America's  first  duty  is  to  herself,  that  patriots 
have  no  right  to  consider  the  interest  of  "for- 
eigners," even  though  those  foreigners  be  civilized 
and  of  our  own  race? 

Pleas  of  this  sort  are  but  the  afterthoughts  of  a 
feeble  casuistry.  Where  the  speech  is  frank  they 
are  abandoned,  and  the  simple  desire  for  conquest, 
for  mastery,  even  though  it  be  of  these  half -clad 
Malays — the  primeval  coerciveness  of  the  savage 
mind  stands  revealed. 

Judge  whether  any  rational  conception  of  mate- 
rial benefit  to  be  won,  any  thought  of  benevolent 
assimilation,  can  have  any  part  in  the  sentiment 
which  prompts  the  following  declaration  of  a  high- 
placed  American  officer,  Colonel  Crane: 

The  best  thing  to  do  with  them  (the  Filipinos) 
would  be  to  kill  off  the  people,  and  then  put  a  bomb 
under  each  island,  and  blow  it  from  the  face  of  the 
earth.  I  would  never  leave  there,  however,  as  long 
as  there  was  one  of  these  fellows  left  to  stick  his  finger 
to  his  nose  at  us  when  we  were  going. 

Is  this  the  elevation  of  mind  which  comes  of 
Empire  and  Imperial  tasks? 

The  above  is  not  an  isolated  illustration  of  the 
new  Imperial  spirit.  It  is  typical  of  the  temper,  if 
not  of  the  language,  of  most  popular  Imperial 
advocacy.  Quite  early  in  the  business,  when  yet 
the  ink  was  hardly  dry  upon  the  message  of  the 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism  183 

President  declaring  that  "forcible  annexation  was 
not  to  be  thought  of,  and  under  our  code  of  mor- 
ality would  be  a  criminal  aggression,"  we  find 
nine-tenths  of  the  press  demanding  the  recogni- 
tion of  American  sovereignty  by  the  Filipinos  as 
an  essential  preliminary  of  even  an  explanation 
of  what  that  sovereignty  meant.  One  weighty 
authority  (5th  May,  1899)  says: 

The  time  has  not  yet  come  for  agitating  the  question 
as  to  what  we  are  going  to  do  with  the  Philippines. 
There  is  but  one  problem  immediately  before  us, 
and  that  problem  is  best  solved  by  the  indomitable 
valour  of  the  men  of  the  firing  line.  General  Otis  has 
declared,  in  words  that  thrill  every  true  American, 
that  he  will  listen  to  nothing,  explain  nothing,  until 
American  sovereignty  is  unconditionally  accepted. 
All  other  problems  relating  to  the  Philippines  must 
wait  until  this  problem,  the  recognition  of  our  author- 
ity as  supreme,  has  been  solved.  There  must  be  no 
parley  with  rebels.^     After  the  guns  of  our  soldiers 

» Dispatches  from  Manila  to  the  New  York  Herald  of  28th  April, 
1899:  "General  Otis  declared  to-night  that  he  would  listen  to 
nothing  except  unconditional  surrender  from  the  rebels"  (i.  e,, 
those  who  declined  to  accept  the  sovereignty  of  the  alien  people  to 
whom  they  had  been  sold  like  so  many  cattle) .  In  his  message  of 
1  ith  April,  1898,  McKinley,  justifying  the  war  with  Spain,  declares 
that  this  latter  country  cannot  be  trusted  to  make  an  honourable 
peace  because  of  "her  refusal  to  consider  any  form  of  mediation, 
or  indeed  any  plan  of  settlement  which  did  not  begin  with  the 
actual  submission  of  the  insurgents  to  the  mother  country,  and 
then  only  on  such  terms  as  Spain  herself  might  see  fit  to  grant." 
If  this  attitude  towards  a  population  over  whom  Spain  had  had 
sovereignty  during  some  himdreds  of  years  was  tyrannical  and 


1 84  America  and  the  New  World-State 

have  been  silenced  in  the  paeans  of  victory,  there  will 
be  time  enough  for  the  jaws  of  the  educators,  the 
"reformers,"  the  politicians,  the  theorists,  the  college 
professors,  and  other  garrulous  individuals,  to  get  in 
their  deadly  work. 

In  the  same  strain  is  the  Portland  Oregonian's 
contr  bution : 

The  Filipinos,  by  prestiming  to  discuss  the  terms 
upon  which  our  sovereignty  would  be  acceptable,  have 
shown  themselves  the  insolent  and  aggressive  foes  of 
our  nation.  For  such  as  those,  there  is  only  one  treat- 
ment. .  .  .  The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  punish  our 
assailants.  .  .  .  We  have  far  greater  reason  to 
punish  them  than  we  had  to  make  war  on  Spain,  for 
Spain  had  not  done  us  one  half  the  injury  that  has  been 
heaped  on  us  through  the  treachery,  insult,  and  in- 
gratitude of  these  semi-savage  rascals  whom  some  of 
our  people  of  peculiar  mental  constitution  so  much 
admire. 

This  paper  forgets  that,  just  a  year  previously, 
it  was  acclaiming  Cubans  and  Filipinos  alike,  as 
sublime  patriots  "  giving  their  lives  in  the  holy 
war  of  Freedom  against  Tyranny." 

And  meanwhile  each  of  these  contradictory 
policies  is  in  turn  advocated  with  a  savage  pas- 
sionateness  which  is  given  to  no  other  political 
matter.     The  senatorial  and  journalistic  patriots 

blameworthy,  what  shall  be  said  of  the  same  attitude  adopted  by 
a  foreign  nation  towards  a  people  who  never  have  admitted 
allegiance  to  it? 


Retrospect  of  American  Patriotism   185 

criticize  those  who  do  not  accept  their  theories — no 
matter  how  much  in  contradiction  with  principles 
of  American  poHtical  Hfe,  or  how  much  in  contra- 
diction with  the  theories  advocated  by  the  same 
patriots  a  month  before — not  as  Republicans  crit- 
icize Democrats,  or  Democrats  Republicans,  but 
as  one  might  criticize  some  moral  pariah,  defending 
some  monstrous  heresy — one  defending  incest 
or  advocating  cannibalism.^  In  this  patriotic 
clamour,  in  the  state  of  intense  feeling  which  such 
patriotism  implies,  reason  is  submerged.  Argu- 
ment is  impossible. 

Under  such  circumstances,  no  contradiction  is 
too  flagrant  for  advocacy,  no  policy  too  mean,  no 
act  too  cruel.  Moral  sensibility  is  blunted.  Not 
merely  do  the  crimes  which  but  a  short  time  since 
excited  vehement  condemnation  fail  longer  so  to 
do,  but  they  meet  with  excuse  and  justification. 
In  the  end  the  nation  commits  them.  It  is  the 
Rake's  Progress  of  material  waste  and  moral 
decline. 

'  No  less  an  organ  than  the  New  York  Tribune  (31st  July,  1902) 
compares  the  critics  of  General  Smith  to  "hyenas  prowling  among 
the  wounded  of  American  battlefields. " 


CHAPTER  IV 

ANGLOPHOBIA  AND  OTHER   ABERRATIONS 

January,  1896 

American  patriotism  in  1896 — The  necessity  for  fighting  England 
— Some  expressions  of  American  sentiment — The  wickedness 
of  the  Pacifist — What  should  we  have  gained  by  fighting 
England? — Patriotism  and  farming — The  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  its  meaning — Our  "fellow-republicans"  in  Venezuela — 
Twelve  months  later — Spain  the  real  villain  in  the  drama — 
The  noble  Cuban — England  our  friend — Annexing  Cuba 
simply  " because  we  want  it " — The  doctrine  of  "the  strenu- 
ous life" — The  law  of  social  progress — American  jingoism 
imported  from  Europe — Why  we  escaped  war  with  England 
— The  "finest  country  on  God's  earth" — The  real  con- 
ditions of  American  life — Can  we  afford  the  luxury  of 
militarism? — Patriotism  and  the  Tariff. 

It  is  becoming  quite  evident  that  we  must  fight 
England:  that  the  doom  has  sounded  for  either 
the  British  Empire  or  the  American  RepubHc. 
The  gods,  watching  this  conflict,  have  turned  their 
thumbs  down.  The  conclusion  can  no  longer  be 
resisted,  imless  all  our  honoured  guides,  our  states- 
men, our  newspapers,  our  reviews,  otir  preachers, 
have  become  quite  untrustworthy.  For  weeks 
now — ever  since  17th  December,  to  be  exact,  for 

186 


Anglophobia  187 

most  of  us  were  in  blissful  ignorance  of  this  terrible 
alternative  on  December  i6th — they  have  all  been 
insisting  with  one  voice  that  we  must  make 
England  bite  the  dust,  humble  her,  and  break  her 
power.  Otherwise,  these  great  United  States  are 
done  for;  their  glory  will  have  departed,  and  we 
are  fit  subjects  for  the  slavery  which  we  are  assured 
we  shall  certainly  endiu*e.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
about  it.  To  question  it,  is  to  write  oneself  down 
a  traitor  to  his  coiintry,  an  unclean  thing.  Those 
unhappy  papers  or  public  men  (we  may  rejoice 
that  they  are  so  few),  who  have  taken  the  impa- 
triotic  line  in  this  matter,  have  been  covered  with 
infamy,  cast  into  the  outer  darkness  where  reside 
Godkin  and  Pixley,  and  a  few  abandoned  uni- 
versity professors. 

As  the  full  consciousness  of  a  righteous  cause 
gives  threefold  power  to  the  strongest  arm,  we  may 
profitably  recall  the  multifarious  wrongs  that  this 
conflict  is  to  avenge  and  to  redress.  Cleveland's 
Ultimatum  does  not,  of  course,  traverse  the  whole 
field  of  our  grievances.  Behind  the  main  point 
of  that  commimication  is  the  story  of  a  century  of 
wrong  upon  which  our  public  press  and  our  patri- 
otic mentors  generally  have  been  enlightening  us. 
I  have,  during  the  last  month,  been  a  diligent 
reader  (thanks  to  the  facilities  of  the  Free  Library) 
of  a  wide  range  of  representative  American  papers, 
notably  such  organs  as  the  Chronicle,  Call,  and 
Evening  Post  of  this  city,  of  the  Los  Angeles  Times, 
the  Denver  Republican,  the  Omaha  Bee,  the  Chicago 


1 88  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Interocean,  the  New  Orleans  Picayune^  the  Indian- 
apolis Sentinel,  the  Washington  Post,  and  the 
leading  papers  of  New  York,  especially  the  Sun. 
More  than  that,  I  have  followed  for  some  time 
with  great  care  the  public  utterances  of  such  lights 
as  Senators  Chandler,  Pettigrew,  Frye,  CuUom, 
Hawley,  and  Lodge,  to  say  nothing  of  a  host  of 
generals,  admirals.  Congressmen,  State  senators, 
and  preachers,  whose  recommendations  to  wade 
in  and  disembowel  the  Britisher  form  the  staple 
of  daily  newspaper  fare  just  now.  If  opinion  thus 
widely  endorsed  be  not  fairly  representative  of 
America,  where  are  we  to  look?  Moreover,  I 
have  supplemented  all  these  sources  of  information 
and  guidance  by  personal  talks  with  many  fervent 
patriots,  and  the  net  result  of  it  all  is  that  we  must 
fight  England  because  (i)  she  is  a  great  advocate 
of  the  pestilential  doctrine  of  Free  Trade;  (2)  of 
gold  coinage;  (3)  of  a  stable  and  non-elective 
Civil  Service,  a  subtle  device  of  tyranny;  (4)  for 
the  advocacy  of  these  heresies  she  corrupts  our 
free  electorate  by  the  lavish  expenditure  of  "Brit- 
ish Gold";  (5)  she  has  more  Foreign  Trade  than 
we  have,  and  it  must  be  taken  from  her  by  strip- 
ping her  of  her  Colonies;  (6)  she  is  a  pirate  and 
land-grabber;  (7)  her  papers  speak  disrespectfully 
of  the  American  accent;  (8)  British  tourists  are 
insolent,  and  wear  absurd  clothes;  (9)  she  gives 
rise  to  Anglomaniacs  in  America,  who  turn  up  their 
trousers,  wear  knickers  and  pyjamas,  part  their 
hair  in  the  middle,  take  "barths,"  and  are  an 


Anglophobia  189 

offence  generally  to  good  Americans;  (10)  she 
owns  too  many  American  securities,  which  it  is 
time  she  sacrificed  as  legitimate  spoil  of  warfare; 
(11)  she  corrupts  our  ambassadors  by  turning 
them  into  "contemptible  flunkeys"  and  Anglo- 
maniacs  {vide  Bayard) ;  (12)  she  still  insolently 
repudiates  (she  does  everything  insolently,  and  I 
am  quoting  the  Call  here)  "the  doctrines  of  1776. 
She  has  never  acknowledged  the  principles  of  free- 
dom of  government,  government  of  the  people,  by 
the  people,  for  the  people.  She  is  ruled  at  home 
for  the  benefit  of  the  land  barons,  and  her  Colonies 
are  oppressed  to  pay  tribute.  She  is  a  standing 
defiance  to  human  freedom " ;  (13)  she  favoured 
the  Confederacy  (Northern  opinion);  (14)  she 
did  not  recognize  the  Confederacy  when  she  might 
(Southern  opinion);  (15)  she  hates  America,  and 
is  determined  to  see  her  humiliated;  (16)  we 
must  vindicate  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

This  last  cause  has  for  the  moment  overweighed 
the  others,  which  may  be  considered  as  the  perma- 
nent ones,  and  I  shall  consider  it  separately.  I 
have  put  down  the  reasons  quite  at  haphazard — 
they  vary  in  their  relative  importance  with  the 
varying  temperament  of  the  patriot — but  I  think 
I  have  got  them  all.  I  desire  to  say  at  once  that 
they  are  all  serious.  None  is  put  down  with  the 
idea  of  ridiculing  the  very  genuine  sentiment  which 
prompts  them.  It  would  be  possible  in  each  case 
to  give  the  authority  in  some  notable  pronounce- 
ment, but  that  is  hardly  necessary.     Anyone  at 


190  America  and  the  New  World-State 

all  acquainted  with  the  newspaper  writing  and 
political  talking  of  the  last  few  weeks  will  recognize 
them  at  a  glance.  For  fear,  however,  that  it 
should  be  thought  I  have  done  less  than  justice  to 
the  alert  patriots,  I  will  quote  a  few  of  the  state- 
ments upon  which  the  foregoing  is  based. 

This  arch-land-grabber  has  planted  her  flag  on  all  the 
scattered  islands,  and  on  nearly  every  spot  on  earth 
where  it  could  monopolize  or  control  the  strategic 
advantages  of  location  for  its  own  interests.  .  .  . 
We  cannot  look  with  indifference  upon  this  policy  of 
conscienceless  encroachment .  .  .  .  If  left  to  herself 
she  will  finally  dominate  Venezuela,  and  a  free  republic 
will  be  crushed  by  an  overpowering  Monarchy. 
(Senator  Cullom,  United  States  Senate.) 

Our  alert  watchman  will  meantime  keep  an  eye 
on  our  good  friends  across  the  Atlantic,  especially, 
when,  having  appropriated  Africa,  the  islands,  and 
even  the  rocks  of  the  sea,  or  wherever  else  force  or 
intrigue  may  gain  a  footing,  they  begin  to  take  an 
interest,  not  altogether  born  of  curiosity,  or  a  purely 
Christian  spirit,  in  this  hemisphere.  One  cannot 
be  so  innocent  as  to  believe  that  the  sentiment  of 
relationship  or  friendship  of  England  to  the  United 
States  would  stand  in  the  way  of  the  settled  policy 
of  Great  Britain  to  make  Englishmen  richer  and  her 
power  greater,  even  at  our  cost.  Her  unvarying  policy 
is,  first  and  last  and  always,  to  advance  British 
interests  and  retain  British  supremacy — to  retain  and 
add  to  British  wealth.  Her  purposes  are  material. 
Whoever  gets  in  the  way  of  that  is  the  enemy  of 


Anglophobia  191 

England,  and  will  be  so  treated — whether  it  be  the 
United  States,  who  may  be  intrigued  against  and 
encroached  upon  and  even  crippled  in  some  time  of  her 
distress,  or  when  off  guard ;  or  a  tribe  of  black  men  in 
Africa  in  the  way  of  her  colonization  schemes,  who  may 
be  safely  massacred  with  machine  guns.  (Hon.  D. 
M.  Dickinson,  ex-Postmaster  General,  in  an  address 
at  the  Loyal  Legion  Banquet,  Detroit.) 

The  gold  monometallic  policy  of  Great  Britain,  now 
in  force  among  all  great  civilized  nations,  is,  I  believe, 
the  great  enemy  of  good  business  throughout  the  world 
at  this  moment.  Therefore,  it  seems  to  me,  if  there 
is  any  way  in  which  we  can  strike  England's  trade 
or  her  moneyed  interest,  it  is  our  clear  policy  to  do 
so  in  the  interests  of  silver.  (Henry  Cabot  Lodge, 
Senate  of  the  United  States,  6th  April  1895.^ 

In  every  emergency  with  which  the  United  States 
has  been  confronted,  the  British  Government  has  been 
our  enemy.  She  is  pushing  us  on  every  side  now. 
She  is  trying  to  straddle  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  and  to 
grab  the  Alaskan  gold-fields.  Whenever  she  gets  hold 
of  a  bit  of  land,  from  that  time  her  boundary  line  is 
afloat.  .  .  .  That  is  the  kind  of  nation  that  we 
are  fighting.  Look  at  their  fancy  drill,  the  other  day, 
when  in  five  days  a  powerful  squadron  was  gathered 
at  the  stated  point;  is  there  no  object-lesson  for 

» It  may  be  worth  while  to  recall  that  at  this  date,  1895-96, 
the  bulk  of  the  Republican  party  were  ardent  Free  Silverites. 
It  was  a  year  later  that  Senator  Lodge,  in  common  with  the  entire 
Republican  party,  suddenly  discovered  (the  discovery  synchro- 
nized with  the  formation  of  the  party  platform)  that  the  gold 
standard  was  the  only  possible  one. 


192  America  and  the  New  World-State 

America  in  that?  I  tell  you  that  we  must  he  ready  to 
fight.  Either  we  will  float  a  dead  whale  on  the  ocean 
or  we  must  say  to  Great  Britain,  "Here  is  where  you 
stop. "  (Hon.  Joseph  Hawley,  United  States  Senator, 
at  the  Banquet  of  the  Alumni  of  Hamilton  College, 
New  York.) 

The  growing  strength  of  the  British  Navy  is  a 
menace  to  the  rest  of  the  worid.  It  is  intended  to 
be,  and  as  such  ought  to  be  crushed.  (Reported 
interview  with  Rear- Admiral  George  E.  Belknap, 
U.  S.  N.  [Retired].) 

The  object  of  my  lecture  tour  is  to  advocate  a  war 
with  England,  with  or  without  cause,  in  the  interests 
of  silver.     (Reported  interview.  Senator  Chandler.) 

I  think  we  should  annex  in  some  way  or  other, 
all  the  countries  on  this  hemisphere.  War  is  a  good 
thing.  (Senator  John  B.  Wilson,  of  Washington,  in 
United  States  Senate.) 

He  [the  British  Lion]  is  a  prowler  in  search  of 
prey,  which  is  land — land  anywhere,  everywhere 
— land  to  convert  the  present  boast  of  possessing  one- 
third  of  the  earth's  surface  into  one  of  holding  one-half 
and  then  two-thirds,  land,  more  land,  to  extend  the 
tribute  to  be  paid  the  British  Crown  indefinitely. 
(Correspondent,  Springfield  Republican.) 

There  is  no  power  on  the  face  of  the  earth  that  we 
need  fear  trouble  with,  except  England.  (President 
Capen,  Tuft's  College.) 


Anglophobia  193 

Grant,  Lord,  that  we  may  be  quick  to  resent  insults. 
(Prayer  of  Blind  Chaplain  of  Senate  on  the  morrow 
of  the  Venezuelan  Message.) 

War  with  England!  Every  good  American  should 
lay  awake  nights  praying  for  it.  (Ambrose  Bierce, 
Examiner.) 

The  final  result  of  all  these  irritations  about  fisheries 
and  boundaries  will  be  that  a  peremptory  order  will 
one  day  be  issued  by  this  country  to  Great  Britain 
to  quit  this  free  soil  for  ever.     (New  York  Journal.) 

The  over-bearing  insolence  of  the  tyrant ;  the  greed 
and  lust  of  the  pirate ;  the  prejudice  of  the  ignoramus ; 
the  implacable,  the  everlasting,  the  hereditary  enemy 
of  this  free  land.     (The  New  York  Sun.) 

A  successful  war  by  us  against  Great  Britain  would, 
without  doubt,  forever  sweep  monarchal  government 
from  this  continent,  and  transform  it  into  a  series  of 
powerful  republics  "of  the  people,  for  the  people,  and 
governed  and  directed  by  the  people."  The  posses- 
sions to  the  north  of  us  would,  if  States  of  our  Union, 
at  once  leap  to  the  front  in  population  and  prosperity, 
and  the  mossy  manses  of  the  Canadas  would  be  re- 
placed by  American  homes.  The  hold  of  the  kingly 
hand  of  mail  upon  the  throats  of  the  people  beyond 
the  seas  would  be  loosened,  and  grand  strides  would  be 
taken  in  the  onward  march  toward  the  brotherhood 
of  man,  the  federation  of  the  world.  (The  Los  Angeles 
Times.) 

The  foregoing  gives  a  fair  idea  of  the  spirit  which 
is  now  dominating  us.     Even  better  evidence  than 
13 


194  America  and  the  New  World-State 

these  expressions  of  mere  opinion  is  the  attitude  of 
Congress  and  the  people  with  regard  to  Cleveland's 
Venezuelan  Message.  They  have  stood  behind 
him  as  one  man.  Party  divisions  have  been  swept 
away.  A  imited  nation  supports  him  in  an  action 
which  Representative  the  Hon.  Geo.  N.  Southwick, 
in  his  appeal  for  coast  defences,  calls  a  declaration 
of  defiance  and  of  war.  That  Congress  so  regarded 
it  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  the  Appropriation  Bill 
was  passed  through  the  House  by  unanimous  con- 
sent the  very  day  following  the  receipt  of  the 
President's  message.  It  is  only  in  the  presence  of 
a  common  enemy  that  Democrats  and  Republicans 
thus  drop  their  differences.  The  public  men  out- 
side politics  who  have  opposed  the  President's 
policy  in  this  matter  can  be  counted  on  one's 
fingers,  while  newspapers  which  have  taken  that 
attitude  are  still  rarer.  The  sort  of  treatment 
which  these  latter  have  received  at  the  hands  of 
patriotic  Americans  may  be  gathered  from  the 
castigation  to  which  the  Sun  has  treated  Godkin 
and  the  New  York  Evening  Post.     Says  the  Sun: 

People  who  could  stand  in  ordinary  times  the 
dismal  egotism  and  unrelieved  snarl  and  sneer  of 
Godkin's  editorial  manifestations  refused  absolutely 
to  tolerate  him  when  he  turned  his  pen  to  defamation 
of  the  American  flag  and  abuse  of  all  that  American 
patriotism  holds  dearest.  The  most  hardened  readers 
of  the  Evening  Post  were  ashamed  to  be  seen  in 
public  places  with  that  sheet  in  their  hands.  They 
felt,  not  without  just  cause,  that  they  might  be  sus- 


Anglophobia  195 

pected  of  treason  to  the  United  States  Government. 
.  .  .  While  the  Evening  Post  under  Godkin's  man- 
agement was  devising  and  uttering  day  after  day,  and 
week  after  week,  insults  more  malignant  and  slanders 
more  infamous  against  our  army,  our  navy,  our  flag, 
and  our  land. 


We  know  what  sort  of  conduct  has  merited  these 
reproaches.  Godkin  has  levelled  "insults  .  .  . 
malignant  and  infamous,  against  our  army,  our 
navy,  our  flag,  and  our  land,"  by  the  infamous 
suggestion  that  the  army  and  the  navy  should  not 
be  employed  to  fight  England  "in  the  interests  of 
silver, "  nor  yet  even  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. Furthermore,  so  lost  has  he  been  to  all 
patriotic  decency  as  to  avow  that  the  British 
doctrine  of  Free  Trade  and  a  stable  Civil  Service, 
are  preferable  to  American  Protection  and  Tam- 
many Hall.  This  visible  preference  for  the  for- 
eigner and  his  doctrines,  the  implied  slander  on 
American  institutions,  fully  justifies  the  severe 
strictures  of  his  neighbour,  the  Sun.  Moreover, 
Godkin's  pestiferous  advocacy  of  peace  at  a  time 
when  every  patriot's  blood  is  tingling  with  the 
distant  roll  of  the  war-drums,  shuts  him  out  from 
the  sympathy  of  all  true  Americans.  We  may 
all  admit  that  Peace — in  the  abstract — is  a  good 
thing,  and  at  ordinary  times  may  be  praised  as  the 
ideal  state  for  civil  society.  Also,  it  is  in  keeping 
with  the  New  Testament.  But,  as  we  may  see  from 
the  attitude  of  our  popular  divines  just  now,  no 


196  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Christian  should  advocate  peace  when  there  is  a 
danger  of  war,  otherwise  he  is  certain  to  offend 
patriotic  susceptibiHties.  At  times  Hke  this  one 
should  remember  that  there  is  an  Old  Testament 
as  well  as  a  New,  and  should  choose  that  body  of 
Holy  Script  which  best  accords  with  the  political 
exigencies  of  the  hour.  In  most  of  this  peace 
advocacy,  so  insolently  persisted  in  when  we  are  all 
thinking  of  war,  one  may  see  the  cloven  hoof  of 
the  Britisher.  Otherwise,  why  is  it  that  it  only 
proceeds  from  sources  which,  like  the  Evening  Post, 
are  already  but  too  tainted  with  Anglomania  and 
British  heresies  of  Free  Trade?  This  connection 
between  British  Free  Trade  and  peace  advocacy 
was  well  sketched  the  other  day  by  the  Chronicle, 
in  these  terms : 

It  cannot  be  expected  that  any  Free  Traders  will 
join  the  patriotic  league.  Did  anyone  ever  see  an 
American  Free  Trader  who  was  in  favour  of  forts  and 
fleets?  ...  If  the  Free  Trader  had  his  way,  not 
a  fort  would  be  built  nor  a  gun  mounted,  nor  an 
armed  ship  set  afloat,  nor  a  militant  thing  done.  .  .  . 
His  object  is  to  reform  human  nature  out  of  existence. 
It  would  be  a  sacrilege  for  him  to  join  such  a  Club 
as  the  Patriotic  League,  and  if  anyone  doubted  it,  he 
would  defend  himself  by  the  economic  principles  of 
the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  .  .  .  The  American 
Free  Trader  is  the  most  solemn,  obdurate,  consistent 
and  irreclaimable  opponent  of  progress  that  the  world 
ever  saw.  But  the  objects  of  the  Patriotic  League  can 
do  very  well  without  any  help  from  the  Free  Trader. 


Anglophobia  197 

There  are  enough  people  of  all  parties  in  the  country, 
of  good  red  blood,  of  hard  sound  sense,  and  with  feet 
on  solid  earth,  to  carry  them  all  through  to  success 
and  leave  room  for  the  consummation  of  many  good 
objects  more. 

Some  patriotic  paper — I  cannot  recall  which  for 
the  moment,  as  I  have  mislaid  the  cutting — went 
even  farther  (justifiably  so,  doubtless)  than  the 
Chronicle.  It  pointed  out  that  as  in  times  past 
the  Cobden  Club  has  lavishly  spent  money  in 
America  for  the  advocacy  of  Free  Trade,  we  are 
justified  in  assuming  that  the  Briton  has  also 
financed  these  treacherous  peace  advocates. 

This  barefaced  corruption  will,  however,  avail 
nothing.  There  are,  as  the  Chronicle  says,  enough 
patriots  "of  good  red  blood,  of  hard  sense,  with 
feet  on  solid  earth,"  to  defeat  the  intrigues  of 
Salisbury's  agents  or  the  hysteria  of  those  morally 
morbid  invertebrates,  who  can  talk  only  of  peace, 
when  the  soul  of  the  nation  demands  war. 

In  our  just  indignation  at  this  perversion  of  the 
moral  sense,  we  should  not  be  led  to  lose  sight  of 
our  aim  and  object  in  the  humiliation  of  England. 
In  this  spiritual  exaltation  which  this  new  crusade 
has  provoked,  we  are  perhaps  apt  to  overlook  the 
more  grossly  material  side  of  the  question.  To 
what  degree  of  moral  and  material  abasement 
should  England  be  reduced,  what  definite  objects 
have  we  placed  before  us?  American  patriots  are 
perhaps  a  little  too  apt  to  regard  the  defeat  of 


198  America  and  the  New  World-State 

England  as  a  worthy  object  in  itself,  apart  from 
any  advantage  that  it  may  bring.  When  Senator 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge  declares  that  "if  there  is  any 
way  in  which  we  can  strike  England's  trade  or  her 
moneyed  interest,  it  is  our  clear  policy  to  do  so," 
does  he  not  perhaps  overlook  somewhat  our 
position  here  in  the  West? 

What,  in  reality,  is  our  economic  position  here 
in  the  West  with  regard  to  England?  I  find  on 
inquiry  that  England  buys  of  us  more  than  all  the 
other  countries  of  the  world  put  together.  Now, 
that  is  a  considerable  fact.  If  we  follow  Senator 
Lodge's  advice  and  destroy  her  as  an  economic 
factor  in  the  world  her  capacity  to  buy  from  us 
vanishes,  and  since  the  West,  being  mainly  agri- 
cultural, is  compelled,  and  will  be  compelled  for 
many  years,  perhaps  for  generations,  to  sell  her 
products  abroad,  we  should  be  in  a  sorry  posture  if 
half  that  market  were  taken  from  us.  One  may 
say  without  exaggeration  that  whole  States  in 
the  West  owe  their  prosperity  to  the  British 
market.  It  is  for  us  a  richer  gold  mine  than  all 
the  bonanzas  that  were  ever  discovered ;  the  amount 
of  gold  that  we  get  from  England  is  many  times 
greater  than  the  amount  that  we  get  from  the 
mines  of  California,  Nevada,  and  Colorado.  Can 
we  afford  to  lose  that  market?  Our  farmers  are 
none  too  well  off  as  it  is  (nearly  ninety  per  cent. 
of  the  farms  in  this  State  are  mortgaged  in  one 
form  or  another),  and  to  deliberately  destroy  the 
prosperity  of  such  a  customer — and  that  of  course 


Anglophobia  199 

would  be  Senator  Lodge's  object — ^would  bring 
many  of  us,  the  majority  of  us,  to  ruin.  I  know 
it  is  said  that  our  own  merchants  would  get  the 
trade  which  England  now  has,  and  that  in  conse- 
quence our  markets  would  expand  in  another 
direction.  But  if  the  Protectionists  are  right  that 
is  not  possible.  They  have  always  told  us  that 
our  tariff  is  necessary  in  order  to  compete  with 
European  pauper  labour,  and  that  because  our 
labour  is  not  so  cheap  we  cannot  produce  things 
so  cheaply.  England's  foreign  market  would 
therefore  go  to  the  cheap  labour  coimtries  of 
Europe,  and  not  to  us. 

But  we  should  lose  a  great  deal  more  than  the 
English  market  by  taking  the  advice  of  Senators 
Lodge  and  Hawley.  Senator  Hawley  invites  us 
to  "look  at  the  map  of  India"  if  we  would  see  the 
sort  of  nation  that  we  are  facing,  and  infers  that 
it  would  be  to  our  immense  advantage  if  England 
were  turned  out  of  most  of  her  vast  possessions. 
A  leading  article  in  the  Call,  the  other  day,  sup- 
ported this  view,  saying  that  if  we  could  help  our 
good  friend  Russia  into  India,  we  should  have 
struck  a  great  blow  for  silver  and  for  the  "libera- 
tion of  the  world  from  the  British  yoke."  Yet 
what  would  be  the  result  of  helping  Russia  to 
India?  It  would  be  this:  that  we  should  lose  a 
market  which  at  present  is  open  to  us  on  exactly 
the  same  terms  that  it  is  to  Englishmen.  Great 
Britain  does  not  claim  for  her  citizens  in  India 
a  single  commercial  advantage  that  she  does  not  as 


200  America  and  the  New  World-State 

freely  accord  to  us.  Now  we  know  perfectly  well 
that  no  other  nation  would  adopt  this  policy.  If 
France  or  Russia  owned  India,  the  first  thing 
those  countries  would  do  would  be  to  differentiate 
by  tariffs  in  favour  of  their  own  citizens  as  against 
the  rest  of  the  world.  And  we  should  find  the 
market  by  means  of  preferential  tariffs  mono- 
polized by  the  paramount  power.  And  India 
is  not  the  only  country  in  which  this  would  take 
place.  The  British  Empire  includes  forty  sepa- 
rate colonies,  embracing  about  one-fourth  of  the 
population  of  the  globe.  At  present  in  those 
countries  we  have  equal  rights,  commercially,  with 
Englishmen.  England  claims  no  advantage  in 
them  which  she  does  not  as  freely  accord  to  us. 
The  moment  those  colonies  passed  under  the  sway 
of  some  other  power,  as  Senators  Lodge,  Cullom, 
Hawley,  Morgan,  Frye,  Wilson,  Pettigrew,  and 
patriotic  statesmen,  admirals,  generals,  and  news- 
paper editors  would  seem  to  desire  that  they  should, 
we  would  find  the  doors  of  a  huge  market-place 
banged  in  our  faces  by  reason  of  a  preferential 
treatment  in  favour  of  other  nations.  It  is  not 
here  a  question  of  opinion  but  of  fact.  It  may  be 
that  I  run  the  risk  of  being  accused  of  placing 
"pocket  before  patriotism, "  but  I  take  it  that  there 
is  a  patriotism  also  which  seeks  that  policy  best 
calculated  to  advance  the  prosperity  and  well- 
being  of  one's  fellow-countrymen.  Desirable  as  it 
is  to  destroy  one's  enemies  and  to  humiliate  them, 
the  satisfaction  should  not  be  too  expensive  a  one. 


Anglophobia  201 

Even  patriotism  does  not  excuse  a  mis-statement 
of  fact ;  or  rather  should  I  say  that  it  will  not  save 
us  from  the  consequences  of  such  mis-statement. 
And  it  is  to  be  feared  just  now  that  the  patriots 
do  mis-state  the  facts  almost  invariably  in  this 
connection.  David  Wells,  who  will  be  allowed  a 
certain  authority  in  this  matter,  stated  in  the 
North  American  Review  the  other  day  that  of  all 
the  grounds  of  American  grievance  against  Eng- 
land the  one  which  was  more  potential  than  the 
aggregate  influences  of  all  other  causes  whatsoever, 

and  which  is  accepted  and  endorsed  as  in  the  nature 
of  a  rightful  international  grievance  by  nearly  every 
member  of  our  national  or  state  legislatures,  and  by 
nearly  every  newspaper  or  magazine  in  the  country 
...  is  the  assumption  that  the  governmental  and 
commercial  policy  of  England  is  characterized  by  no 
other  principle  save  to  monopolize  through  arbitrary, 
selfish,  and  unjust  measures  everything  on  the  earth's 
surface  that  can  glorify  herself  and  promote  the  inter- 
ests of  her  own  insular  population,  to  the  detriment  of 
all  other  nations  and  peoples ;  and  that  it  is  the  bound- 
en  duty  of  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United 
States,  in  behalf  of  popular  liberty,  civilization,  and 
Christianity,  to  put  an  end  to  the  further  continuance 
of  such  a  policy,  even  if  a  resort  to  war  would  be 
necessary  to  effect  it. 

And  yet,  universal  as  this  belief  is  in  patriotic 
American  minds,  it  is  as  certain  as  anything  can 
be  that  it  amoimts  to  a  fiat  contradiction  of  all 


202  America  and  the  New  World-State 

the  facts  of  the  case.  It  is  not  possible  to  cite  one 
single  instance  where  Great  Britain  maintains  a 
monopoly  for  her  people  as  against  the  rest  of  the 
world,  in  all  the  immense  territory  over  which  she 
holds  sway.  More  than  that,  it  has  been  well 
said  that  it  is  impossible  to  cite  any  such  similar 
instance  of  commercial  liberaHty  in  the  world's 
history.  In  no  other  case  is  it  possible  to  point  to 
the  case  of  a  great  and  strong  government,  coming 
into  indisputable  possession  and  control  of  a  great 
area  of  the  earth's  surface  abounding  with  almost 
illimitable  elements  of  natural  wealth  and  con- 
sequent vast  opportunities  for  exclusive  trade, 
commerce  and  the  collection  of  revenue,  saying 
freely  to  all  the  peoples  of  all  the  other  nations 
and  governments:  Come  and  share  all  these  ad- 
vantages equally  with  us. 

In  view  of  all  this,  therefore,  why  must  we,  as 
Senator  Joseph  Hawley  says,  either  "float  a  dead 
whale  on  the  ocean, "  or  say  to  Great  Britain,  "here 
is  where  you  stop"? 

I  am  not  doubting,  mind  you,  that  this  must  be 
our  policy.  I  am  simply  saying  that  in  the  light 
of  incontrovertible  fact  American  patriots  are 
largely  mistaken  in  the  causes  assigned  for  that 
policy.  A  comparison  between  the  fiscal  methods 
of  England  and  the  rest  of  the  world  shows  that  our 
evident  interest  is  on  the  side  of  British,  rather 
than  any  other  foreign  extension.  It  is  certain, 
of  course,  that  though  this  noble  patriotic  instinct 
is  at  fault  in  so  far  as  one  cause  for  its  action  is 


Anglophobia  203 

concerned,  that  sentiment  as  a  whole  must  be  a 
righteous  one.  We  may  profitably  therefore  in- 
vestigate its  other  presumed  motives  of  action,  as 
we  shall  be  certain  by  the  process  of  exclusion  to 
arrive  finally  at  what  may  be  termed  the  "justify- 
ing cause, "  a  result  which  will  certainly  add  to  our 
definiteness  of  purpose  in  the  coming  conflict. 

We  come  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Here  surely 
we  may  find  reason  for  the  patriotic  faith  that  is 
in  us.  We  have  been  so  often  told  that  it  is  the 
true  "American"  doctrine,  that  it  is  the  "expres- 
sion of  our  destiny,"  "the  embodiment  of  our 
national  aspirations."  But,  so  dense  am  I,  that 
I  have  but  a  vague  and  shadowy  notion  of  what 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is,  notwithstanding  my 
patient  attention  to  much  fiery  oratory,  learned 
discourse,  and  newspaper  wisdom.  And — though 
I  would  not  for  worlds  speak  disrespectfully  of  the 
Equator  or  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine — I  have  a  good 
notion  that  most  Americans  are  in  my  case.  Some 
irreverent  scoffer  in  an  after-dinner  speech  the 
other  night  was  guilty  of  this  ribald  jest:  Says 
Jones,  "What  is  this  I  hear.  Smith,  about  your 
not  believing  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine?"  Smith 
retorts,  "It's  a  wicked  lie.  I  never  said  I  did  not 
believe  in  it.  I  do  believe  in  it.  I  would  lay  down 
my  life  for  it.  What  I  did  say  was  that  I  do  not 
know  what  it  means." 

That,  to  be  frank,  is  my  position.  I  believe  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  of  course,  because  I  try  to 
be  a  truly  patriotic  American.     I  would  lay  down 


204  America  and  the  New  World-State 

my  life  for  it.  We  all  would.  The  newspaper 
editors  especially  are  pining  to  disembowel  the 
Britisher  in  the  name  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
But  I  must  say  I  wish  I  knew  what  it  meant. 
Although  it  would  not,  by  a  long  shot,  be  the  first 
time  in  history  that  men  have  very  willingly  shed 
their  blood,  voicing  a  battle-cry  the  meaning  of 
which  they  did  not  understand,  it  would  be  more 
satisfactory  at  our  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  if 
we  knew  why  we  were  to  lay  waste  so  many  homes, 
to  set  so  many  mothers  weeping  through  the  long 
nights  over  so  many  orphans,  why  we  are  to  go 
forth  and  kill  so  many  husbands  and  fathers  who 
speak  our  language,  read  our  Bible,  share  our 
traditions,  and  for  the  most  part  are  bom  to  just 
such  joys  and  sorrows  as  make  up  our  own  lot. 

If  we  cannot  tell  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is, 
we  should  do  well  to  see  what  it  evidently  is  not: 
for  of  late  assuredly  it  has  been  masquerading  in 
borrowed  clothes.  Until  17th  December  it  is 
certain  that  not  one  American  in  ten  thousand  had 
ever  heard  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  might  have 
been  one  of  the  main  religious  tenets  of  Mormon- 
ism  for  all  they  could  have  told  to  the  contrary 
on  the  evening  of  i6th  December,  1895.  On  17th 
December,  however,  our  Government  was  being 
supported  in  war  preparations  to  enforce  its  respect 
by  England  "at  any  cost  whatsoever.  To  the 
last  dollar  and  the  last  man!" 

The  circumstances  which  led  up  to  this  sudden 
and  marvellous  development  are  sufficiently  clear. 


Anglophobia  205 

During  the  best  part  of  a  century,  a  boundary 
dispute  has  been  going  on  between  England  and 
Venezuela.  The  origins  of  the  dispute  reach  back 
to  the  time  when  the  United  States  were  yet  un- 
born, when  this  country  was  part  of  the  British  do- 
minions, some  sections  part  of  the  Spanish.  Great 
Britain  has  a  little  colony  of  no  importance  border- 
ing upon  Venezuela,  and  some  of  her  settlers,  being 
in  doubt  as  to  their  status,  wanted  the  matter 
settled.  One  is  not  surprised  at  this  desire  of 
theirs.  We  know  the  sort  of  "republic"  which 
Venezuela  is.  I  find  on  inquiry  that  during  the 
first  twenty  years  of  her  history  as  a  republic,  she 
fought  no  less  than  a  hundred  and  twenty  battles, 
either  with  her  neighbours  or  with  herself,  and 
she  has  maintained  that  average  pretty  well  since. 
One  can  never  know  for  certain  which  is  the 
government  and  which  the  insurgents.  An 
American  firm,  having  seciired  the  orders  for  some 
arms  from  the  "government,"  sent  a  ship-load 
down,  to  find  the  "insurgents"  in  power.  The 
arms  were  promptly  seized  as  "contraband,"  and 
the  captain  indicted  for  aiding  and  abetting  a 
movement  destined  to  overthrow  the  established 
authority.  He  appealed  to  his  Consul,  but  before 
the  Consul  could  intervene,  the  new  government 
had  been  overthrown  by  a  third  party.  This 
is  a  true  story.  A  certain  Florentine  lawyer — 
Tomasso  Caivano — ^wrote  a  book  detailing  his 
experiences  of  twenty  years'  life  in  Venezuela  and 
some  of  the  Central  American  "repubHcs. "     His 


2o6  America  and  the  New  World- State 

story  of  the  exploits  of  some  Spanish-American 
presidents  outdo  anything  that  we  know  of  the 
ancient  Roman  despots  or  the  Sultans.  A  certain 
Rufinio  Barrois  was  accustomed  to  have  a  dozen  of 
his  political  enemies  shot  every  afternoon  on  the 
public  square,  to  the  braying  of  a  military  brass 
band.  Their  wives  and  daughters  he  had  exposed 
stark  naked  in  cages  on  the  same  public  place. 
Signor  Caivano  cites  a  typical  incident  in  the  rule 
of  a  Venezuelan  President.  The  election  of  the 
President  being  in  dispute,  the  case  went  before  the 
Supreme  Court.  All  the  judges  who  pronounced 
against  the  President  actually  in  power  were 
promptly  caught,  imprisoned,  and  shot.  Then 
the  President  issued  a  pronunciamento  in  which 
he  declared  himself  dictator — not  that  he  liked 
personal  government,  which  was  abhorrent  to  his 
strong  republican  sentiments,  but  because  such  a 
step  was  necessary  to  safeguard  the  sacred  liberties 
which,  etc. 

Such  are  the  country  and  people  upon  whom  we 
have  expended  a  great  deal  of  effusive  praise  of 
late,  and  whom  we  have  espoused  as  "noble  fellow- 
republicans"  as  against  "British  monarchists." 
To  the  plain  person  it  would  seem  that  so  far  as  we 
have  any  interest  in  this  matter  at  all,  it  is  on  the 
side  of  England,  since  once  the  territory  in  dispute 
became  English  we  could  trade  in  it,  live  in  it, 
exploit  its  reputed  gold  mines  on  precisely  the  same 
terms  as  Englishmen.  While  it  remains  Venez- 
uelan we  can  neither  trade  there  nor  live  there 


Anglophobia  207 

with  any  security.  Our  trade  relations  with 
Venezuela,  as  one  may  judge  from  the  Httle  fact 
cited  just  now,  have  time  and  again  been  subject 
to  embarrassment  and  injustice,  requiring  the 
interposition  of  our  Government.  Yet  such  is 
the  force  of  this  portentous  "Monroe  Doctrine" 
that  the  President  champions  the  cause  of  these 
precious  cut-throats  at  the  risk  of  a  frightful  war 
with  a  people  who  are  our  best  customers  and  with 
whom  in  reality  we  have  no  sort  of  quarrel — and 
the  nation  supports  him  to  the  last  man,  and  votes 
millions  with  one  voice  to  prepare  for  the  conflict. 

I  know  that  behind  the  merits  of  this  particular 
case  there  is  said  to  stand  a  larger  question.  It  is 
claimed  that  should  England  gain  in  this  squabble 
with  Venezuela,  should  the  marsh-land  in  dispute 
be  seized  by  her,  her  power  would  be  so  increased 
in  South  America  as  to  endanger  the  security  of 
our  national  institutions  in  North  America.  This 
is  quite  seriously  put  forward  as  the  rock  on  which 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  stands. 

Surely  there  must  be  some  mistake.  For  over  a 
hundred  and  thirty  years  Great  Britain  has  pos- 
sessed more  land  on  this  continent  than  we  have — 
not  a  thousand  miles  away  near  the  equator,  but 
here,  at  our  doors.  Her  possessions  stretch  away 
from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  unknown  North.  Her 
frontier  runs  along  by  ours  for  over  three  thousand 
miles.  And  during  that  time  of  contiguity  we  have 
grown  from  feeble  distracted  colonies  into  the 
greatest  republic  of  the  world.     For  three  gener- 


2o8  America  and  the  New  World-State 

ations  we  have  had  no  trouble  with  our  neighbours; 
they  have  never  in  the  least  threatened  our  institu- 
tions nor  our  republicanism.  Up  to  the  present  it 
has  never  occurred  to  the  patriot  to  claim  that 
this  enormous  territory  on  our  border — greater 
than  the  whole  of  Europe — was  any  danger  to  us. 
But  suddenly  we  declare  that  if  England  increases 
by  so  much  as  a  dozen  leagues  a  little  swampy 
colony  in  South  America — a  colony  which  does  not 
contain  as  many  white  men  as  one  would  find  in 
a  fair-sized  American  village — the  very  existence 
of  this  republic  is  threatened. 

The  fact  is,  we  have  no  interests  whatever  in  the 
settlement  of  this  quarrel.  And  where  we  have  no 
interests,  we  have  no  rights  for  interference.  As 
Edward  J.  Phelps,  an  American  who  should  compel 
the  respect  of  every  American,  says,  with  an  em- 
phasis which  is  all  the  more  extraordinary  coming 
from  an  ex-ambassador,  "Till  some  man  can  stand 
forth,  and  inform  us  how  we  are  to  be  injured  by 
the  adjustment  of  that  Venezuelan  boundary  line, 
I  shall  venture  respectfully  to  assert  that  it  is  a 
controversy  we  have  no  right  to  meddle  with." 

And  yet  what  has  been  the  action  of  the  Presi- 
dent, an  action  supported  in  the  name  of  patriotism 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine?  By  a  message  to 
Congress  we  are  informed  that  he  has  taken  this 
dispute  in  hand;  that  his  proposal  to  the  British 
Government  that  an  arbitration  should  take  place 
between  that  country  and  Venezuela  to  determine 
the  question  had  been  assented  to  in  part,  but  in 


Anglophobia  209 

part  declined  for  special  reasons  courteously 
stated,  and  that  thereupon  without  further  dis- 
cussion the  President  had  decided  to  ascertain  the 
line  by  an  ex  parte  commission  of  his  own  appoint- 
ment, and  to  compel  Great  Britain  to  accept  the 
result.  It  was  not  even  claimed  that  the  United 
States  had  the  slightest  interest,  present  or  future, 
in  the  settlement  of  the  question,  or  any  especial 
alliance  or  connection  with  Venezuela.  Nor  was 
it  claimed  (if  that  could  have  made  any  difference) 
that  Great  Britain  had  taken  a  step,  or  uttered  a 
word,  which  showed  a  disposition  to  encroach  upon 
the  rights  of  Venezuela,  or  to  bring  any  force  to 
bear  upon  her  adjustment  of  the  dispute.  Neither 
was  it  made  to  appear  even  that  she  was  in  the 
wrong  in  her  contention  as  to  the  true  location  of 
the  line,  since  that  question  was  admitted  to  be 
involved  in  such  obscurity  that  a  learned  com- 
mission of  jurists  and  scholars  was  necessary  to 
discover  by  laborious  investigation  whether  she 
was  right  or  not — an  inquiry  which  promises  to 
involve  many  months,  possibly  years,  of  labour. 
Edward  J.  Phelps  well  resumes  the  American 
position  thus: 

It  was  simply  assumed  that  because  the  boundary 
in  dispute  was  in  this  hemisphere,  the  United  States 
had  the  right  to  dictate  arbitration  between  the  parties 
as  the  proper  method  of  ascertaining  its  location,  and, 
if  that  was  refused,  to  define  the  line  for  herself,  and 
to  enforce  its  adoption.  This  extraordinary  conclu- 
sion was  asserted  for  the  first  time  against  a  friendly 
14 


210  America  and  the  New  World-State 

nation,  not  as  a  proposition  open  to  discussion  to 
which  its  attention  and  reply  were  invited,  but  as  an 
ultimatum  announced  to  begin  with.  And  it  was  ad- 
dressed, not  to  that  nation  itself,  through  the  ordinary- 
channels  of  diplomatic  intercourse,  but  to  a  co-ordi- 
nate branch  of  our  own  government,  and  thence 
through  the  newspapers  to  the  world  at  large. 

And  yet,  no  act  in  all  President  Cleveland's 
political  career  has  been  so  popular  as  this;  none 
has  so  stirred  the  great  heart  of  the  people,  or  so 
opened  the  flood  gates  of  patriotic  emotion.  Con- 
cerning this  act,  his  political  opponents,  on  pain  of 
being  classed  with  the  enemies  of  their  country,  are 
silent.  Patriots  will  not  permit  criticism.  But 
where  does  the  Monroe  Doctrine  come  in?  Surely 
this  new  faith,  which  we  are  all  to  hold  as  sacred, 
as  the  safeguard  of  our  nationality,  is  not  the 
preposterous  assumption  to  which  Mr.  Phelps  has 
referred.  Surely  it  has  some  basis  and  sanction 
other  than  this.  To  fight  a  great  war  with  all  its 
infinite  and  unseen  possibility  of  mischief  over  such 
a  matter  as  this  South  American  boundary  is  to 
attain  the  burlesque.  There  must  be  something 
more  than  this  for  it  to  have  become  part  of  the 
American  theory  of  government.  Can  no  one 
tell  us  what  it  is? 

January  1897 

It  is  now  just  a  year  since  I  wrote  at  some  length 
concerning  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  America's 


Anglophobia  211 

foreign  relations  generally.  In  that  year  public 
opinion  has  moved  so  far  and  changed  so  vastly, 
that  slow-moving  folk — among  whom,  it  seems,  I 
must  class  myself — have  become  a  little  bewildered. 
At  the  beginning  of  last  year  the  whole  country,  or 
at  least  the  patriotic  newspapers  and  statesmen 
and  clergymen,  were  absolutely  persuaded  that 
America  must  annihilate  Great  Britain,  or  "float 
a  dead  whale  on  the  ocean,"  to  quote  Senator 
Hawley's  thrilling  words  of  that  time.  For  doubt- 
ing this  much,  or  rather  for  desiring  reasons  for 
thus  sallying  forth  upon  the  destruction  of  Eng- 
land, some  critics  have  handled  me  pretty  roughly. 
I  was,  it  appears,  "sneering  at  all  that  true  Amer- 
icans hold  most  sacred."  I  was  "un-American, 
anti- American ; "  a  man  of  "timid  peace,"  who 
would  have  this  country  wedded  to  a  life  of 
"ignoble  ease;"  one  whom  the  "flag  waving  in  the 
breeze"  altogether  failed  to  inspire.  A  certain 
correspondent  thought  that  all  true  Americans 
would  regard  me  as  "a  traitor,  for  writing  such 
treasonable  stuff.  .  .  .  Such  persons  who  drag 
Old  Glory  in  the  mud  are  beneath  the  notice  of 
true  Americans  .  .  .  their  Anglomaniac  drivel 
is  only  saved  from  being  treasonable  by  the  fact 
that  it  is  despicable." 

These  criticisms  date  of  course  a  year  back,  and 
the  patriot  will  doubtless  recall  them  with  some 
surprise,  because,  for  the  moment,  he  has  forgotten 
all  about  the  duty  to  annihilate  England.  He  is 
after  somebody  else's  gore  for  the  moment.     In- 


212  America  and  the  New  World-State 

deed,  in  the  Eastern  States,  though  not  out  West 
(we  do  not  abandon  our  historic  sport  of  tail- 
twisting  so  easily)  one  may  evince  a  certain  friend- 
liness towards  the  erstwhile  "enemy"  without 
rendering  one's  patriotism  suspect.  Now  we  have 
discovered  the  real  villain  in  the  drama.  The 
ogre  who  is  on  the  look-out  to  throttle  us,  and 
whom  we  must  slay  if  our  liberty  and  our  civiliza- 
tion is  not  to  go  down  under  a  tidal  wave  of  Wey- 
lerism,  is — Spain.  And  I  take  it  as  evidence  of 
the  capacity  of  the  American  for  clear  and  rapid 
perception  that  we  were  all  ignorant  of  this  fact 
six  months  since.  Not,  indeed,  until  the  starting 
of  a  journalistic  campaign  of  education  did  most 
of  us  know  that  we  had  any  particular  grievance, 
or  that  our  national  safety  was  threatened  by  that 
singularly  distracted  and  powerless  country.  As 
for  our  capacity  for  ready  sympathy  for  (foreign) 
mulattoes,  I  am  frankly  astounded.  A  few  weeks 
since,  it  was  the  noble  Venezuelans,  threatened 
by  the  grasping  Briton ;  now  it  is  the  noble  Cubans 
"carrying  on  their  sublime  and  deathless  struggle 
for  liberty,"  as  the  Examiner  puts  it,  against  the 
haughty  Spaniard. 

I  know  I  shall  be  told  that  I  am  a  "timid  blood- 
less mugwump,"  but,  to  be  quite  honest,  I  have 
just  as  much  sympathy  for  those  Cuban  Washing- 
tons  as  I  have  for  the  noble  Opposition  party  now 
carrying  on  a  bloody  war  against  cruel  tyrants  in 
Costa  Rica,  San  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Santo  Domingo,  Hayti,  and  half  a  dozen 


Anglophobia  213 

other  Sambo  republics  whose  names  I  have  for  the 
moment  forgotten.  In  all  those  countries  there  is 
a  tyrant  as  bloody,  as  cruel,  as  tyrannical  as 
Weyler  himself.  He  is  called  the  President  or  the 
Dictator,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  there  is  a  party 
of  perennial  revolt,  as  in  Cuba,  fighting  against  him. 
But  our  patriots  don't  care.  Nobody  proposes 
that  the  United  States  should  intervene.  Nobody 
takes  the  least  interest.  And  we  are  quite  right. 
Our  intervention  could  only  make  matters  worse — 
worse,  that  is,  for  ourselves — and,  un-American 
and  anti-American  as  I  am  certain  to  be  called  for 
it,  I  deem  the  interests  of  seventy  million  Americans 
of  greater  import  than  those  of  some  half  million 
or  million  and  a  half  copper-coloured  gentry  now 
cutting  one  another's  throats  in  the  distressful 
Isle  of  Cuba.  More  especially  so  since  I  am  per- 
fectly persuaded  that  the  Cubans,  following  faith- 
fully the  example  of  Spanish-America  generally, 
will,  as  a  republic,  be  no  better  off  than  they  have 
been  heretofore  as  a  colony  of  Spain.  Indeed,  when 
one  compares  the  normal  condition  of  Cuba  under 
Spain  to  the  normal  condition  of  "free"  San 
Salvador,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  advan- 
tage, the  immense  advantage,  lies  with  Cuba. 

This,  I  know,  is  rank  treason,  but  I  am  en- 
couraged to  talk  it  because  my  treason  of  three 
months  back  has  now  become,  at  least  in  the 
Eastern  States,  respectable  patriotism.  When 
I  wrote  a  year  ago,  no  one  could  say  a  word  for 
England   save  on  pain   of  outlawry.     Now  the 


214  America  and  the  New  World-State 

patriots  are  singing  her  praises,  because  she  is 
supposed  to  be  taking  our  side  in  the  Cuban 
business.  How  do  I  know  but  that  six  months 
hence,  when  we  shall  have  found  another  dog  to 
chaw,  these  same  patriots  may  not  be  singing  the 
praises  of  Spain?  I  think  this  the  more  likely  in 
that  our  sudden  and  perfervid  advocacy  of  the 
Cubans  is  hardly  explained  by  the  reasons  usually 
and  publicly  adduced.  I  do  not  desire  to  impute 
motives  to  such  elevated  moralists  as  the  patriots, 
or  to  question  their  sincerity ;  but  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  the  Cuban  Civil  War  might  go  on  for  a 
century,  as  similar  wars  have  gone  on  for  a  century 
in  Central  America,  without  our  being  disturbed  or 
taking  any  particular  notice,  but  for  the  fact  that 
our  "  manifest  destiny  "  men  have  had  their  eye  on 
Cuba  for  a  generation.  The  island  lies  so  tempt- 
ingly within  the  sphere  of  our  immediate  destiny. 
It  is  true,  of  course,  that  we  are  only  thinking  of 
the  poor  concentrados,  of  spreading  freedom  and 
beneficent  rule.  I  do  not  doubt  for  a  minute  the 
sincerity  of  Archbishop  Ireland  when  he  says  that 
Americans  are  anxious  to  give  their  lives  "to  the 
pure  and  high-bom  ambition  to  succour  their 
fellow-men."  But  also  I  cannot  forget  how  the 
slave-holding  Southerners  used  exactly  this  lan- 
guage sixty  years  since,  when  it  became  a  question 
of  acquiring  new  slave-holding  territory.  At  that 
date,  when  the  real  object  was  to  extend  slavery, 
we  were  told  that  war  was  made  upon  Mexico 
because  the  United  States  was  anxious  to  extend 


Anglophobia  215 

the  sovereignty  of  "the  flag  of  freedom."  Do 
you  know  the  original  author  of  the  phrase  "mani- 
fest destiny"?  It  was  the  slave-holding  Caleb 
Gushing.  No  people  were  so  great  at  "manifest 
destiny"  as  the  slave-holders,  a  fact  of  which  any 
reader  of  the  Biglow  Papers  may  readily  con- 
vince himself.  Parson  Wilbur  was  a  great  deal 
more  severe  on  it  than  I  should  ever  think  of 
being: 

All  this  big  talk  of  our  destinies 

Is  half  of  it  ignorance,  t'other  half  rum. 

I  am  quite  sure  that  no  such  insinuation  could  be 
made  against  our  bellicose  clergy  to-day.  At  the 
time  of  the  war  against  Mexico,  a  war  in  which  the 
desire  to  extend  slave  territory  played  the  dominat- 
ing part,  so  worthy  a  man  as  Edward  Everett  could 
talk  of 

the  duty  devolved  upon  us  by  Providence  to  carry  the 
republican  institutions  which  our  fathers  achieved  with 
all  the  organized  institutions  of  an  enlightened  com- 
munity, institutions  of  religion,  law,  education,  charity, 
art,  and  all  the  thousand  graces  of  the  highest  culture, 
beyond  the  Missouri,  beyond  the  Sierra  Nevada,  per- 
haps in  time  around  the  circuit  of  the  Antilles,  perhaps 
to  the  Archipelagoes  of  the  Central  Pacific. 

It  is  curious,  therefore,  that  just  at  this  time  we 
should  be  talking  of  manifest  destiny  when  we  are 
proclaiming  to  the  world  our  sacred  disinterested- 
ness in  going  to  the  aid  of  Cuba.     But  one  occa- 


2i6  America  and  the  New  World-State 

sionally  gets  flashes  of  the  under  feeling.  You 
have  seen  Senator  John  R.  Wilson's  recent  pro- 
nouncement: "I  would  have  Cuba  if  I  could.  In 
fact  I  think  we  should  annex  in  some  way  or  other 
all  the  countries  on  this  hemisphere.  War  is 
a  good  thing."  Senator  Frye — what  doughty 
patriots  all  these  Senators  are ! — follows  in  a  like 
strain:  "I  should  annex  Cuba  by  conquest," 
says  he,  "simply  because  we  want  it."  These 
statesmen  are  singularly  honest,  and  I  prefer  their 
doctrines  to  those  of  the  highfalutin  folk  who  talk 
about  the  "will  of  Providence,"  "America's  great 
mission,"  and  make  Almighty  God  an  ally  of  the 
Republican  party  generally.  Senator  Frye,  dis- 
pensing with  these  heavenly  sanctions,  is  prefer- 
able: Annex  Cuba  "because  we  want  it."  No 
need  to  invoke  immortal  destiny. 

My  earlier  critic,  since  he  too  has  taken  the 
Almighty  into  partnership,  will,  I  fear,  be  more 
angry  with  me  than  ever.  But  how  do  I  know  that 
he  does  not  completely  share  the  views  of  Senators 
Frye  and  Wilson  as  to  the  ultimate  destinies  of 
Cuba?  And  I  say  this  because  he  quotes  with 
approval  President  Cleveland's  injunction  to  the 
Princeton  students  to  "support  your  country 
when  she  is  right,  and  I  am  not  sure  you  ought  not 
to  support  her  when  she  is  wrong."  How  do  I 
know  that  Mr.  Kyle  does  not  deem  our  action 
towards  Spain  wrong,  but  that  he  supports  it  in 
public  because  he  is  determined  to  vindicate  his 
country  "right  or  wrong"?    As  a  matter  of  fact, 


Anglophobia  217 

Mr.  Kyle  is  the  last  person  in  the  world  who  has  a 
shadow  of  right  to  appeal  to  any  moral  standard. 
He  says  in  effect  that  he  would  still  support  the 
United  States,  however  wrong  she  might  be;  he 
would,  in  fact,  argue  that  wrong  was  right,  and 
then  he  has  the  consummate  impudence  to  say 
that  my  "lecturing"  is  immoral.  He  repudiates 
altogether  the  moral  law  in  questions  of  interna- 
tional politics,  and  then  calls  Providence  to  witness 
that  I  am  an  immoral  person  and  a  perverter  of 
youth,  or  words  to  that  effect.  Under  the  circum- 
stances his  reference  to  "superior  airs"  needs  no 
comment  of  any  sort. 

The  position  with  regard  to  Spain  has  become 
dangerous  simply  because  patriots  of  Mr.  Kyle's 
stamp  are  beginning  to  set  the  tone  of  our  national 
feeling.  They  shout  louder  than  other  folk. 
They  hector  and  browbeat  as  "traitors"  all  who 
disagree  with  them,  so  that  reflection  and  civilized 
argument  become  impossible.  We  are  face  to  face 
with  a  curious  phenomenon  which  is  difficult  to 
explain.  It  would  seem  that  the  nation  is  set 
upon  warfare  of  some  sort.  For  months  we  have 
been  spoiling  for  a  scrap.  A  few  weeks  since  it  was 
Venezuela.  The  danger  was  averted  by  the  extra- 
ordinary submission  of  England.  To-day  it  is 
Cuba,  and  if  that  danger  can  be  overcome  we 
shall  find  some  other  thing  over  which  to  quarrel 
and  assert  our  greatness  to-morrow.  Our  news- 
papers, statesmen,  public  men,  and  clergy  even, 
are  talking  to  us  of  the  advantages  of  warfare — 


2i8  America  and  the  New  World-State 

not  war  with  any  one  particular  nation  or  for  any 
particular  purpose,  but  just  warfare  generally. 
These  wiseacres  are  suddenly  discovering  that 
without  periodical  blood-letting  we  must  certainly 
decay.  Theodore  Roosevelt  has  enunciated  a 
precious  doctrine  of  the  "strenuous  life,"  accord- 
ing to  which,  unless  we  fight  frequently,  we  shall 
die  from  "ignoble  ease." 

We  must  play  a  great  part  in  the  world,  and  especi- 
ally .  .  .  perform  those  deeds  of  blood  and  valour 
which  above  everything  else  bring  national  renown. 
.  .  .  Our  army  and  navy  have  never  been  built  up 
as  they  should  be  built  up.  .  .  .  The  navy  and 
army  are  the  sword  and  shield  which  this  nation  must 
carry.  .  .  .  We  do  not  admire  the  man  of  timid 
peace.  In  this  world  the  nation  that  has  trained 
itself  to  a  career  of  unwarlike  and  isolated  ease  is  bound 
to  go  down  in  the  end  before  other  nations  which  have 
not  lost  the  manly  and  adventurous  qualities. 

Since  when  has  this  become  the  "American 
doctrine"?  Certain  it  is  that  all  our  traditions 
are  founded  upon  very  different  groimdwork.  For 
two  htmdred  and  fifty  years — because  I  take  it 
that  the  principles  of  Puritanism  are  the  best 
elements  in  the  American  character — we  have  held 
to  a  diametrically  opposed  ideal.  We  have  some- 
how had  an  idea  that  the  superiority  of  this  country 
to  the  Old  World  lay  in  our  freedom  from  the  bur- 
den of  militarism,  from  the  mischief  of  the  military 
ideal.     Have  all  our  great  teachers  been  nursing 


Anglophobia  219 

a  delusion?  Have  we  to  confess  that  the  principles 
which  have  been  a  beacon-light  for  two  hundred 
and  fifty  years  are  all  wrong?  Mr.  Roosevelt 
apparently  thinks  so. 

But  does  history,  American  or  other,  support 
him?  Are  the  military  nations  the  prosperous  and 
virile  ones?  Turkey  is  the  most  militarized  nation 
in  Europe;  England  the  least.  Which  order  of 
principles  seems  to  have  worked  out  the  best? 
And  on  this  continent  has  the  progress  been  to  the 
unwarlike  and  unadventurous  Yankee  or  to  the 
Spanish-Americans  already  referred  to — the  peo- 
ples who  have  had  a  ceaseless  training  in  warfare 
and  should  possess  in  abundance  "the  manly  and 
adventurous  qualities"? 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  authorities  are  alto- 
gether on  Mr.  Roosevelt's  side.  Herbert  Spencer 
has  for  some  time — about  sixty  years  that  is — 
enjoyed  something  of  a  reputation  as  a  sociologist. 
He  is  supposed  to  know  something  of  the  operation 
of  social  laws,  of  the  development  of  man  and 
society,  and  the  relations  of  one  to  the  other.  He 
may  not,  perhaps,  be  the  equal  of  Mr.  Roosevelt 
on  those  matters,  but  he  has  at  least  this  in  his 
favour:  that  while  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  wielding 
his  terrible  wooden  sword  in  the  nursery,  while 
Mr.  Roosevelt  was  indeed  as  yet  unborn,  Herbert 
Spencer's  name  was  pronounced  with  respect  by 
men  of  learning  the  world  over.  How  does  this 
veteran  specialist's  opinion  agree  with  that  of 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  who  deems  that  the  "unwarlike 


220  America  and  the  New  World-State 

nation  is  bound  in  the  end  to  go  down  "  ?    Spencer 

says: 

Social  progress  is  to  be  achieved,  not  by  systems  of 
education,  not  by  the  preaching  of  a  religion,  but  only 
by  cessation  from  antagonisms.  Advance  to  higher 
forms  of  man  and  society  depends  on  the  decline  of 
militancy  and  the  growth  of  industrialism. 

The  diminution  of  militarism  is  not  by  Spencer 
reckoned  one  element  of  progress,  but  the  sole 
one.  In  view  of  this,  too,  one  reads  with  interest 
the  following  from  the  wise  yotmg  man  who  pro- 
vides the  political  instruction  for  the  readers  of 
the  Chicago  Inter  ocean'. 

Those  dear  old  ladies,  who  are  afraid  of  this  country 
becoming  a  military  nation,  may  set  their  minds  at 
rest.  It  has  become  one,  and  no  American,  except 
those  who  rather  like  to  see  it  kicked  by  the  European 
monarchies  and  its  flag  insulted,  will  regret  the  fact. 

It  is  true  that  the  simple  parade  of  authoritative 
names  does  not  suffice  to  silence  an  argument. 
But  my  complaint  is  that  neither  Mr.  Roosevelt 
nor  the  war-mongering  parsons  so  much  as  notice 
the  weighty  arguments  brought  by  Spencer;  they 
fail  altogether  to  deal  with  considerations  which 
thoughtful  men  the  world  over  have  esteemed  as 
fatally  condemning  the  military  ideal.  And  until 
these  warriors  do  adduce  some  reply  to  the  argu- 
ments for  peace,  I  shall  assume  that  they  are 
ignorant  of  them,  or  can  find  no  reply  to  them. 

Do  not  think  that  I  am  alone  in  foreshadowing 


Anglophobia  221 

these  dangers  of  militarism,  or  that  only  cranks, 
who  can  be  pooh-poohed  down,  share  these  views. 
In  a  recent  North  American  appears  an  article 
in  which  our  growing  tendency  to  warfare  is  ably 
and  significantly  sketched.  The  author,  Mr.  R.  N. 
Shaler,  says: 

Those  persons  who  are  accustomed  to  observe  the 
movements  of  public  opinion  have  had  occasion  to 
note  of  late  a  curious  tide  which  is  setting  our  nation 
towards  warfare.  Although  by  our  happy  isolation 
from  the  field  of  European  rivalries  and  by  the 
traditions  of  our  forefathers,  ours  is  the  one  great  state 
of  the  world  which  seems  to  be  appointed  for  the 
offices  of  peace,  we  appear  to  be  driven  by  a  blind 
impulse  into  modes  of  thought  and  action  concerning 
our  neighbours  that  will,  if  unchecked,  bring  us  to 
contests  of  arms.  A  trifling  fracas  with  Chili,  a  mere 
police  court  case ;  an  insurrection  in  Cuba ;  a  matter  of 
fishing  in  Newfoundland;  of  sealing  in  Alaska,  or  the 
confused  questions  of  a  wilderness  boundary  in  South 
America,  each  and  all  serve  to  set  the  dogs  of  war  bay- 
ing. These  questions  may  be  settled  by  the  judicious 
conduct  of  a  few  men  who  are  in  actual  control  of  our 
foreign  relations,  and  others  as  they  arise  may  be  thus 
arranged ;  but  by  the  next  turn  of  the  political  wheel 
we  may  lose  this  protection  and  find  in  the  high  places 
men  who,  like  the  others,  have  eaten  of  the  insane  root, 
and  who  will  welcome  the  opportunity  for  this  nation 
to  enter,  as  these  madmen  phrase  it,  "on  a  larger 
sphere  of  action. " 

In  his  address  the  other  day  at  the  Arbitration 
Conference  in  Washington,  Carl  Schurz  said: 


222  America  and  the  New  World-State 

To  judge  from  the  utterance  of  some  men  having 
the  public  ear,  we  are  constantly  threatened  by  the 
evil  designs  of  rival  or  secretly  hostile  powers  that  are 
eagerly  watching  every  chance  to  humiliate  our  self- 
esteem,  to  insult  our  flag,  to  balk  our  policies,  to 
harass  our  commerce,  and  even  to  threaten  our  very 
independence,  and  putting  us  in  imminent  danger  of 
discomfiture  of  all  sorts,  unless  we  stand  with  sword 
in  hand  in  sleepless  watch,  and  cover  the  seas  with 
warships,  and  picket  the  islands  of  every  ocean  with 
garrisoned  outposts,  and  surround  ourselves  far  and 
near  with  impregnable  fortresses. 

President  Eliot,  of  Harvard  University,  at  this 
same  conference,  was  still  more  emphatic  and  still 
more  significant.  Referring  to  the  Venezuelan 
incident,  he  said : 

We  had  then  one  great  surprise.  .  .  .  We  thought 
that  the  separation  of  the  executive  and  legislative 
functions  in  our  country  had  one  great  advantage  on 
which  we  could  rely,  namely,  that  when  executive 
propositions  of  a  grave  and  serious  nature  were  laid 
before  the  legislative  branches,  the  legislative  branch 
might  be  depended  upon  to  give  consideration  and 
procure  delay.  We  have  been  painfully  surprised  to 
learn  by  the  actual  fact  that  that  reliance  is  not  well 
founded.  Moreover,  we  have  seen  a  new  phenomenon 
in  our  country,  and  perhaps  in  the  world,  namely,  the 
greatly  increased  inflammability  of  a  multitudinous 
population  in  consequence  of  the  development  of  the 
telegraph  and  the  daily  press. 

President  Eliot  then  went  on  to  declare,  with  the 
courage  which  should  endear  him  to  every  Amer- 


Anglophobia  223 

ican  who  wishes  well  of  his  country,  that  our 
patriotism  is  but  a  bastard  European  production 
at  best. 

We  have  seen  during  the  last  few  years,  in  both 
political  parties,  and  perhaps  as  much  in  the  one  as  the 
other,  the  importation  from  Europe  of  an  idea,  a  policy 
absolutely  new  amongst  us,  absolutely  repugnant  to 
all  American  public  experience — an  importation  from 
the  aristocratic  and  military  nations  of  Europe.  I 
refer,  of  course,  to  this  modem  American  notion  called 
"jingoism,"  a  detestable  word,  gentlemen,  used  in 
naming  a  detestable  thing.  The  term  is  of  English 
origin  and  not  from  the  best  side  of  English  politics, 
but  from  the  worst — from  the  politics  of  Palmerston 
and  Disraeli  and  not  of  Gladstone.  It  is  the  most 
abject  copy  conceivable  of  a  pernicious  foreign  ideal, 
and  yet  some  of  my  friends  endeavour  to  pass  it  off 
upon  the  American  people  as  patriotic  Americanism. 
.  .  .  Can  anything  be  more  offensive  to  the  sober- 
minded,  industrious,  laborious  classes  of  American 
society  than  this  doctrine  of  jingoism,  this  chip-on- 
the-shoulder  attitude,  this  attitude  of  a  ruffian  and  a 
bully?  This  is  just  what  jingoism  means,  coupled 
with  a  brutal  and  despotic  militarism  which  naturally 
exists  in  countries  where  the  government  has  been 
despotic  or  aristocratic,  and  where  there  has  always 
been  an  enormous  military  class.  The  teaching  of 
this  doctrine  by  our  press  and  some  of  our  public 
men  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  this  conference  has 
gathered  now. 

But  surely  the  very  worst  feature  of  the  "inflam- 
mability of  a  multitudinous  population"  to  which 


224  America  and  the  New  World-State 

President  Eliot  referred,  the  feature  which  has  in  it 
the  most  danger,  is  that  the  men  to  whom  we  have 
a  right  to  look  for  keeping  uppermost  the  sober 
second  thought  of  the  nation,  the  better  class  of 
our  public  men  and  our  clergy,  seem  the  very- 
readiest  to  add  fuel  to  the  flame.  Nothing  has 
been  more  extraordinary  during  the  last  few 
months  than  the  servility  with  which  our  pulpit 
has  kow-towed  to  the  worst  passions  of  the  multi- 
tude. I  could  reproduce  here — were  I  not  already 
running  to  too  great  a  length — sermons  which  in 
their  vague  warlike  mysticism  were  fitter  in  the 
mouths  of  Dervishes  than  of  Christian  men.  And 
these  incitements  to  strife  only  occur  when  the 
feeling  of  the  people  is  already  warlike.  When  we 
are  clothed  and  in  our  right  minds  the  clergy  coo 
as  gently  as  any  sucking  dove.  It  is  an  impleasant 
thing  to  say,  but  does  not  this  inevitably  suggest 
the  reflection  that  the  clergy  are  more  anxious  to 
preach  what  is  popular  than  what  is  right  ?  Reflect 
on  this  incontrovertible  fact:  When  in  December 
last  the  relations  with  England  were  most  strained, 
when  it  was  touch  and  go  as  to  whether  we  should 
have  a  war  with  England  upon  our  hands,  did  not 
the  daily  press  treat  us  to  sermons  from  eminent 
divines,  in  which  the  wrongs  this  country  has 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  were 
eloquently  set  forth?  Yet  now,  when  the  danger 
has  passed  and  it  has  become  more  the  thing  to 
talk  of  arbitration,  the  clergy  are  telling  us  of  all 
the  reasons  for  being  good  friends  with  England. 


Anglophobia  225 

Surely  it  would  have  been  better  to  set  forth  those 
claims  of  friendship  when  we  were  in  danger  of 
forgetting  them,  rather  than  now  when  there  is  not 
the  least  danger.  But  the  clergy  did  not.  Think 
of  the  action  of  the  chaplain  of  the  Senate,  who  in 
the  midst  of  the  Venezuelan  madness  could  pray 
that  this  country  should  be  "quick  to  resent 
insults."  Forgetting  every  injunction  of  his  faith 
this  minister  of  the  Prince  of  Peace  could  cover 
the  worst  of  jingoism  with  the  sanction  of  Chris- 
tianity. I  would  wager  my  last  dollar  that  when 
we  come  to  discuss  the  arbitration  treaty,  this 
doughty  cleric  will  inform  the  Almighty  upon 
the  benefits  of  peace. 

It  is  true  that  this  moral  poltroonery — the  desire 
to  be  on  the  side  of  the  big  crowds — is  not  confined 
to  the  parsons,  but  one  is  justified  in  expecting 
better  things  of  them.  When  they  lead  the  way, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  politicians  follow. 
These  latter  are  indeed  almost  preferable,  since 
they  make  little  secret  of  being  guided  in  their 
opinions  by  what  constitutes  "good  politics." 
The  attitude  of  the  politicians  in  our  recent  war 
fever — I  mean  at  the  height  of  the  war  fever — is 
referred  to  with  engaging  frankness  by  Congress- 
man Elliott  of  South  Carolina,  in  the  March  North 
American.  After  stating  that  the  Republicans 
suspected  the  President  somewhat  of  precipitating 
the  question  upon  Congress  by  his  aggressive 
message,  for  the  purpose  of  bolstering  up  the 
waning  fortunes  of  his  party,  and  were  determined 

IS 


226  America  and  the  New  World-State 

not  to  be  outdone  by  him  in  patriotic  fervour,  while 
the  Democrats  naturally  felt  that  it  would  never  do 
for  them  to  block  the  course  of  a  Democratic 
President,  he  goes  on  to  say: 

Undoubtedly  within  a  very  few  hours  afterwards, 
when  it  had  been  seen  what  irreparable  injury  had 
been  wrought  by  the  danger  of  war,  many  a  member 
of  the  House  wished  he  had  had  the  pluck  to  do  what 
Mr.  Boutelle  was  so  much  tempted  to  do,  and  call  a 
halt.  And  this  too,  especially  on  the  part  of  those 
who  felt  that  there  could  be  no  greater  public  calamity 
than  a  war  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  that  it  would  be  a  disaster  of  unspeakable 
horrors,  and  who,  moreover,  felt  a  great  deal  of  sym- 
pathy in  the  main  reason  put  forward  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury for  declining  arbitration,  that  it  involved  the 
"transfer  of  large  numbers  of  British  subjects,  who 
have  for  many  years  enjoyed  the  settled  rule  of  a  Brit- 
ish colony,  to  a  nation  of  different  race  and  language, 
whose  political  system  is  subject  to  frequent  disturb- 
ance, and  whose  institutions  as  yet  too  often  afford 
very  inadequate  protection  to  life  and  property," 
a  reason  which  Lord  Salisbury  suggested  would  induce 
the  United  States  to  be  equally  firm  in  declining  to 
entertain  proposals  of  such  a  nature.  At  least  I 
can  speak  for  myself  in  this  regard, 

I  say  that  the  position  of  the  politician  thus 
described — who  would  wage  war  upon  a  friendly 
people  for  refusing  to  adopt  an  attitude  he  himself 
would  refuse  to  adopt — is  in  some  sense  explicable, 
thcnigh  certainly  not  excusable.     But  why,  outside 


Anglophobia  22^ 

Congress,  do  not  men  have  the  pluck  as  Mr.  Elliott 
puts  it,  to  call  a  halt?  That  many  men  of  influence 
feel  privately  with  Mr.  Boutelle  is  certain.  It  is 
sufficient  to  get  such  men  into  a  fairly  confidential 
mood  for  them  to  avow  privately  that  they  regard 
our  new-bom  jingoism  as  mischievous  and  ridicu- 
lous. Why  do  they  not  say  so  in  public?  More 
generally  than  not  they  would  lose  nothing  mate- 
rially by  their  courage.  It  seems  simply  that  they 
are  in  a  blue  funk  of  being  found  momentarily  in 
the  minority,  of  being  called  "traitors"  by  little 
asses  and  yellow  newspapers.  Courage  of  the 
prize-ring  sort  is  a  cult  amongst  us,  but  the  courage 
which  will  consent  to  be  for  a  time  unpopular,  to 
stand  with  one's  face  to  the  silly  flag-wagging  mob, 
to  pronounce  a  word  for  common-sense  and  com- 
mon honesty  in  times  of  general  dementia,  seems 
all  but  completely  absent. 

I  am  aware  that  the  average  American  will  con- 
sider this  as  altogether  too  serious  a  view  of  the 
matter.  It  will  be  deemed  solemn  and  owlish  to 
object  to  what  is  probably  but  a  little  harmless 
excitement.  That  this  talk  of  war  and  the  parade 
of  the  paraphernalia  of  war  adds  a  zest  to  politics 
dull  enough  for  the  most  part.  That  it  pleases 
the  women  folk  and  gives  the  boys  something  to 
do  o*  nights.  That  there  is  nothing  very  serious 
in  it  at  all,  and  that  it  will  end  as  the  Venezuelan 
excitement  ended — in  smoke.  And  that  is  why 
the  politicians  and  the  parsons  lend  themselves  to 
it.     The  country  is  "all  right, "  and  rich  enough  to 


228  America  and  the  New  World-State 

spend  a  little  money  on  gold  lace  and  excitement 
if  it  wants  to. 

If  history  has  any  lessons  at  all,  no  fallacy  is 
more  dangerous  than  this.  No  man  can  watch 
the  movements  of  opinion  in  this  country  without 
seeing  that  this  war  talk  which  we  start  with  a 
light  heart  soon  becomes  serious.  Nothing  is  more 
fatal  to  the  sense  of  humour  and  proportion  than 
this  patriotism  of  flags  and  war-drums.  It  is 
true  that  we  avoided  war  with  England  at  the 
time  of  the  Venezuelan  business,  but  only  because 
she  adopted  an  attitude  which  no  other  country 
would  have  adopted.  France  would  not  have 
done  it;  nor  Germany;  nor  will  Spain.  The 
Spanish  "pundonor"  will  make  it  absolutely 
impossible.  And  even  if  we  do  manage  to  avoid 
conflict  with  Spain,  we  shall  get  it  with  some  other 
nation,  if  the  humour  now  upon  us  lasts.  Those 
people  who  will  not  take  the  trouble,  nor  incur  the 
odium  patrioticum,  of  setting  their  faces  against 
that  humour  because  it  is  harmless,  are  mak- 
ing exactly  the  sort  of  error  they  would  make  in 
allowing  a  child  to  play  with  squibs  in  a  powder 
magazine. 

But  even  if  it  should  never  result  in  war,  it  is 
still  mischievous,  and  will  cost  us  dear — is  costing 
us  dear.  I  know  that  America  is  supposed  to 
be  so  rich  as  to  afford  any  folly,  any  stupidity. 
Our  newspapers  are  fond  of  talking  of  our  bound- 
less wealth,  the  "  per-r-airies  stretching  from  the 
rock-boimd  coast  o*  Maine  to  the  sunny  shores 


Anglophobia  229 

of  the  golden  Pacific."  All  this  oratory  is  very 
attractive,  and  Americans  are  very  fond  of  it, 
but  what  are  the  facts? 

The  last  time  I  heard  that  phrase  about  "this 
sun -kissed  land"  and  the  "boimdless  prairies 
stretching  from  the  rock-bound  coast,"  and  so 
forth,  it  was  from  the  lips  of  a  gentleman  in  a 
country  store,  who  concluded  the  oration  by  asking 
the  loan  of  a  dollar  and  a  half  in  order  to  get  a  sack 
of  flour  to  take  home  to  his  wife,  the  store-keeper 
declining  further  credit  on  an  account  which  was 
already  four  and  a  half  years  old.  I  am  not 
romancing;  it  is  an  absolute  fact.  The  farmer  in 
question  had  for  half  an  hour  been  indulging  in 
precisely  the  sort  of  bamboozle  with  which  our 
land  companies  fill  their  rose-coloured  circulars. 
"The  richest  country  on  God  Almighty's  earth, 
sir."  The  man  might  have  stood  for  the  land 
agent  in  Martin  Chuzzlewit;  the  lineaments  of 
Dickens's  picture,  drawn  sixty  years  since,  were 
all  there,  faithful  to  the  last  detail.  With  just 
this  difference:  my  friend  was  not  a  land  agent. 
He  did  not  want  to  sell  me  his  farm ;  I  don't  know 
why  he  was  filling  me  up  with  all  this  land-agency 
romance.  No  one  did.  It  just  came  natural  to 
him.  Now  the  facts  of  this  patriot's  situation  is 
that  his  farm  is  mortgaged  to  the  hilt,  as  also  are 
his  team  and  wagon ;  his  implements  he  has  never 
paid  for;  his  grocery  account  is  something  over 
four  years  old;  he  can  never  remember  the  time 
when  he  was  out  of  debt;  his  wife,  at  thirty-five,  is 


230  America  and  the  New  World-State 

an  old  and  worn  woman ;  she  can  never  remember 
the  time  when  she  was  not  overworked,  when  she 
had  not  to  get  up  by  dayHght,  and  well  before  it 
in  winter  time,  to  cook  the  coarse  grub  for  the 
family  and  the  occasional  hands.  The  wooden 
shack  in  which  they  live  is  an  oven  in  summer, 
a  refrigerator  in  winter.  A  garden  the  farm  does 
not  possess ;  no  one  would  have  the  time  to  attend 
to  it.  The  vegetables  are  bought  from  the  travel- 
ling Chinaman,  and  the  wife  and  her  husband  have 
not  even  the  meagre  satisfaction  of  owning  the 
farm  upon  which  for  years  they  have  laboured  like 
convicts.  And  they  never  will  own  it.  In  a 
couple  of  years  the  bank  will  foreclose,  the  ram- 
shackle wagon  will  be  loaded  with  bedding  and  a 
frying-pan,  and  this  worn  woman  with  the  tired 
face  will  follow  her  husband  to  some  newer  terri- 
tory, where  the  process  will  be  started  all  over 
again  da  capo.  "Finest  country  on  God  Al- 
mighty's earth,  sir.  A  million  happy  homes,  sir, 
stretchin'  from  the  rock-bound.    .    .    ." 

I  shall  be  told  that  this  is  an  exceptional  case; 
many  Americans  will,  in  perfect  good  faith,  call  it 
pure  romance,  because  they  are  ignorant  of  the  real 
conditions  of  their  own  country.  Their  knowledge 
of  American  farm  life  is  such  as  they  see  it  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  summer  boarder,  and  such  as 
it  is  represented  by  politicians,  by  land  agents,  and 
also,  be  it  said,  by  the  extraordinary  self -deceiving 
twaddle  which  the  farmers  themselves  have  ac- 
quired the  habit  of  indulging  in.     But  whether  I 


Anglophobia  231 

am  right  or  wrong,  I  speak,  at  least,  as  one  who  has 
gone  through  the  mill,  as  one  who  has  worked  as  a 
labourer  upon  a  score  of  ranches  in  California,  who 
has  himself  ranched,  who  has  passed  a  goodly 
period  of  his  life  cheek  by  jowl  with  farmers  and 
farm  hands.  Most  town-bred  Americans,  and 
some  who  are  not  town-bred,  but  remember  the 
farm  from  a  boy's  standpoint,  speak  habitually 
without  the  advantage  of  such  an  experience,  and 
I  will  appeal  from  their  usual  highfalutin  periods 
to  certain  undeniable  facts.  I  will  take  the  three 
counties  of  California  with  which  I  am  most 
familiar:  Fresno  County,  Kern  County,  and  Tu- 
lare County.  They  are  fairly  representative,  and 
include  in  their  area  the  fruit-growing,  the  grain- 
farming,  and  cattle-raising  interests.  Now,  if  you 
examine  the  public  records  of  these  counties,  as  you 
can  easily  do,  you  will  find  that,  striking  an  aver- 
age over  the  whole,  ninety-seven  per  cent,  of  those 
farms  to  which  titles  have  been  acquired  from  the 
Government  are  mortgaged  in  one  form  or  another; 
if  you  examine  the  records  of  chattel  mortgages 
deposited  in  the  court-houses,  you  will  find  that 
in  addition  to  the  mortgages  upon  the  land,  nearly 
half  the  farmers  have  also  mortgaged  their  imple- 
ments or  their  crops.  That  is  to  say  that  not  four 
farmers  in  a  hundred  own  their  farms.  That 
already  is  a  great  fact.  The  man  who  year  in  year 
out  has  to  find  interest  for  a  debt  cannot  be  called 
independent;  but  it  is  the  figure  of  the  interest 
which  is  even  a  greater  fact.     The  average  is  eight 


232  America  and  the  New  World-State 

per  cent ;  in  some  cases  it  rises  even  on  first  mort- 
gages to  twelve  per  cent:  one  per  cent  a  month. 
Now,  there  is  no  industry  in  the  world,  least  of  all 
agriculture,  which  can  pay  eight  and  ten  and 
twelve  per  cent  interest  upon  debt  incumberment. 
An  industry  normally  characterized  by  such  a 
thing  is  not  a  prosperous  one;  it  is  one  having 
something  radically  wrong  with  it,  for  no  man  will 
year  in  year  out  pay  another,  twelve  per  cent 
interest  if  his  business  is  profitable.  He  will  keep 
such  princely  profits  on  invested  capital  for  himself. 
But  that  is  not  the  whole  story.  Go  into  one  of 
the  big  stores  in  our  country  towns,  and  get  the 
store-keeper  to  tell  you  in  confidence  the  real 
condition  of  his  accounts  with  his  farming  cus- 
tomers. You  will  find  that  the  majority  of  his 
accounts  have  run  from  three  to  five  years;  that 
the  farmers  "pay  something  on  account"  after 
harvest,  and  that  only  a  small  minority  are  for 
long  out  of  his  debt  or  free  from  liens  which  he 
holds.  And  those  deferred  accounts  also  pay  one 
per  cent  a  month  interest. 

Now  go  to  the  farms.  What  sort  of  food  do  the 
farmer  and  his  wife  eat?  What  sort  of  clothes  does 
the  wife  wear ?  What  sort  of  leisure  do  they  enjoy  ? 
I  will  tell  you.  You  will  go  into  a  hundred  farm- 
houses— into  five  hundred  in  this  State — before 
you  will  find  one  in  which  there  is  a  hired  girl  to 
help  the  farmer's  wife.  The  fiction  is  that  we  spoil 
our  women  and  pamper  them.  I  don't  know  how 
it  is  in  the  towns.     In  the  towns  I  imderstand  that 


Anglophobia  233 

the  wives  of  dry-goods  clerks  can  keep  their  hired 
girls,  but  I  could  name  a  score  of  women  married 
to  farmers,  with  property  supposed  to  reach  five 
figures  in  value,  who  are  accustomed  to  rise  at  five, 
light  the  fire,  cook  the  grub,  clean  the  house,  do 
the  washing,  milk  the  cows,  feed  the  poultry,  at- 
tend to  the  children,  mend  their  clothes,  cook  the 
midday  meal,  cook  the  supper,  do  the  chores,  and 
go  to  bed  at  something  near  midnight.  There  is 
not  a  day-labourer's  wife  in  the  city  who  would  not 
be  ashamed  to  dress  so  meanly,  or  who  would  not 
refuse  the  food  she  eats  every  day  of  the  year. 
There  are  thousands  of  farmhouses  in  this  State 
where  "meat"  means  salt  pork,  "vegetables" 
potatoes,  where  beef  or  mutton  is  never  tasted 
from  one  year's  end  to  another.  The  life  of  the 
man  is  a  corresponding  one.  A  capitalist,  a  man 
whose  property  is  supposed  to  be  worth  thousands 
of  dollars,  he  pitches  hay  with  the  sun  a  hundred 
in  the  shade.  In  the  winter  he  puts  the  frost- 
crusted  harness  on  to  his  own  shivering  beasts, 
feeds  and  waters  them  himself.  And  after  ten  or 
fifteen  or  twenty  years  of  this  he  gets  sold  up,  and 
pulls  up  stakes,  to  start  on  a  hundred  and  sixty 
acres  of  government  land  "fenced  by  a  couple  o* 
yaller  dogs,"  but  situated  happily  in  "the  richest 
country  on  God  Almighty's  earth,  sir!" 

I  know  that  this  sketch  will  be  pooh-poohed  as 
fantastic  and  exaggerated.  But  it  is  the  truth; 
the  figures  of  mortgages,  the  evidence  of  our  eyes, 
everything  save  the  florid  oratory  which  we  swal- 


234  America  and  the  New  World-State 

low  as  other  drunkards  swallow  gin  and  morphia 
supports  its  truth.  Here  and  there  we  have  a 
publicist  who  will  tell  it.  Occasionally  you  will 
see  it  reflected  in  the  agricultural  press,  while  a  few 
shrewd  observers  like  Hamlin  Garland  have  testi- 
fied to  it  in  their  books.  I  challenge  any  one 
who  is  entitled  to  speak  on  the  matter  by  close 
contact  with  our  farming  population  to  rebut  its 
general  truth. 

But  what  has  this  to  do  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and  the  conflict  with  Spain,  and  with  our 
recent  warlike  talky-talky?  It  has  everything  to 
do.  My  contention  with  regard  to  our  growing 
militarism  was  that  this  country  could  not  afford 
the  luxury.  I  do  not  mean  that  it  could  not  find 
the  money — it  could  maintain  an  army  of  a  million 
men  if  needs  be,  as  it  has  done  before — but  that 
the  condition  of  things  I  have  described  never  will 
be  mended,  if,  instead  of  busying  ourselves  with  our 
own  people,  we  get  excited  over  the  wrongs  of 
Cubans,  and  "the  fulfilment  of  our  destiny." 
We  may  be  sure  that  if,  in  a  country  like  ours,  a 
country  possessing  in  abundance  everything  from 
which  the  wealth  of  the  world  is  created,  those 
who  work  the  hardest  get  the  least ;  if  our  tillers  of 
the  soil  are  in  effect  worse  off  than  the  peasants 
of  rocky  Switzerland  or  crowded  Holland,  and 
infinitely  worse  off  than  the  farmers  of  effete 
England — if  this  be  the  case,  there  is  something 
radically  wrong.  It  is  not  natural  that  our  agri- 
cultural population  should  be  both  poor  and  over- 


Anglophobia  235 

worked,  debt-ridden  and  toil-driven.  Yet  such 
is  the  case.  Our  towns  are  wealthy,  our  manu- 
facturers are  rich,  and  get  richer  every  day,  but 
our  farmers  remain  poor.  And  our  farmers  are 
the  larger  class,  at  least  in  the  Western  sections. 
They  are,  or  should  be,  the  backbone  of  our 
country,  the  reservoir  of  its  best  blood,  the  keeper 
of  its  best  traditions.  And  yet,  the  nature  of  our 
new  patriots  is  such  that  they  are  much  more 
interested  in  the  woes  of  the  Cubans  than  in  the 
hardships  of  American  men  and  women.  The 
Examiner  has  just  been  sending  out  photos  of  the 
Cuban  women  in  the  Concentration  Camps,  and 
our  statesmen  and  our  clergy  weep  over  them. 
Yet  I  warrant  that  were  I  to  make  a  collection 
of  the  pale-faced  and  overworked  women  of  our 
farms  not  one  of  these  statesmen  or  these  clergy- 
men would  give  it  a  glance.  You  may  call  me 
names,  and  say  that  I  am  no  patriot,  but  to  me 
the  men  and  women  that  I  know,  their  struggle  for 
the  daily  bread  that  is  so  poor  and  hard,  are  of 
more  import  than  the  Cubans  and  all  their  causes. 
Let  the  Cubans  work  out  their  own  salvation, 
and  let  us  give  our  energies  to  ours. 

But  the  patriot  won't  have  it.  When  I  see  a 
perfervid  young  man  waving  little  flags,  I  know 
that  it  is  no  use  talking  to  him  about  Americans 
— about  the  people  say,  in  Fresno  County.  You 
must  talk  to  him  of  those  noble  Cubans  if  he  is 
to  show  the  least  interest.  And  he  is  like  most 
patriots. 


236  America  and  the  New  World-State 

And  that  is  what  I  mean  by  saying  that  we 
cannot  afford  this  militarism.  Not  only  will  it 
not  help  us  to  find  what  is  wrong  with  our  own 
institutions — with  those  policies  which  keep  those 
poor  who  should  be  rich,  and  make  richer  those 
who  are  rich  enough — but  it  will  prevent  our  doing 
so.  The  moment  that  we  fight  Spain  we  shall 
become  mixed  with  the  haute  politique.  We  shall 
fight  our  elections  upon  questions  of  prestige  in 
Europe;  upon  subduing  this  or  that  enemy; 
upon  acquiring  more  empire.  The  expansionist 
with  his  flag  and  his  drum  will  so  interest  us  that 
we  shall  have  no  inclination  to  listen  to  the  dull 
fellow  who  is  talking  mere  domestic  problems. 
Our  taxes  will  double,  but  if  one  object,  he  is 
told  that  he  is  putting  "pocket  before  patriotism, " 
and  that  it  is  all  for  the  glory  of  the  flag.  And, 
worst  of  all,  that  peculiar  temper  which  has  bHnded 
our  Western  population  during  a  generation  to  its 
real  interests  will  be  immeasurably  strengthened 
by  all  this  warlike  adventure. 

This  temper  has  led  us  to  prefer  indulgence  in 
a  sentiment  of  hostility  to  the  furtherance  of  our 
interests.  We  have  been  persuaded,  and  for  years 
we  held  it  as  unquestionably  true  that,  as  Senator 
Lodge  puts  it,  if  we  could  do  anything  to  injure 
England,  it  was  our  clear  interest  to  do  so.  Eng- 
land! The  very  best  customer  for  our  products 
that  exists  in  the  world,  a  country  that  takes  more 
of  them  than  all  the  rest  of  the  world  put  together. 
And  it  is  a  customer  of  this  proportion  that  we 


Anglophobia  237 

are  to  destroy  if  possible — the  only  great  foreign 
market  where  our  beef,  and  pork,  and  grain,  and 
fruit,  have  an  absolutely  free  market!  I  am 
absolutely  astonished  at  the  strength  of  the  Anglo- 
phobia as  it  exists  now,  and  has  for  years  existed 
among  Western  farmers.  What  grievance  have 
they  against  England?  What  injury  has  she  done 
them?  They  could  not,  to  save  their  immortal 
souls,  tell  you,  but  they  hate  her,  and  if  any 
politician  is  especially  offensive  with  regard  to 
her,  they  will  vote  for  him. 

Now,  it  is  evident  that  this  is  not  a  rational 
temper :  that  it  is  not  one  in  which  our  best  inter- 
ests will  receive  a  quiet  and  clear-headed  consider- 
ation. But  it  is  one  which  the  new  militarism  will 
foster.  England  will  not  necessarily  be  the  object 
of  it,  but  we  shall  be  taught  to  distrust  and  hate 
the  "foreigner,"  to  try  and  injure  him,  to  create 
large  forces  to  overawe  him.  In  other  words, 
sentimentality,  the  sentimentality  of  suspicion 
and  hostility,  the  sentimentality  of  the  drum- 
banging  patriot,  will  influence  our  policy  in  the 
future,  as  Anglophobia  has  influenced  it  in  the 
past.  We  have  recently  had  a  singular  illustration 
of  how  this  noisy  sentimentalism  of  Anglophobia 
manages  to  silence  sober  argument.  I  referred 
just  this  minute  to  the  enormous  interest  paid  by 
farmers  on  loans.  Not  unnaturally  this  large 
interest  has  attracted  foreign  capital  to  the  State. 
By  the  ordinary  operation  of  supply  and  demand, 
as  foreign  capitalists  showed  their  readiness  to  lend, 


238  America  and  the  New  World-State 

the  rate  of  interest  showed  a  tendency  to  descend, 
an  immense  advantage  to  the  farmer.  One  would 
have  supposed  that  he  would  have  welcomed  this 
influx  of  foreign  capital,  allowing  him  more  easily 
to  develop  his  land,  or  in  any  case  to  exchange  a 
mortgage  of  twelve  per  cent  for  one  at  six  or  seven. 
But  the  Californian  banks,  or  the  Eastern  insur- 
ance companies  who  support  them,  have  pre- 
sumably too  good  a  thing  in  loaning  money  at 
twelve  per  cent  to  allow  the  market  to  be  cut  in 
that  way.  In  any  case,  the  politicians  organized 
a  patriotic  howl  about  the  wickedness  of  foreigners 
having  liens  on  land  in  the  State.  The  picture  of 
the  bloated  British  capitalist  acquiring  the  farms  of 
American  ranchers  was  vividly  drawn.  (It  stands 
to  reason,  of  course,  that  we  cannot  borrow  foreign 
money  without  security,  so  that  mortgages  were 
passing  into  the  hands  of  foreigners — to  the 
immense  benefit  of  the  American  who  paid  the 
interest.)  Of  course  the  appeal  was  successful. 
The  farmer  found  the  chance  of  doing  an  imagined 
injury  to  the  Britisher  irresistible,  and  a  law  has 
been  voted  by  the  Assembly  which  will,  to  put  it 
at  the  lowest,  hamper  the  business  arrangements 
by  which  we  make  use  of  foreign  capital.  And  of 
course  the  farmer  will  cheerfully  return  to  paying 
his  twelve  per  cent. 

That  is  but  an  instance  in  which  our  "patriot- 
ism" is  paid  for  in  material  sacrifice.  But  why 
should  the  sacrifice  be  all  on  our  side,  why  should 
not  the  bank  or  the  manufacturer  also  contribute 


Anglophobia  239 

his  quota?  He  asks  us,  in  the  name  of  patriotism, 
not  to  give  the  foreigner  a  lien  on  the  land.  Well 
and  good.  Then  let  him  lend  us  money  at  the 
rate  at  which  the  foreigner  is  content  to  lend  it. 
But  somehow  the  American  capitalist  does  not  see 
it. 

This  is  but  an  instance.  A  much  more  serious 
matter  connected  with  our  Anglophobia  and 
patriotism  of  the  stump,  and  one  which  lies,  it  is 
my  firm  conviction,  at  the  very  bottom  of  the 
unnaturally  hard  fight  of  the  farmer  for  a  Hving, 
is  the  question  of  Protection.  I  am  not  going  to 
argue  that  question  au  fond.  I  am  not  going  to 
pretend  that  Free  Trade  is,  under  every  circum- 
stance, a  wise  policy;  I  am  perfectly  willing  to 
admit  that  Protection  may  be  logically  defensible, 
and  that  we  may  be  wise  to  adopt  it.  I  only  want 
to  point  out  two  incontrovertible  facts:  (i)  That 
sentimentalism,  Anglophobia,  "patriotism,"  play 
a  large  role  in  our  defence  of  the  policy;  (2)  that 
our  economic  position  is  the  exact  reverse  to  that 
of  the  Eastern  manufacturer,  and  that,  a  priori, 
a  policy  which  benefits  him  is  Hkely  to  injure  us. 

Let  me  make  the  first  point  plain.  Think  of  all 
the  Protectionist  articles  that  you  read  during  the 
last  campaign;  think  of  the  attitude  of  all  the 
Protectionist  newspapers.  Were  they  not  all 
Anglophobe,  bellicose,  truculent,  jingo?  A  fair 
sample  among  Western  papers  is  the  Chronicle 
of  San  Francisco.  Not  a  day  passes  without  that 
paper  taking  the  opportiinity  to  abuse  England, 


240  America  and  the  New  World-State 

to  stimulate  the  hatred  of  Americans  for  that 
country  and  for  all  things  British.  It  realizes 
perfectly  well  that  Protection  is  based  on  a  certain 
amount  of  hostility  to  the  foreigner,  and  conse- 
quently on  the  flaunting  of  our  military  forces.  In 
my  last  article  on  this  subject  I  had  occasion  to 
point  this  out.  "Did  anyone  ever  see  an  Amer- 
ican Free  Trader  who  was  in  favour  of  forts  and 
fleets?"  asks  the  Chronicle  in  triumph.  It  opines 
that  the  patriotic  league  will  get  no  help  from  the 
Free  Trader.  For  belligerency,  for  warlike  pre- 
parations, it  says  quite  frankly  that  you  must  go 
to  the  Protectionist.  And  it  takes  it  as  proof  of 
"good  red  blood"  (which  occasionally,  it  may  be 
pointed  out,  runs  into  boisterous  choleric  trucu- 
lence)  that  this  should  be  so.  During  the  recent 
campaign  the  Republicans  circulated  a  campaign 
pamphlet  setting  forth  how  much  McKinley  was 
hated  in  England,  and  a  campaign  man  told  me 
that  he  found  it  very  useful.  You  know  the  style 
of  the  average  stump  orator  on  this  matter.  The 
moment  that  he  touches  upon  Free  Trade,  he  will 
begin  to  tell  you  what  objectionable  people  the 
British  are.  It  is  true  that  during  the  last  cam- 
paign he  was  a  little  more  circimispect  in  this 
matter  because  the  Democrats  stole  his  thimder 
on  behalf  of  Free  Silver.  They  worked  Anglo- 
phobia against  the  "British  gold  bugs"  as  the 
Republicans  have  for  years  worked  it  against 
"British  Free  Traders."  The  spectacle  of  the 
two  great  American  parties,  each  accusing  the 


Anglophobia  241 

other  of  "legislating  for  the  foreigner,"  or  of 
"being  in  the  pay  of  Britain,"  is  an  amazing 
and  instructive  spectacle. 

Presumably  the  poUticians  know  their  business. 
Both  sides  would  not  thus  appeal  to  sentiment — 
the  sentiment  of  national  hostilities — unless  such 
appeals  were  successful.  We  can  only  presimie, 
therefore,  that  the  American  puts  sentiment  be- 
fore business,  or  mixes  sentiment  with  business. 
Either  is  fatal  if  we  desire  to  keep  clear  heads  on  the 
matter.  What  we  have  to  consider  is,  what  policy 
will  give  us  the  best  price  for  our  crops,  and  will 
enable  us  to  buy  the  most  with  the  money  that  we 
get? 

What,  shorn  of  all  verbiage,  are  the  facts  of  the 
fiscal  situation  so  far  as  it  regards  us  out  in  the 
West?  This  much  at  least  is  undeniable:  Our 
staple  agricultural  products  are  things  the  price 
of  which  no  Protection  can  raise.  We  import  no 
wheat,  no  flour,  no  beef,  no  mutton,  no  poultry, 
no  eggs,  no  butter,  no  cheese,  no  com,  no  barley, 
no  oats.  Protection  can  do  nothing  for  us.  Con- 
sequently when  Protection  raises  prices,  it  raises 
the  prices  only  of  those  things  that  we  buy:  the 
timber  for  our  houses  from  Canada;  the  crockery 
and  cutlery  we  put  in  them  from  England;  the 
clothing  that  we  wear  from  Scotland;  the  rails 
upon  which  our  goods  are  transported  to  market — 
everything  almost,  from  the  clothes  in  which  we 
are  swaddled  when  we  are  bom  to  the  lumber 
of  which  our  coffin  is  made,  is  raised  in  price  by 
Id 


242  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Protection.  Nothing  that  we  sell  is  raised  in  price. 
Our  incomes  are  the  same.  The  cost  of  Hving  is 
enormously  increased.  Such  is  the  net  result  of 
Protection  as  it  affects  the  farmer.  From  this 
simple  statement  there  is  in  the  end  no  escape. 
We  have  an  illusory  tariff  on  raisins  which  most 
of  us  don't  grow ;  on  Mexican  cattle  which  it  would 
be  to  our  immense  advantage  to  get  cheap  in  order 
to  fatten  with  our  cheap  hay;  on  wool  for  the 
protection  of  an  industry  which  is  the  enemy  of  the 
man  who  tills  the  soil;  but  for  the  rest  Protection 
cannot  even  pretend  to  do  anything  for  us.  All 
it  can  do  is  to  increase  the  cost  of  everything  we 
buy,  and  so  cut  down  our  incomes  fifteen,  twenty, 
and  thirty  per  cent ;  increase  our  banking  rate  by 
making  the  cost  of  farm  development  greater,  to 
assail  generally  the  farmers'  solvency,  and  impair 
seriously  the  buying  capacity  of  our  best  customers. 
That  such  an  arrangement  suits  the  Eastern 
manufacturer  who  sells  us  our  clothing,  our 
machinery,  and  the  thousand  and  one  things  neces- 
sary for  daily  life  other  than  our  food,  I  fully 
believe.  That  we  should  make  a  certain  sacrifice 
to  develop  American  manufactures,  to  render  our 
industries  diverse,  is  an  arguable  proposition. 
But  that  we  should  do  this,  not  to  a  small  extent 
and  as  a  compromise,  but  to  an  almost  illimitable 
extent,  and  under  the  impression  that  we  are 
getting  rich  in  the  process,  must  be  to  all  who  dis- 
passionately consider  it  a  matter  for  unmeasured 
amazement.     Nothing  seems  to  disturb  our  serene 


Anglophobia  243 

infatuation  with  this  singular  arrangement.  The 
Eastern  manufacturers  get  enormously  wealthy; 
as  company  concerns  they  pay  outrageous  divi- 
dends; their  originators  generally  become  mil- 
lionaires, having  started  as  the  office-cleaner. 
Not  a  few  of  them  exercise  most  illegitimate 
influence  in  legislatiu-es  and  courts,  yet  the  farmer, 
the  lean,  hungry  caricature  of  "Judge,"  dressed 
in  cotton  jeans  and  obliged  to  get  his  flour  on 
credit,  is  asked  to  pay  the  piper :  and  does  so  with 
a  jingo  whoop  about  "sockin'  it  to  the  Britisher," 
and  "giving  the  lion's  tail  a  twist."  The  poorest 
industry  in  this  country  is  taxed,  taxed  to  its  eye 
teeth,  to  feed  the  richest,  and  the  victim  regards 
it  as  a  fair  arrangement,  a  "patriotic"  one.  He 
is  so  satisfied  to  leave  it  all  to  the  Easterner,  that 
he  has  not  even  taken  the  trouble  to  have  his 
interests  properly  represented.  There  is  not  a 
manufacturing  interest  that  is  not  strongly  organ- 
ized politically  with  lobbyists  and  all  the  machin- 
ery of  "representation"  in  Congress.  The  iron 
men,  the  steel  men,  the  tinplate  men,  the  sugar 
men,  the  lumber  men,  the  window-sash  men,  the 
glass-blowing  men,  the  baby-carriage  men,  down 
to  those  desiring  protection  against  the  pauper 
coffins  of  Europe,  are  all  represented  in  the  lobbies, 
and  are  careful  to  have  the  ears  of  chairmen  of 
committees.  The  farmers  alone — the  men  upon 
whose  industry  the  country  has  been  built  up,  its 
backbone  from  the  beginning,  the  men  who  should 
come  first — these  alone  have  no  chairmen  of  com- 


244  America  and  the  New  World-State 

mittees  in  their  pocket.  All  they  can  do  in  the 
way  of  organization  is  an  association  that  excites 
the  hilarity  of  the  smallest  ward  boss.  No,  we 
are  content  to  leave  it  all  to  the  dear,  good 
manufacturers,  who  will  tell  us  what  is  really  the 
"  American  doctrine. " 

But  this  is  a  side  issue.  From  the  original  pro- 
position, namely,  that  Protection  adds  nothing  to 
our  incomes  while  it  increases  the  price  of  every- 
thing we  buy,  there  is  no  getting  away.  The 
Protectionist  does  not  even  pretend  or  attempt 
to  meet  it.  I  have  hstened  to  scores  of  debates, 
public  and  private,  and  never  once  has  this  point 
been  fairly  met.  Always  in  the  end  does  the  Pro- 
tectionist get  away  to  the  "Eiiropean  invasion," 
and  "Europe  getting  rich  at  America's  expense." 
It  suffices  for  him  to  show  that  so  many  thousand 
cotton-weavers  of  Lancashire  have  been  ruined, 
or  that  o\ir  imports  are  decreasing,  to  have  pre- 
sumably gained  his  point,  oblivious  of  the  fact 
that,  however  this  may  benefit  the  manufacturer, 
the  farmer  pays:  he  pays  more  for  his  cotton  but 
gets  no  more  for  his  wheat.  It  is  Hkely  that  he 
will  get  less  since  those  Lancashire  cotton- weavers 
will  perforce  buy  the  less.  Dependent  to  an 
enormous  extent  upon  a  rich  England  for  his 
market,  the  American  farmer  will  be  hugely  pleased 
when  the  Protectionist  shows  him  that  McKinley 
is  ruining  British  industry.  If  the  Free  Trader  be 
persistent,  the  Protectionist  will  silence  him — at 
least  in  public — by  some  insinuation  of  Anglo- 


Anglophobia  245 

mania,  of  being  "no  American,"  of  preferring 
Britain  to  his  own  country,  and  being  told  to 
remember  Bunker  Hill.  From  patriotism  there 
is  no  appeal. 

Yet,  nevertheless,  may  we  ask,  what  have  the 
sins  of  Great  Britain  in  Ireland,  the  objectionable 
accent  or  behaviour  of  the  British  tourist,  the 
fooleries  of  our  Anglomaniacs,  to  do  with  the  price 
of  wheat?  Is  it  quite  serious,  when  we  are  talking 
of  crops  and  prices,  for  one  party  to  the  argument 
to  imitate  the  accent  of  the  "blawsted  Britisher," 
and  to  say  that  you  are  "so  English,  dontcher- 
know"?  Yet  I  have  never  listened  to  a  campaign 
speech  in  which  these  silly  tricks  have  not  been 
introduced.  And  they  always  succeed.  The  good 
farmers  sitting  round  are  for  the  most  part  hugely 
pleased,  accept  it  all  as  a  serious  argument.  I 
have  seen  closely  and  cogently  reasoned  argument 
in  favour  of  Free  Trade  replied  to  by  the  remark, 
"Aw  yaas!  So  English,  yer  know.  Is  it  rainin' 
in  Lunnon?"  and  the  listeners  have  for  the  most 
part  regarded  this  sally  with  huge  satisfaction — 
a  complete  and  full  answer  to  everything  which 
could  be  said  in  favour  of  " British"  Free  Trade. 

In  the  face  of  this  you  tell  me  that  Anglophobia 
is  a  harmless  foible.  I  seriously  maintain  that,  by 
reason  of  it,  the  Western  farmer  has  been  bam- 
boozled for  two  generations.  Whatever  be  the 
merits  of  the  question,  he  has  never  considered 
them.  It  is  sufficient  with  him  that  Free  Trade 
is  the  "British  policy, "  and  in  consequence  wrong. 


246  America  and  the  New  World-State 

The  causeless  animosity  over-rides  all  other  con- 
siderations. And  when  to  this  primitive  tribal 
enmity  is  added  the  windy  bombast  about  this 
"sun-kissed  land,"  and  the  "thousand  happy 
homes"  (all  mortgaged),  the  burlesque  is  complete. 
Burlesque?  I  know  of  nothing  more  pathetic  than 
the  spectacle  of  a  man  burdened  with  toil,  with 
debt,  poorly  fed,  poorly  clad,  his  wife  awearied  with 
the  monotony  of  petty  drudgery,  and  his  children 
anaemic,  enthralled  by  a  political  oratory  which 
ignores  his  debts,  ignores  his  poverty,  his  toil,  and 
is  concerned  only  to  inflame  his  hatred  of  a  people 
ten  thousand  miles  away,  to  tickle  a  bootless  vain- 
glory about  the  wide  "  per-r-airies,  stretching  from 
the  rock-bound  coast  of  Maine  to  the  sunny  shores 
of  the  golden  Pacific."  Ordinarily  I  resent — as  a 
farmer  myself — the  ill-concealed  contempt  of  the 
town  American  for  the  "hayseed,"  the  facile 
caricatures  of  Judge  and  Puck.  But  when  I  wit- 
ness the  spectacle  I  have  just  described,  upon  my 
soul,  I  think  he  deserves  everything  in  that  way 
that  he  gets. 

If  it  be  true,  as  I  honestly  believe  that  it  is  true, 
that  this  hostility  and  vainglory  have  so  influenced 
our  judgment  of  the  right  fiscal  policy  as  to  induce 
a  wrong  decision,  how  immeasurable  has  been  the 
cost  of  this  sentimentalism !  Think  of  all  the  lives 
that  have  been  made  the  harder,  of  the  con- 
stitutions that  have  been  shattered,  of  the  women 
made  prematurely  old,  of  the  houses  that  are 
the  meaner,  of  the  children  that  are  neglected, 


Anglophobia  247 

of  the  homes  that  are  less  easy,  for  the  sake  of  doing 
something  which  will  displease  the  British  or  startle 
Europe.  Was  I  wrong  in  saying  that  we  cannot 
afford  this  miHtarism,  this  blatant  desire  to  impress 
the  foreigner  with  "our  epperlettes  and  feathers"? 
Is  not  this  too  high  a  price  to  pay  for  it  all? 

We  have  seen  how  eloquent  some  of  our  moral 
preceptors — including  some  clergymen — can  be- 
come concerning  the  dangers  of  long-continued 
peace.  Might  not  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  the  rest 
occasionally  vary  these  themes  with  one  concern- 
ing the  danger — the  cost — of  hate?  I  know  that 
certain  of  our  patriots  would,  Hke  the  Chronicle, 
pour  infinite  scorn  upon  introducing  the  "  economic 
principles  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount"  into  a 
political  discussion.  But  there  is,  nevertheless,  an 
economic  side  to  the  moral  law.  If  men  cannot 
violate  it,  save  to  their  cost,  it  is  certain  that 
nations  cannot.  And  when  we  charge  Englishmen 
of  to-day  with  historical  offences  for  which  they 
are  no  more  morally  responsible  than  for  the  crimes 
of  Nero,  or  make  war  on  Spain  for  offences  which 
are  no  concern  of  ours — offences  which,  when 
committed  by  others  than  Spain,  or  by  ourselves, 
leave  us  unmoved — we  do  an  injustice  for  which  we 
shall  sooner  or  later  pay  in  full.  When  we  nurse 
a  desire  to  humiHate  others,  to  parade,  Hke  the 
savage,  o\ir  big  muscles  and  our  big  body,  when 
our  pride  becomes  vainglory,  the  debauch  will  not 
be  indulged  without  penalty.  Unless  all  history 
has  deceived  us,  luiless  the  story  of  a  hundred 


248  America  and  the  New  World-State 

nations  has  been  devised  for  our  deception,  that 
"Destiny,"  so  dear  to  the  patriot's  heart,  shall 
exact  the  full  tale  for  all  our  passion,  our  vainglory 
and  unreasonableness.  And  the  innocent  shall 
pay  with  the  guilty — for  the  guilty  it  may  be — "to 
the  third  and  fourth  generation." 

These  articles  are  not  reprinted  with  any  idea 
of  throwing  doubt  upon  the  sincerity  of  our  present 
desire  for  peace  and  our  condemnation  of  the 
Prussian  doctrine;  but  because  if  we  are  to  help 
rid  the  world  of  that  doctrine  and  set  up  a  world- 
state  based  upon  international  co-operation,  we 
must  first  of  all  set  our  own  house  in  order — clear 
our  own  minds  of  such  misconceptions  and  false 
theories  as  caused  the  aberrations  dealt  with  in 
these  reprinted  papers.  For  it  is  only  thus  that 
we  shall  have  clearly  before  us  a  reasoned  basis 
for  that  World-Society  which  I  believe  it  to  be 
our  destiny  to  take  the  lead  in  creating. 

In  what  way  these  poisonous  ideas  which  have 
led  even  ourselves  astray  in  the  past  and  which 
have  now  plunged  Europe  into  the  present  disas- 
trous struggle,  can  be  destroyed,  so  clearing  the 
way  for  organized  co-operation,  is  the  subject  of 
the  third  part  of  this  book. 


PART  III 
CAN  ARMS  ALONE  DESTROY  PRUSSIANISM? 


349 


CHAPTER  I 

CAN  ARMS  ALONE  DESTROY  PRUSSIANISM  ? 

**A  war  against  war" — What  does  the  annihilation  of  Germany 
mean? — Can  sixty-five  millions  be  killed  off? — The  parti- 
tion of  Germany — How  it  would  Prussianize  Europe — How 
Germany  became  Prussianized — The  reaction  of  a  Prussian- 
ized Europe  upon  America — The  military  indestructibility 
of  modern  peoples — The  mutability  of  alliances — What 
should  follow  the  defeat  of  Germany? — How  Prussianism 
can  be  destroyed — The  real  basis  of  the  society  of  nations — 
The  rdle  of  America  in  organizing  that  society. 

At  the  beginning  of  Part  II  of  this  book  I  have 
given  a  good  deal  of  evidence  to  show  how 
universally  in  Britain  this  war  is  regarded  as  hav- 
ing been  caused  by  the  prevalence  of  a  false 
doctrine,  which  constitutes  a  menace  to  the 
peace  of  the  worid  and  must  be  destroyed  in 
order  to  obtain  security  and  to  be  freed  from  the 
burdens  of  militarism  for  which  that  doctrine  is 
responsible;  and  how  largely  this  idea  is  accepted 
in  America.  It  is  apparent  from  the  evidence  I 
have  quoted  that  in  the  minds  of  an  immense 
number  of  educated  people  this  war  is  justified  by 
the  fact  of  being  a  "war  against  war,"  in  having 
as  its  object  the  destruction  of  the  Prussian  idols 

251 


252  America  and  the  New  World-State 

of  brute  force  and  militarism.  The  Allies  will  go  to 
Beriin,  as  the  London  Times  tells  us,  to  insist  "that 
the  worship  of  war  shall  cease, "  and  in  order  that 
the  Germans  may  once  more  turn  to  Luther  and  to 
Goethe,  and  renounce  Nietzsche,  Treitschke,  and 
Bernhardi.  It  has,  for  the  British,  indeed,  be- 
come almost  the  war  of  pacifists,  while  progressive 
reformers,  idealists,  socialists,  have  in  great  num- 
bers supported  it  on  similar  grounds.  Mr.  Blatch- 
ford,  the  British  Socialist,  sees  in  the  war  a  new 
ally  for  Socialism,  while  his  colleague,  Mr.  Neil 
Lyons,  tells  us  that  it  is  "the  best  fight  for  Social- 
ism that  has  ever  been  waged  anywhere  or  any- 
when. "  Professor  Gilbert  Murray  is  convinced 
that  this  war  will  mark  the  liberalization  of  Russian 
institutions;  for  while  the  defeat  of  the  autocracy 
in  Germany  is  to  liberate  the  German  people,  the 
victory  of  the  autocracy  in  Russia  is  to  liberate 
the  Russian  people,  a  view  which  is  also  shared  by 
Mr.  H.  G.  Wells  and  Mr.  C.  Hagberg  Wright,  who 
both  write  that  "this  war  has  made  Russia  defi- 
nitely liberal  by  linking  her  almost  indissolubly 
with  the  Western  liberal  Powers." 

Such,  then,  is  for  the  moment  the  all  but  uni- 
versal view:  the  military  defeat  of  Germany  will 
of  itself  destroy  the  old  fallacies  and  sophisms,  the 
old  passions  and  ugly  temper  produced  by  the  evil 
doctrines  of  militarism,  the  belief  in  force,  the 
reign  of  bureaucracy.  All  this  will  disappear  from 
Europe,  and  we  shall  have  peace  and  security  for 
some  generations  at  least,  if  the  Allies  do  but 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism      253 

"beat  Germany  to  her  knees."  Indeed,  the 
British  people  have  come  in  their  minds  to  make 
those  evils  synonymous  with  the  German  State: 
destroy  the  German  State,  and  you  have  destroyed 
these  things.  And  this  idea  is  very  widely  reflected 
in  the  expressions  of  American  public  opinion. 
Indeed  Professor  Hale  of  Chicago  University  has 
even  pleaded  that  the  United  States  should  join 
the  Allies  in  the  war  so  that  they  may  help  to 
replace  the  system  of  aggression  by  a  system  of 
international  law. 

Now,  I  want  to  suggest  that  such  a  belief  is  both 
unsound  and  dangerous;  that  its  prevalence  may 
prove  disastrous  to  the  very  results  which  the 
British  people  hope  to  accomplish  by  this  war  and 
which  we  wish  to  see  accomplished;  that,  indeed,  if 
it  is  not  corrected,  it  may  absolutely  defeat  these 
results ;  that  while  it  is  true  that  they  must  secure 
at  any  cost  the  victory  of  the  Allies,  mere  military 
victory  will  not  of  itself  bring  about  that  better 
and  safer  society  which  we  all  hope  for,  and  which 
is  the  justification  of  this  war ;  that  the  attainment 
of  that  object  will  depend  not  alone  upon  the  de- 
feat of  Germany,  but  upon  the  kind  of  peace  and 
settlement  that  follows  such  defeat,  and  the  energy 
with  which  they  insist  upon  the  right  kind  of  recon- 
struction after  the  war,  and  see  that  in  their  own 
policy  and  conduct  they  avoid  the  fallacies  and 
errors  of  their  enemy ;  that  if  they  neglect  this  half 
of  their  task,  the  other  half — the  war  itself,  its 
infinite  suffering  and  sacrifice — will  be  barren,  and 


254  America  and  the  New  World-State 

will  render  still  more  remote  the  achievement  of 
the  splendid  aims  and  aspirations  which  sanctify 
it  in  the  minds  of  the  British  people.  And  since  it 
is  probable  that  American  opinion  will  have  a  great 
influence  upon  the  terms  of  peace,  and  we  shall  cer- 
tainly be  affected,  it  is  essential  also  that  we  should 
get  into  our  own  minds  a  clear  idea  of  what  the 
position  will  be,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
great  aims  for  the  triumph  of  which  we  hope  can 
be  accomplished. 

Let  us,  at  the  risk  of  some  repetition,  get  the 
position  quite  clear.  It  is  essential  to  the  best 
interests  of  Europe  and  mankind  that  the  Allies 
should  win,  and  that  Prussian  military  autocracy 
should  realize  its  helplessness  as  against  its  united 
neighbours.  It  is  quite  certain,  moreover,  that 
the  British  nation  is  going  through  with  this  war, 
and  that  it  is  going  to  win,  at  whatever  cost. 
There  is  not  the  faintest  risk  of  the  nation  wavering 
on  that  point.  But  there  is  a  very  grave  risk  that 
the  other  essential  to  what  it  desires  to  accomplish 
by  the  war  may  be  overlooked ;  and  that  risk  will 
be  greatly  increased  if  this  other  essential  is  over- 
looked by  ourselves  and  is  not  urged  by  us  upon  the 
Allies.  And  it  is  for  that  reason  that  it  is  important 
to  urge  this  fact — that  a  victory  for  the  Allies  will 
not  of  itself  render  the  future  peace  of  Europe 
secure ;  will  not  achieve  any  of  these  things  in  the 
direction  of  destroying  militarism  in  Europe  which 
are  suggested  in  these  very  optimistic  expressions 
of  opinion  I  have  quoted;  that,  unless  victory  is 


How  to  Destroy  Prussian  ism     255 

accompanied  by  political  wisdom  on  their  part, 
the  crushing  of  Germany  may  leave  Europe  in  a 
worse  condition  than  before  the  war,  expose  the 
world  to  its  renewal  at  no  distant  date,  fasten 
the  shackles  of  militarism  more  firmly  than  ever 
upon  the  long-suffering  peoples  of  Europe;  and 
expose  us  to  a  repetition  of  the  losses  and  disloca- 
tion of  financial  and  industrial  life  which  we  are 
now  experiencing. 

If  that  futility  is  to  be  avoided,  the  doggedness 
of  the  British  people  in  this  war  must  be  intelligent 
instead  of  unintelligent;  they  must  fight  not 
blindly,  but  with  a  clear  vision  of  what  we  want; 
they  must  know  what  this  war  is  about,  and  how  its 
objects  will  be  achieved,  and  with  firm  resolution 
not  to  share  the  errors  and  the  faults  of  their 
enemies,  not  to  be  led  away  from  the  high  aims 
with  which  it  started,  into  the  low  aims  of  even  an 
excusable  vengeance,  with  a  determination  not  to 
"lose  their  tempers  and  call  it  patriotism";  and 
we  on  our  side  must  be  at  least  equally  clear,  in 
our  perception  of  these  ends  and  the  manner  of 
achieving  them. 

It  is  probable  that  few  things  have  been  so  fruit- 
ful in  the  creation  of  political  error  and  false  ideas 
as  words  or  phrases  or  illustrations  which,  used  in 
the  first  instance  because  they  are  picturesque  or 
rhetorical,  but  not  even  pretending  to  be  an  exact 
statement  of  facts,  are  in  the  end  taken  as  meaning 
exactly  what  they  say  or  represent.  Economists 
like  Professor  Cannan  have  shown  us,  for  instance, 


256  America  and  the  New  World-State 

how  the  employment  of  military  terms  with 
reference  to  international  trade,  and  other  econo- 
mists how  the  habit  of  talking  of  "France"  or  the 
*'  United  States"  as  doing  so  much  trade,  as  though 
they  were  commercial  corporations  actually  carry- 
ing on  business  (oblivious  of  the  fact  that  France 
and  America  as  nations  or  governments  do  no 
international  trade  at  all),  has  given  rise  to  essen- 
tially false  ideas  in  economics.  In  the  same  way 
political  writers  have  shown  that  to  talk  of  nations 
"owning"  a  territory  has  given  rise  to  other  false 
ideas.  So  in  the  present  juncture  British  journal- 
ists talk  picturesquely  of  "beating  Germany  to  her 
knees"  and  "annihilating"  her,  of  "wiping  her 
from  the  map,"  of  "smashing  her."  What 
precisely  do  these  resounding  phrases  mean? 
What,  for  instance,  does  the  "destruction"  of 
Germany  mean?  "Germany"  comprises  sixty- 
five  millions  of  people.  Is  it  proposed  to  slit  all 
their  throats?  Will  the  Allies  have  "destroyed" 
them  because  they  have  beaten  their  armies? 
Suppose  that  the  Allies  kill  or  permanently  disable 
in  this  war  a  million  German  soldiers  (which  will  be 
a  very  large  proportion),  there  will  still  remain  to 
this  population  of  sixty-five  millions  some  five 
millions  of  fighting  men.  They  cannot  be  "de- 
stroyed"; they  cannot  be  massacred ;  they  cannot 
be  distributed  as  prisoners  of  war  among  the 
Allies  to  be  maintained  as  a  permanent  charge; 
they  cannot  even  be  expelled  from  Germany. 
It    has    been    definitely    suggested    in    several 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     257 

quarters  that  while,  of  course,  the  Allies  cannot 
annihilate  Germany  in  the  sense  of  destroying  her 
population  or  even  the  men  who  have  fought  in 
her  army,  they  can  break  up  the  German  Empire 
by  partitioning  it  as  Poland  was  partitioned  in  the 
past.  It  is  suggested  that  France  and  Belgium 
are  between  them  to  have  all  Germany  up  the 
Rhine,  Schleswig-Holstein  is  to  be  given  back  to 
the  Danes,  Russia  is  to  have  other  Baltic  provinces 
and  East  Prussia,  Switzerland  is  to  be  enlarged, 
and  so  forth. 

Even  though  such  a  policy  is  not  very  much 
supported  in  Britain,  it  may  conceivably  be  pushed 
by  one  or  more  of  the  Continental  Allies,  and  it  is 
important,  therefore,  to  see  what  it  involves,  to 
examine  the  sort  of  Europe  such  a  settlement  would 
produce — whether  it  would  be  that  liberalized  one 
freed  from  the  doctrine  of  orce,  which  the  author- 
ities I  have  quoted  foretell.  First,  there  would, 
of  course,  be,  as  the  result  of  this  "partitioning" 
of  Germany  d  la  Pologne,  not  one  Government 
holding  down  conquered  prov'nces,  but  four  or  five. 
Now,  a  Government  that  is  holding  down  unwill- 
ing provinces  cannot  be  a  democratic  Government. 
It  will  have  within  its  borders  two  degrees  of  re- 
presentative government,  two  degrees  of  freedom, 
two  degrees  of  democracy,  for  the  reason  that  it 
will  not  be  able  to  grant  to  a  hostile,  resentful, 
and  conquered  people  the  same  freedom  to  express 
its  wishes  through  its  votes,  or  even  through  the 
medium  of  the  press,  that  it  grants  to  its  own 
17 


258  America  and  the  New  World-State 

people,  properly  speaking.  Very  many  speak  of 
this  war  as  giving  the  prospect  of  liberalizing  Rus- 
sia, as  enabling  the  Western  Allies  to  induce 
Russia  to  accept  some  of  the  parliamentary  prin- 
ciples for  which  they  stand;  but  if  Russia  annexes 
German  provinces,  it  is  quite  certain  that  she  will 
not  give  them  freedom  to  express  their  views  either 
through  representative  institutions  or  the  ordinary 
machinery  of  a  free  people — popular  meeting  and 
demonstration,  a  free  press,  and  so  forth.  Because 
naturally  a  conquered  province  would  at  once  use 
this  freedom  for  the  purpose  of  an  agitation  in 
favour  of  separation  or  autonomy,  and  this,  of 
course,  the  conquering  Government  could  not 
tolerate.  Provinces  which  are  in  this  way  con- 
quered by  the  sword  would  have  to  be  held  by  the 
sword.  The  very  fact  of  having  within  her  borders 
a  hostile  element  would  compel  the  victorious  con- 
quering country  to  remain  military  in  its  make-up, 
and  maintain  the  machinery  of  political  repression. 
And  in  a  lesser  degree  the  same  sort  of  thing  would 
be  taking  place  in  France.  If  the  France  of  the 
future  were  to  include,  as  has  been  suggested,  all 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  certain  of  those  pro- 
vinces, German  since  the  earliest  dawn  of  history, 
would  not  readily  accept  the  sway  of  their  heredi- 
tary enemies.  They,  too,  would  have  to  beheld 
by  the  sword,  and  to  do  that  the  victor  must  retain 
the  sword.  France,  too,  would  have  to  set  up 
the  ugly  machinery  of  repression;  she  could  not 
tolerate  separatist  agitation  in  her  new  conquests. 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     259 

There  would  be  laws  against  meetings,  laws  possibly 
against  the  use  of  German  speech,  and  in  France 
there  would  be  two  orders  of  citizens.^  From 
being  a  homogeneous  people  living  under  the  same 
law  for  all,  France  would  become  like  Russia,  and, 
like  the  pathetic  empire  of  Austria  which  has  gone 

'  And,  of  course,  such  efforts  at  repression  would  fail.  The  fact 
that  it  is  no  longer  possible  as  the  result  of  military  victory  to 
dispossess  a  people  of  its  material  possessions  makes  it  more  and 
more  difficult  to  push  home  military  force  with  the  old  ruthless- 
ness  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  an  alien  language  or  law.  British 
experience  in  the  attempt  at  Anglicizing  provinces  like  Quebec 
or  Ireland,  German  experience  with  the  Alsatians,  Russian  with 
the  Finns,  show  that  where  economic  considerations  render  it 
necessary  to  leave  a  people  in  possession  of  their  means  of  live- 
lihood, military  force  is  as  a  matter  of  simple  fact  reduced  to 
futility  in  these  matters.  I  have  summarized  the  matter  in  the 
synopsis  of  The  Great  Illusion  as  follows:  "The  forces  which  have 
brought  about  the  economic  futility  of  military  power  have  also 
rendered  it  futile  as  a  means  of  enforcing  a  nation's  moral  ideals 
or  imposing  its  social  institutions  upon  a  conquered  people. 
Germany  could  not  turn  Canada  or  Australia  into  a  German 
colony — i.e.,  stamp  out  their  language,  law,  literature,  traditions, 
etc. — by  'capturing'  them.  The  necessary  security  in  their 
material  possessions  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants  of  such  conquered 
provinces,  quick  intercommunication  by  a  cheap  press,  widely- 
read  literature,  enable  even  small  communities  to  become  articu- 
late and  effectively  defend  their  special  social  or  moral  possessions, 
even  when  military  conquest  has  been  complete.  The  fight  for 
ideals  can  no  longer  take  the  form  of  fight  between  nations, 
because  the  lines  of  division  on  moral  questions  are  within  the 
nations  themselves  and  intersect  the  political  frontiers.  There  is 
no  modern  State  which  is  completely  Catholic  or  Protestant,  or 
liberal  or  autocratic,  or  aristocratic  or  democratic,  or  socialist 
or  individualist;  the  moral  and  spiritual  struggles  of  the  modem 
world  go  on  as  between  citizens  of  the  same  State  in  unconscious 
intellectual  co-operation  with  corresponding  groups  in  other  States 
not  as  between  the  public  powers  of  rival  States." 


26o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

to  pieces,  an  artificial  creation  possessing  different 
races,  different  languages,  different  laws,  one  group 
dominating,  another  subservient;  she  also  would 
be  maintaining  a  system  based  not-  upon  consent, 
but  upon  her  ability  to  compel  unwilling  popula- 
tions to  submit  to  her  rule,  so  that  the  net  outcome 
of  this  war,  to  destroy  militarism  and  Prussianism, 
would  be  to  render  liberal  France  more  militarized 
than  ever,  to  turn  France  into  a  kind  of  Prussia, 
and  to  Prussianize  still  further  the  great  military 
empire  of  Russia. 

Such,  then,  would  be  the  outcome  of  a  war  en- 
tered upon  for  the  liberalization  of  Europe;  the 
vindication  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  the 
ending  of  the  rule  of  the  sword,  the  destruction  of 
the  philosophy  of  conquest,  and  of  the  holding 
down  of  people  by  sheer  might ;  for  the  ending  of 
military  castes,  of  government  based  on  brute  force 
and  armament.  Having  entered  upon  this  war  as 
a  crusade  to  end  those  things,  the  Allies  finish  it  by 
breaking  up  a  great  nationality,  by  handing  over 
provinces  without  their  consent  to  alien  rulers 
whom  they  detest,  and — as  a  necessary  and  inevit- 
able consequence — create  several  military  auto- 
cracies, so  as  to  enable  the  conquering  Allies  to 
hold  their  conquered  provinces  in  subjugation. 
We  should  have  in  Europe  not  one  Alsace-Lorraine 
— which  has  been  sufficient  of  itself  to  keep  alive 
during  nearly  half  a  century  resentment  and  bitter- 
ness which  have  been  a  large  factor,  perhaps  the 
dominating  one,  in  creating  the  present  catas- 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     261 

trophe — but  several.  Yet  Alsace  was,  after  all, 
a  German-speaking  province,  bound  by  a  thousand 
years  of  history  to  the  German  group,  its  union  to 
France  having  been  itself  an  act  of  conquest  two 
centuries  since.  If  annexation  to  the  German 
Empire  even  under  those  conditions  was  an  act  of 
ruthless  tyranny  and  oppression,  as  we  believe  it 
to  have  been,  what  shall  be  said  of  the  transfer  of 
German-speaking  provinces  to  a  Muscovite  Empire, 
of  the  transfer  of  great  free  cities  and  ancient 
republics  to  the  domination  of  the  Russian  bureau- 
cracy, the  Czar  and  the  Grand-Dukes? 

Is  this  to  be  the  end  of  the  "War  of  Liberation  "  ? 
Is  the  Holy  War  against  the  Devil's  Doctrine  of 
Prussianism  to  end  by  the  Allies  actually  com- 
mitting the  very  crime  which  they  accuse  Germany 
of  desiring  to  commit:  of  forcing  their  rule  and 
civilization  upon  unwilling  neighbours?  Are  they 
going  to  end  this  war  by  themselves  becominig  con- 
verted to  the  Prussian  doctrine?  And  is  this  an 
end  which  will  be  viewed  with  satisfaction  by  the 
great  democratic  community  of  the  United  States? 

When  they  actually  tackle  the  problem,  I  do  not 
suppose  that  the  Western  Governments  would 
tolerate  for  a  moment  the  transfer  of  a  genuinely 
German  province  to  Russian  rule.  Not  only, 
however,  is  such  an  outcome  of  the  war  airily  dis- 
cussed in  Britain  itself,  but  there  is  a  very  real 
danger  that  the  British  may  be  dragged  by  their 
Allies — and  their  Allies  include,  of  course,  Russia, 
Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Japan — into  a  settlement 


262  America  and  the  New  World-State 

upon  principles  in  which  they  as  a  free  and  demo- 
cratic people  do  not  beheve  and  which  to  us  would 
be  still  more  repellent.  That  this  danger  is  not 
chimerical  is  proved  by  a  sign  or  two  which  have 
already  been  given,  of  the  sort  of  settlement  which 
Russia,  for  instance,  desires.  The  Novoe  Vremya, 
a  Russian  paper  which  is  pretty  freely  used  by  the 
Russian  Government  as  a  vehicle  of  official  com- 
munications, has  already  shown  very  considerable 
irritation  at  what  it  supposes  to  be  Great  Britain's 
reticence  in  preparing  for  the  partitioning  of  the 
German  Empire.  The  military  critic  of  the 
London  Times,  who  will  not  be  accused  of  undue 
democratic  prejudice,  comments  on  this  as  follows: 

The  Novoe  Vremya  took  our  statesmen  to  task  the 
other  day  for  aiming  only  at  the  capture  or  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  German  Navy  and  the  humbling  of  German 
militarism.  We  ought,  it  seems,  to  aim  higher — • 
namely,  at  the  crushing  of  Germany  for  good  and  all. 
In  a  great  war  between  Allies,  the  criticism  of  one 
friendly  Power  by  another  is  best  suspended,  for  if 
we  begin  telling  each  other  what  we  ought  to  do  we 
shall  not  be  so  well  prepared  to  pull  together.  We 
are  all  doing  our  best,  fighting  our  own  comers,  and 
none  of  us  wants  to  be  told  his  business.  If  the  Novoe 
Vremya  will  look  into  the  matter,  it  will  observe  that 
to  crush  German  militarism,  and  to  make  an  end  of 
the  system  which  has  burdened  and  oppressed  Europe 
for  so  long,  will  give  us  all  that  we  can  legitimately 
desire.  To  crush  the  Germans  as  a  whole,  we  must 
either  kill  them  all  or  occupy  their  countries  per- 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     263 

manently,  and  we  do  not  want  to  substitute  one 
tyranny  for  another.  Nor,  we  can  be  sure,  does 
Russia.  We  have  to  draw  the  teeth  of  this  Prussian 
monster,  to  humble  a  military  caste,  and  to  leave 
Prussia  herself  at  the  peace  with  the  constitution 
which  she  has  so  long  sought  in  vain.  In  these  reason- 
able aims  we  shall  sooner  or  later  have  large  sections 
of  the  German  people  with  us,  and  our  ends  can  then 
be  more  quickly  attained.  But  to  kill  or  everlastingly 
to  police  a  nation  of  sixty  millions  of  people  is  an 
extravagant  proposition,  and  in  war  one  must  aim 
at  what  is  attainable,  and  not  the  reverse.  This  is  a 
military  as  well  as  a  political  question.  We  must  not 
impose  upon  strategy  an  impossible  task,  for  if  we 
do  we  may  be  unable  to  achieve  aims  which  are  both 
practicable  and  desirable.* 

One  may  reply,  of  course,  that  the  Russians 
and  the  French  are  not  like  the  Germans,  that  it  is 
not  in  their  nature  to  show  the  ruthlessness,  the 
brutality,  and  the  stupidity,  that  the  Prussians 
have  shown,  and  that  they  represent  a  different 
moral  force  to  the  Germans.  But,  as  I  have 
shown  in  a  preceding  chapter,  the  most  obvious 
facts  of  the  case  cannot  ascribe  the  crimes  of  the 
Germans  to  their  race.  For  a  very  long  time  they 
stood,  as  a  whole,  as  the  least  aggressive  people  in 
Europe — idealistic,  so  little  nationalist  or  military 
that  Goethe  could  not  bring  himself  to  be  dis- 
turbed even  by  the  Napoleonic  invasion  of  his 
country. 

'  London  Times,  September  24,  1914. 


264  America  and  the  New  World-State 

There  was  a  Germany  that  for  centuries  in 
Europe  meant,  as  even  British  newspapers  in  war- 
time admit, 

cradle-songs  and  fairy-stories,  and  Christmas  in  old 
moonlit  towns,  and  a  queer  simple  tenderness  always 
childish  and  musical;  with  philosophers  who  could 
forget  the  world  in  thought  like  children  at  play,  and 
musicians  who  could  laugh  suddenly  like  children 
through  all  their  profundities  of  sound.  The  Germans 
of  the  past  were  always  children  even  when  they  were 
old  and  fat  and  learned;  and  the  world  loved,  while  it 
laughed  at,  the  contrast  between  their  power  and  their 
childishness.  All  other  nations  had  some  wickedness 
in  them,  but  they  kept  a  kind  of  innocence  that  made 
them  the  musicians  of  the  world.  ^ 

Such  was  the  old  Germany;  it  is  not  the  Ger- 
many of.  to-day,  but  that  Germany  was  of  the 
same  race,  of  the  same  blood,  as  the  evil  Germany 
that  we  now  know.  And  this  revolution,  this 
transformation,  which  has  turned  a  great  country 
from  something  beautiful  into  something  ugly, 
from  something  good  into  something  evil,  is  the 
work  of  an  idea,  of  a  false  doctrine,  and  the  effect 
of  the  institutions  which  have  been  the  outgrowth 
of  that  false  doctrine. 

Those  institutions  are  the  legacy  of  victory. 
The  old  Germany  was  a  Germany  of  small  self- 
governing  States,  of  small  political  power.  The 
new  Germany  is  a  "great"  Germany,  with  a  new 

'  London  Times,  Literary  Supplement,  October  8,  1914. 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     265 

ideal  and  spirit  which  comes  of  victory  and  miH- 
tary  and  poHtical  power,  of  the  reshaping  of 
poHtical  and  social  institutions  which  the  retention 
of  conquered  territory  demands :  its  militarization, 
regimentation,  centralization,  and  unchallenged 
authority;  the  cultivation  of  the  spirit  of  domin- 
ation, the  desire  to  justify  and  to  frame  a  philo- 
sophy to  buttress  it.  Someone  has  spoken  of  the 
war  which  made  "Germany  great  and  Germans 
small." 

But  why,  when  people  talk  of  partitioning  Ger- 
many among  the  conquering  Allies,  should  they 
expect  the  causes  which  have  worked  such  havoc 
with  this  people  should  work  differently  in  the 
case  of  other  European  States?  Have  the  races 
that  inhabit  them — remoter  from  the  Anglo-Saxons 
than  the  German  —  some  fundamental  moral 
quality  not  possessed  by  the  Teutonic  or  Anglo- 
Saxon  stock,  which  will  enable  them  to  resist  those 
evils  which  flow  from  the  fatal  glamour  of  political 
greatness  and  military  conquest?  Why  should  we 
suppose  that  these  causes,  which  have  worked  so 
disastrously  in  the  case  of  older  Germany,  should 
have  any  very  different  effect  in  the  case  of  a 
triumphant  and  conquest-holding  Russia  and 
France?  And  if  that  happened,  Prussianism  and 
its  philosophy  would  not  have  been  destroyed; 
it  would  merely  have  been  transferred  from  one 
capital  to  another  or  to  others.  Do  British  writers 
desire,  when  they  talk  airily  of  giving  France  all 
Germany  up  to  the  Rhine,  to  revive  the  French 


266  America  and  the  New  World-State 

spirit  which  marked  the  France  of  Louis  XIV, 
which  for  nearly  two  hundred  years  kept  Britain 
in  constant  fear,  and  involved  a  long  and  bitter 
struggle  worse,  even,  than  that  which  is  now  being 
waged  against  Germany?  Do  they  wish  to  revive 
once  more  that  spectre  which  was  laid  but  yester- 
day— the  possible  menace  of  a  Russia,  at  present 
rudimentary  and  but  partially  civilized,  but  grow- 
ing vastly  in  area  and  in  numbers,  to  their  position 
both  in  Asia  and  in  Europe?  If  the  most  elemen- 
tary wisdom  guides  British  statesmanship,  there 
will  be  no  "partitioning "  of  Germany  d>  a  Pologne. 

Nor  is  this  a  question  which  concerns  merely 
the  nations  of  Europe.  As  I  have  shown  in 
Part  I  of  this  book,  our  connection  with  Europe, 
economic,  political,  and  intellectual  has  become  so 
close  that  a  highly  militarized  Europe  cannot  but 
react  upon  America.  The  effects  of  such  a  policy 
as  that  which  I  have  indicated  would  be  not 
merely  to  prolong  in  Europe  the  period  of  unrest 
and  of  armament  competition;  it  would  involve 
dear  money  and  restricted  markets  for  our  indus- 
tries. And  it  would  almost  certainly  lead  to  an 
agitation  on  the  part  of  the  big  armament  people 
among  ourselves  which  would  draw  us  too  into  the 
vortex  of  militarism  and  injure  almost  irreparably 
the  development  of  our  own  social  and  economic 
life. 

Suggestions  which  have  a  much  greater  air  of 
feasibility  are  that  after  the  transfer  o  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France,  or  the  creation  in  these  pro- 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     267 

vinces  of  an  autonomous  State  like  Luxemburg, 
and  the  retrocession  of  Schleswig-Holstein  to 
Denmark,  the  incorporation  of  German  Poland 
in  the  reconstituted  Polish  kingdom,  the  neutral- 
ization or  internationalization  of  the  Kiel  Canal, 
the  transfer  of  all  the  German  colonies  to  Britain, 
and  the  destruction  of  her  fleet,  the  German 
Empire  would  then  be  so  weakened  that  she  could 
not,  for  many  generations  at  least,  especially  in 
view  of  the  dismemberment  of  her  ally  Austria, 
threaten  again  the  peace  of  Europe.  Or  if  that 
should  not  suffice,  the  dethronement  of  the  Kaiser 
and  some  possible  bargain  with  the  Southern 
German  States  would  resolve  the  existing  German 
Empire  into  a  "geographical  expression,"  which 
it  was  until  half  a  century  ago. 

Now,  there  is  much  in  this  programme  that  is 
feasible  and  desirable,  if  it  were  accompanied  by 
some  guarantee  of  real  autonomy  in  the  case  of  a 
reconstituted  Poland,  and  the  whole  arrangement 
supplemented  by  the  formation  of  a  European 
League  or  Federation  or  Council  of  Nations,  or 
better  still,  a  World  Federation  in  which  America 
should  take  her  rightful  place ;  and  into  which  the 
German  States  should  come  on  equal  terms  with 
the  other  European  States,  so  that  Germans  would 
have  some  guarantee  that  the  preponderant  mili- 
tary power  of  their  rivals  would  not  be  used  in 
attempts  to  destroy  their  nationality,  or  to  place 
them  in  a  position  in  which  their  commerce  and 
industry  would  be  carried  on  with  a  handicap,  and 


268  America  and  the  New  World-State 

their  work  of  national  organization  checked  and 
hampered  by  foreign  influences  and  jealousies. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  miHtary  and  poUtical  power 
is  used,  for  instance,  to  reduce  their  armament, 
while  that  of  Russia,  say,  or  of  France,  is  allowed  to 
grow  unchecked;  if  Germany  is  placed  under  the 
tutelage  of  a  Power  like  Russia,  which  she  regards 
as  non-European,  or  of  France,  her  historic  enemy, 
such  use  of  force  will  be  resisted,  and,  if  history 
teaches  any  lessons  at  all,  successfully  resisted. 
If,  indeed,  the  settlement  is  imposed  on  her  from 
without,  instead  of  being  arranged  with  her  co- 
operation and  consent,  it  will  not  endure,  and  none 
of  those  results  in  the  direction  of  a  better,  more 
stable  and  secure,  less  military  and  force-worship- 
ping Europe  which  were  to  flow  from  German  de- 
feat can  for  a  moment  be  expected  to  result  from 
it.  And  I  have  shown  that  for  us  the  defeat  of 
these  aspirations  would  have  a  very  real  and 
very  serious  significance.  We  cannot  afford,  on 
the  ground  of  our  own  most  vital  interests,  to  see 
them  defeated. 

I  want  to  suggest  that  this  failure  of  our  expecta- 
tions is  certain  if  the  Allies,  like  the  Prussians 
before  them,  base  their  settlement  upon  sheer 
military  might,  disregarding  the  consent  or  desires 
or  co-operation  of  the  Germans,  in  view  of  the  well- 
demonstrated  fact  that  the  sheer  military  sub- 
servience in  those  conditions  of  a  people  like  the 
Germans  can  only  be  temporary,  because  (a)  of 
the  recuperative  capacity  shown  by  such  conquered 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism      269 

States  in  the  past,  and  (b)  of  the  extreme  muta- 
bility of  alliances — it  being  a  possibly  temporary 
alliance  which  gives  the  preponderance  of  power 
against  them. 

The  merely  temporary  effect  upon  a  virile  people 
of  the  destruction  of  their  armies  and  political 
machinery,  the  artificial  and  unreal  character  of 
the  apparent  "  wiping  off  the  map"  that  follows, 
has  been  dramatically  demonstrated  in  the  case  of 
Germany  within  the  memory  of  the  fathers  of  men 
still  living.  In  the  first  few  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century  Prussia  was  annihilated  as  a  military  force. 
The  army  was  destroyed  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt, 
and  the  whole  country  was  overrun  by  the  French. 
By  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  Prussia  was  deprived  of  all 
territory  west  of  the  Elbe  and  all  her  Polish 
provinces,  of  the  southern  part  of  West  Prussia,  of 
Dantzig,  thus  losing  nearly  half  her  population  and 
area;  the  French  army  remained  in  occupation  un- 
til heavy  contributions  demanded  by  France  were 
paid  and  by  the  subsequent  treaty  the  Prussian 
army  was  limited  to  not  more  than  42,000  men, 
and  she  was  forbidden  to  create  a  militia.  She  was 
broken,  apparently,  so  completely  that  even  some 
five  years  later  she  was  compelled  to  furnish,  at 
Napoleon's  command,  a  contingent  for  the  invasion 
of  Russia.  The  German  States  were  weakened 
and  divided  by  all  the  statecraft  that  Napoleon 
could  employ.  He  played  upon  their  mutual 
jealousies,  brought  some  of  them  into  alliance  with 
himself,   created   a  buffer  State   of  Westphalia, 


270  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Frenchified  many  of  the  German  Courts,  endowed 
them  with  the  Code  Napoleon.  Germany  seemed 
so  shattered  that  she  was  not  even  a  ' '  geographical 
expression."  It  seemed,  indeed,  as  though  the 
very  soul  of  the  people  had  been  crushed,  and  that 
the  moral  resistance  to  the  invader  had  been 
stamped  out,  for,  as  one  writer  has  said,  it  was  the 
peculiar  feature  of  the  Germany  which  Napoleon 
overran,  that  her  greatest  men  were  either  indiffer- 
ent, like  Goethe,  or  else  gave  a  certain  welcome 
to  the  ideas  which  the  French  invaders  represented. 
Yet  with  this  unpromising  material  the  workmen 
of  the  German  national  renaissance  laboured  to 
such  good  purpose  that  within  a  little  more  than 
five  years  of  the  humiliation  of  the  Peace  of  Tilsit, 
the  last  French  army  in  Germany  had  been  de- 
stroyed, and  it  was  thanks  to  the  very  condition 
imposed  by  Napoleon,  with  the  object  of  limiting 
her  forces,  that  Prussia  was  able  finally  to  take 
the  major  part  in  the  destruction  of  the  Napo- 
leonic, and  in  the  restoration  of  the  German, 
Empire.'  It  was  from  the  crushing  of  Prussia 
after   Jena   that   dates   the   revival   of   German 

'  By  the  convention  which  followed  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  the 
Prussian  army  was  limited  to  42,000  men.  Schamhorst  kept  to 
the  terms  of  this  convention,  and  at  no  time  was  the  army  more 
than  42,000  men;  but  he  saw  to  it  that  each  year  or  two  they 
were  a  different  42,000,  so  that  when  Prussia's  opportunity  came, 
after  the  failure  of  Napoleon's  Russian  campaign,  she  was  able 
to  call  up  a  quarter  of  a  million  trained  men,  and  became  by 
her  energy  and  power  the  most  formidable  of  the  Continental 
members  of  the  alliance  which  broke  Napoleon. 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     271 

national  consciousness  and  the  desire  for  German 
unity. 

Now  take  the  case  of  France  in  1870.  The 
German  armies,  drawn  from  States  which  within 
the  memory  of  men  then  Hving  had  been  mere 
appanages  of  Napoleon,  which  as  a  matter  of  fact 
had  furnished  some  of  the  soldiers  of  his  armies, 
had  crushed  the  armies  of  Louis  Napoleon.  Not 
merely  was  France  prostrated,  her  territory  in  the 
occupation  of  German  soldiers,  the  French  Empire 
overthrown  and  replaced  by  an  unstable  republic, 
but  frightful  civil  conflicts  like  the  Commune  had 
divided  France  against  herself.  So  distraught, 
indeed,  was  she  that  Bismarck  had  almost  to 
create. a  French  Government  with  which  to  treat 
at  all.  What  was  at  the  time  an  immense  indem- 
nity had  been  imposed  upon  her,  and  it  was  gen- 
erally believed  that  not  for  generations  could  she 
become  a  considerable  military  or  political  factor 
in  Europe  again.  Her  increase  of  population 
was  feeble,  tending  to  stagnation ;  her  political  in- 
stitutions were  unstable ;  she  was  torn  by  internal 
dissensions;  and  yet,  as  we  know,  within  five 
years  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  France  had  already 
sufficiently  recuperated  to  become  a  cause  of 
anxiety  to  Bismarck,  who  believed  that  the  work 
of  "destruction"  would  have  to  be  begun  all  over 
again.  And  if  one  goes  back  to  earlier  centuries, 
to  the  France  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  her  recovery  after 
her  defeat  in  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession, 
to  the  incredible  exhaustion  of  Prussia  in  wars  like 


272  America  and  the  New  World-State 

the  Thirty  Years'  War,  when  her  population  was 
cut  in  half,  or  the  Seven  Years'  War,  it  is  the  same 
story:  a  virile  people  cannot  be  "wiped  from  the 
map."  Their  ideals,  good  or  bad,  cannot  be 
destroyed  by  armies. 

There  are,  moreover,  one  or  two  additional 
factors  to  be  kept  in  mind.  The  marvellous 
renaissance  of  France  after  1871  has  become  a  com- 
monplace ;  and  yet  this  France,  which  is  once  more 
challenging  her  old  enemy,  is  a  France  of  stationary 
population,  not  having,  because  not  needing,  the 
technical  industrial  capacity  which  marks  certain 
other  peoples,  like  ourselves  and  the  Germans. 
The  German  population  is  not  stationary;  it 
is  increasing  at  the  rate  of  very  nearly  a  million  a 
year;  and  if  the  result  of  this  war  is  to  attenuate 
something  of  the  luxury  and  materialism  which 
has  marked  modern  Germany,  that  rate  of  popula- 
tion increase,  will  not  diminish,  but  rather  be 
accelerated,  for  it  is  the  people  of  simple  life  that 
are  the  people  of  large  families.  It  is  altogether 
likely  that  the  highly  artificial  Austrian  Empire 
(itself  the  work  of  the  sword,  not  the  product  of 
natural  growth),  embracing  so  many  different  races 
and  nationalities,  will  be  politically  rearranged. 
The  result  of  that  will  be  to  give  to  German  Austria 
an  identity  of  aim  and  aspiration  with  the  other 
German  States,  so  that,  however  the  frontiers  may 
be  rectified  and  whatever  shuffling  may  take  place, 
this  solid  fact  will  remain,  that  there  will  be  in 
Central  Europe  seventy-five  or  eighty  millions 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     273 

speaking  German,  and  nursing,  if  their  nationality 
is  temporarily  overpowered,  the  dream  of  reviving 
it  when  the  opportunity  shall  occur. 

And  there  is  one  more  fact:  as  I  have  already 
hinted,  the  elements  which  distinguish  one  people 
from  another  both  in  its  good  and  bad  qualities 
are  the  things  of  the  mind.  Someone  has  asked, 
"What  is  it  that  makes  the  difference  between  the 
kind  of  society  that  existed  in  the  State  of  Illinois 
five  hundred  years  ago,  and  the  kind  of  society 
that  exists  there  to-day?"  The  Red  Indian  had 
the  same  soil  and  air  and  water,  the  same  bodily 
vigour  as,  or  better  bodily  vigoiir  than,  that  pos- 
sessed by  us  to-day;  aU  the  raw  materials  of  a 
complex  civilization  were  there  as  much  five  hund- 
red years  ago  as  now.  The  one  thing  which 
marks  the  difference  between  the  modern  American 
and  the  Red  Indian  is  just  the  difference  of  know- 
ledge and  ideas,  the  accumulated  experience  and 
the  secret  of  the  management  of  matter.  Given 
that,  given  this  knowledge  of  the  manipulation  of 
the  raw  materials  of  Nature,  and  a  completely  new 
society  is  readily  created.  You  may  go  into 
American  cities,  of  which  fifteen  years  ago  not 
one  stone  stood  upon  another,  but  which  have  all 
the  machinery  of  civilization — the  factories,  the 
railroads,  the  tram-lines,  telephones,  telegraphs, 
newspapers,  electric  light,  schools,  warmed  houses 
— ^that  one  can  find  in  New  York  or  in  Paris.  It 
is  merely  accumulated  knowledge  which  enables 
all  these  things  to  be  created  in  a  desert  within  a 
18 


274  America  and  the  New  World-State 

decade.  Now,  that  fact  means  this,  that  given 
this  accumulated  knowledge  and  this  technical 
capacity,  the  recuperation  of  a  people  from  the 
destruction  of  war  will  be  much  more  rapid  in  our 
day  than  it  has  been  in  the  past.  And  that  tech- 
nical capacity,  that  special  knowledge,  the  Ger- 
mans possess  to  a  very  high  degree;  they  have, 
indeed,  been  called  the  Americans  of  Europe.  If 
we  can  imagine  the  machinery  of  civilization 
destroyed,  their  factories  pulled  down,  and  the 
railroads  torn  up  (things  which  will  not  happen 
to  any  very  great  degree),  even  so,  within  a  very 
few  years  it  would  all  be  restored  once  more,  and 
we  should  have  to  reckon  with  this  fact  of  seventy- 
five  million  Germans  manufacturing,  trading, 
teaching,  organizing,  scheming  as  before. 

I  come  to  the  other  group  of  factors  which  I 
have  enumerated  above,  showing  the  impossibility 
permanently  of  suppressing  by  sheer  force  of  arms 
a  national  ambition,  good  or  bad,  and  that  is  the 
mutability  of  the  alliances  by  which  alone  such  a 
result  can  be  achieved. 

In  the  Balkan  War  we  had  manifested  two 
extraordinary  political  phenomena  that  are  par- 
ticularly suggestive  in  this  connection.  The  first 
Balkan  War  was  won  by  a  group  of  separate  States, 
not  linked  by  any  public  formal  political  bond, 
but  thrown  together  by  one  common  fear,  resent- 
ment, or  ambition:  the  desire  to  wrest  members 
of  their  race  from  Turkish  tyranny.  When  the 
Balkan    League   started   upon   the   war   against 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     275 

Turkey,  everyone  prophesied  that  their  jealousies 
and  the  difficulty  of  miHtary  co-operation  would 
throw  the  advantage  on  the  side  of  Turkey. 
Events  falsified  this  prophecy.  The  Balkan  League 
astonished  the  world  by  its  successes  against  the 
very  highly  militarized  power  of  Turkey.  But 
immediately  the  war  was  over  and  this  military 
success  achieved,  dissensions  arose  among  the 
allies  over  the  division  of  the  spoils;  and  the  first 
Balkan  War  was  succeeded  by  a  second  Balkan 
War,  in  which  the  members  of  the  Balkan  League 
fought  against  one  another,  and  the  final  settle- 
ment was  such  as  to  satisfy  none  of  the  parties.* 

Now,  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  Etiropean  system 
of  alliances — notably  those  embodying  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  balance  of  power — is  the  assiimption 
that  the  superior  military  force  of  one  country  can 
and  will  be  used  to  its  own  advantage  and  to  the 
disadvantage  of  weaker  Powers.  This,  it  is  urged, 
implies  the  need  for  establishing  a  balance,  an 
equilibrium,  so  that  neither  can  challenge  the  other. 

But  it  is  obvious  that  in  the  degree  to  which  there 
is  a  belief  in  the  advantages,  moral  or  material, 
of  conquest,  the  desire  for  the  domination  of  some- 
one else,  there  will  always  be  a  tendency  for  the 
individual  member,  when  he  sees  a  chance  by  the 
rearrangement  of  parties,  to  exchange  the  po- 
litically unprogressive  condition    of  equilibrium 

*  An  eminent  American  who  has  recently  travelled  from  one 
end  of  the  Balkans  to  the  other  says  that  the  prevailing  remark 
everywhere  is  that  rien  n'est  fini. 


276  America  and  the  New  World-State 

for  the  progressive  and  expanding  condition  of 
victory  over  others.  Or,  to  put  it  differently,  so 
long  as  nations  believe  (as  they  do  believe)  that 
there  is  advantage  as  well  as  safety  in  being 
stronger  than  others,  there  will  always  be  an 
impulse  so  to  rearrange  the  groupings  that  the 
obvious  advantage  of  strength  lies  with  them  and 
against  the  rival,  whether  that  rival  be  a  group  or  a 
nation.  Military  power  in  any  case  is  a  thing  very 
difficult  to  estimate;  an  apparently  weaker  group 
or  nation  has  often  proved,  in  fact,  to  be  the 
stronger,  so  that  there  is  a  desire  on  the  part  of 
each  side  to  give  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  to  itself, 
and  we  come  to  believe  that  the  way  to  secure 
peace  is,  in  the  phrase  of  Mr.  Churchill,  the  Brit- 
ish First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  "to  be  so  much 
stronger  than  your  enemy  that  he  will  not  dare  to 
attack  you."  But  the  other  side  also  thinks  that, 
and  each  cannot  be  stronger  than  the  other.  Thus 
the  natural  and  latent  effort  to  be  strongest  is 
obviously  fatal  to  any  "balance."  Neither  side, 
in  fact,  desires  a  balance;  each  desires  to  have 
the  balance  tilted  in  its  favour.  This  sets  up  a 
perpetual  tendency  to  rearrangements,  regroup- 
ings, and  reshufflings  in  these  international  alli- 
ances, sometimes  taking  place  with  extraordinary 
and  startling  rapidity,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Balkan 
States.  It  is  already  illustrated  in  the  present 
war — Italy  has  broken  away  from  a  formal  alliance 
that  everyone  supposed  would  range  her  on  the 
German  side.    There  is  at  least  a  possibility  that 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     2^] 

she  may  finally  come  down  upon  the  Anglo-Franco- 
Russian  side.  You  have  Japan,  which  little  more 
than  a  decade  since  was  fighting  bitterly  against 
Russia,  to-day  ranged  upon  the  side  of  Russia. 
The  position  of  Russia  is  even  still  more  startling. 
In  the  struggles  of  the  eighteenth  and  early  nine- 
teenth centuries  Britain  was  always  on  the  side  of 
Russia;  then  for  two  generations  Britishers  were 
taught  that  any  increase  of  the  power  of  Russia 
was  a  particularly  dangerous  menace.  That  once 
more,  was  a  decade  ago  suddenly  changed,  and  the 
British  are  now  fighting  to  increase  both  relatively 
and  absolutely  the  power  of  a  country  which  their 
last  war  upon  the  Continent  was  fought  to  check. 
The  war  before  that,  which  they  fought  upon  the 
Continent,  was  fought  in  alHance  with  Germans 
against  the  power  of  France.  As  to  the  Austrians, 
whom  they  are  now  fighting,  they  were  for  many 
years  their  faithful  allies.  So  it  is  very  nearly 
true  to  say  of  all  the  combatants  respectively,  that 
they  have  no  enemy  to-day  that  was  not,  histori- 
cally speaking,  quite  recently  an  ally,  and  not  an 
ally  to-day  that  was  not  in  the  recent  past  an 
enemy. 

These  combinations,  therefore,  are  not,  never 
have  been,  and  never  can  be,  permanent.  If 
history,  even  quite  recent  history,  has  any  meaning 
at  all,  the  next  ten  or  fifteen  or  twenty  years  will 
be  bound  to  see  among  these  nine  combatants  now 
in  the  field,  rearrangements  and  permutations  out 
of  which  the  crushed  and  suppressed  Germany  that 


278  America  and  the  New  World-State 

is  to  follow  the  war — a  Germany  which  will  em- 
brace, nevertheless,  seventy -five  million  of  the 
same  race,  highly  efficient,  highly  educated,  trained 
for  co-ordination  and  common  action — will  be 
bound  sooner  or  later  to  find  her  chance. 

Let  us  summarize  the  conclusions  of  some  of  the 
queries  that  we  have  put. 

The  annihilation  of  Germany  is  a  meaningless 
phrase.  You  cannot  annihilate  sixty-five  or 
seventy-five  million  people.  They  will  remain, 
the  men  who  have  built  their  homes  and  the  men 
who  have  fought  their  battles  will  still  be  there. 
You  cannot  divide  them  up  between  France  and 
Russia  save  at  the  cost  of  making  those  two  States 
highly  militarized,  undemocratic,  and  oppressive 
Powers.  If  you  broke  up  these  seventy-five  mil- 
lions into  separate  States,  there  is  no  reason  why, 
if  a  Balkan  League  could  be  formed  and  fight  with 
success,  a  German  League  could  not  do  likewise. 
Those  diplomatic  combinations  by  which  the 
German  States  of  the  future  are  to  be  kept  in 
subjugation  cannot  be  counted  upon  for  perma- 
nence and  stability — such  combinations  never  have 
been,  and  in  their  nature  cannot  be,  permanent 
or  immutable. 

For  this  reason  Prussianism  will  never  be  de- 
stroyed by  a  mere  military  victory  of  one  group 
over  another.  If  the  war  is  to  begin  and  end  with 
the  defeat  of  the  German  armies  and  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  German  State,  the  result  will  be  either 
to  transfer  Prussianism  and  all  that  it  represents  in 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     279 

the  way  of  militarism  from  one  capital  to  another 
or  to  others;  or  to  create  a  situation  in  which  the 
struggle  for  military  domination  on  the  part  of 
the  German  people  will  break  out  afresh  in  another 
form;  or  else  to  achieve  both  these  results:  to 
revive  the  military  ambitions  of  France,  to  stimu- 
late those  of  Russia,  and  so  to  recast  those  of 
Germany  as  to  make  them  material  for  future 
explosions. 

The  expectation  that  you  can  cure  Germans  of 
Prussianism,  that  you  can  drive  a  false  doctrine 
from  their  minds  merely  by  overpowering  their 
armies  and  invading  their  country,  is  not  only 
very  false  philosophy,  but  it  happens  to  be,  curi- 
ously enough,  the  characteristically  Prussian  phi- 
losophy; it  is  Prussianism  pure  and  simple,  and 
falls  into  the  very  fallacy  which  makes  Prussianism 
so  stupid  and  evil  a  thing. 

Let  me  put  the  matter  very  definitely :  I  submit — 

(i)  That  because  we  are  right  when  we  say  that 
Prussianism  is  a  false  doctrine,  a  mischievous 
fallacy,  an  evil  state  of  mind  and  temper,  we  are 
wrong  when  we  think  that  the  military  defeat  of  an 
army  can  destroy  it,  since  to  do  so  is  to  ask  that  a 
man  shall  abandon  his  belief  because  a  stronger 
man  has  struck  him,  or  a  larger  army  beaten  his; 
it  is  to  assume  that  beliefs  depend  not  on  the  mind, 
but  on  the  operation  of  material  things — the 
heavier  artillery  or  better  cavalry,  material  force 
in  fact. 

I  submit  also  (2)  that  beUef  in  a  false  doctrine 


28o  America  and  the  New  World-State 

can  only  be  corrected  by  recognition  of  its  fallacy ; 
that  the  false  doctrine  of  Prussianism — the  belief 
in  the  value  of  military  power,  the  desire  for 
political  domination — ^is  not  confined  to  Northern 
Germany,  but  in  greater  or  lesser  degree  infects 
all  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  and  is  largely  held 
even  among  ourselves. 

(3)  That  a  better  World-Society,  therefore, 
depends  not  only — perhaps  not  mainly — upon 
the  military  defeat  of  one  particular  nation,  but 
upon  a  general  recognition  that  the  struggle  for 
political  power  which  all  nations  have  pursued 
when  opportunity  offered  is  a  barren  and  evil 
thing;  that  the  attainment  of  such  power  adds 
neither  to  the  moral  nor  material  welfare  of  those 
who  achieve  it;  and  that  if  ever  the  Western 
World  is  to  be  truly  civilized,  we  must  honestly 
and  sincerely  abandon  this  struggle,  and  all  the 
shoddy  conceptions  of  pride  and  glory  and  patriot- 
ism with  which  it  is  bound  up,  in  favour  of  the  co- 
operation of  all  for  the  security  and  welfare  of  all. 
The  society  of  nations  must  be  based,  as  all  other 
civilized  societies  are  based,  upon  the  agreement 
of  partners  co-operating  to  a  common  end,  and  in 
the  circumstances  the  lead  in  this  new  conception 
must  be  given  by  ourselves  and  by  the  victorious 
AlHes.  Finally,  I  submit  that  upon  the  sincerity 
and  pertinacity  with  which  this  aim  is  followed  by 
us  and  by  them,  upon  the  genuineness  of  our 
disbelief  in  Prussianism,  will  the  nature  of  the 
future  depend. 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     281 

All  these  propositions  have  been  supported  of 
late  in  somewhat  tinexpected  quarters.  The 
London  Times  says : 

If  it  be  true  that  "  every  man  in  the  German  Empire 
believes  sincerely  and  honestly  to-day  that  the  war  is 
one  of  self-defence  against  the  hostile  encroachments  of 
Russia,  France,  and  England, "  "every  man"  must  be 
disillusioned.  Not  until  the  German  people  has  been 
compelled  to  perceive  this  struggle  in  its  true  light 
can  there  be  a  prospect  of  lasting  peace  for  the  world. 

Well,  that  of  course  is  exactly  what  I  desire  to 
urge:  there  will  be  no  peace  in  Europe  imtil  the 
Germans  are  convinced  that  Russia,  France,  and 
Britain  do  not  desire  and  do  not  intend  to  encroach 
upon  their  Fatherland.  The  question  is,  How 
shall  they  be  convinced  of  that?  Some  British 
writers  are  saying,  "By  dismembering  their 
Fatherland."  Will  that  convince  them  that  they 
are  not  threatened  and  do  not  need  to  revive  their 
armaments? 

There  are  many,  of  course,  who  urge  that  the 
main  business  is  to  convince  them  that  they  cannot 
encroach  upon  the  countries  of  others;  that  what 
they  think  beyond  that,  does  not  matter  much  to 
their  neighbotu'S.  Well,  I  submit  with  the  Times 
that  it  is  very  important  indeed  what  opinion 
Germans  form  as  to  the  motives  and  objects  of 
their  enemies. 

The  British  people  have  decided  and  we  are  dis- 
posed to  agree  with  them  that  the  Prussian  military 


282  America  and  the  New  World-State 

party  desired  and  plotted  this  war  for  the  purpose 
of  subduing  France,  challenging  the  power  of 
Britain,  and  making  Germany  the  dominant  State 
of  the  world.  That  is  possibly  a  true  view,  but  it  is 
not  the  explanation  of  the  war  which  the  military 
party  have  given  to  the  German  people.  To  the 
German  people  they  represent  this  war  as  one  of 
defence,  and  at  the  present  moment  the  assump- 
tion cited  by  the  Times  is  certainly  true:  sixty 
million  Germans  are  absolutely  persuaded  that 
they  are  fighting  this  war  in  defence  of  their 
Fatherland,  to  save  their  nationality  from  destruc- 
tion. It  is  not  a  question  of  whether  they  are 
right  or  wrong;  that  is  undoubtedly  what  the 
overwhelming  mass  of  Germans  sincerely  and 
honestly  believe.  The  attitude  of  many  to  the 
military  party  has  changed  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  Before  the  war,  when  they  were  told  by 
the  Prussian  military  party  that  Germany  needed 
far  larger  armaments,  great  sections  in  Gennany 
did  not  believe  them.  The  Social  Democrats,  for 
instance,  which  number  one-third  of  the  entire 
voters  of  the  Empire,  strenuously  opposed  the 
agitation  of  the  German  Navy  League  and  Army 
League,  and  accused  the  Prussian  military  party  of 
exaggeration  or  deception  when  that  party  urged 
that  the  country  was  in  danger  from  its  neighbours. 
But  now  the  anti-militarist  party  in  Germany, 
when  they  see  their  country  or  their  colonies  about 
to  be  invaded  by  five  enemy  nations,  are  wondering 
whether  after  all  the  Prussians  were  not  right  in 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     283 

asking  for  larger  armaments.  If  Germany  is 
beaten,  the  Prussians  will  be  able  to  say:  "If  you 
had  given  us  all  that  we  asked  for  in  the  way  of 
armaments,  we  should  not  have  been  beaten." 
Thus  there  are  very  many  millions  of  Germans 
who,  distrusting  and  detesting  the  Prussians  be- 
fore the  war,  are  now  disposed  to  say,  "Perhaps 
after  all  the  Prussians  were  right  to  be  prepared 
and  to  have  this  big  and  efficient  military  ma- 
chine. "  Do  you  suppose  the  Germans  will  be  less 
disposed  to  say  that,  if  Germany  is  broken  up  and 
its  territory,  or  any  considerable  portion  of  it, 
passes  under  alien  government? 

It  is  one  of  the  outstanding  characteristics  of 
Prussian  stupidity  to  assume  that  other  people 
will  be  affected  by  motives  which  would  never 
influence  the  conduct  of  a  Prussian.  The  senseless 
philosophy  of  his  warfare  is  based  on  the  assump- 
tion that  he  can  terrify  the  people  of  an  invaded  or 
conquered  province  out  of  the  determination  to 
defend  their  country,  knowing  perfectly  well  that 
if  he,  a  Prussian,  were  defending  Prussia,  threats 
of  harsh  treatment  would  only  make  h"m  more 
determined  to  resist  the  invader.  If  you  examine 
the  mistakes  in  the  diplomacy  and  government  of 
Prussia,  you  will  find  that  most  of  them  are  due 
to  this  absolute  incapacity  of  the  Prussian  to  put 
himself  in  the  other  man's  shoes,  to  the  general 
assumption  that  the  Prussian  is  "different";  that 
it  is  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  other  people  whose 
country  he  is  pleased  to  invade  are  like  him,  and 


284  America  and  the  New  World-State 

have  an  equal  tenacity  and  determination  not  to 
yield  to  bullying  and  to  force. 

And  yet,  when  people  assume  that  by  "smash- 
ing "  Germany,  they  are  going  to  discredit  militar- 
ism or  induce  the  German  to  abandon  his  effort 
to  remain  a  great  military  power,  are  they  adopting 
any  other  than  the  Prussian  way  of  reasoning? 
Let  me  put  a  definite  case. 

There  are  in  Great  Britain  a  considerable  num- 
ber erf  people  who  for  fifteen  years  have  been 
urging  that  a  much  larger  army  than  she  has  here- 
tofore possessed  was  necessary  for  her  defence,  and 
that,  if  she  could  not  get  it  otherwise,  she  ought  to 
resort  to  compulsion.  Now,  the  views  of  those 
military  advocates  have  not  been  adopted.  But 
suppose  the  British  were  beaten  in  this  war,  that 
their  country  were  overrun  by  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians,  that  their  Empire  were  broken  up.  Would 
the  effect  of  that  be  to  make  national  service  less 
or  more  likely?  Would  a  German  invasion  cause 
them  to  reduce  their  armaments  in  other  respects, 
and  to  render  them  less  anxious  to  be  strong  in  the 
future?  You  know,  of  course,  that  it  would  have 
the  exactly  contrary  effect.  Why  do  you  expect, 
therefore,  that  if  the  circumstances  were  reversed 
Germany  would  act  differently? 

Even  though  Germans  succeeded  somehow  in 
preventing  the  British  raising  an  army,  would  that 
in  any  way  alter  their  conviction  that  to  raise  an 
army  is  what  they  ought  to  do  if  they  could?  If 
their  Empire  were  broken  up,  and  their  colonies 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     285 

passed  under  German  rule,  does  any  Briton  really 
think  all  the  five  nations  of  the  British  Empire 
woiild  sit  down  and  accept  that  as  the  last  word, 
that  they  would  not  plot  and  scheme  and  dream 
and  contrive  and  teach  the  old  ideals  to  their 
children,  and  make  them  love  the  old  memories 
and  pray  every  day  for  their  revival?  Would  they 
ever  abandon  hope  that  that  revival  and  renais- 
sance would  take  place? 

Again,  why,  therefore,  should  we  expect  that 
other  people  would  act  differently? 

Indeed,  the  case  is  stronger  than  I  have  put  it. 
Suppose  that  the  British  Empire,  broken  up  in  the 
twentieth  centiuy,  had  only  a  hundred  years  before 
been  broken  up  utterly,  and  yet  had  pieced  itself 
together  again,  stronger  and  mightier  than  ever, 
would  there  be  a  Briton  alive  who  would  not 
know  that,  sooner  or  later,  his  chance  would  come, 
and  that  he  would  re-establish  his  Empire  again, 
as  his  fathers  did  before  him? 

Again,  while  there  are  many  Americans  who 
believe  that  a  great  increase  of  our  naval  and 
military  armaments  is  necessary,  and  also  many 
who  are  honestly  opposed  to  that  increase,  do  you 
believe  that  if  an  attempt  were  made  by  any  con- 
ceivable combination  of  foreign  powers  to  impose 
a  limitation  of  armaments  upon  us  by  force,  we 
should  consent  to  such  a  Umitation?  Would  not 
those  who  were  in  favour  of  big  armaments  re- 
double their  efforts?  And  would  not  many  of 
those  who  had  opposed  them  feel  compelled  to 


286  America  and  the  New  World-State 

change  sides,  and  to  join,  however  reluctantly,  in 
the  demand  for  great  naval  and  miHtary  prepara- 
tions, rather  than  acquiesce  in  a  policy  dictated  to 
us  by  foreigners? 

Need  we  necessarily  conclude,  therefore,  that 
the  complete  defeat  of  Germany  in  this  war  is 
unnecessary  or  undesirable  in  the  interests  of  the 
peace  of  the  world?  Not  the  least  in  the  world. 
It  is  probably  now  true  that  there  can  be  no  perma- 
nent peace  in  Europe  until  Germany  is  defeated, 
but  what  I  have  urged  throughout  this  book 
is  that  the  defeat  of  Germany  alone  will  not  give 
us  permanent  peace;  and  that  only  by  bold  and 
constructive  work  along  the  lines  I  have  indicated, 
involving  the  abandonment  of  false  political 
doctrine  by  ourselves  and  the  Allies,  as  well  as 
by  Germany,  can  we  prevent  this  war  from  becom- 
ing the  seed  of  future  wars. 

That  conclusion  is  not  in  the  least  invalidated — 
indeed  it  is  strengthened — even  if  we  take  the  view 
that  this  war  arises  out  of  an  attempt  on  the  part 
of  Germany  to  impose  her  rule  upon  Europe.  We 
are  told  that  Germany  is  fighting  this  war  for  the 
mastery  of  Europe  as  against  the  Slav;  it  is  a 
struggle  as  to  whether  Slav  or  Teuton  shall  domin- 
ate the  world.  Whether  the  culprit  in  this  case 
be  German  or  Russian,  there  is  only  one  thing 
which  can  permanently  end  it,  and  that  is  for  both 
alike  to  realize  that  this  thing  for  which  they 
struggle  is  a  futile,  empty,  and  evil  thing  even  when 
attained.    If  Germany  could  conquer  all  Europe, 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     287 

not  a  single  one  of  the  millions  of  men  and  women 
who  make  up  Germany  would  be  one  whit  the 
better  morally  or  materially.  They  would  in  all 
human  probability  be  morally  and  materially  the 
worse.  The  men  and  women  of  the  great  States — 
of  the  Austrias,  the  Russias,  and  the  Germanys — 
do  not  lead  happier  or  better  lives  by  reason  of 
such  "greatness"  than  do  the  Swiss  or  Dutch  or 
Scandinavians.  This  political  power,  bought  at 
such  infinite  price,  does  not  add  any  mortal  thing 
morally  or  materially  of  value  to  the  Hves  of  those 
who  purchase  it  so  dearly.  It  is  true  that  the 
United  States  is  a  great  power,  but  the  prosperity  of 
our  people  is  not  due  to  the  naval  or  military  force, 
actual  or  potential,  which  we  wield,  but  to  the 
natural  resources  of  the  coimtry  and  the  industry 
and  intelligence  of  its  inhabitants,  and  to  the  fact 
that  our  circimistances  have  enabled  us  to  steer 
clear  on  the  whole,  of  that  strife  for  political  and 
military  power  in  which  the  Empires  of  Europe 
have  believed  greatness  to  consist. 

It  is  the  illusion  as  to  the  value  of  this  thing  for 
which  the  nations  struggle,  that  we  must  dispel. 
So  long  as  we  nurse  the  worship  of  this  idea  of 
political  "greatness" — and  such  a  worship  is  not 
a  German  any  more  than  it  is  a  French  or  British 
or  American  idea,  it  is  world-wide — we  must 
expect  the  worship  to  take  the  form  of  these  ignoble 
wars.  It  is  this  worship — of  which  we  are  all 
guilty — which  is  the  true  Prussianism,  and  which 
must  be  destroyed. 


288  America  and  the  New  World-State 

That  result  cannot  be  achieved  by  any  purely 
mechanical  means.  It  involves  what  all  human 
progress  involves,  a  correction  of  ideas.  It  must  be 
approached  through  the  mind.  We  must  realize 
that  certain  beliefs  that  we  have  held  in  the  past 
are  unsound,  and  we  must  be  prepared,  in  order  to 
vindicate  the  better  creed,  to  take,  if  need  be, 
certain  risks,  less  risk  than  that  involved  in  the 
armed  camp  of  the  past,  infinitely  less,  but  still 
some  risk.  We  have  seen  that  the  plan  of  the 
rivalry  of  armaments,  the  plan  of  each  being  more 
prepared  for  war,  of  being  stronger  than  anyone 
else,  has  miserably  failed.  A  plan  based  on  uni- 
versal distrust  cannot  give  a  decent  human  society. 
We  shall  have  to  try  more  honestly  and  more  sin- 
cerely and  with  more  persistence  than  we  have 
tried  before  to  agree  together  for  our  common  good, 
and  instead  of  having  one  group  facing  another 
group,  three  nations  facing  three  nations  and 
acting  in  rivalry,  it  must  be  all  the  great  nations 
of  the  civilized  world  acting  in  common  for  our 
common  good.  And  we  in  America  must  recognize 
that  we  cannot  stand  aside  from  the  development 
of  civilized  society,  that  our  interests  are  bound 
up  inextricably  with  those  of  the  other  members  of 
that  society;  and  that  our  interest  as  well  as  our 
duty,  lies  in  contributing  our  share  to  its  organiza- 
tion, and  the  improvement  of  the  ideas  on  which  it 
is  based. 

In  the  last  resort  human  society  does  not  and 
cannot  rest  upon  force.     When  at  an  election  the 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     289 

Republicans  vote  the  Democrats  out  of  power, 
what  assurance  have  they  that  the  Democrats 
will  surrender  that  power?  You  say  the  army, 
and  navy?  But  it  is  the  existing  Democratic 
Government  that  commands  the  army  and  navy 
that  holds  all  the  instruments  of  power.  There  is 
no  assurance  that  the  Democrats  will  just  step 
down  and  surrender  the  instruments  of  power  to 
their  rivals,  save  the  agreement,  the  convention; 
and  if  that  agreement  were  not  abided  by,  the 
Republicans  would  raise  an  army  of  rebellion  and 
turn  the  Democrats  out,  just  as  in  certain  South 
American  republics.  And  they,  of  course,  would 
hold  power  until  the  Democrats  had  raised  an  army, 
and  so  you  would  have  the  sort  of  thing  that  pre- 
vails in  Venezuela  and  the  other  countries  where 
revolutions  succeed  one  another  every  six  months. 
It  is  not  the  existence  of  our  army  which  prevents 
that,  because  countries  like  Venezuela  have  more 
soldiers  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  the  popula- 
tion than  any  others.  The  only  thing  which  pre- 
vents it,  is  the  general  faith  that  each  reposes  in 
the  other  playing  the  game.  A  similar  convention 
must  be  extended  to  the  international  field,  and 
until  we  get  a  general  recognition  of  the  need  for 
action  by  that  method  between  nations,  Prussian- 
ism will  never  die.  The  only  hope  for  its  defeat 
resides  in  the  triumph  of  a  truer  and  better  political 
doctrine,  the  realization  that  struggle  for  military 
ascendancy  must  be  abandoned,  not  by  one  party 
alone,  but  by  all  alike.     That  international  anarch- 

X9 


290  America  and  the  New  World-State 

ism,  the  belief  that  there  is  no  society  of  nations, 
must  be  abandoned  for  a  frank  recognition  of  the 
obvious  fact  that  the  nations  do  form  a  society,  and 
these  principles  which  all  recognize  as  the  sole  hope 
of  the  maintenance  of  civilization  within  the  na- 
tions must  also  be  applied  as  the  only  hope  for 
the  maintenance  of  civilized  intercourse  between 
nations. 

Just  lately  there  has  been  given  impressive 
evidence  that  even  orthodox  diplomatists,  when 
the  brink  of  tragedy  reveals  the  realities  beneath 
the  superficialities  of  conventional  statecraft, 
recognized  the  need  for  this  new  spirit  and 
bolder  method. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  in  the  years  pre- 
ceding the  war,  British  diplomacy  had  given  its 
adherence  to  the  principle  of  the  Balance  of 
Power — of  throwing  its  weight  on  the  side  of  one 
group  as  against  another  group  which  was  pre- 
sumed to  be  hostile  to  it.  If  such  a  system  was 
designed  to  keep  the  peace,  it  has  obviously  and 
pathetically  failed.  The  preceding  pages  give  a 
hint  of  why,  by  virtue  of  its  very  nature,  such 
a  policy  must  fail.  When,  in  the  tragic  days 
at  the  end  of  July,  its  failure  became  evident. 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  at  the  eleventh  hour  and  fifty- 
ninth  minute,  made  a  desperate  and  despairing 
effort  hurriedly  to  formulate  a  policy  which  should 
be  based  on  the  opposite  principle  of  the  Con- 
cert, or  European  League.  In  a  dispatch  he 
says: 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     291 

If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the 
present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be 
to  promote  some  arrangement  to  which  Germany  could 
be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no 
aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against 
her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves, 
jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked 
for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  Crisis, 
and  Germany  having  a  corresponding  object  our 
relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto 
been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  pro- 
posals ;  but  if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute 
than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations, 
be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reac- 
tion which  will  follow  may  make  possible  some  more 
definite  rapprochement  between  the  Powers  than  has 
been  possible  hitherto. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  the  previous  crisis — that 
arising  out  of  the  Balkan  War — Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  abandoned  the  principle  of  the  Balance  of 
Power,  and  worked  towards  a  European  agree- 
ment. We  may  take  it,  therefore,  that  his  influ- 
ence may  now  be  definitely  won  to  this  latter 
principle.  One  can  only  regret  that  the  principle 
of  the  Balance  of  Power,  having  been  abandoned 
in  the  Balkan  crisis,  was  ever  revived.  For, 
as  the  events  show,  it  is  not  at  the  last  stroke  of  the 
clock,  at  the  edge  of  the  precipice,  when  all  the 
disastrous  forces  of  conflict  have  already  gained 
a  terrible  momentum,  that  they  can  be  stopped, 
and  a  new  and  revolutionary  policy  framed  to  cope 


292  America  and  the  New  World-State 

with  them.  But  after  the  war  is  over  peace  must 
be  so  arranged  that  it  wil  be  possible  to  revive 
that  plan,  and  pursue  it  sincerely,  resolutely,  and 
patiently.  And  we  in  America  must  throw  the 
whole  of  our  influence,  which  will  be  greater  after 
the  war  than  it  has  ever  been  before,  upon  the 
side  of  world  co-operation  and  organization. 
Meanwhile,  and  as  a  last  word,  it  is  necessary  to 
point  out  that,  though  it  is  essential  to  realize 
that  the  mere  military  victory  of  the  Allies  will  not 
solve  the  old  troubles,  that  victory  is  none  the 
less  necessary  for  their  solution,  and  nothing  that 
I  have  written  here  is  in  the  slightest  degree  in 
conflict  with  insistence  upon  that  great  need. 
While  the  doctrine  of  Prussianism  cannot  be 
destroyed  by  arms  alone  neither  can  it  be  destroyed 
if  Prussian  arms  are  victorious. 

Let  me  try  to  make  the  position  clear  by  an 
historical  analogy,  on  which  I  have  already  touched. 
The  ideals  of  the  Catholic  Church  were  at  one 
period  of  the  history  of  Europe  "protected"  and 
promoted  by  military  force.  That  is  to  say, 
Catholic  groups  or  States  attempted  to  smash 
Protestant  groups  or  States  in  the  interests  of 
Catholicism,  and  to  some  extent,  at  least,  the 
converse  was  true  of  Protestant  groups  or  States. 
Each  attempt  was  rightly  resisted  by  the  other 
party.  The  evil  was  not  in  either  ideal;  the  evil 
was  in  the  attempt  to  impose  that  ideal  by  force 
upon  others,  a  proposition  to  which  any  Catholic 
or  Protestant  to-day  will  thoroughly  agree.    A 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     293 

good  Catholic  would  to-day  be  as  ready  to  die  for 
his  faith  on  the  battlefield  as  were  his  forbears. 
But  there  are  many  good  Catholics  who  would  fight 
on  the  side  of  Protestants  if  we  could  imagine  a 
Catholic  group  attempting  to  impose  Catholicism 
by  force.  When  Protestants  were  attacked  in  the 
sixteenth  century,  they  very  rightly  defended 
themselves;  but  when,  after  victory,  they  made 
the  mistake  of  attempting  to  smash  Catholicism 
by  the  very  same  means  which  the  Catholics  had 
been  using  against  them,  they  did  nothing  but 
perpetuate  the  wars  of  religion.  Those  wars 
ceased,  not  by  one  party  finally  overcoming  and 
crushing  the  other,  and  making  Europe  completely 
Protestant  or  completely  Catholic,  but  by  both 
parties  agreeing  not  to  attempt  to  enforce  their 
respective  faith  by  the  power  of  the  sword.  It  was 
not  the  Catholic  faith  which  created  the  wars  of 
religion;  it  was  the  belief  in  the  right  to  impose 
one's  faith  by  force  upon  others.  So  in  our  day, 
it  is  not  the  German  national  faith,  the  Deutschtum, 
the  belief  that  the  German  national  ideal  is  best 
for  the  German — it  is  not  that  belief  that  is  a 
danger  to  the  world,  it  is  the  belief  that  that  Ger- 
man national  ideal  is  the  best  for  all  other  people, 
and  that  the  Germans  have  a  right  to  impose  it  by 
the  force  of  their  armies.  It  is  that  belief  alone 
which  can  be  destroyed  by  armies.  The  Allies 
must  show  that  they  do  not  intend  to  be  brought 
under  German  rule,  or  have  German  ideals  imposed 
upon  them;  and,  having  demonstrated  that,  the 


294  America  and  the  New  World-State 

Allies  must  show  that  they,  in  their  turn,  have  no 
intention  of  imposing  their  ideals  or  their  rule 
or  their  dominance  upon  German  peoples.  The 
Allies  must  show  after  this  war  that  they  do  not 
desire  to  be  the  masters  of  the  German  peoples  or 
States,  but  their  partners  and  associates  in  a 
Europe  which  "none  shall  dominate,  but  which  all 
shall  share." 

If  the  settlement  is  to  be  along  these  lines,  if 
we  are  to  get,  as  the  result  of  this  war,  a  better  state 
of  things  in  which  the  idea  of  public  right  shall 
replace  the  rule  of  force,  and  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  industry  and  civilization  shall  be  exempt 
from  the  burden  of  armament  competition  and  the 
interruption  and  dislocation  caused  by  war,  the 
United  States  must  realize  its  responsibilities  and 
play  its  part.  We  must  recognize  that  we  are 
vitally  interested  in  the  problems  of  the  recon- 
struction which  is  to  follow  the  war,  and  we  must 
use  all  the  influence  we  possess — it  is  immense — 
to  ensure  that  this  reconstruction  shall  take  place 
upon  the  right  lines.  It  must  be  our  part  to 
insist  upon  the  only  principles  by  which  Prus- 
sianism  can  really  be  destroyed,  and  we  must 
be  prepared  to  come  into  the  organized  society 
of  the  future  and  to  lend  it  the  sanction,  not 
necessarily  or  preferably  of  our  military  force, 
but  of  those  weapons  of  moral  and  economic 
pressure  which  we  can  wield  with  peculiar  effect. 
In  this  way  America  will  not  only  confer  a 
lasting  blessing  upon  mankind, — the  blessing  of 


How  to  Destroy  Prussianism     295 

a  secure  and  permanent  peace, — but  will  estab- 
lish herself  as  the  leader  of  the  New  World-State 
in  which  all  hope  of  human  progress  is  now 
centred. 


INDEX 


Aggression:  26;  33;  39-40,  61, 
141,  157,  178-85,  190-3, 
216,  281,  291.  See  also 
Conquest,  Defence,  War 

Aguinaldo,  177 

Alaska,  191,  221 

Alexander  the  Great,  63 

Alliances:  suggested  abandon- 
ment of  rival  group,  26; 
Washington  against  entan- 
gling, 27;  mutability  of,  28, 
34,  274-8.  See  also  Diplom- 
acy 

Allies:  Germany  and,  26,  116- 
19;  Prussianism  and  the, 
258-62;  partition  of  Ger- 
many and  the,  260,  265 

Alsace-Lorraine,  48,  259-60 

America.     See  United  States 

America,  part  of  Europe:  3-25; 
deprived  of  capital  as  result 
of  war,  13;  morally  as  well 
as  materially,  21;  wants 
European  trade,  23,  as  to 
future  attitude  to  Europe, 
26-7;  in  wide  acceptance 
of  Prussianism,  115 

America,  South:  field  for  capi- 
tal, 14;  German  trade  in,  99; 
Republics  of,  179,  180,  289; 
boundaries  in,  221.  See  also 
Argentine,  Bolivia,  Chili, 
Paraguay,  Venezuela 

Anglophobia  in  America:  186- 
248;  as  expression  of  Ameri- 
can patriotism,  150;  Her- 
bert Spencer  on,  153 


Anglo-Saxon.     See  Britain  and 

United  States 

Annexation:  theories  of,  82, 
I99»  257-8;  United  States 
and  Canadian,  192-3;  and 
Cuban,  214,  216,  234;  Ger- 
many and,  48,  258,  266; 
France,  Russia,  and,  257- 
60.  See  also  Aggression, 
Conquest 

Annihilation:  impossibility  of, 
of  Filipinos,  1 1 ;  of  Germans, 
256,  262-3,  269-70,  272, 
274,  278;  of  France,  271 

Arbitration  Conference  in 
Washington,  221 

Argentine,  investments  in,  51 

Armament,  Armaments,  28, 
118,  122,  282-6,  288.  See 
Force,  Navy 

Arms  and  Industry,  8-9;  100 

Army.     See  Force 

Army  and  Navy  Journal,  173 

Asquith,  Mr.  Herbert,  the 
war  "a  spiritual  conflict,"  75 

Atlanta  Constitution,   166 

Attack.  See  Aggression,  De- 
fence 

Australia,  alliance  of,  31 

Austria:  alliances  of,  30;  34; 
and  United  States,  45 ;  empire 
of,  artificial,  259 


B 


Bach,  72 

Balance  of  Power:  defined,  33; 
and    British    independence. 


297 


298 


Index 


Balance  of  Power — Continued 
36;   mutability  of   alliances 
under,  274,  276-8;  and  Bal- 
kan crisis,  291 

Balkan  States,  34;  274-5,  291 

Barnes,  A.  A.,  166 

Belgium:  alliances  of,  30;  as 
"little  people,"  94;  and 
terms  of  peace,  257 

Belknap,  Rear- Admiral,  192 

Bernhardi,  General  von,  75;  80; 
123;  137 

Bethmann-HoUweg,  Chancellor 
von, 125 

Bierce,  Ambrose,  193 

Biglow  Papers,  215 

Bismarck,  131,  271 

Blackwood' s  Magazine,  153 

Blatchford,  Mr.  Robert,  252 

Boer  War,  156,  174-5 

Bolivia,  American  interests  in, 
156 

Bonsai,  Stephen,  170 

Brahms,  72 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  no 

Britain:  attitude  of,  to  Con- 
tinent, 33-4;  and  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power,  36;  and  United 
States,  45;  and  Germany, 
56;  and  the  war,  114;  and 
Prussianism,  124-46;  alli- 
ances of,  277;  question  of 
defeat  of,  284  See  also 
British  Empire,  Colonies 

British  Empire:  consequences 
of  break-up  of,  93,  285; 
control  of,  in  India,  199.  See 
Australia,  Canada,  India 

Brooke,  Major-General,  171 

Brownell,  Captain,  171 


Cflesar,  63 

Caivano,  Tomasso,  205 

Calvin,  24 

Canada:  and  Germany,  97- 
9;  259;  and  United  States, 
193,  207,  241  >  i 

Cannon,  Professor,  255  \ 


Capen,  President,  192 

Capital,  scarcity  of,  12-14.  *^c* 
aho  Finance 

Catholics  and  Protestants,  48, 
51,  83,  259,  292 

Central  Bureau  of  Organiza» 
tion,  need  for,  59 

Chamberlain,  Stewart,  74;  81 

Chandler,  Senator,  192 

Chaplain  of  Senate,  193;  225 

Chili,  American  interests  in, 
156,  221 

Churchill,  Mr.  Winston,  276 

Civilization:  need  of  saner  or* 
ganization  of,  5;  character 
of,  depends  on  ideas,  18; 
has  not  changed  human 
nature,  130.  See  Co-opera- 
tion, Force,  Society 

Clausewitz,  142 

Clergy  and  war,  224-5 

Cleveland,  President:  Venez- 
uelan Message  of,  149,  194, 
208-10;  to  Princeton  stu- 
dents, 216 

Cobden  Club,  197 

Colonial  Policy:  of  England, 
99,  200-1;  Roosevelt  on, 
178 

Colonies:  and  German  expan- 
sion, 96;  and  conquest,  98- 
9;  and  imperialism,  178, 
182;  and  trade,  188,  189; 
and  tariff,  200,  201.  See 
Markets 

Commerce.     See  Trade 

Concert,  or  European  League, 
290-1 

Conduct,  low,  determined,  il, 

lOI 

Conquest:  does  not  enrich  a 
nation,  1 1 ,  47, 79,  82 ;  failed  in 
Poland  and  Lorraine,  48, 
265;  failed  in  Ireland,  Fin- 
land, 259;  Germany  and 
Canada,  97-8,  259;  influ- 
ence of  idea  of,  on  German 
mind,  121;  Spanish  Ameri- 
can War,  war  of,  156,172, 
181;   Roosevelt   on,    178-9; 


Index 


299 


Conquest —  Continued 

American  desire  for,  180- 
4,  192-3;  England  and, 
190,  259,  265-7 

Conscription,  122 

Co-operation :  necessary  for  con- 
quest of  nature,  9,  10;  be- 
tween nations,  essential,  8, 
23,  30;  military,  15,  29;  in- 
ternational,as  basis  of  World- 
State,  119,  248;  in  terms  of 
peace,  268,  292-3 

Costa  Rica,  American  inter- 
ests in,  156 

Cramb,  Prof.  J.  A.,  fate  in 
history,  105;  admiration  for 
Prussian  ideal,  130;  moral 
justification  for  war,  131 

Crane,  Colonel,  182 

Cuba,  154,  213-14,  216-17, 
221,  234-5 

CuUom,  Senator,  176;  190;  200 

Gushing,  Caleb,  215 

D 

Day,  Lieutenant,  171 
Defence,  26,  39,  181,  282-3 
Denmark,  94,  140,  257 
Depew,  Senator,  162 
Dewey,  Admiral,  177 
Dickinson,  Hon,  D.  M.,  191 
Diplomacy,  124,  266,  290 
Disraeli,  223 
Division    of  labour,   14.      See 

Co-operation,  Civilization 
Domination.     See    Fallacies, 

Ideals,  Prussianism 
Doyle,  Sir  Arthur  Conan,  77 


£ 


Eliot,  President,  77;  222-3 
Elliott,  Captain,  161 
Elliott,  Congressman,  225 
Empire,   British.     See  British 

Empire 
England.     See  Britain 
Evening  Post,  New  York :  testi- 
mony of  Governor  Taft,  159; 


water    cure,    i69»;    Sun    on 

Evening  Post,  194 
Everett,  Edward,  215 
Expansion.     See   Imperialism, 

Territory 


Fallacies:  nations  as  isolated 
units,  3;  nations  as  rivals,  5, 

9,  288;  nations  can  be  exter- 
minated, II,  256,  263;  "cap- 
turing" trade,  6,  128,  188; 
of  relation  of  political  power 
to  national  prosperity,  il, 
47»  79i  94»  287;  of  security 
by  armament,  41,  49-50; 
of  wealth  by  conquest,  82, 
199;  of  moral  gain  by  power 
to  dominate,  94,  259;  of 
State  as  person,  103;  of 
Prussianism  enumerated, 
116;  of  survival  of  the  fittest 
through  the  war,  139 ;  de- 
stroyed by  defeat  of  Ger- 
many, 252-3,  278,  279;  of 
economic  advantage,  259. 
See  also  Force,  Ideas 

Farmers,  Western:  pride  in 
country,  229,  233,  246;  poor 
as  peasants,  234;  and  British 
capitalist,  238;  and  protec- 
tion, 239-47;  unrepresented, 

243 

Farms,  American:  life  on,  230, 
233;  mortgaged,  231-2;  pro- 
tection and  the,  242 

Fate  in  history,  105,  106,  iii 

Finance :  foreign  investments 
secure  without  force,  5 1 ; 
closed  Stock  Exchanges,  56; 
British  and  American  in- 
vestments, 189;  American 
farm  mortgages  and  British 
investments,  237-8 

Food:  American  Indians  and, 

10,  100;  Britain  dependent 
on  foreign,  55;  Germany  and 
Canadian,  97.  See  also 
Struggle 


300 


Index 


Force:  society  based  on,  i8, 
112,  130,  288;  "world  domi- 
nation" by,  27;  cancellation 
of,  between  individuals,  37; 
useless  for  promoting  ideals 
82-3;  253-61;  appeal  to, 
vs.  appeal  to  reason,  log- 
12;  German  Chancellor  and 
illusion  of  function  of,  125; 
Admiral  Mahan  and  doc- 
trine of  force,  126;  function, 
in  government,  289.  See 
also  Prussianism 

France:  alliances  of,  30;  34; 
and  United  States,  45;  as 
ally,  115;  as  victor,  257-8; 
cannot  be  destroyed,  271 

Free  Trade,  149,  188,  195-7, 
240,  243-5.  See  also  Pro- 
tection, Trade 

Frye,  Senator,  200,  216 


Gardner,  Major,  161;  163;  171; 

173 
Gardner,     Representative    A. 

P.,  122 
Garland,  Hamlin,  234 
German  Army  League,  282 
German  Navy  League,  282 
Germany:   conquest   of    India 
by,  16;  treaty  of  peace  with, 
26;  alliances  of,  30,  35;  rela- 
tion  to   United   States,   45; 
England's  and  world's  debt 
to,    70-1 ;     Bernhardi     and, 
123;  the  Allies  and,  253-5; 
old  and  new,  264;  rearrange- 
ments in  politics,  272;  can- 
not be  destroyed,  269,  278. 
See  also  Prussianism,  War 
Gladstone,  223 
Godkin,  E.  L.,  194-5 
Goethe,  72,  80,  263,  270 
Government :    militarism    dis- 
torts structure  of,  257,  265; 
and  banking,  57;  misconcep- 
tion of  real  functions  of,  91, 
126-7;  principles  of  189,  210, 


258-9.  See  also  Nation, 
State 

Graham,  Stephen,  114 

Great  Illusion,  the,  and 
national  advantage,  91-2; 
on  problem    of    subsistence 

'  and  political  conquest,  98- 
9;  futility  of  military  vic- 
tory, 259 

Greece,  21,  50 

Grey,  Earl,  136-7 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  290 

Grimm,  71 

Gutenberg,  21 

H 

Hale,  Professor,  253 

Hardy,  Thomas,  77 

Hawley,  Senator,  192;  199; 
202;  211 

Heine,  72 

Herald,  New  York,  183 

"Heretic,  odour  of  the,"  85, 
102 

History,  need  of  re-writing,  21 ; 
lessons  of,  228,  268;  not 
deceptive,  247 

Hoar,  Senator,  160 

Holland,  79,  94 

Hostility  of  races,  not  ineradic- 
able, 31 

Humperdinck,  71 


I 


Ideas:  value  of  correcting  false, 
4.67,  73.  254,288;  wars  pro- 
duced by  false,  11,  68,  86; 
character  of  society  deter- 
mined by,  18,  273;  change  of, 
affects  whole  planet,  19,  95; 
influence  of  foreign,  21; 
German  nation  transformed 
by,  70-82,  121;  are  facts, 
79;  "Will  to  Power"  philo- 
sophy, 81-2;  witchcraft  and 
change  of,  102;  neutrality 
a  delusion,  140;  changed  only 
by   intellectual    conversion. 


Index 


301 


Ideas — Continued 

147;  false,  in  economics,  256. 
See  also  Fallacies,  Religious 
beliefs 

Ideals:  community  of,  18;  of 
future,  influenced  by  war, 
25;  refuge  in  improvement 
of,  85;  of  domination,  not 
universal,  86 ;  development 
of  political,  88;  necessity  for 
changed  ideals,  147;  no  fron- 
tiers, 259;  not  protected  by 
force,  259,  292;  national, 
293-4.  ^^^  ^^^(^  Religious 
beliefs 

Imperialism:  philosophy  of, 
94-5;  Rhodes  on  British, 
135;  Colonies  and,  178,  182; 
danger  of,  in  United  States, 
221,  236 

India,  16,  93..  ^99 

Indian,  American,  10,  19,  100, 

273  ,      .  . . 

Interdependence:  of  civiliza- 
tions, 20,  55;  intellectual 
and  moral,  22;  growth  of, 
in  modern  times,  19,  55.  See 
also  Co-operation 

Inter  ocean,  Chicago,  159;  174- 
5;  220 

International  Council  of  Con- 
ciliation, 62,  118 

International  Law :  English 
violations  of,  139-42 

International  relations:  old 
axioms  as  to,  3;  effect  of 
severance  of,  56;  in  witch- 
craft stage,  103;  real  facts 
obscured,  113 

International  trade:  real  na- 
ture of,  6-7 ;  has  no  frontiers, 
8,256 

Intervention,  17,  26,  44,  154, 
207,  213 

Investments.     See  Finance 

Ireland,  Archbishop,  155;  214 

Isolation,  national:  no  longer 
possible,  5,  7,  22,  25;  mili- 
tarism and,  29;  effects  of,  56 

Italy,  34,  276 


Japan,  28,  34,  115,  118 
Jingoism,  223,  225,  227,  239, 

243 
Journal,  New  York,  193 

K 

Kaiser,  the  German,  33;  64;  76; 

131;  267 
Kant,  72,  80 
Kipling,  132;  146 


Law:  in  society  of  individuals, 
38;  observed  without  mili- 
tary force,  50:  of  struggle, 
96-7,  105;  of  evidence  in 
witchcraft,  102;  of  political 
entities,  129;  of  relation  of 
morality  to  military  strength, 
134;  of  social  progress,  220 

Lea,  Homer,  on  law  of  strug- 
gle, 106;  brutality  of  na- 
tional development,  129;  in- 
ternational moralities,  139- 
141 

Lodge,  Senator,  150,  191,  198- 
9,  200 

Louis  XIV,  21;  266 

Luther,  Martin,  21 

M 

McKinley,  William,  154;  157; 

240 
Maguire,  Dr.  Miller,  143 
Mahan,     Admiral:     on     pre- 
dominant naval  power,  126; 

morality        and        military 

strength,  138 
"Manifest  Destiny,"  214,  234, 

248 
Markets,  15,  127,  198-9.     See 

also  Free  Trade 
Massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew, 

51;  85;  of  Filipinos,  159 
Maude,  Colonel,  139 


302 


Index 


Mexico,  58,  214-15 

Militarism:  danger  of,  in 
United  States,  16-17,  27, 
31, 221-2, 266;  isolation  and, 
29;  and  prosperity,  219; 
Spencer  and,  220;  a  luxury, 
234;  and  Protection,  240; 
and  Germany,  263-8 

Militarists :  becoming  inter- 
nationalists, 29-30;  and 
man's  fighting  instincts,  103, 
106;  increased  armament 
and  the,  104;  statement  of 
case  of,  107-8;  fatalism  and 
the.  III 

Monroe  Doctrine :  defined,  203 ; 
relation  of,  to  Venezuela, 
205-10 

Montaigne  and  witchcraft,  102 

Montenegro,  115,  118 

Morality:  and  self-interest,  50, 
52-3,  88;  and  military 
strength,  138.  See  Con- 
duct, Ideals,  Ideas 

Moral  sanctions  not  upheld 
by  force,  48-50 

Moratorium,  52 

Morgan,  Senator,  200 

Mozart,  72 

Murray,  Prof.  Gilbert,  252 

R-Iurray,  Major  Stewart,  141-2 

N 


Napoleon,  21;  33;  63;  108;  269 

Nationality,  clash  of,  not  in- 
evitable, 82;  transformation 
of  ideals  of,  83;  break  up  of 
great,  260,  267;  cannot  be 
crushed,  269,  271,  273-4 

Nations:  as  rival  units,  4,  105, 
128;  and  non-intercourse, 
58;  created  by  physical 
power,  129.  See  also  Gov- 
ernment, Society,  States 

Nature:  our  war  with,  5,  10; 
history  akin  to  Nature  and 
the  elements,  105;  "man's 
nature    makes    war    inevit- 


able," 130.  See  also  Strug- 
gle 

Navy,  Navies,  15,  17,  126,  128, 
146,  192 

Neutralization,  140,  267 

Nicaraguan  Canal,  191 

Nietzsche,  69;  "Will  to 
Power,"  81-2 

Nineteenth   Century   (London), 

133 
Non-intercourse,  41,  58 
North   American  Review,   201; 

221;  225 
Novoe  Vremya,  262 


O 


Ohl,  Joseph,  166 
Otis,  General,  183 
"Ownership."      See      Posses- 


Pacifists:  real  position  of,  in; 
"enemies  of  peace,"  143 

Palmerston,  223 

Panama  Canal,  17 

Paraguay,  48 

Partitioning.  See  Annexa- 
tion 

Patriotism:  of  Germany  rests 
on  force,  133;  and  war,  134- 
5;  retrospect  of  American, 
148-85;  false,  152,  180;  rea- 
son and,  185;  "  pocket  before 
patriotism,"  200,  236;  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and,  208-10; 
inconsistent,  212-13;  of  flags 
and  drums,  228;  and  Pro- 
tection, 239-40;  and  temper, 

255 
Patriots,  184,  194-5, 197,  201- 

2,  210,  229,  235 
Patterson,  Senator,  177 
Peace :  war  and,  matter  of  two 
parties,  32;  treaty  of,  61-3, 
267-8,  281,  286,  294-5; 
Germany  and  doctrines  of, 
123,  291;    Ruskin    on,  132; 


Index 


303 


Peace— Continued 

Godkin  and,  195;  advocacy 
of,  in  times  of  war,  196-7; 
militarists  and,  220 

Pettigrew,  Senator,  200 

Phelps,  E.  J.,  208-9 

Philadelphia  Record,  soldier's 
letter  in,  168 

Philippines:  question  of  sover- 
eignty, 157,  184;  McKinley 
on,  157;  American  barbari- 
ties in,  160-76;  water  cure, 
169-71;  prevarication  of 
Senator  Root  concerning, 
163;  Major  Gardner's  report 
on,  163-4;  principles  of 
America  violated  in,  185 

Poland,  48,  257,  267,  269 

Police  and  policemen,  r61e  of, 
37-8,  62 

Portland  Oregonian,  167,  184 

Possessions :  material  and 
moral,  secure,  23,  259;  as 
expression  of  power,  127; 
annexed,  192-3;  British,  in 
America,  205-8 ;  maintained 
by  sword,  258,  272 

Press  rand  war  enthusiasm,  134, 
187-8;  attitude  of,  toward 
England,  201,  204;  and 
national  "enemies,"  212; 
and  public  opinion,  222-3 

Protection:  and  patriotism, 
149;  195,  239;  and  markets, 
198;  and  labour,  199 

Prussianism :  moral  foundations 
of,  67-112;  economic  case 
for,  96;  of  Anglo-Saxons, 
114-47;  can  arms  alone 
destroy,  251-95;  summary 
of  philosophy  of,  279-80. 
See  also  Fallacies,  Ideals, 
Ideas 

Public  opinion:  need  of  edu- 
cated, 6;  unorganized,  40; 
American,  and  the  belli- 
gerents, 45-6,  114,  253; 
and  the  causes  of  the  war,  69 ; 
of  Filipinos,  before  and 
after  Spanish  War,  177;  and 


the  press,  222;  and  the  pul- 
pit, 224-5;  S'l^d   the   treaty 
of    peace,     254.     See    also 
Conduct,  Ideas 
Puritanism,  218 


Quakers,  83 


Q 


R 


Reason:  appeal  to,  vs.  appeal 
to  force,  loi,  109-12;  and 
patriotism,  185 

Reformation:  international  in- 
fluence of  religious,  2 1 ;  poli- 
tical, to  be  accomplished,  in 
future,  113 

Religious  beliefs:  war  and,  11, 
83,  95,  292;  relation  to  the 
State,  87,  88 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  135 

Rifleman,  A,  128 

Roberts,  Lord,  122;  Prussian- 
ism of,  124-5 

Roosevelt,  President,  on  na- 
tional glory,  132 ;  on  colonial 
policy,  1 78 ;  against  humani- 
tarianism,  179;  doctrine  of 
the  "strenuous  life,"  218, 
219 

Root,  Secretary  of  War,  163; 
164 

Rowland,  Dr.  Henry  C,  175-6 

Ruskin,  John,  132 

Russia:  no  permanent  invasion 
of,  17;  alliances  of,  30;  34; 
and  United  States,  45;  as 
ally,  115,  118;  and  conquest 
of  India,  199;  liberalized, 
252;  as  victor,  257-8;  and 
the  Finns,  259 


Sarolea,  Charles,  145 
Schiller,  71 

Schoeffel,  John  B.,  168 
Schubert,  71 


304 


Index 


Schumann,  71 

Schurz,  Carl,  221 

Security,  national:  how  ob- 
tained, 23;  40-2;  fallacy  of , 
by  armament,  41,  49-50;  in 
terms  of  treaty  of  peace,  61 

Self-interest  and  morality.  See 
Morality 

Self-sacrifice:  aimless,  87;  of 
a  community,  88;  for  coun- 
try, 135       . 

Senate  Enquiry  Commission, 
163 

Sentimentality,  237-9,  241, 
246 

Servia:  alliances  of,  30;  as  ally, 
115,  118 

Shaler,  R.  N.,  221 

Silver  question  in  America, 
188,  191, 192,  195 

Slavery:  Nietzsche  and,  87, 
92;  imperialism  and,  95; 
political,  187;  Mexican  War 
and,  214-15 

Smith,  General  Jacob:  Philip- 
pine policy  of,  1 60-1;  court- 
martial  of,  173;  Army  and 
Navy  Journal  on,  174 

Snee,  Michael,  168 

Social  Democrats,  282 

Society:  character  of,  depen- 
dent on  ideas,  18;  place  of 
force  in,  36-8;  sanctions  of, 
41,  294;  well-being  as  aim 
of,  not  sordid,  88-91;  de- 
velopment of,  288-90.  See 
also  Government,  Interde- 
pendence 

Society  of  nations,  39-40,  63, 
113,  280,  290 

South  America.  See  America, 
South 

Southwick,  Geo.  N.,Hon.,  194 

Sovereignty,  question  of:  in 
Cuba,  154;  in  Philippines, 
157;  in  Poland,  267 

Spain:  South  American  trade 
and,  99;  relations  of,  to 
Cuba,  154;  213;  commercial 
interests  of,  in  Philippines, 


156;  and  the  government  of 
the  Philippines,  158;  United 
States   adopts   methods   of, 
158,  172 
Spencer,  Herbert,  153;  219 
Springfield  Republican,  192 
State,  States:  purpose  of  exist- 
ence of,  86;  small,  as  pros- 
perous   as    large,    94,    103; 
economic    conflict    of,    not 
necessary,  99-100;  as  units 
and  persons,  103;  indestruc- 
tibility   of,    256.     See    also 
Government,  Nations 
Storey,  General  John  J.  P.,  130 
Struggle:  for  bread,  5,  10,  96, 
100, 128;  moral  and  spiritual, 
259;  for  power,  286-8 
Subjugation.     See  Conquest 
Sun,  New  York,  against  Eng- 
land, 193;  against  New  York 
Evening  Post,  194 
Sussex  versus  Wessex,  9;  99 
Sustenance.     See  Food 
Sweden,  94 
Switzerland,  48;  50;  79;  94 


Taft,  Governor,  testimony  be- 
fore Senate  Committee,  159 

Territory:  need  of,  motive  for 
war,  79;  transfer  of,  82,  129, 
157,  261,  267.  See  also 
Annexation,  Conquest 

Testament,  Old  and  New,  196 

Theories.     See  Ideas 

Times,  London,  75;  114;  252; 
262-3;  264;  281 

Times,  Los  Angeles,  193 

Times,  New  York,  77,  78 

Torture:  of  heretics,  48;  of 
FiUpinos,  159,  169,  17 1-2 

Trade,  foreign,  23,  56,  128, 
188,  198,  207.  See  also 
Free  Trade 

Transvaal.     See  South  Africa 

Treitschke,  69;  75 

Tribune,  New  York,  153;  185 

Turkey,  219,  275 


Index 


305 


United  States :  losses  of, 
through  this  war,  12;  danger 
of  militarism  in,  16,  18,  28; 
22 1 ;  problem  of  defence  of, 
17;  goodwill  of,  wanted,  41; 
and  world  leadership,  42-64; 
and  Cuba,  154;  and  the 
Philippines,  157-84;  and 
England,  187-210;  r61e  of 
Protection  in,  239-45;  ^s 
leader  of  New  World-State, 
267,  29-54 


Venezuela,  152;  190;  194;  205- 

10,  212,  228,  289 
Voltaire,  7 1 

W 

Waller,  Major,  171;  173 
War,  wars:  defined,  1 1 ;  indem- 
nities of,  paid  by  all,  12; 
effect  commercially  of,  15; 
internationalized,  31;  mat- 
ter of  two  parties,  32;  Bal- 
ance of  Power,  favorable  to, 
35;  doctrines  (aggression  and 
domination)  that  make,  67- 
248;  H.  G.  Wells  on,  74; 
disappearance  of  religious, 
83;  cause  of  wars  of  religion, 
95;  not  ineradicable,  103; 
desirable  results  of  this,  117- 
19;  as  result  of  competitive 
system  of  civilization,  128; 
highest  function  of  State, 
131-2;  survival  of  the  fittest 


and,  139;  necessity  of  de- 
claration of,  illusion,  139; 
talk  of,  with  England,  150- 
2,  186-93;  Spanish-Ameri- 
can, 154-85;  Senator  Wil- 
son on,  192;  war- talk  not 
harmless,  227-8 ;  war  against, 
251-2 

Washington,  George,  27 

Water   cure.     See   Philippines 

Wealth:  national,  190;  202; 
conquest  for,  79,  82;  and 
international  prosperity,  151 

Weber,  72 

Wells,  David  A.,  150;  201 

Wells,  H.  G.,  74;  252 

Wessex  versus  Sussex,  9;  99 

Weylerism,  212 

Wheaton,  General,  167 

Wilhelm  II.     See  Kaiser 

Wilkinson,  Prof.  Spenser,  on 
sea-power,  127;  on  leader- 
ship of  human  race,  137 

"Will  to  Power"  philosophy, 
80-3 

Wilson,  John  B.,  Senator,  192; 
200; 216 

Wilson,  President,  46,  61 

Witchcraft,  Montaigne  and, 
102 

Wolcott,  Senator,  155 

Woodruff,  Colonel,  161 

World  Federation,  267 

World-Partnership:  each  na- 
tion's dependence  upon,  52, 
53;  to  common  ends,  118, 
294 

World-State,  5,  54,  59,  60,  63, 
113,  119,  147,  248,  280,  295 

Wright,  C.  Hagberg,  252 

Wyatt,  "God's  Test  by  War," 
133-134;  138 


Jl:  Selection  from  the 
Catalogue  of 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


Complete  Catalogue  sent 
on  application 


Arms  and  Industry 

A  Study  of  the  Foundations  of  Inter- 
national Polity 


By  Norman  Angell 

Author  of  "  The  Great  Illusion,"  etc 
12°.    $1.25  net 

In  this  book  the  author  of  "  The  Great 
Illusion  "  shows  systematically  and  scien- 
tifically, though  with  the  same  clearness 
and  simplicity  which  marks  his  earlier 
work,  the  nature  of  those  forces  which 
are  transforming  the  relationship  of 
states,  and  indeed,  to  some  extent,  the 
mechanism  of  organized  society  as  a 
whole. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  work  is  de- 
voted to  showing  the  interaction  of  ma- 
terial and  moral  forces  in  politics,  the 
relation  of  nationality  and  political  ideal- 
ism to  those  theories  with  which  the 
author's  name  is  so  strongly  identified. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


Why  War  Must  Cease 

The  Great  Illusion 

A  Study  of  the  Relation  of  Military  Powa  to  National 
Advantage 

By  Norman  Angell 

400  Pages.  Crown  8vo.   $1.00  net.  Postage  Extra. 
Contents  i 


PART  I.— THE  ECONOMICS  OF  THE  CASE 

1.  Statement  of  the  Economic  Case  for  War 

2.  The  Axioms  of  Modern  Statecraft 

3.  The  Great  Illusion 

4.  The  Impossibility  of  ConfiscatioD 

5.  Foreitin  Trade  and  Military  Power 

6.  The  Indemnity  Futility 

7.  How  Colonies  are  **  Owned  " 

PART  2.— THE  HUMAN  NATURE  OF  THE  CASE 

1 .  Outline  of  the  Case  for  War 

2.  Outline  of  the  Case  for  Peace 

3.  Unchaniflnii  Human  Nature 

4.  Do  the  Warlike  Nations  Inherit  the  Earth? 

5.  The  Diminishing  Factor  of  Physical  Force  :  Paycho- 

loiiical  Results 

6.  The   State   as  a   Person :    A    False   Analogy  aad   Its 

Consequences 

PART  3.— THE  PRACTICAL  OUTCOME 

1 .  Armament,  but  not  alone  Armament 

2.  The  Relation  of  Defence  to  Adifression 

3.  Methods 

"  Mr.  Angell  throws  into  the  dust-bin  the  worn-out  theories, 
the  axioms  of  statecraft,  the  shibboleths  of  diplomats,  the 
mouthings  of  politicastros,  as  to  the  necessity  for  war.  Not 
to  speak  of  it  flamboyantly,  this  work  is  to  war  and  to  the 
spirit  of  the  war  god  the  modern  Mene,  Mene,  Tekel,  Uphar- 
sin,  the  flamingly  prophetic  handwriting  on  the  wall  for  all 
captains  of  whatsoever  sort  who  by  means  of  war  would  keep 
humanity  frightened,  brutalized,  enslaved,  and  impoverished." 
—  St.  Louis  Globe-Democrat. 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
NEW  YORK  LONDON 


"THE    GREAT   ILLUSION"   AND 
PUBLIC    OPINION 

AMERICA 

"  New  York  Times,"  March  12,  ipn. 

"A  book  which  has  compelled  thought;  a  book  full  of  real  ideas 
deserves  the  welcome  it  has  received.  The  author  is  enjoying  the 
almost  unlimited  praise  of  his  contemporaries,  expressed  or  indicated 
by  many  men  of  eminence  and  influence,  by  countless  reviewers  who 
have  lately  hungered  for  a  hero  to  worship. 

"Moreover  .  .  .  it  certainly  makes  for  genuine  aesthetic  pleasure, 
and  that  is  all  most  of  us  ask  of  a  book. " 

"  The  Evening  Post,"  Chicago  (Mr.  Floyd  Dell),  Febniary  17, 191 1. 

"The  book,  being  read,  does  not  simply  satisfy  curiosity;  it  dis- 
turbs and  amazes.  It  is  not,  as  one  would  expect,  a  striking  expres- 
sion of  some  familiar  objections  to  war.  It  is  instead — it  appears  to 
be — a  new  contribution  to  thought,  a  revolutionary  work  of  the  first 
importance,  a  complete  shattering  of  conventional  ideas  about 
international  politics;  something  corresponding  to  the  epoch-making 
'  Origin  of  Species '  in  the  realm  of  biology. 

"AH  of  this  it  appears  to  be.  One  says  'appears,'  not  because  the 
book  fails  completely  to  convince,  but  because  it  convinces  so  fully. 
The  paradox  is  so  perfect  there  must  be  something  wrong  about  it ! .  . . 

"At  first  glance  the  statement  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  book 
looks  rather  absurd,  but  before  it  is  finished  it  seems  a  self-evident 
proposition.  It  is  certainly  a  proposition  which,  if  proved,  will 
provide  a  materialistic  common-sense  basis  for  disarmament.  .  .  . 

"There  is  subject-matter  here  for  ironic  contemplation.  Mr. 
Angell  gives  the  reader  no  chance  to  imagine  that  these  things  '  just 
happened.'     He  shows  why  they  happened  and  had  to  happen. 

"One  returns  again  and  again  to  the  arguments,  looking  to  find 
some  fallacy  in  them.  Not  finding  them,  one  stares  wonderingly 
ahead  into  the  future,  where  the  book  seems  to  cast  its  portentous 
shadow." 

"  Boston  Herald,"  January  21, 1911. 

"This  is  an  epoch-making  book,  which  should  be  in  the  hands  of 
everyone  who  has  even  the  slightest  interest  in  human  progress.  .  .  . 
His  criticism  is  not  only  masterly — it  is  overwhelming;  for  though 


**  THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  "  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

controversy  will  arise  on  some  of  the  details,  the  main  argument  is 
irrefutable.  He  has  worked  it  out  with  a  grasp  of  the  evidence  and  a 
relentlessness  of  logic  that  will  give  life  and  meaning  to  his  book  for 
many  a  year  to  come. " 

"  Life  »'  (New  York). 

"An  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  history  of  the  forces  that  have 
shaped  and  are  shaping  our  social  development  that  throws  more 
light  upon  the  meaning  and  the  probable  outcome  of  the  so-called 
'war  upon  war'  than  all  that  has  been  written  and  published  upon 
both  sides  put  together.  The  incontrovertible  service  that  Mr. 
Angell  has  rendered  us  in  '  The  Great  Illusion '  is  to  have  introduced 
intellectual  order  into  an  emotional  chaos. " 


GREAT  BRITAIN. 

"  Daily  Mail." 

"No  book  has  attracted  wider  attention  or  has  done  more  to 
stimulate  thought  in  the  present  century  than  'The  Great  Illusion.' 
Published  obscurely,  and  the  work  of  an  unknown  writer,  it  gradually 
forced  its  way  to  the  front.  .  .  .  Has  become  a  significant  factor  in 
the  present  discussion  of  armaments  and  arbitration." 

"  Nation." 

"  No  piece  of  political  thinking  has  in  recent  years  more  stirred  the 
world  which  controls  the  movement  of  politics.  ...  A  fervour,  a 
simplicity,  and  a  force  which  no  political  writer  of  our  generation  has 
equalled  .  .  .  rank  its  author,  with  Cobden,  among  the  greatest  of 
our  pamphleteers,  perhaps  the  greatest  since  Swift. " 

"  Edinburgh  Review." 

"  Mr.  Angell's  main  thesis  cannot  be  disputed ,  and  when  the  facts 
.  .  .  are  fully  realized,  there  will  be  another  diplomatic  revolution 
more  fundamental  than  that  of  1756." 

"  Daily  News." 

"So  simple  were  the  questions  he  asked,  so  unshakable  the  facts 
of  his  reply,  so  enormous  and  dangerous  the  popular  illusion  which  he 
exposed,  that  the  book  not  only  caused  a  sensation  in  reading  circles, 
but  also,  as  we  know,  greatly  moved  certain  persons  high-placed  in 
the  political  world. 

"The  critics  have  failed  to  find  a  serious  flaw  in  Norman  Angell's 
logical,  coherent,  masterly  analysis." 


«  THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  "  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

Sir  Frank  Lascelles  (formerly  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin)  in 
Speech  at  Glasgow,  January  29, 1912. 

"While  I  was  staying  with  the  late  King,  his  Majesty  referred  me 
to  a  book  which  had  then  been  published  by  Norman  Angell,  entitled 
'The  Great  Illusion.'  I  read  the  book,  and  while  I  think  that  at 
present  it  is  not  a  question  of  practical  politics,  I  am  convinced  that 
it  will  change  the  thought  of  the  world  in  the  future. " 

R,  A.  Scott  James  in  "  The  Influence  of  the  Press." 

"  Norman  Angel  in  recent  years  has  done  more  probably  than 
any  other  European  to  frustrate  war,  to  prove  that  it  is  unprofit- 
able. He  was  probably  the  guiding  spirit  behind  the  diplomacy 
which  checked  the  Great  Powers  from  rushing  into  the  Balkan 
conflict." 

J.  W.  Graham,  M.A.,  in  "  Evolution  and  Empire." 

"  Norman  Angell  has  placed  the  world  in  his  debt  and  initiated  a 
new  epoch  of  thought.  ...  It  is  doubtful  whether  since  the  '  Origin 
of  Species '  so  many  bubbles  have  been  burst,  and  so  definitely  plain 
a  step  in  thought  been  made,  by  any  single  book. " 

Mr.  Harold  Begbie  in  the  "  Daily  Chronicle." 

"A  newideaissuddenly  thrust  upon  the  minds  of  men.  ...  It  is 
hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  this  book  does  more  to  fill  the  mind 
with  the  intolerable  weight  of  war,  to  convince  the  reasonable  mind 
.  .  .  than  all  the  moral  and  eloquent  appeals  of  Tolstoy.  .  .  .  The 
wisest  piece  of  writing  on  the  side  of  peace  extant  in  the  world  to- 
day." 

"  Birmingham  Post." 

"'The  Great  Illusion,'  by  sheer  force,  originality,  and  indisputable 
logic,  has  won  its  way  steadily  forward,  and  made  its  author  a  person 
to  be  quoted  by  statesmen  and  diplomatists  not  only  in  England,  but 
in  France,  Germany,  and  America." 

"  Glasgow  News." 

"If  only  for  the  daring  with  which  Mr.  Angell's  extraordinary 
book  declares  that  the  accepted  ideas  are  so  much  moonshine,  it 
would  be  a  work  to  attract  attention.  When  we  add  that  Mr. 
Angell  makes  out  a  decidedly  brilliant  and  arresting  case  for  his 
contention,  we  have  said  sufficient  to  indicate  that  it  is  worth  perusal 
by  the  most  serious  type  of  reader. " 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  "  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

"  The  Western  MaU.»' 
"A  novel,  bold,  and  startling  theory." 


MILITARY  OPINION. 

"  Anny  and  Navy  Journal "  (N.  Y.),  October  5,  1910. 

"If  all  anti-militarists  could  argue  for  their  cause  with  the  candour 
and  fairness  of  Norman  Angell  we  should  welcome  them,  not  with 
'bloody  hands  to  hospitable  graves,'  but  to  a  warm  and  cheery 
intellectual  comradeship.  Mr.  Angell  has  packed  away  in  his  book 
more  common  sense  than  peace  societies  have  given  birth  to  in  all 
the  years  of  their  existence.  .  .  ." 

"United  Service  Magazine"  (London),  May,  191 1. 

"It  is  an  extraordinarily  clearly  written  treatise  upon  an  absorbingly 
interesting  subject,  and  it  is  one  which  no  thinking  soldier  should 
neglect  to  study.  .  .  .  Mr.  Angell's  book  is  much  to  be  commended 
in  this  respect.  It  contains  none  of  the  nauseating  sentiment  which 
is  normally  parasitic  to  'peace'  literature.  The  author  is  evidently 
careful  to  take  things  exactly  as  he  conceives  them  to  be,  and  to  work 
out  his  conclusions  without  '  cleverness '  and  unobscured  by  technical 
language.  His  method  is  to  state  the  case  for  the  defence  (of  present- 
day  'militarist'  statecraft),  to  the  best  of  his  ability  in  one  chapter, 
calling  the  best  witnesses  he  can  find  and  putting  their  views  from 
every  standpoint  so  clearly  that  even  one  who  was  beforehand  quite 
ignorant  of  the  subject  cannot  fail  to  understand.  Mr.  Angell's 
book  is  one  which  all  citizens  would  do  well  to  read,  and  read  right 
through.  It  has  the  clearness  of  vision  and  the  sparkling  conciseness 
which  one  associates  with  Swift  at  his  best." 

"  The  Army  Service  Corps  Quarterly "   (Aldershot,  England), 
April,  191 1. 

"The  ideas  are  so  original  and  clever,  and  in  places  are  argued 
with  so  much  force  and  common  sense,  that  they  cannot  be  pushed 
aside  at  once  as  preposterous.  •  .  .  There  is  food  here  for  profound 
study.  .  .  .  Above  all,  we  should  encourage  the  sale  of  'The  Great 
Illusion'  abroad,  among  nations  likely  to  attack  us,  as  much  as 
possible." 

"  War  OflSce  Times  "  (London). 

"  Should  be  read  by  everyone  who  desires  to  comprehend  botl:  the 
strength  and  t>"»  weakness  of  this  country." 


**THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  AUTHORITIES. 

"  American  Joximal  of  Political  Economy." 
"The  best  treatise  yet  written  on  the  economic  aspect  of  war." 

"  American  Political  Science  Review." 

"It  may  be  doubted  whether  within  its  entire  range  the  peace 
literature  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  has  ever  produced  a  more  fas- 
cinating or  significant  study, " 

"  Economist "  (London). 

"  Nothing  has  ever  been  put  in  the  same  space  so  well  calculated  to 
set  plain  men  thinking  usefully  on  the  subject  of  expenditure  on 
armaments,  scare  and  war.  .  .  .  The  result  of  the  publication  of 
this  book  has  been  within  the  past  month  or  two  quite  a  number  of 
rather  unlikely  conversions  to  the  cause  of  retrenchment." 

"  Investors'  Review  "  (London),  November  la,  1910. 

"  No  book  we  have  read  for  years  has  so  interested  and  delighted 
us.  .  .  .  He  proceeds  to  argue,  and  to  prove,  that  conquests  do  not 
enrich  the  conqueror  under  modern  conditions  of  life.  .  .  .  The 
style  in  which  the  book  is  written — sincere,  transparent,  simple,  and 
now  and  then  charged  with  fine  touches  of  ironic  humour — make  it 
very  easy  to  read. " 

"  Economic  Review  "  (London). 

"  Civilization  will  some  day  acknowledge  a  deep  debt  of  gratitude 
to  Mr.  Norman  Angell  for  the  bold  and  searching  criticism  of  the 
fundamental  assumptions  of  modern  diplomacy  contained  in  his 
remarkable  book.  .  .  .  He  has  laid  his  fingers  upon  some  very  vital 
facts,  to  which  even  educated  opinion  has  hitherto  been  bUnd." 

"  Journal  des  Economistes." 

"Son  livre  sera  beaucoup  lu,  car  il  est  aussi  agr^able  que  profond, 
et  il  donnera  beaucoup  k  r6fldchir. " 

"  Ejcport"  (Organ  des  Centralvereins  fiir  Handelsgeographie). 

"By  reason  of  its  statement  of  the  case  against  war  in  terms  of 
practical  politics  and  commercial  advantage  (Real-  und  Handels- 
politikers),  the  keenness  and  the  mercilessness  of  the  logic  by  which 
the  author  explodes  the  errors  and  the  illusions  of  the  war  phantasists 
.  .  .  the  sense  of  reality,  the  force  with  which  he  settles  accounts 
point  by  point  with  the  militarists,  this  book  stands  alone.  It  is 
unique." 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

Dr.  Friedrich  Curtius. 

"The  book  will,  I  hope,  convince  everyone  that  in  our  time  the 
attempt  to  settle  industrial  and  commercial  conflicts  by  arms  is  an 
absurdity,  ...  I  doubt,  indeed,  whether  educated  folks  in  Ger- 
many entertain  this  '  illusion '  ...  or  the  idea  that  colonies  or  wealth 
can  be  'captured.'  ...  A  war  dictated  by  a  moral  idea,  the  only 
one  we  can  justify,  is  inconceivable  as  between  England  and  Ger- 
many. " 

Dr.  Wilhelm  Ostwald,  who  has  occupied  chairs  in  several  German 
Universities,  as  well  as  at  Harvard  and  Coltunbia. 
"From  the  first  line  to  the  last  'The  Great  Illusion*  expresses  my 
own  opinions." 

Dr.  Sommer,  Member  of  the  Reichstag. 

"A  most  timely  work,  and  one  which  everyone,  be  he  statesman 
or  political  economist,  should  study  .  .  .  especially  if  he  desires  to 
understand  a  peace  ideal  which  is  practical  and  realizable.  .  .  . 
Without  agreeing  on  all  points,  I  admit  gladly  the  force  and  sugges- 
tiveness  of  the  thesis.  .  .  .  We  on  our  side  should  make  it  our 
business,  as  you  should  on  yours,  to  render  it  operative,  to  use  the 
means,  heretofore  unrealized,  of  joint  work  for  civilization.  In 
rendering  possible  such  joint  work,  Norman  Angell's  book  must  take 
a  foremost  place." 

Dr.  Max  Nordau. 

"  If  the  destiny  of  people  were  settled  by  reason  and  interest,  the 
influence  of  such  a  book  would  be  decisive.  .  .  .  The  book  will 
convince  the  far-seeing  minority,  who  will  spread  the  truth,  and  thus 
slowly  conquer  the  world. " 

Dr.  Albert  Suedekum,  Member  of  the  Reichstag,  author  of  several 

works  on  municipal  government,  editor  of  Municipal  Year- 

Books,  etc. 

"I  consider  the  book  an  invaluable  contribution  to  the  better 
understanding  of  the  real  basis  of  international  peace. " 

Dr.  Otto  Mugdan,  Member  of  the  Reichstag,  Member  of  the  National 
Loan  Commission,  Chairman  of  the  Audit  Commission,  etc. 

"The  demonstration  of  the  financial  interdependence  of  modem 
civilized  nations,  and  the  economic  futility  of  conquest,  could  not  be 
made  more  irrefutably. " 

Professor  A.  von  Harder. 

"I  agree  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  wait  for  action  as  between  govern- 
ments; far  better,  as  Jaurfes  proved  the  other  day  in  the  French 
Chamber,  for  the  peoples  to  co-operate.  .  .  .  The  book  should  be 
widely  circulated  in  Germany,  where  so  many  are  still  of  opinion  that 
heavy  armaments  are  an  absolute  necessity  for  self-defence." 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

BRITISH  COLONIAL  OPINION. 

W.  M.  Hughes,  Acting  Premier  of  Australia,  in  a  letter  to  the 
"  Sydney  Telegraph." 

"  It  is  a  great  book,  a  glorious  book  to  read.  It  is  a  book  pregnant 
with  the  brightest  promise  to  the  future  of  civilized  man.  Peace — 
not  the  timid,  shrinking  figure  of  The  Hague,  cowering  under  the 
sinister  shadow  of  six  million  bayonets — appears  at  length  as  an 
ideal  possible  of  realization  in  our  own  time." 

Sir  George  Reid,  Australian  High  Commissioner  in  London  (Sphinx 
Club  Banquet,  May  5,  1911). 

"I  regard  the  author  of  this  book  as  having  rendered  one  of  the 
greatest  services  ever  rendered  by  the  writer  of  a  book  to  the  human 
race.  Well,  I  will  be  very  cautious  indeed — one  of  the  greatest 
services  which  any  author  has  rendered  during  the  past  hundred 
years." 


FRANCE  AND  BELGIUM. 

M.  Anatole  France  in  "  The  English  Review,"  August,  1913. 

"One  cannot  weigh  too  deeply  the  reflections  of  this  ably 
reasoned  work." 

"  La  Petite  Republique  "  (M.  Henri  Turot),  17  Decembre,  1910. 

"  J'estime,  pour  ma  part,  'La  Grande  Illusion'  doit  avoir,  au  point 
de  vue  de  la  conception  moderne  de  I'&onomie  politique  interna- 
tionale,  un  retentissement  ^gal  k  celui  qu'eut,  en  matiere  biologique, 
la  publication,  par  Darwin,  de  'I'Originedes  espfcces.' 

"C'est  que  M.  Norman  Angell  joint  k  I'originalit^  de  la  pensfe  le 
courage  de  toutes  les  franchises,  qu'il  unit  k  une  prodigieuse  Erudition 
la  lucidity  d'esprit  et  la  methode  qui  font  jaillir  la  loi  scientifique 
de  I'ensemble  des  6v6nements  observe. " 


"  Revue  Bleu,"  Mai,  191 1. 

"Fortement  6tay^es,  ses  propositions  6manent  d'un  esprit  sin- 
guliferement  r6aliste,  ^galement  inform^  et  clairvoyant  qui  met 
une  connaissance  des  affaires  et  une  dialectique  concise  au  service 
d'une  conviction,  aussi  passionnee  que  g^n^reuse. " 


"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION"  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

M.  Jean  Jaurds,  dtiring  debate  in  French  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
January  13,  1911;  see  Journal  Officiel,  14  Janvier,  1911. 

"II  a  paru,  il  y  a  peu  de  temps,  un  livre  anglais  de  M.  Norman 
Angell,  'La  Grande  Illusion,'  qui  a  produit  un  grand  effet  en  Angle- 
terre.  Dans  les  quelques  jours  que  j'ai  pass&  de  I'autre  c6t6  du 
d^troit,  j'ai  vu,  dans  les  reunions  populaires,  toutes  les  fois  qu'il^tait 
fait  mention  de  ce  livre,  les  applaudissements  6clater." 


GERMANY  AND  AUSTRIA. 

"  K51nische    Zeitung." 

"Never  before  has  the  peace  question  been  dealt  with  by  so  bold, 
novel,  and  clear  a  method;  never  before  has  the  financial  interde- 
pendence of  nations  been  shown  with  such  precision.  ...  It  is 
refreshing  to  have  demonstrated  in  this  unsentimental,  practical 
way  the  fact  that  as  our  financial  interdependence  increases  war  as  a 
business  venture  necessarily  becomes  more  and  more  unprofitable." 

"  Der  Turmer  "  (Stuttgart). 

"This  demonstration  should  clear  the  air  like  a  thunderstorm.  .  .  . 
It  is  not  because  the  book  brilliantly  expresses  what  are  in  many 
respects  our  own  views  that  we  urge  its  importance,  but  because  of 
its  unanswerable  demonstration  of  the  futility  of  military  power  in 
the  economic  field." 

"  Konigsberger  Allgemeine  Zeitung.** 

"This  book  proves  absolutely  that  conquest  as  a  means  of  material 
gain  has  become  an  impossibility.  .  .  .  The  author  shows  that  the 
factors  of  the  whole  problem  have  been  profoundly  modified  within 
the  past  forty  years." 

"  Ethische  Kultur  **  (Berlin). 
*'  Never  has  militarism  been  combated  by  economic  weapons  with 
the  skill  shown  by  Norman  Angell.  ...  So  broad  and  comprehen- 
sive a  grasp  of  the  moral  as  well  as  the  economic  force,  that  the  book 
is  a  real  pleasure  to  read.  .  .  .  The  time  was  ripe  for  a  man  with  this 
keenness  of  vision  to  come  forward  and  prove  in  this  flawless  way 
that  military  power  has  nothing  to  do  with  national  prosperity." 

Professor  Karl  von  Bar,  the  authority  on  International  and  Criminal 
Law,  Privy  Councillor,  etc. 

"Particularly  do  I  agree  with  the  author  in  these  two  points:  (i) 
That  in  the  present  condition  of  organized  sdciety  the  attempt  of  one 
nation  to  destroy  the  commerce  or  industry  of  another  must  damage 
the  victor  more  perhaps  than  the  vanquished ;  and  (2)  that  physical 
force  is  a  constantly  diminishing  factor  in  human  affairs.  The 
rising  generation  seems  to  be  realizing  this  more  and  more. " 


"  Few  writers  have  stimulated  reflection  upon  International 
Politics  more  than  Mr.  Norman  Angell." — The  Times,  London. 

Arms  and  Industry 

A  Study  of  the 

Foundations  of  International  Polity 

$1.25 

SOME  OPIXZOXS 

"  No  individual  since  Grotius  has  done  as  much  for  international  peace  as 
Norman  Angell,  and,  like  Grotius,  he  seems  never  to  exhaust  himself,  but 
always  to  bring  new  thoughts  to  light.  Hence  every  book  he  writes  is  a 
distinct  contribution  to  his  subject." — The  Post,  Boston. 

"  Those  who  read  Mr.  Norman  Angell's  illuminating  book  The  Great 
Illusion  will  greet  with  pleasure  his  recent  work  on  international  polity. 
Arms  and  Industry,  the  object  of  which  is  to  show  that  the  civilized  world  has 
become  morally  and  intellectually,  as  well  as  economically,  interdependent. 
.  .  .  The  book  is  extremely  interesting.  One  by  one  Mr.  Angell  takes  up 
certain  objections  to  Pacifist  doctrines,  and  with  a  clearness  of  style  that 
recalls  that  of  the  late  John  Fiske,  he  answers  those  objections  in  a  way  that 
shows  us  how  prone  we  all  are  to  repeating  opinions  long  after  the  state  of 
things  that  originated  them  has  ceased  to  exist." — Herald,  New  York. 

•■  In  the  presence  of  what  is  now  going  on  in  Europe,  some  may  find  humor 
in  calling  war  The  Great  Illusion.  But  it  is  illusion  in  the  sense  that  it  doesn't 
pay.  Nobody  is  going  to  get  much  out  of  it,  even  the  victor — unless  it 
should  be  everlastmg  peace.  No  one  has  done  more  to  prove  the  idiocy  of 
modern  militarism,  or  to  advance  the  day  when  all  men  shall  rise  up  and  see 
it  so." — Evening  Globe,  New  York. 

"Mr.  Angell  is  tremendously  in  earnest.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  that.  .  .  . 
He  is  one  of  the  most  engaging  and  persuasive  of  irenic  advocates;  perhaps, 
in  paradox,  because  in  pleading  for  peace  he  is  himself  so  tremendously 
belligerent." — Tribune,  New  York. 

"Another  book  by  Norman  Angell,  founder  of  the  new  school  of  Pacifism, 
invites  attention  again  to  the  theories  of  a  school  that  has  already  attained  a 
place  of  importance  in  statecraft.  Mr.  Angell's  addresses  in  this  volume 
are  examples  of  clear  thinking  and  sound  exposition.   .   .   . 

"  Certain  portions  of  Mr.  Angell's  criticism  must,  it  would  seem,  be  taken 
into  consideration  by  all  who  do  practical  thinking  upon  questions  of  inter- 
national polity." — Republican,  Springfield. 

"  Mr.  Angell  believes  in  the  efficacy  of  logic.  He  believes  that  the 'man  in 
the  street'  when  given  a  chance  to  see  with  clearness  is  apt  to  be  right  in  his 
judgments.  In  his  propaganda  he  advances  simply  the  more  vital  considera- 
tions against  war,  using  the  utterances  of  present  day  statesmen  for  his  cue." 
—Evenim  Post,  Chicago  (E.  L.  Talbut). 

"  It  is  not  a  mere  appendix  to  Mr.  Norman  Angell's  Great  Illusion,  develop- 
ing some  special  point  or  dealing  with  some  special  objection,  as  was  his  vol- 
ume of  the  First  Balkan  War.  It  is  a  restatement  of  his  whole  position,  moral 
and  philosophical  as  well  as  economic.  It  is  the  creed  and  the  ethic  of  the  new 
Pacifism.  Therefore,  it  cannot  be  reviewed  in  a  few  columns.  It  will  be 
"reviewed,"  directly  or  indirectly,  by  whole  libraries  of  controversy  stretch- 
ing over  many  countries  and  several  generations,  and  by  the  pages  of  the 
history  of  the  future.  .  .  .  Sentimentalist  and  cynic  join  hands  against  Mr 
Norman  Angell,  as  they  have  against  all  Reformers  who  ever  appealed  at  once 
to  the  interests  and  to  the  hearts  of  the  people.  .  .  .  Since  I  have  read  Mr. 
Norman  Angell  I  feel  that  I  have  found  something  out  that  I  shall  always 
have  in  mind  and  always  work  for.  and  that  my  whole  outlook  on  pres- 
ent and  future  has  shifted  to  a  new  point  of  view.  ...  I  have  not  said  a 
fifth  part  of  the  things  that  will  occur  to  readers  of  this  volume.  It  is  as  full 
of  matter  as  an  egg  is  full  of  meat." — C.  M.  Trevelyan  in  War  and  Peace, 
London. 

"  The  new  school  of  thought  initiated  by  Mr.  Angell  is  now  widely  recogniz- 
ed as  one  of  the  most  important  movements  of  our  times.  .  .  First  and  foremost, 
Mr.  Angell  stands  revealed  as  a  profound  thinker.  He  does  not  shirk  living 
issues  nor  depend  upon  theories  in  the  abstract.  In  point  of  fact,  despite 
the  contrary  assertion  of  his  critics,  he  is  eminently  practical  and  relies  upon 
forceful  reasoning  for  the  enunciation  of  his  principles.  If  he  is  read  with  an 
open  mind,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  his  conclusions  can  possibly  be  resisted.  . . . 
His  views  gather  tremendous  force  from  the  beauty  and  clarity  of  their 
expression." — Acadamy,  London. 

New  York  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons  London 


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